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ABSTRACT
ASSESSMENT OF ECCS EFFECTIVENESS FOR LIGHT WATER NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS
The effectiveness of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) for
light water nuclear power reactors was the subject of lengthy, controver-
sial and technically complex hearings conducted by the AEC over the two
years from 1971 through 1973. An independent, objective review and
assessment of the technical issues associated with ECCS effectiveness
was conducted in a study performed at the Environmental Quality Laboratory
of the California Institute of Technology. The review was based upon
the testimonies and supporting technical documentation of the principal
participants in the hearings: the AEC, utilities, reactor manufacturers,
and intervenors.
From the review, the critical technical parameters influencing ECCS
performance, which were at issue, are identified. Of fifteen parameters
cited by the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safety in the hearings as
being of unproved conservatism, essentially all are reviewed in detail,
including, for example, the initial stored fuel energy, fuel rod gas gap
conductance, fluid flow rates through broken pipes, metal-water reaction
energy release and fuel rod embrittlement, reflood/core-spray heat
transfer, and reflooding rates, as well as the adequacy of ECCS analyti-
cal models and numerical methods. ,The relative influence of uncertain-
ties in the performance criteria associated with these parameters is
assessed. Based upon the relative importance of these parameters,
alternative responses to resolution of the ECCS problem are analyzed.
The importance of the core reflooding rate in resolving the technical
issues of the problem is emphasized. The conservatism of the proposed
criteria (current and past) is reviewed. Recommendations are made for
improvements in criteria conservatism, especially in the establishment
of minimum reflood heat transfer rates (or alternatively, reflooding
rates). Several new and/or accelerated research programs and addi-
tional large scale testing programs are also recommended. Suggestions
are also made for areas in which design improvements would help to
achieve greater ECCS reliability.
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FOREWORD
The siting of nuclear power plants in California is one of the
problems which the Environmental Quality Laboratory has addressed.
Previously published work dealt only with the siting issue, and not
with the question of the desirability of nuclear power plants or their
problems. But at the outset it was recognized that at least two major
technical problems pervaded all public discussion of nuclear power.
One was the question of disposal of high-level readioactive waste; the
other was the adequacy of plant safety systems and particularly the
emergency core cooling system (ECCS). v~,ile one can study the siting
of power plants without reference to the former problem, the latter
problem can enter into consideration of specific site locations.
Because EQL studies, as well as those performed by other groups,
have shown that many sources of energy will be needed to meet society's
perceived needs, it has been our view that nuclear power plant siting
and safety problems are in urgent need of resolution. The Laboratory
staff would have preferred not to address the safety question, but we
found that we could not consider siting without facing the public's
questions on safety. We also recognize that the nature of EQL would
preclude our adding to the massive body of theoretical and empirical
knowledge concerning reactor engineering. It was felt, however, that
we should understand the nature of the controversy in order that we
could at least communicate the facts to those interested.
It is our intention to consider the problem of radioactive waste
disposal in future studies. The present study, carried out by Dr.
Finlayson, addresses one key element of the power plant safety problem.
In the recently completed study of reactor safety sponsored by the AEC I
(termed the Rasmussen Study after the principal investigator), analysis
was made of the probability of accidents of various types, and estimates
1 WASH 1400 Reactor Safety Study (Draft), USAEC, August 1974.
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were made of the likely consequences of such accidents. That study did
not analyze the physical events occurring during the '~aximum credible
accident," or loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). The Rasmussen study con-
cluded that the probability of accident was very low, and that the expected
consequences ~"ere far less than previous "worst case" analysis would suggest.
Previously, the issue of the physical events transpiring during a LOCA
was the subject of extensive hearings on the Interim Acceptance Criteria for
Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Subsequent to the hearings, revised Accep-
tance Criteria were issued by the AEC and are in force. The continued
public debate over the safety of nuclear power plants centers on the
adequacy of the Acceptance Criteria.
This study by Dr. Finlayson (which was carried out while the hearings
were being completed and afterwards) centers upon the physical events ·of a
LOCA and the adequacy of the Acceptance Criteria for insuring successful
design of the ECCS. (This is different from the Rasmussen analysis, which
investigated the probability of the equipment working as it should.) The
purpose of this study is informational.
The technical facts, as reported in the literature and reviewed in
the AEC hearings, are summarized and highlighted. From this, Finalyson
has been able to differentiate alternative courses of action for reducing
perceived hazards associated with ECCS operation. Comments have been pro-
vided on the results that might be expected from following one route or
another. Among the alternatives are those which would be painful or unac-
ceptable to one or another point of view. There are paths, however, which
may more closely approach acceptability to all. It is hoped that by pub-
lishing this document the participation of an informed public in the process
of decision-making will be helped.
The importance of "stopping the argument" is sometimes lost to parti-
sans of both sides in the controversy over nuclear power. It is instructive
to reflect on the arguments that have raged over rthe appropriate levels to
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be required for limits on radioactive emissions from po~er plants during
normal operation. The controversy was effectively stilled when the pro-
posal was made by the AEC to reduce allowable limits to the point where
the acrimonious, detailed technical arguments were no longer pertinent,
yet the cost factors involved with the rules were (hopefully) not too
onerous to the operators. The question of routine emissions is no longer
much of an issue.
In the same way Finlayson has sought technical solutions which avoid
many of the detailed arguments yet hopefully can be implemented at a cost
within reason. It is in this spirit that the study has been published.
Martin Goldsmith
Deputy Director
Environmental Quality Laboratory
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1 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS FOR LIGHT WATER REACTORS
Basic to an understanding of the controversies
which have surrounded some nuclear plants is the reali-
zation that from the inception of the nuclear power
program, the [Atomic Energy] Commission has been concerned
with safety. For many years that was practically the
only issue considered at the public hearings held in local
communities on individual plants. Many persons within
the nuclear industry have commented that the AEC talked
about safety so much and is supporting so much safety-
related work that it is not surprising that the average
citizen may have some apprehensions.
The jargon of the nuclear industry has not offered
much comfort. Terms such as "design basis accident,"
"maximum credible accident" and "reasonable assurance"
may be perfectly acceptable to the scientist and engineer,
but are not reassuring to the public. On the other hand,
some persons who willingly accept everyday risks such as
highway traffic, walking across streets, using electricity
and fire, often use another yardstick with respect to
nuclear power, insisting on absolutes which will never
be attainable (U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, Dec. 1972,
(.!.' p. III-l);
We now approach the key issues. The reactor con-
structors claim that they have devoted more effort to
safety problems than any other technologists have. This
is true. From the beginning they have paid much attention
to safety and they have been remarkably clever in devising
safety precautions. This is perhaps pathetic, but it is
not relevant. If a problem is too difficult to solve,
one cannot claim that it is solved by pointing to all the
efforts made to solve it (Hannes Alfven, May 1972, 1).
It is generally conceded that the nuclear power industry has
expended more effort to insure the safety and reliability of operating
reactors than has ever been expended by any other industry in safety
related activities. However, in spite of their efforts, substantial
controversy has recently developed over nuclear plant safety. Members
of the nuclear community have suggested that the probability of a
* Underscored numbers refer to references. See reference list at end
of report. (Appendix 11)
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major accident involving the potential release of large quantities of
radioactive fission products is extremely small, the probability being
of the order of one accident in 100,000 to 1,000,000 reactor years of
operation (1)· Although the quantitative value associated with the prob-
ability of a major reactor accident is a subject of controversy, it is
generally conceded that the probability is very small. However, even
accepting the low accident probability there are a sufficient number
of people, as represented by Alfven, who feel that unresolved safety
issues still exist, in spite of the good efforts of the reactor engi-
neers and scientists, to make reactor safety a significant current
national problem.
It is the goal of this paper to try to put into perspective
one aspect of the safety of light water power reactors (LWR) , the
functional effectiveness of the so-called Emergency Core Cooling
System (ECCS). The ECCS is the element of a nuclear power plant which
is designed to cool the reactor in the event of one of the most serious
possible accidents considered credible by the U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC) -- the so-called Design Basis Accident (DBA) -- the Loss
of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
This report represents the results of an investigation of the
problem areas associated with the ECCS reliability issue. An attempt
has been made to present an objective evaluation of the principal
areas associated with the ECCS controversy, and to provide an evalua-
tion of the options available to produce at least partial resolution
of some of the apparently unresolved issues. In order to do this, a
brief review is given in this chapter of the philosophy and practice
in the design of nuclear power reactors, as promulgated by the AEC.
The principal technical issues associated with the ECCS
controversy have been raised and discussed in advisory hearings con-
ducted by the AEC. This report presents the results of an attempt
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to weigh the technical evidence presented directly or indirectly in
connection with the hearings. The principal protagonists in the
adversary hearings and their primary presentation of technical material
were: the AEC regulatory staff. who presented (as a partial listing)
an initial statement of Testimony (~). a Supplemental Testimony (~).
a concluding Statement (~), and an Environmental Statement (61); the
reactor manufacturers. each of whom submitted a similar number of
testimonial elements into the record (e.g. 11. 11); the electrical power
utilities (11); and a combined group of intervenors. the Consolidated
National Intervenors. whose principal technical spokesmen were repre-
sentatives of the Union of Concerned Scientists. Daniel Ford and
Henry Kendall (2.2.2). In the course of this review. the testimonies
and statements of these organizations were reviewed in depth and
supplemented by evaluation of many other supporting documents. most
of which have been noted in the reference list.
1.1 Reactor Safety in Perspective
In attempting to assure the safety of nuclear power generation
the AEC has promulgated a design philosophy of multiple barriers
against the escape of radioactivity from nuclear facilities.* The AEC
describes this as the "defense-in-depth" design philosophy embodying
"three levels of safety." These three levels of safety are described
by the AEC as:
The First Level of Safety
Precept: Design for unquestionable safety in normal
operations and maximum tolerance for system malfunctions.
Use design features inherently favorable to safe operation;
emphasize quality. redundancy. inspectability. and testability
prior to acceptance for sustained commercial operation over
the plant lifetime.
* Basic principles of light water reactor and emergency core cooling
system operation and design are presented in appendix 1.
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The Second Level of Safety
Precept: Assume accidents will occur in spite of care in
design, ,construction and operation. Provide safety systems
to protect operators and to prevent or minimize damage when
such accidents occur.
The Third Level of Safety
Precept: Evaluate effects of hypothetical accidents, where
protective systems are assumed to fail simultaneously with
the accident they are intended to control. Provide additional
safety systems as appropriate (1, pp. 2.2 to 2.5).
The first level of safety embodies the concept of selecting
fuel, coolant and structural materials whose properties are well known
and incorporating them into designs which have inherent stability and
safety characteristics. The philosophy calls for safety margins
(i.e., conservatism in thermal, hydraulic and structural member design)
to be incorporated into designs at all critical stages. Instrumenta-
tion and controls are to be provided to assure that operators know the
operating conditions of the plants at all times and have control over
them. Redundancy is a recommended characteristic of design in all
crucial safety related areas -- including instrumentation -- to assure
that the failure of one component will not compromise the safety of the
entire system or deprive the operators of needed information to ensure
its safe operation.
The second level of safety represents a recognition that in
spite of all efforts to insure a totally safe design, failures, design
errors, construction oversights and operating errors will occur in
the course of the lifetime of the plant. This level is designed to
provide safety systems to accommodate a spectrum of possible mistakes
or oversights before they become accidents in which the risk of public
radioactive contamination is experienced. As an example, redundant
offsite power sources needed to energize emergency equipment in the
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event of loss of the plant's own power are backed up by redundant
on-site power sources. A fast-acting reactor shutdown (SCRAM) system
is provided. The SCRAM system is designed to terminate the nuclea~
fission process in the event of emergency conditions. It is activated
by redundant and independent instrument channels which monitor plant
parameters. Engineered rate-limiting mechanisms are built into the
system to prevent excessive rates of power increase which might result
from abnormal motion of the control rods or their accidental ejection
from the core.
The third level of safety supplements the first two by pro-
viding additional safety systems to cover the consequences of potential,
although highly improbable, combinations of failures of protective systems
of the first and second safety levels. The margin of safety provided
in this third level is evaluated by analyzing the system response to
the so-called design basis accident, the most severe accident which is
considered conceivable for design purposes. The DBA is an accident
which is postulated to occur at a time when a single element of the
safety system is also temporarily (or permanently) unavailable (the
so-called single-failure criterion). The failed element of the system
has been determined to be the one which results in the most serious
system consequences. For light water reactors, the design basis
accident is the so-called Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).*
1.1.1 LOCA consequences in the event of ECCS failure·
The LOCA is assumed to occur as a result of the rupture of
one of the main coolant pipes for the system and to result in a sudden
loss of reactor coolant water with accompanying rapid nuclear steam
system depressurization as the fluid is exhausted into the contain-
ment vessel. This period is referred to as the "blowdown" phase of
the accident. In a LWR, the cooling water is an integral part of the
* A detailed presentation of the physical processes occurring during
a LOCA is presented in appendix 2.
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nuclear reaction process, acting as a moderator which slows the
fissioned neutrons to velocities such that the potential for further
fission in the enriched uranium fuel is enhanced. The loss of the
coolant in the reactor core will stop the nuclear reaction, which is
the source of energy for power generation. Consequently, uncontrolled
nuclear excursions or bomblike explosions are not possible conse-
quences of a LOCA.
However, the nuclear reactions of normal operations produce
long-lived radioactive fission products within the fuel rods (the
nuclear equivalent of ashes from fossil fuels) which continue to release
substantial quantities of highly energetic radiation by radioactive
decay even after the nuclear fission process has been stopped. The
fission product inventory of a typical reactor is described in more
detail in appendix 1. Exposure to many of the fission products is
extremely hazardous. The AEC's "three levels of safety" concept was
developed basically to prevent fission products from being released
into the environment. The potentially hazardous result of a LOCA is
that it may result in all safety barriers between man and fission
products being broken down.
To prevent the escape of fission products into the environ-
ment, the ECCS must be able to cope with the energy released. Immedi-
ately after plant shutdown, following a period of sustained operation,
the radioactive decay of the fission products will release energy
equivalent to about 7 percent of the rated thermal output of the plant.
For a nuclear power plant producing 1000 megawatts of electrical power
(ME
e
) , approximately 3300 megawatts of thermal energy (MWt ) are
produced under normal operating conditions by the reactor, assuming a
typical efficiency of approximately 33 percent. For such a reactor,
immediately after shutdown 225 MW of heat would be produced as a result
t
of the radioactive energy of the fission products. The energy output
of the fission products decays rather rapidly tp 5 percent at 10 seconds
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after shutdown, 2 percent after about 10 minutes, 1 percent after
2.25 hours, until within a day after shutdown only approximately 0.5
percent or about 15 MW , of the rated power is produced (61, p. 20).
t -
Because this energy results from radioactive disintegration (or decay)
of the fission product nuclides, this heat source of the reactor is
commonly called "decay heat."
Although the relative magnitude of the decay heat is small
when compared to the rated output of the plant, its absolute magnitude
is sufficiently large that it requires active cooling for long periods
to prevent meltdown with subsequent catastrophic results. In the
event of a LOCA, unless supplementary cooling water is supplied
quickly to the fuel rods they will rapidly increase in temperature
with consequent swelling and rupture. The function of the Emergency
Core Cooling System is to supply this needed cooling water to the
reactor core to prevent excessive fuel rod damage. However, in the
event of a design basis LOCA, even with adequate ECCS performance,
some fuel rod rupture would probably take place. In the words of the
AEC Commissioners, as stated in their Opinion to final ECCS Acceptance
Criteria (AC),
••• it is obvious that, when the course of the LOCA is
calculated according to the conservative prescriptions
of an approved evaluation model, swelling and bursting
of the cladding will be estimated to occur in abundance
(60, p. 1105).
The ruptured rods would release the majority of their gaseous and
volatile fission products to the reactor containment and possibly
(even assuming no major failures of reactor containment vessels)
to the environment thereafter at a low leak rate. Fuel rod rupture
alone would not be considered catastrophic, if it were to occur.
But if the ECCS should fail to function, the absence of
coolant would cause the rod temperatures to increase rapidly.
Without cooling, the redistribution of the internal energy of the
fuel rods alone would cause the surface temperature of the hottest
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rod in the reactor to increase to about 2300°F. In the continued
absence of coolant, due to the coolant pipe rupture, and the ECCS
failure, the most highly irradiated rod in the core would increase
in temperature at a rate of about 20°F per second. At rod temperatures
on the order of 2000°F (and higher), exothermic reaction would take
place between the remaining steam vapors in the core and the fuel rod
cladding material itself (commonly a zirconium alloy, zircaloy). In
addition to adding energy to that of the decaying fission products,
these reactions produce hydrogen which may induce a potentially explos-
ive environment when mixed with air in the containment vessel into which
the coolant, hydrogen from the reaction, and gaseous and volatile
fission products are discharged from the ruptured pipes. Moreover,
this metal-water reaction produces oxidation of the fuel rod cladding
which may induce its embrittlement. In the event of excessive oxi-
dation, the cladding may become so brittle that the loads developed
during cooling could cause them to disintegrate with subsequent dis-
persal of fission products to the containment vessel and potential
blockage of coolant paths within the reactor core.
As the uncooled LOCA thermal excursion continues, at tempera-
tures on the order of 3400°F, melting would occur. After a reasonably
short period of time (estimated to be from 10 minutes to one hour,
11, p. 141), the molten fuel could be expected to have collapsed
into a heap in the bottom of the pressure vessel and then through the
bottom of the containment vessel into the earth with resultant great
increases in the subsequent potential for dispersal of large quanti-
ties of radioactive fission products in the biosphere. The molten
mass of core material could then proceed to melt its way into the
earth transferring energy to the earth and decaying in energy itself
with time, as it slowly progressed downward. Its downward progress
would ultimately be limited by achievement of a stable condition in
which the rate of energy production of the molten mass matched the
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heat transfer capacity of the surrounding rock. The concern over
the downward migration of the core material into the earth has
sometimes been referred to as the "China syndrome," indicative
(in an exaggerated fashion) of the uncertainty concerning the termi-
nal depth of the molten core material. In point of fact, such progres-
sion would probably stop within some hundreds of feet.
The disastrous potential of the sequence of events which
might occur in the event of ECCS failure, as outlined above, is clear.
The release of a small fraction of the gaseous and volatilized fission
products of a large power reactor to the environment surrounding the
plant could have several effects in the vicinity of the plant. The
wind-blown radioactivity might be expected to produce, depending upon
exposure levels and the magnitude of the release, prompt deaths
(within 30 days) from acute downwind radiation exposure, long-term
health effects (both somatic and genetic) from lower levels of radiation
exposure downwind, and property damage, perhaps most importantly denial
of the agricultural and other kinds of land use for long periods.
1.1.2 LOCA probability
Although the probability of an accident occurring leading to
the loss of coolant is considered extremely remote, Emergency Core
Cooling Systems (ECCS) have been designed and built into existing
power plants to preclude the problems that would be associated with
a LOCA in which no cooling water was delivered to the core. If the
ECCS performs in accordance with design, coolant will be supplied to
the core by spraying or flooding so that excessive fuel rod tempera-
ture increases, along with consequent gross deformation of the core,
are prevented. The system is also designed to assure that the long-
term decay heat associated with the core will be adequately removed
to prevent subsequent failure occurring through the previously described
series of events.
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It has been stated by the AEC that the probability of the
design basis accident LOCA occurring at all is remote (i.e., on the
order of one accident in 100,000 to 1,000,000 reactor years, as pre-
viously noted). However, even if the validity of such assertions is
accepted, the probability of a LOCA occurring is still finite, and
the consequences of failure of the ECCS to function are so severe
that it is necessary to require that reliable ECCS performance be a
high probability event.
It is essentially impossible to develop a statistical data
. base for such low probability events as the LOCA. Consequently the
public, and much of the scientific community at large, is inclined
to mistrust the use of probabilistic estimates as a basis for con-
clusions with respect to ECCS performance, in connection with the
broader questions of nuclear reactor safety. However, LOCA probability
is generally conceded to be very low by the technical community, even
though estimates of its quantitative value may be uncertain.
There is sometimes a tendency to allow the apparent low
probability of the DBA to influence the evaluation of the importance
of the ECCS. For example, Stephen Hanauer, chief technical advisor
to the AEC's regulatory staff, has stated, "In principle, it should
be po~sible to reduce the probability of a LOCA to so Iowa value
that protection against its consequences - the ECCS - would not be
required" (12). However, it is the opinion of many, the AECregulatory
staff included, that the inability to guarantee a zero probability for
the LOCA and the magnitude of its consequences without emergency cooling
make it essential that the ECCS must exist and perform reliably.
Consequently, and importantly, the probability of successful
performance of the ECCS should be considered as a separate issue from
the probability of the LOCA itself. Otherwise, the two events tend to
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become confused. As much weight then begins to be given to the unlike-
lihood of the LOCA occurring as is given to evaluation of the technical
and scientific phenomena behind the design of the ECCS itself.
That this concept is recognized and followed is demonstrated
in statements by Milton Shaw, the AEC's former director of Reactor
Development and Technology (RDT) and Andrew J. Pressesky, the Assistant
Director for Nuclear Safety in the RDT at the time of the ECCS hearings.
"Our job is to work out these problems," Pressesky says, "and that's
what we're trying to do. For our purposes, the probability of an
accident is one" (emphasis added). Shaw adds that he thinks "serious
reactor accidents will inevitably occur - but that safety systems will
protect public life and property" (13). Because of the non-zero proba-
bility of serious accidents, as acknowledged by Shaw and Pressesky, our
study has been conducted under the implicit assumption that a LOCA
can occur. As was the case in the hearings, only the reliability of
ECCS' performance is the subject of evaluation.
1.2 Historical Assessment of the Bases for the Interim Acceptance
Criteria
The preliminary set of performance standards or Interim
Acceptance Criteria (lAC) -- against which ECCS were to be designed
were the subject of lengthy (125 days from Jan. 27, 1972 to July 25,
1973) hearings before the AEC. The expectations for the hearings were
summarized in the words of Alvin M. Weinberg, then Director of the
AEC's Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Dr. Weinberg stated:
"Faced with questions of this weight, which in a most basic sense are
not fully susceptible to a yes or no scientific answer, the AEC has
invoked the adjudicatory process •..• The record of the hearings is
expected to contain all that is known about emergency core cooling
systems and to provide the basis for setting the criteria for design
of such systems" (14, emphasis added).
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Perhaps the judicial concept of adversary proceedings selected
by the AEC for the hearing, pitting the regulatory staff against the
Consolidated National Intervenors, as well as the reactor manufacturers
and electrical utilities, may not have been the most practical means
of producing the result hoped for by Weinberg and the public at large.
The hearings required 125 days of testimony and cross-examination over
an 18 month period. The results are contained in 22,380 pages of
recorded transcript of oral testimony in which more than 1000 documents
were referenced, of which about 250 were admitted to the record as
exhibits.
Why were the hearings required and what was the basis for
issuance of the controversial lAC? The lAC represented a major mile-
stone in over five years of continuing activity by the AEC concerning
ECCS. Around 1966, the AEC's regulatory staff became concerned about
problems associated with extrapolation of the design and analysis
procedures for the small nuclear power reactors of that period
(generally of less than 100 MW capacity) to today's very large plantse .
with capacities frequently greater than 1000 MW , which were then in
e
the planning and initial construction phases. Research was especially
sought on information related to the emergency core cooling problem.
A task force of 12 engineers and scientists (seven from industry and
five from AEC supported labs), headed by the late William K. Ergen
of ORNL, was appointed in October 1966 to investigate the problem.
In 1967, the Ergen report, "Emergency Core Cooling" (11), was published
with a limited distribution. The report pointed out some serious
issues demonstrating the need for effective ECCS operation and outlined
a recommended major research program to resolve the uncertainties
highlighted by the investigation.
It does not appear that all of the programs recommended by
the Ergen task force were ever implemented. But several major changes
in the LWR safety research program did occur as a result. As a
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particular example, in 1967 the AEC reoriented a major research reactor
program then under construction in recognition of the importance of
investigating ECGS operational phenomena. The project, called the
Loss of Fluid Test (LOFT) facility, had originally been conceived to
investigate the effects of the meltdown of a reactor following a LOCA,
when no EGGS was in operation. Shaw redirected the emphasis of the
program to the more difficult problem of answering questions associated
with the physical processes of the ECCS cooling of a reactor which has
undergone a LOCA. Unfortunately LOFT ran into prodigious cost overrun
problems and delays as a result of this change in design concept and
the program's being made a showcase for demonstration of the AEC's
then newly emphasized quality control program. As a result, the LOFT
facility is still under construction and test schedules are uncertain.
System tests under nuclear power are not scheduled until 1976.
In spite of the urgent need for accelerated research on
reactor emergency cooling, the AEC's safety budget remained essentially
constant from 1967 to 1972 at approximately $35 million per year.
To compound the painful aspect of budgetary restraints, it should be
noted that within this period of constant budgets, where inflation
meant reduced research activity at best, the fast breeder's share of
this safety" budget rose from $4 million in 1969 to more than $11 million
in 1972. Though Shaw fought to maintain or increase the safety budget,
it was the opinion of Congress and the budgetary elements of the execu-
tive branch that LWRs had matured sufficiently to permit industry to
handle the bulk of their own safety related R&D.
The AEC's limited safety research funds resulted in discontin-
uance of important programs related to several aspects of ECCS problems
which were nowhere near completion. As an example, in February 1971,
an ORNL program felt by many to be the lab's single most important
piece of nuclear safety research, a study of how reactor fuel rods
might behave during a major LOCA, was cancelled, though it had run
only two of its scheduled four years.
1-13
In the midst of these painful budget exercises, two addi-
tional storm warnings were raised for the AEG. In 1969, an AEG Inter-
nal Study Group provided results of their work calling for greater
emphasis on quality control in reactor design and construction and con-
firming the use of the LOCA as a design basis accident. This study was
followed in a letter from the AGRS, of 12 Novenber 1969, which reempha-
sized to Glenn Seaborg, then Chairman of the AEG, the AGRS' concern over
the neglect of research on emergency core cooling and fuel failure
mechanisms for LWRs. The letter stated in part:
The committee has strongly recommended safety research
of this kind several times during the past three years; the
regulatory staff has also strongly supported such work.
However, only small or modest efforts have been initiated
thus far (13).
So, it became increasingly evident to the AEG that a need
existed to perform more LOGA research. Thus after over two years of
review, in February 1970, the AEG published their "Water Reactor Safe-
ty Program Plan" (WASH-1146) (]2). The plan outlined 139 unsettled
safety questions and designated 44 of them (including many related to
the EGGS) as "very urgent, key problem areas, the solution of which
would clearly have great impact, either directly or indirectly, on a
major critical aspect of reactor safety" (15).
In November 1971, WASH-1146 was followed up by a supplemen-
tal "Water Reactor Safety Program Augmentation Plan" (16). This docu-
ment emphasized:
Emergency core cooling has been described in the overall
Program Plan, WASH-1146, as 'generally considered to be
the most urgent problem areas in the safety program today.'
A major loss-of-coolant accident is extremely unlikely,
and present EGG systems, as designed, are expected to
mitigate the consequences of such an accident should one
occur. However, present experimental data and analysis
techniques are not now sufficient to provide the degree
of EGG assurance deemed necessary by the AEG [emphasis
added] (16, p. 7).
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In the midst of this environment, late in 1970, a "senior
task force" of four executive members of the AECls regulatory staff,
under the direction of Stephen H. Hanauer, was appointed to evaluate
the ECCS problem. Perhaps it is no coincidence that almost at the
same time the task force was appointed some dramatic experimental
results were obtained which appear to have had an important impact
on development of the lAC. From November 1970 to March 1971, a series
of experiments were conducted at the AECls National Reactor Testing
Station (NRTS), Idaho Falls, Idaho. These experiments, designated the
"Semiscale Blowdown and Emergency Core Cooling (ECC) Project" were
conducted on a highly idealized model of a Pressurized Water Reactor
(PWR) as part of the research program supporting and leading to the
LOFT program. The "Semiscale" tests were conducted using a 9-inch
mock up of a reactor pressure vessel containing electrically heated
simulated fuel elements cooled by water circulating through a sing1e-
loop heat exchanger circuit.
In a series of tests with the apparatus described above,
it was discovered that in simulated LOCAs essentially all of the
emergency core coolant injected following initiation of the break
was swept out of the reactor mock up (along with the original coolant
water) during the rapid decompression -- or blowdown -- phase of the
simulated accident. The complete and total expulsion of the emer-
gency coolant apparently came as a most unpleasant surprise to the
researchers and AEC. Since critics of nuclear power have tried to
use the "Semiscale" test results to "demonstrate" that adequate ECCS
performance is unlikely, it should be reemphasized that the test
equipment was substantially different from an actual operation nuclear
steam supply system (see appendix 1). One of the principal differences
was the use of a single loop for the primary reactor heat transfer
system for the test apparatus. Operational nuclear power plants all
use multiple loop heat exchange paths between the reactor and two to
four steam generators -- as opposed to the single-loop of the "Semiscale"
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equipment. Thus, among other things, the coolant flow path redundancy
helps to reduce the probability that all of the emergency coolant
would be expelled during blowdown. Direct extrapolation of the results
to operational reactors are clearly invalid. Nonetheless, the results
were unpleasant because they were unexpected. Analytical methods
applied by those conducting the experiments to the experimental appa-
ratus had not predicted the outcome as it took place.*
Apparently in response to the "Semiscale" results, George M.
Kavanaugh, the AEC assistant general manager for reactors, appeared
before the Joint Committee for Atomic Energy on 13 May 1971 to request
supplemental funding for several "significant technical issues" --
including $2 million for water reactor safety. In the course of his
presentation, Kavanaugh was questioned about a statement he made
implying that the "Semiscale" results had not "resolved some of the
areas of major uncertainty raised by differences among the analyses
(furnished by reactor manufacturers) particularly with regard to
their evaluation of the operating effectiveness of the emergency
core cooling" (18). When asked by Senator Howard Baker (R. Tenn.) to
explain what he meant by "differences," the following dialogue took place:
Kavanaugh: " •.• [The experiments] have had results
which have not been confirmatory of what the people doing
those experiments thought might happen. Now they are not
conclusive.
Baker:
thought?"
"
"
meaning that it was worse than you
Kavanaugh: "Yes, worse. If it were better we might
not have been allowed to come up here asking for money.
But they [the results] are not conslusive. In other words,
* Analytical evaluations by reactor manufacturers, subsequent to
the experiments, did show that vendor codes were able to predict
the "Semiscale" results with "reasonable accuracy" C!1.,p. 3,7).
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the experiment was done on something far from a
reactor . . . • It is difficult to draw conclusions
from those experiments • . . . What we want to do are
more of these experiments (18).
In spite of the limitations of applicability of extrapola-
tions of the experiments, the results were evidently significant
enough to spur the investigation being conducted concurrently by
Hanauer's task force to climactic activity levels. On June 29, 1971,
the task force issued the so-called Interim Acceptance Criteria (see
appendix 3). The regulations were considered so urgent that they were
put into force without the customary 30 to 60 day comment period.
The hastened enforcement precipitated a showdown with environmental
intervenors who were already introducing ECCS problems at several
licensing hearings. James Schlesinger, then chairman of the AEC,
ordered the lAC hearings in an effort to settle the issue once and
for all in a single generic rule-making hearing. The importance of
the hearings was highlighted by a letter to Schlesinger from the ACRS,
dated 10 Feb 1972. It stated in part:
In several previous reports the Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards has emphasized the need for high
priority for safety research work aimed at gaining a
better understanding of the phenomena important to the
course of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA).
In connection with its review of the Interim Acceptance
Criteria, the Committee has stated its belief that more
work is required on code development, on improved
emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), and on safety
research oriented to LOCA-ECCS.
The Committee has recently reviewed the general
plans of the AEC and the nuclear industry for water
reactor safety research. In this review, the Committee
had the benefit of a Subcommittee meeting held on
December 7-8, 1971, with representatives of the
Division of Reactor Development and Technology, the
AEC Regulatory Staff, and the nuclear industry.
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In this report, the Gommittee confines its attention
primarily to safety research pertinent to LOGA-EGGS.
Gontinuing progress must be made in improving our know-
ledge ih these areas of the increased number of reactors
soon to be operating and because some of these reactors·
are to operate at higher power densities.
After first commenting on the increased EGGS-related
research by the vendors, the AGRS letter expressed concern
regarding the relative roles of utilities, vendors, and
the AEG in this matter. The AGRS proceeded to identify
and discuss five areas relating to EGGS performance which
needed special emphasis. The five areas are: (1) flow
coolant injection; (2) reflooding rates as affected by
steam binding; (3) flow and heat during blowdown; (4) im-
proved EGGS computer codes; and (5) fuel-rod failure
(62, p. 37).
The hearings were impressive in both quantity of testimony
produced and duration. They have produced a number of changes in
the criteria (see appendix 3). However, readers may be intimidated
by the sheer bulk of the hearings' testimony, as well as the complex-
ity of the technical problems associated with the EGGS. As a result,
readers may well be understandably uncertain about whether the results
have demonstrated that a "final solution" to the problem has been
achieved. The apparent lack of resolution to the problem even within
the technical community itself, and the critical needs of decision-
makers trying to evolve rational energy strategies for a balanced
assessment of the EGGS problem, led EQL to attempt an independent and
objective evaluation of the EGGS' problem. This report presents the
results of that study.
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2 INTERIM ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA
In essence. the Interim Acceptance Criteria (lAC) developed
by a task force headed by Hanauer did two things. First they prescribed
a set of general rules. applicable to all reactors. which established
design limits for peak fuel temperatures and overall reactor oxidation.
as well as requirements that prescribed that core geometry be maintained
in a coolable condition during the LOCA transient.* and required that
heat removal from the core be assured. Secondly. the lAC specified
instructions for utilization of numerical analysis methods for ECCS
design and evaluation for each of the principal manufacturers: Westing-
house (W). General Electric (GE), Babcock and Wilcox (B & W), and
Combustion Engineering (CE).
A. Criteria for all light-water power reactors
The performance of the emergency core cooling system is judged
to be acceptable if the calculated course of the loss-of-coolant acci-
dent is limited as follows:
1. The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature
does not exceed 2300°F. This limit has been chosen on the
basis of available data on embrittlement and possible subse-
quent shattering of the cladding. The results of further
detailed experiments could be the basis for future revision
of this limit.
2. The amount of fuel element cladding that reacts chemically
with water or steam does not exceed 1 percent of the total
amount of cladding in the reactor.
* Transient: An event which takes place in a brief period of time.
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3. The clad temperature transient is terminated at a time
when the core geometry is still amenable to cooling, and
before cladding is so embrittled as to fail during or after
quenching.
4. The core temperature is reduced and decay heat is removed
for an extended period of time, as required by the long-lived
radioactivity remaining in the core.
B. Criteria for specific reactors
Each reactor shall be evaluated in accordance with the general
criteria above, and using a suitable evaluation model. (Examples of
acceptable evaluation models are described.)
The lAC excerpts presented demonstrate the division of the
criteria into general and specific elements. Under the general criteria
of part A, the first two numbered items were specified in order to pro-
tect the reactor against fuel rod cladding embrittlement. Excessive
oxidation of the cladding material produces embrittlement asa result
of metal-water reactions of the zircaloy with the reactor cooling water,
which becomes important at high temperatures, on the order of 2000°F.
Limiting the peak temperature experienced by the cladding and the amount
of clad oxidation, as specified in the first two criteria, was also
apparently designed to limit the additional energy which would be avail-
able through the exothermic metal-water reaction to exacerbate the rod
temperature excursion, as well as to limit the amount of hydrogen pro-
duced in the reaction. Excessive hydrogen production could lead to
explosive conditions in the containment vessel. Criticisms (2) of these
two criteria were largely directed at the adequacy of simply specifying
a maximum fuel rod temperature alone (2300°F), independent of time;
the conservatism of the peak temperature limit chosen, if a maximum
value alone (without time at temperature criteria) were to be chosen;
and the adequacy of the I percent overall oxidation limit established
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to preclude clad embrittlement or the development of unstable energy
input conditions which might exceed the controllability limits of the
ECCS.
The third criterion preservation of the core geometry in
a condition which will permit it to be cooled by the application of the
emergency coolant -- was criticized by the Consolidated National Inter-
venors (CNI) in terms of its inadequacy to even satisfy the definition of
a criterion. The principal objection raised was that the language of the
criterion was too general to provide adequate direction to a designer
to guide his analysis. The CNI called the language "operationally vague"
and devoid of sufficient specificity to qualify as an acceptable criterion
(~, p. 33).
There has been little debate over the fourth of the listed
general criteria. This is because the criterion implies that under
applicable conditions the critical thermal transient associated with
the LOCA has been controlled and that only long term, relatively low
level decay heat removal remains as a problem. Apparently most critics
have been willing to accept this aspect of the heat removal problem
as being amenable to relatively straightforward engineering solutions.
Specific (but remarkably brief) criteria identifying the
"suitable" evaluation models for each reactor manufacturer's designs
were given in the lAC (as shown in appendix 3). These models were
presented with detail apparently felt to be commensurate with initial
AEC concepts of requirements for sepcification of acceptable assumptions
to be made in performance of the ECCS analysis. Specific codes and
certain ranges of variables to be used in the analysis were designated
in the criteria. The evaluation models were the source of the majority
of the criticisms raised by intervenors.
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MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS IN LOCA ANALYSIS
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Figure 2.1 PWR LOCA Analysis
Calculated Temperature vs Time Plot
(After Figure I, 16, by permission.)
2.1 lAC Problem Areas
In general, the criteria were faulted for specification of
methods and assumptions whose conservatism could not be adequately
defended, in the opinion of the intervenors. To illustrate the magni-
tude of the unresolved problems which were recognized to be associated
with the ECCS (at approximately the time the lAC were published),
figure 2.1 has been abstracted from the AEC's Water Reactor Safety
Program Augmentation Plan (16).
In figure 2.1, the major problem areas of LOCA/ECCS analysis
were identified by the AEC as they occur chronologically in a LOCA in
a pressurized water reactor (PWR). The figure indicates, as a function
of the various distinguishing periods of the accident, the specific areas
within each regime where needed improvements were recognized and called
for in methods of analysis. The temperature history shown is only a
schematic representation of a LOCA thermal excursion. However, the
general pattern shown of the temperature-time-thermodynamic process
scenario provides a basic description of LOCA events in a PWR.
Detailed discussions of the specific problem areas, as they
are related to the various thermodynamic regimes shown in figure 2.1,
are given in subsequent portions of the report. However, a "general
observation" given by theAEC in connection with this figure should be
included here •
••. As was stated previously, the end product of
the safety program must generally result in the
development of improved analysis methods. To
date, the evolution of codes has not kept pace
with the development of ECCS systems.
As reactor designs and their operating characteristics
changed, the analysis methods were "patched up,"
rather than redeveloped, with the net result that,
overall, existing methods are inefficient, inflexible,
and do not adequately represent the physical phenomena
intended (16).
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To further illustrate the problem and indicate the extent
of the disputed areas of uncertainty in analysis of thermodynamic
response, figure 2.2 has been reproduced (~, p. 1.13A) from a document
of the Aerojet Nuclear Corporation (ANC), the operators of the National
Reactor Testing Station (NRTS) facilities of the AEC at Idaho Falls.
Again, as in figure 2.1, the various events of the LOCA are shown in
the framework of a time history of the response of major reactor system
elements. The numerous problem areas for which incomplete understanding
existed at the time are clearly shown in this figure.
The problems which will be addressed in most detail in this
report dealing with the unknowns of ECCS are concerned primarily with
evaluation of system responses of the lower half of the figure: the
primary system response, the core mechanical and thermal response, and
the ECC action. Although the problems of containment response and the
engineered safety system are not unimportant to reactor safety, most
are felt to be relatively well understood. It is mostly in connection
with their interaction with other elements of the system that responses
are uncertain. Within this framework, some reference to their effects
will be made in subsequent discussion.
These problems have been a subject of continuing review on
the part of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). The
United States Congress, insetting up the AEC, established the ACRS.
The Committee is composed of experts in various aspects of reactor
safety whose function is to advise the Commission with respect to
"hazards of proposed or existing reactor facilities and the adequacy
of proposed reactor safety standards" along with other responsibilities.
In response to direct questions submitted to the ACRS by the
intervenors in the ECCS hearings, a written statement of reply was
formulated by the Committee related to uncertainties in analysis
methods utilized in ECCS evaluation. The ACRS stated:
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Figure 2.2
ANC Outline of LOCA Problem Areas
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The ACRS takes the view that items in the approved
evaluation models are proven to be conservative when
fully confirmed by experimental evidence and supporting
analytical studies. On this basis, the following
representative items are considered not proven to be
conservative, and are undergoing investigation:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Analytical models and numerical methods.
Amount of initial stored energy in the fuel.
Treatment of phase separation and nonequilibrium
effects.
Treatment of loop resistances.
Treatment of hot channel flow, including flow
blockage and flow redistribution.
Treatment of break flows.
Treatment of decay heat.
Transient critical heat flux and heat transfer.
Treatment of clad ductility.
PWRs -- Distribution of injected water --
Reflooding rates, reflood heat transfer, and
carryover.
BWRs* -- Level swell -- Spray heat transfer.
While the above aspects are considered not proven to be
conservative, the ACRS nevertheless believes that they
can be handled in such a manner that there is reasonable
assurance that, with appropriate use of the Interim Accept-
ance Criteria and other applicable design and evaluation
criteria, water reactors of current design can be oper-
ated without undue risk to the health and safety of the
public (19).
The fifteen items of uncertain conservatism specified by the
ACRS provide a succinct list of the problem areas associated with the
lAC which were addressed in the hearings. A brief evaluation of some
of the critical items for which the ACRS felt that conservatism had
not been adequately established is presented in the following chapter
* BWR: Boiling Water Reactor (see appendix 1).
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of this report. Detailed analyses of the items reviewed are given
in appendixes 5 to 10.
The final Acceptance Criteria (AC) issued by the AEC on
December 28, 1973, contains a number of substantial changes, when
compared to the original lAC. The complete text of the AC is pre-
sented in appendix 3, along with the text of the lAC. A detailed
discussion of the important changes in the AC and their implications
is presented in the subsequent chapters.
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3.0 SUMMARY AND EVALUATION OF HEARINGS RESULTS
Although the vast [lAC Hearing] record thus far
developed in this proceeding has been marred by excessive
focus on peripheral matters and seemingly interminable
arguments among counsel and between counsel and the Board
in an atmosphere too closely 'akin to a criminal trial
portrayed in the popular media', there is nevertheless,
a substantial amount of testimonial and documentary evi-
dence on the central technical issues in the proceeding.
Each of the principal participants, including the staff,
presented evidence in support of its views. In addition~
the staff presented for the evidentiary record certain
divergent technical viewpoints on particular technical
subject areas. The open inquiry directed by the Commis-
sion in the rulemaking proceeding has adduced evidence
from the various participants -- of diverse qualitative
weight -- which is designed to support points of view
running across the entire decision spectrum (from support
for a peak clad temperature of 2700 0 at one end to a call
for a virtual moratorium on power-reactor licensing at the
other). Nevertheless, it is the staff's view that a
critical evaluation of all of the evidence in the record
of this proceeding as it has developed thus far will
show that the reliable, probative and substantial evi-
dence provides full and firm support for the improvements
to the Interim Criteria proposed by the staff.
AEC Concluding Statement
(.§., p. 20)
This quote acknowledges the AEC's recognition of the bulk and complex-
ity of the lAC Hearing Record. Evaluations of the hearings' results
by the various participants were as diverse as the evidence presented
in the hearings' record, ranging from claims of excessive conservatism
to non-conservatism. This chapter will present an overview of the
hearings. The hearings' results are reviewed in terms of the adequacy
of the lAC, changes to the lAC which were recommended in the staff's
IIConcluding Statement ll with its Proposed Rule (PR) and finally the ulti-
mate changes made in the AC, with specific (but concise) problem analyses
(presented in greater detail in the appendices). A general evaluation
of the criticality of ECCS parameters will also be presented.
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3.1 ECCS Hearings Results
The results of the hearings must be evaluated around two
questions. The first question is: What did the hearings contribute
to the evaluation of the adequacy of the lAC? The second question is:
What changes occurred in the ECCS' criteria as a result of the hearings
and how did they affect the criteria conservatism?
3.1.1 Adequacy of the lAC
The question of evidence for the adequacy of the lAC was
indirectly answered in the testimony of Rosen and Colmar. Dr. Morris
Rosen and Mr. Robert Colmar were two members of the AEC regu.latory staff
who made outspoken criticisms of the lAC. Dr. Rosen was the Technical
Advisor to the Director of Reactor Licensing and headed the branch of
the staff that served as a focal point for ECCS performance evaluations
from 1967 until January 1972. Colmar, a senior nuclear engineer on the
regulatory staff under Rosen, was the principal investigator assigned
by the ECCS Task Force to study flow blockage and its effects. The two
men were dissenting members of the regulatory staff and presented testi-
mony concerning their objections at the hearings. At one time during
their testimony, Board Member John H. Buck questioned them about the
differences between their observations and evaluations of data and those
of the staff panel. Buck drew from Rosen and Colmar the acknowledgement
that both they and the panel had been working with the same data and the
same consultants. As reported in a Nuclear Industry editorial, Buck
observed:
But it seems to us, as may be natural in a situation
like this, there is some difference in philosophy and some
differences in judgment that results from that data and
from the people to whom you listen and perhaps the philo-
sophies that you have as to where you want to go.
When the two [Rosen and Colmar] indicated they still
feel insufficient experimental information exists on which
to develop adequately the Interim Acceptance Criteria,
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Buck asked them if they feel the regulatory staff thinks
it has enough experimental data. Rosen replied:
'I would have to say that if the results of this
hearing lead to a reevaluation of the ••• criteria, I
would have to assume that somehow the staff felt they
did not have sufficient information to make their
earlier recommendations or that new information has
been produced in the last several months to make them
reevaluate' (20, p. 33).
With these words, Rosen provided a reasonable means for evalu-
ating the adequacy of the lAC. If changes were made, then the material
presented at the hearings, or produced during them, must have illuminated
inadequacies in the original criteria.
Though changes did occur between formulation of the lAC and the
AC, the staff panel mumbers never conceded that the lAC were not entirely
adequate. Near the conclusion of the hearings, Dr. Stephen Hanauer, the
staff panel chairman, was cross-examined by Ford of CNI with respect to
his evaluation of the lAC. The testimony is recorded as:
Q. [by Mr. Ford]: In retrospect, Dr. Hanauer, is it
your present view that the criteria [and evaluation
models] promulgated in June of 1971 are not overall
suitably conservative, but there is in fact a need
for additional conservatism in several cases? ••
A. [Dr. Hanauer]: Well it is certainly true that the
Regulatory Staff has recommended that certain changes
be made in the criteria [and models] which make them
more conservative •.• That does not make them necessarily
unsuitable. The target is moving, and the information
being obtained changes some of our information from
time to time.
Q. [by Mr. Cherry]: Now, Dr. Hanauer, •.•• [d]o you still
believe that the [original] evaluation models are
suitably conservative over-all in effect ••• ?
A. [Dr. Hanauer]: ••• Well, frankly, I don't know the
answer today. It's not a question I have addressed
myself to. I have gone past that and recommended
some changes ••• r suspect, though r have not considered
the question in some time, that the old, unimproved
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evaluation models might still be found by me to be
found suitably conservative although I have proposed
chan&es (Tr. 19792-94)** (~, p. 19-20) (emphasis added).
In spite of possible claims for lAC conservatism, the staff
did recognize the PR changes as improvements. In the words of their
"Concluding Statement":
The proposed new regulations are believed by the staff
to constitute an improvement over the Interim Policy State-
ment. The only significant change in the acceptance criter~a
themselves is the replacement of a single temperature limit
by a combination of temperature and oxidation limits - a
change foreseen in the Interim Policy Statement itself.
The changes in the evaluation models require various aspects
of the calculation to be done better, define better the pro-
cedures and parameters used, and take better account of the
various physical phenomena now kno\vu to occur during postu-
lated LOCA' s (~).
Though the significance of PR changes were minimized by the staff, the
changes were extensive and substantial. In the environmental impact
statement prepared in connection with the PR changes, the costs of the
changes were acknowledged, as follows:
As will be seen in the following sections, the costs of the
Proposed Rule, with its conservatisms, are not unsubstantial.
In the Staff's view, however, conservatisms are warranted
for the protection of health and safety given th~ present
state of knowledge, and it does not appear to the staff
that the attendant costs are in imbalance with the desired
safety objective (61, p. 99) (emphasis added).
In the sense of Rosen's testimony, that changes made in the lAC implied
staff recognition of the validity of pertinent criticisms, the Proposed
Rule (21) did itself make a statement about lAC adequacy, which will be
discussed in more detail in the remainder of this chapter.
Generally speaking, the new AC incorporated most of the
recommendations of the PRo However, there are some differences of
substance between the sets of specification. No serious attempt will be
made to detail the differences between AC and PRo Principal emphasis
** References to pages in the official Hearings Transcript.
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will be placed upon evaluation of the AC and comparison of its changes
with respect to the lAC.
3.1.2 The Acceptance Criteria - revisions to the lAC
In brief, the AEC has identified the principal changes in the
AC, as compared with the lAC, in the following words:
The Interim Policy Statement includes: (1) general criteria
for emergency core cooling systems applicable to all light-
water power reactors (the Interim Acceptance Criteria, o~ lAC),
(2) requirements for analysis using a suitable evaluation model,
(3) provisions for application to various classes of reactors
by specified dates, (4) provision for variance under stated
conditions, and (5) a listing of acceptable evaluation models.
The new regulation has sections serving the same purpose as
(1), (2), (3), and (4) above. No complete listings of accept-
able evaluation models accompany this decision. The required
and acceptable features of evaluation models, however, will
provide the basis for the Regulatory Staff to determine the
acceptability of such models as may be furnished.
The principal. changes from the Interim Policy Statement
are as follows. The old criterion number one, specifying that
the temperature of the zircaloy cladding should not exceed
2300°F is replaced by two criteria, lowering the allowed peak
zircaloy temperature to 2200°F and providing a limit on the
maximum allowed local oxidation. The other three criteria of
the lAC are retained, with some modification of the wording.
These three criteria limit the hydrogen generation from metal-
water reactions, require maintenance of a coolable core geom-
etry, Rnd provid~ for long-term cooling of the quenched core.
The most important effect of the changes in the required
features of the evaluation models is that swelling and burst-
ing of the cladding must now be taken into consideration when
they are calculated to occur, and that the maximum temperature
and oxidation criteria must be applied to the region of clad
swelling or bursting when the maximum temperature and oxida-
tion are calculated to occur there. Another important change
is the requirement that, in the steady state operation just
before the accident, the thermal conductance of the gap be-
tween the fuel pellets and the cladding should be calculated
taking into consideration any increase in gap dimensions re-
sulting from such phenomena as fuel densification and should
also consider the effects of the presence of fission gases.
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When these effects are taken into consideration a higher stored
energy may be calculated. Other changes in the evaluation
models are mostly in the direction of replacing previous broad
conservative assumptions with more detailed calculations where
new experimental information is available or where better cal-
culational methods have been developed.
The wording of the definition of a loss-of-coolant acci-
dent has been modified to conform to its long-accepted usage,
limiting it to breaks in pipes. Justification for the exclu-
sion of consideration of pressure vessel failures from the LOCA
is ex~ensively discussed throughout Volume 39 of the transcript
(April 11, 1972), and we have referred to it earlier (pp. 6~8).
The new regulations also require a more complete documenta-
tion of the evaluation models that are used (60, p. 1093)
(emphasis added).
In essence, the AC is much more complete in detail and encom-
passes many more specific problem areas than the lAC. In particular,
its treatment of the problems cited in the hearings is a great deal more
detailed than in the lAC. The sections of the AC seem to address them-
selves very closely to the items listed by the ACRS as being of uncertain
conservatism (listed in sec. 2.1).
3.2 Analysis of lAC Problem Areas Within the Context of the
New Acceptance Criteria
This section summarizes material (presented in detail in
several appendices) analyzing the ACRS' list of items "considered not
proven to be conservative" in context with the changes implied in the
new Acceptance Criteria.
3.2.1 Metal-Water reactions, energy release and rod embrittlement
In the areas of energy release and rod embrittlement from
metal-water reactions, the AC shows the most evident changes. The re-
duction in the peak cladding temperature criterion (from 2300°F to 2200°F)
and the imposition of a new local oxidation limit for the cladding (17 per-
cent equivalent conversion to Zr02 based upon the Baker-Just oxidation
model) have been described as the most significant changes in the AC.
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In their Opinion Statement for the new Acceptance Criteria
the AEC Commissioners stated:
It should be remembered that the calculations that are
made of the effectiveness of the ECCS center on maintaining
the integrity of the zirca10y cladding, since if it remains
intact we can be sure that the uranium dioxide fuel pellets
will be kept separate and coolable. To keep the zircaloy
intact requires controlling its maximum temperature and
oxidation (60, p. 1091),
and
Our selection of the 2200°F limit results primarily from
our belief that retention of ductility in the zircaloy is the
best guarantee of its remaining intact during the hypothetical
LOCA (60, p. 1098).
In addition, the AC requires the inclusion of oxidation on the
inside of swollen and ruptured cladding as well as the outside, a feature
neglected in the lAC. The AC requires that calculation of the internal
rod oxidation begin at the calculated time of rupture, with the use of
Baker-Just oxidation model required in the calculation. Moreover, the
calculated 17 percent limit must include in a specified manner both in-
ternal and external oxidation, as described above, as well as the thin-
ning of the clad during the swelling and rupture process.
Though the new criteria are greatly improved over the elemental
2300°F temperature limit of the lAC, in the opinion of the author they
do not appear to have achieved assured conservatism in all respects.
As discussed in appendix 7, the AEC has consistently deempha-
sized the potential importance of the energy release rates from the
zirconium-steam reaction. The AEC Concluding Statement dismisses the
energy release problem with a single sentence. It states:
Melting and energy release from zirconium-steam reaction
are not the basis for specifying a 2200°F limit; in fact,
a 2300°F limit would be sufficient in this regard (i, p. 75).
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Adequate evidence that energy release rates can be dismissed in this
manner has not been (and in fact cannot be) presented. In appendix 7,
figure A7.3 and the accompanying explanation show that at 2200°F the
17 percent equivalent Zr02 oxidation limit does not proscribe the allow-
able time duration for exposure to the 2200 of peak temperatures suffi~
ciently to preclude energy release rates which may be of the same order
of magnitude as, or greater than, the decay heat release. The Commission
has given more adequate recognition to this energy source in its opinion
to the AC where it stated:
In addition to the primary heat transfer effects of
taking into consideration the swelling and rupture of the
cladding, there would be important secondary effects
arising from the steam oxidation of the cladding by the
steam. Higher temperatures would lead to increased oxi-
dation, which would contribute to a further increase in
temperature, and the opening in the cladding would allow
oxidation on the inside, again increasing the calculated
temperature (60, p. 1106).
Though the potential importance of the energy release from the
zirconium-steam reaction has been poorly acknowledged by the AEC staff,
the method for evaluating it has been conservatively prescribed in all
of the criteria documentation. The required use of the Baker-Just oxi-
dation model gives conservative estimates of metal-water reaction energy
release for temperatures above 1900°F. When combined with the AC require-
ment that the "reaction shall be assumed not to be steam limited" (60,
p. 1134), the energy release estimates should be adequately conservative.
From the standpoint of limiting rod embrittlement, the 17 per-
cent equivalent Zr02 oxidation criterion is of borderline conservatism.
As discussed in connection with figure A7.6 (appendix 7), this amount of
oxidation would probably put the rod in a "partially ductile" condition,
for which brittle failure in the course of the LOCA could not be posi-
tively discounted. At the 17 percent oxidation limit, the rod is left
with a zero ductility temperature (ZDT) of approximately 900°F, below
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which the rod has no ductility and the probability of brittle failure
is increased. A ZDT of 900°F is uncomfortably high, since maximum
LOCA quenching stresses are induced as rod wetting occurs at tempera-
tures from approximately 700 to lOOO°F (Z5, p. 3-15). It appears that
the Combustion Engineering recommendation for embrittlement oxidation
limits of FW> .65 (see table A7-Z, appendix 7), which corresponds to an
equivalent ZrOZ oxidation of about 10 percent to 14 percent and a ZDT
of approximately 400°F, would be a more acceptably conservative limit.
The Consolidated Utilities Group has also recognized the conservatism
of a lower oxidation limit. They have stated:
••.• a limit on the calculated •••• equivalent oxidation
of lZ mole percent would prevent clad embrittlement
and failure and should conservatively bound conditions
which could be experienced during a design basis LOCA
(11, p. 39).
In conclusion, the AC metal-water reaction criteria limits
of ZZOO°F and 17 percent equivalent ZrOZ oxidation, though improved over
the lAC criterion, are still of borderline conservatism. The combined
criteria do not eliminate the potential for metal-water reaction energy
release rates of the same order of magnitude as those from decay heat
nor do they preclude excessive embrittlement. Lower equivalent oxidation
limits (lZ-14 percent) would give increased conservatism. However, the
use of the Baker-Just oxidation model, especially with the AC's exclusion
of the assumption of steam limitation for the reaction, does give conser-
vative estimates of total oxidation and energy release. Consequently,
when used in the evaluation models, the current oxidation rate relations
are apparently suitably conservative in prescribing the magnitude of the
oxidation produced and energy release, though the 17 percent oxidation
limit does not guarantee prevention of brittle rod failure. Assuming
nominal power peaking factors (local power distribution) within the core t
rods which might reach the 2Z00°F criteria limit are likely to be local-
ized to a relatively small region of the core -- from 5 to 15 percent
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of the total area of the core. If clad exposure is limited to criteria
levels of less than 17 percent equivalent zircaloy oxidation, then
massive melting and core geometry changes resulting from brittle failure
of fuel rods appears unlikely. Fuel elements are likely to be relatively
cool at the time brittle failure might occur (on the order of 1000°F),
and relatively small amounts of material would be likely to be dispersed
when cladding failure occurred. Consequently, additional mechanical
damage resulting from melting in the core induced by brittle failures of
the fuel rods should be relatively light and coolability would probably
not be seriously perturbed. Thus, the uncertain conservatism of the 17
percent oxidation limit on prevention of brittle failure of the fuel rods
has probably a second-order effect on large scale distortion and/or melt-
ing of the core. Under these circumstances, the consequences of possible
brittle failures of the fuel rods are not expected to be of major signi-
ficance in the LOCA sequence of events, even if such failures should occur.
3.2.2 Initial stored fuel energy and related thermal parameters
Information pertinent to initial stored fuel energy is found
in sections IAI and IB of appendix K of the AC (cf appendix 3), repro-
duced below.
Section IAI.
The Initial Stored Energy in the Fuel. The steady-state
temperature distribution and stored energy in the fuel be-
fore the hypothetical accident shall be calculated for the
burn-up that yields the highest calculated cladding tempera-
ture (or, optionally, the highest calculated stored energy).
To accomplish this, the thermal conductivity of the U02 shallbe evaluated as a function of burn-up and temperature, taking
into consideration differences in initial density, and the
thermal conductance of the gap between the UO and the
cladding shall be evaluated as a function of the burn-up,
taking into consideration fuel densification and expansion,
the composition and pressure of the gases within the fuel
rod, the initial cold gap dimension with its tolerances,
and cladding creep.
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Section lB.
Swelling and Rupture of the Cladding and Fuel Rod
Thermal Parameters
Each evaluation model shall include a provlslon for
predicting cladding swelling and rupture from consideration
of the axial temperature distribution of the cladding and
from the difference in pressure between the inside and
outside of the cladding, both as functions of time.
To be acceptable the swelling and rupture calculations
shall be based on applicable data in such a way that the.
degree of swelling and incidence of rupture are not under-
estimated. The degree of swelling and rupture shall be
taken into account in calculations of gap conductance,
cladding oxidation and embrittlement, and hydrogen
generation.
The calculations of fuel and cladding temperatures
as a function of time shall use values for gap conductance
and other thermal parameters as functions of temperature
and other applicable time-dependent variables. The gap
conductance shall be varied in accordance with changes
in gap dimensions and any other applicable variables
(from appendix 3).
The PR prescribed that steady state gap coefficients be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis for each vendor's reactor designs,
since "substantial differences" exist in the fuel cladding designs be-
tween vendors and even with a given vendor's product lines. In formu-
lating the AC, the Commission retained this case-by-case analysis re-
quirement (60, p. 1101).
The lAC treatment of initial stored fuel energy was notable
for its brevity. It stated, for example, "peak cladding temperature has
been shown to be relatively insensitive to changes in gap conductance
during an accident" (~, p. 4-26). Relatively large values of gap con-
ductance were prescribed (1000-2400 B/hr-ft2-OF), apparently without
substantial evaluation, as they had been recommended by the vendors.
With such relatively high gap conductances, fuel rod heat transfer pro-
cesses were dominated by the low convective film heat transfer coefficients
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between rod and coolant (generally less than 100 B/hr-ft2) during blow-
down and reflood, so that the significance of the gap conductance for
heat transfer of the initial stored energy was minimized. (This is dis-
cussed more fully in appendix 6.)
The AEC appeared to progressively reevaluate the importance
of gap conductance and initial stored fuel energy as the hearings pro-
ceeded. The AEC Supplemental Testimony reported the results of a para-
metric investigation of the influence of gap conductance on initial
stored fuel energy release during the LOCA (i, pp. 10-16 to 10-23) (also
appendix 10). In this investigation, the important effect of clad swell-
ing and rupture during the LOCA on gap conductance with its consequent
impact on the transfer of stored fuel energy was demonstrated. The study
showed that substantially lower gap conductance values were calculated
(between limits of approximately 5-100 B/hr-ft2-OF) than were prescribed
in the lAC (1000-2400 B/hr-ft2-OF). At low values such as these, fre-
quently less than concurrent convective film heat transfer coefficients,
gap conductance became very important. It was observed that when swell-
ing occurred during blowdown, a reduction in gap conductance from ~teady
')
state values of about 800-1000 B/hr-ft~-OF to approximately 5-100 B/hr-
ft 2_OF resulted in frequent corresponding increases in peak temperatures
as high as 100°F to 200°F, and sometimes resulted in uncoolable condi-
tions. (Additional observations on this AEC parametric study are pre-
sented in sec. 3.3.1 and appendix 10.)
Between the publication of the Supplemental and Concluding
Statements, the AEC moved to correct the lAC deficiencies with respect
to the stored fuel energy. The Commission Opinion in presenting the AC
strengthens and clarifies the PR recommendations. The AC now provides
criteria for initial stored fuel energy which approach "assured" con-
servatism. The influence of clad swelling and rupture on the "hot rod"
calculations for DBA and the requirement to select parameters influencing
the initial stored fuel energy so that it is maximized are definite steps
in the direction of assured conservatism.
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If there are faults with the AC, they are: (1) There are no
quantitative specifications (or limits) given for important thermal para-
meters and (2) case-by-case evaluation of gap conductance is required.
Though the effect of (2) would appear to at least partially compensate
for the potential problems with (1), the AC approach implies some con-
tinuing uncertainty on the part of the AEC over how to deal with the
initial stored fuel energy.
3.2.3 Fission product decay heat
Though the AC goes into more detail about required assumptions
of reactor operating power levels and in-core power distribution (peaking
factors) prior to LOCA and presents a more complete description of how
reactor kinetics at shutdown must be handled, the basic lAC criterion
for fission product decay heat (i.e., utilization of the proposed ANS 5.1
Standard + 20 percent) has been retained without modification.
During the early stages of the hearings, a substantial contro-
versy was provoked by the CNI over the adequacy of the proposed M~S 5.1
Standard to correctly predict the decay heat rate in the critical LOCA
time period of approximately 1000 sec after break initiation. The tech-
nical basis for questioning the ANS 5.1 Standard + 20 percent criterion
(see appendix 5) centered around recent decay heat investigations of
England (23). When the CNl first introduced England's analysis into the
hearing record, serious questions were raised about the adequacy of pre-
dictions of the magnitudes of early decay heat release rates and the
asymptotic decay heat limit prescribed by ANS Standard 5.1 for fuel ex-
posed to irradiation for large integrated flux-time values. England's
doctoral dissertation developed a method for improving on existing
neutron capture analysis techniques through incorporation of a more
complete physical model of the coupling of short half-life nuclides in
the fission product chain. England's dissertation results gave an indi-
cation that fuel exposed to large neutron flux-time histories would ex-
perience significant increases (as much as a factor of 2 or more) in
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decay heat release at shutdown. Following publication, England's initial
thesis (Q) analysis was found to have errors in numerical programming
and input data. Although a corrected study (~) showed agreement in
principle with the original thesis (note appendix 5, figure A5.3), the
magnitude of predicted increases was significantly reduced to less than
10 percent for a relatively low flux-time irradiation history case.
Comparison of results of England's code (CINDER) with other
sophisticated numerical summation analysis methods (when appropriate .
corrections for coding and input data errors have been made) shows the
need for an upward correction to the ANS Standard 5.1 of approximately
6 percent for the low flux-time irradiation cases. When appropriate
flux levels and irradiation periods are considered for the AC require-
ments of "hot rod" calculations, a need for a total net upward correction
to the ANS Standard 5.1 of about 10-15 percent is required, at shutdown
times of approximately 1000 sec.
When empirical results are considered as a basis for evaluation
of summation calculations, we observe that there is good general agree-
ment between CINDER calculations and the empirical data for shutdown
times greater than 100 seconds. The "best estimates" of such experimen-
tal data ~) give direct quantitative support to an upward deviation
from the ANS Standard 5.1 of 6 percent or better at shutdown time of the
order of 1000 seconds. Moreover, Perry et al. have estimated a one-
standard deviation uncertainty of the order of + !5 percent in the em-
pirical results.
Therefore, it appears that in the critical LOCA shutdown period
of about 1000 seconds ANS Standard 5.1 + 20 percent will correspond to
an equivalent deviation uncertainty of about one standard deviation from
the expected mean decay heat values. It is legitimate to ask whether
confidence limits are adequately and conservatively bounded at one
standard deviation. ANS Standard 5.1 ~ 20 percent appears to be equiva-
lent to a one standard deviation uncertainty, and! the probability that
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higher decay energies will be experienced above the AC prescribed limits
is above 30 percent. Increasing the decay energy limits to ANS Standard
5.1 ~ 30 percent would reduce the probability of experiencing decay
heats above the criteria limits to about 11 percent, but if the criteria
limits were raised to ANS Standard 5.1 + 35 percent, the probability is
less than 5 percent that the criteria limits would be exceeded. A 30 per-
cent probability of exceeding the AC (ANS Standard 5.1 ± 20 percent)
limits seems inadequately conservative. Consequently, it would seem de-
sirable to increase the bounding criteria values to either ANS Standard
5.1 + 30 percent, or ANS 5.1 + 35 percent.
3.2.4 Break flows
Break flows are a major determinant of the blowdown rate and
duration. Consequently, their potential impact on the thermal history
of the reactor is evident. Break flows greater than anticipated could
induce shorter blowdown periods with potentially increased containment
pressures and probable increases in fuel rod temperatures prior to emer-
gency coolant injection.
The AEC has prescribed the use of the Moody fluid discharge
model (55) both in their Concluding Statement (~, p. 105) and the final
AC (60, p. 1108) as well as in their initial Direct Testimony (~, pp. 2-41
& 4-15), and in the lAC themselves. Moody's analysis method was developed
for flow of a two-phase (liquid-steam) mixture through pipes based upon
an idealized isentropic equilibrium model of the flow. eNI attempted to
show that for relatively short pipes, where the length-to-diameter ratio
was short (less than 10), two-phase equilibrium would not exist and meta-
stable liquid flow (flow of pure liquid at temperatures and pressures
where vaporization would be expected under equilibrium conditions) would
take place (2, chapter 8). Based upon experimental results of Fauske (1£),
under these conditions greatly increased break flow rates could be obtained
("1.7 times greater than the rate predicted by the designers for two-
phase flow")(2, p. 8.1).
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Examination of experimental results, including Fauske's (ap-
pendix~, figure A9.1) shows that significant differences exist between
initial metastable flow (in pipes of very short length and small diameters)
and equilibrium flow rates.
The highest metastable flow rates are approximately a factor of
three greater than the equilibrium choked-flow conditions for relatively
long pipes. It is apparently this potential for flow rates truly sub-
stantially different than those predicted for equilibrium flow that c~used
concern of the ACRS and CNI.
The reactor manufacturers have challenged the validity of a
break flow model based upon metastability concepts. They have suggested,
alternatively, that metastable flow is a function of pipe length only.
Consequently, it would only be observed for very short distances (of less
than one foot) compared to typical break lengths of approximately three
feet or more.
The intervenors have argued that Fauske, and the majority of the
experimental evidence, supports the concept that metastability is better
related to the ratio of break length to pipe diameter than to break length
alone. For the large pipes of interest in reactors, frequently as large
as two feet in diameter, the length-to-diameter ratios are well within the
critical values associated with experimentally observed metastable flow
for the small pipes (for which experimental data exists) (figure A9.2,
appendix 9).
Examination of the experimental data appears to support the
intervenor claim that break flows, as predicted by the Moody model, could
be substantially underestimated. The regulatory staff tried to overcome
this problem in their Concluding Statement by calling for more than one
model of blowdown break flow to be used in analyzing critical flow in
accordance with the revised criteria of their Proposed Rule (~, pp. 105-
108). Thus the staff concluded that,
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The critical flow model of Moody is appropriate for
use in break spectrum analyses of blowdown transients in
BWRs and PWRs on the basis that it overpredicts blowdown
flow ••. whenever the break exit plane quality is greater
than about two percent ••• However, for the blowdown period
during which subcooled liquid, saturated liquid or low
quality two-phase fluid exists at the break exit plane,
the Moody model underpredicts experimental discharge data •.•
Therefore, the Proposed Rule requires the use of a model
which is more appropriate to these fluid conditions.
One such model contained in the evidence of this proceed-
ing is the modified Zaloudek model of Westinghouse (Exhi~it
1151, [ILl Section III). The Moody model may also be
applicable for early times during blowdown before the
exit plane quality reaches two percent if it is used with
a Moody multiplier of greater than unity ••. The staff con-
cludes On the basis of this evidence that models appro-
priate to these flow regimes do exist (~, p. 108) (empha-
sis added).
In its revised AC, the Commission has downgraded the importance
of the early blowdown stages where the need for a Moody multiplier of
greater than unity had been recognized. The AC now require that,
For all times after the discharging fluid has been calcu-
lated to be two-phase in composition, the discharge r~te shall
be calculated by use of the Moody model----the calculation
shall be conducted with at least three values of a discharge
coefficient applied to the postulated break area, these
values spanning the range from 0.6 to 1.0 (60, p. 1108).
Though the Commission acknowledged that recommendations for
discharge coefficients greater than one were widespread, their discus-
sion of the AC implies that the Moody model is always conservative and
that the metastable flow period (if any) is adequately covered by Moody
model results. They acknowledge that
There was widespread agreement that a variable discharge
coefficient provides a better fit to the data than a
constant one •••• Ybarrando (Transcript p. 6362) reported
the result of an ANC calculation with a discharge coef-
ficient initially 2.0 and later in blowdown 0.6, where
the first peak in the clad temperature exceeded by about
100°F the value obtained with a fixed discharge coeffi-
cient of 1.0 (60, pp. 1111, 1112) (emphasis added).
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Nevertheless, the Commission concluded
We agree with the Staff position as to correctness of use
of the model based on critical flow, since the length of time
available during the blowdown far exceeds the amount needed
for nucleation and build-up of two-phase discharge. Further-
more, the evidence is strong that use of the Moody correlation
does not underestimate observed experimental discharge rates,
as would be the case if discharge were really metastable,
but in fact it definitely overestimates the discharge rates
(60, p. 1112).
The question of the adequacy of the experimental data was not
addressed in any significant manner in the AC discussion. However, it
should be noted that little or no experimental data exists for realistic
break flow from large pipes.
In summary, it appears that the Moody break flow model may under-
predict nonequilibrium metastable flow by nearly a factor of two (at least
for a brief period), as indicated by the CNI. To account for this possi-
bility, the regulatory staff suggested in the PR that a different model,
although not entirely explicitly specified, be used for estimating flow
rates at the beginning of the blowdown period. Use of this model would
have predicted flow rates greater than those estimated with the Moody
model. In the final AC, the Commission eliminated the staff recommenda-
tion, concluding that the Moody model (with discharge coefficients less
than or equal to one) was always conservative.
In view of the limited experimental basis for models which may
be applied to the large diameter pipes associated with a DBA for large
operational reactors, it would appear desirable to perform additional
break flow tests with more representatively sized equipment. In the
absence of experimental data which clearly supports the Moody model or,
alternatively, demonstrates the validity of a nonequilibrium model of
break flow metastability, more conservative and definitive specifications
should be given in the criteria. Specifically quantified values of Moody
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multipliers (greater than one) should be prescribed, along with their
period of application, in order to assure that conservatism is attained
for break flow specifications.
3.2.5 Transient critical heat flux and blowdown heat transfer
At the beginning of the LOCA transient, heat is transferred
from the fuel rods to the coolant water in a continuation of the highly
efficient nucleate boiling heat transfer mode of normal (steady state)
reactor operation. Heat transfer coefficients under nucleate boiling
conditions are immensely higher (approximately a factor of 10,000) than
those which occur during the core spray or initial reflood portions of
the cooling process. During the rapid system decompression accompanying
blowdown, a transition in the boiling process takes place from pinpoint
nucleate boiling to film boiling and two-phase (liquid-vapor) convective
cooling, which greatly reduces the system cooling capability.
In describing the LOCA transient, analysis methods depend upon
the development of the concept of time periods during which a given boil-
ing transitional condition occurs (e.g., time to critical heat flux, time
to departure from nucleate boiling, or duration of the period of stable
film boiling). The blowdown process induces the first important depar-
ture from nucleate boiling. This transition achieves its importance be-
cause the rapid rod cladding dryout accompanying blowdown makes re-
establishment of the nucleate boiling, high heat transfer conditions for
the rod very difficult. Moreover, the conditions required for such re-
establishment (rewetting) are uncertain. As a result of this uncertainty,
the revised criterion conservatively requires that rewetting be neglected
during blowdown, immediately after critical heat flux (CHF) is first
predicted. The new AC state:
After CHF is first predicted at an axial fuel rod location
during blowdown, the calculation shall not use nucleate boil-
ing heat transfer correlations at that location subsequently
during the blowdown even if the calculated local fluid and
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surface conditions would apparently justify the reestablishment
of nucleate boiling. Heat transfer assumptions characteristic
of return to nucleate boiling (rewetting) shall be permitted
when justified by the calculated local fluid and surface con-
ditions during the reflood portion of a LOCA (60, p. 1109)
(emphasis added).
Neglect of rewetting during blowdown, after departure from nucleate boil-
ing (DNB), was apparently also practiced under the lAC and precludes the
assumption of redevelopment of nucleate boiling conditions.
The importance of the heat transfer occurring after CHF or DNB
has been recognized by all those who have investigated the LOCA. In its
discussion of the AC, the Commission stated:
The rate at which heat is transferred from the clad to the
water after departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) is vital
to estimation of the course of a hypothetical loss-of-coolant
accident for a PWR. DNB is calculated to occur within about
a tenth of a second after a postulated instantaneous double-
ended break of a large pipe, or a large split. The heat
transfer after this time would primarily determine the tem-
perature history of the clad during blowdown and the possi-
bility that clad damage would occur during this phase. It
would also determine the effectiveness of removal of heat
from the oxide fuel itself and thus the stored energy in
the fuel at the time refill of the plenum by ECCS fluid
starts (60, p. 1117) (emphasis added).
For example, if the DNB transition can be avoided, the high heat transfer
rates associated with nucleate boiling will cause a reduction in the
stored energy of the fuel (and hence the potential for heating the clad-
ding) corresponding to an average temperature decline of about 150°F/sec.
Each additional second of nucleate boiling during depressurization can
permit a delay of about 10 sec in core coolant (ECC) injection (li).
Since the DNB/CHF transition from nucleate boiling to stable
film boiling is so important to heat transfer during blowdown, reactor
manufacturers have attempted to develop transition models which numeri-
cally describe the physical processes taking place. These models have
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been the origin of most of the controversy associated with heat transfer
estimates during the blowdown period. The models have generally tried to
make the transition process resemble nucleate boiling as long as possible.
for obvious reasons. Such models have also attempted to incorporate
hysteresis-like effects which permitted rewetting with a return to nucleate
boiling conditions if appropriate CHF values were reobtained for relatively
short periods (on the order of milliseconds). The general effect of most
of the vendor models proposed to date would be to retain essentially full
nucleate boiling heat transfer during most of the blowdown phase of the
LOCA (60). p. 1118).
After reviewing the basis for the models. the Commission chose.
perhaps as a result of apparent inconsistencies in the arguments of both
the vendors and the regulatory staff. to preclude rewetting following
DNB during blowdown. and to require the use of stable film boiling models
during the post-CHF period. They stated:
We note the inconsistency of vendor positions that would
rely on hysteresis-like effects as the basis for switching
criteria such as those above. as compared to other positions
calling for instantaneous rewet. We note also the ineonsis-
tency of Staff positions to the contrary in both cases.
The point remains that there is not adequate understanding
of either rewet after CHF or of hysteresis-like effects
during flow reversal in a fast transient. The Staff's
position has been to approve use of only stable film boil-
ing once DNB has been calculated to occur. even when fluid
and clad temperature conditions appropriate to rewet exist.
This course is conservative. No less conservative position
is justified by the record of the hearing. We concur with
the Staff's proposal that the nucleate boiling term of the
Westinghouse correlations not be used after DNB is calculated
to occur, and that other models incorporate the equivalent
assumption of stable film boiling throughout the period
after DNB (60, p. 1118) (emphasis added).
The uncertainty associated with CHF and post-CHF heat transfer
results from basic inadequacies in the transient and steady-state CHF
experimental data (as noted above). No data exists, either steady-state
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or transient, for large arrays of 7 x 7 or greater and full length rod
bundles with PWR rod diameters. In addition, a principal problem with
the available data' seems to be related to the lack of adequate correla-
tion between theoretical and numerical analyses, and the experimental
programs which have been conducted. Weaknesses of this type have left
the scalability of test results an open question and, consequently, the
conservatism of correlation models uncertain. More test programs with
solid analytical bases, such as the program outlined in reference 34,
are needed before the adequacy of AEC or vendor models can apparently
be assured in the analysis of this important aspect of the LOCA. However,
it should be reemphasized that in the absence of such programs, the AEC
appears to have made adequately conservative assumptions in the AC.
Data obtained from the recommended test programs would be expected to
lead to requirements for heat transfer coefficients which are generally
less conservative in the important post-CHF period.
3.2.6 Reflooding rates and the treatment of loop resistance
Reflooding rates are a very critical element in the effective-
ness of the LWR-ECCS. As discussed in greater detail in appendices 8 and
9, and the following section of this chapter, the reflood rate is a domi-
nating factor in post-blowdown heat transfer. For the PWR it is the sole
method of emergency cooling. In the case of the BWR, reflooding provides
the dominant means of ultimately achieving temperature turnaround, and
resolution of the LOCA thermal excursion. Thus, it is Vitally important
that the reflood rate be maintained at as high a value as possible to
assure ECCS adequacy.
The reflooding rate is critically affected by the resistance of
the primary loop of the reactor through the mechanism of steam binding.
As stated in the Commission's Opinion to the AC,
The reflooding rate for pressurized water reactors
would be controlled to a large extent by steam binding,
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the phenomenon by which the resistance to flow through
the reactor system (steam generators, pumps, etc.) of the
effluent from the reactor core limits the rate of reflood
and, indirectly, the rate of heat removal from the fuel
rods. The pumps in their locked rotor condition would
typically provide more than half of this resistance to
flow so that the stipulation of their being locked is a
serious limitation. If the pump rotors were not locked,
their resistance to flow would be reduced by 60% (Exhibit
1113, p. 14-10). In their Concluding Statement, Combus-
tion Engineering states that if the pumps were free running
during reflood the calculated maximum temperature of the,
zircaloy cladding would be reduced by 7SoF (CE Concluding
Statement, p. 3-61) (60, p. 1122).
The factors affecting steam binding and reflooding rates were
analyzed as one part of a fault tree investigation of ECCS performance
by Brockett, et ala of ANC (10). With respect to reflooding rates they
stated:
In calculations of the core reflooding rate, the pressure
drop from the core inlet to the core outlet plus the pressure
drop from the core outlet back to the downcomer is equated
to the head of water in the downcomer. This near balance
of water head in the downcomer with backpressure from steam
escaping the system has been referred to as the steam-binding
problem. A 17% error in reflooding rate calculations would
be necessary to cause a 10% error in heat transfer coeffi-
cients. The three diamonds on the right relate to the supply
of water to the downcomer which is a key factor in the re-
flooding rate calculations. In order for a fault to occur,
the predicted downcomer water height would have to be about
40% higher than the actual height (10, p. 319).
Brockett, et ala summariz~d the three aspects of ECCS perfor-
mance which could cause the predicted pressure drop to be lower than the
actual values (and consequently lead to overestimated, or unconservatively
generous, predictions of reflooding rates). They considered the following
faults to dominate:
(1) Analysis Underpredicts Effect of Plugging by ECC Water in Pipes.
For plant design in which ECC is injected into the piping, the
actual pressure drops will be complex functions of momentum and
energy exchanges between the ECC and the steam flowing in the
lines. Two-phase pressure drops of real significance in terms
of core reflooding rates are most likely to occur during accumu-
lator injection when ECC flow rates are high. The author's
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op~n~on is that if the angle of the ECC injection line is
such that the ECC momentum is directed down the pipe the
plugging problem would be less than for an ECC line with
a 90 degree angle to the inlet piping. Although perhaps
not significant, the assumption that one of the two LPIS
systems fails to operate, which is customarily assumed in
safety analysis, would not be conservative in calculating
core refloodingrates provided the downcomer is filled
by the accumulator; that is, the additional LPIS flow
with both systems operating would not increase the core
flooding rate, which is controlled by steam binding, and
would contribute to increasing the system pressure drop
to the break by additional water plugging.
(2) Analysis Underpredicts Energy or Mass Transfer from Steam
Generator Secondary System to Primary Loop. During core
reflooding the fluid from the secondary side of the steam
generator has the potential to transfer energy, and in the
event of a tube leakage also mass, to the primary system.
Transfer of either mass or energy can add significantly
to the pressure drop from the upper plenum to the downcomer
annulus. Unless the secondary side has depressurized before
reflooding is initiated, significant errors in reflooding
rates would occur if energy transfer processes are not
properly taken into account. Current predictions, which
are based on the secondary side of the steam generator
being at normal operating temperatures at reflooding
initiation, are considered to account for all energy trans-
fer processes. If only a few tubes leak, mass transfer
processes can also significantly add to the error in the
calculated reflooding rates. To provide a 17% reduction
inreflooding rates (at 1.5 in/sec), a tube break area of
about 0.003 ft 2 would be required. Present predictions
are based on the assumption that none of the tubes fail.
(3) Analysis Underpredicts Pump Resistance. During the reflooding
phase of the accident the pump is subjected to a superheated
steam flow at a rate which considerably exceeds the pump
capacity. In this situation the pump is simply a resistance.
It is, however, the component with the highest resistance
in the operating loop and would cause unacceptable reflood-
ing rates if actual values of pump resistance exceed pre-
dicted values by about 50%. Potential sources of errors in
evaluating pump resistance include:
(1) Error in calculating pump speed
(2) Application of an inappropri~te pump characteristic
curve
(3) Compressibility effect not taken into account.
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Current licensing criteria require the assumption of a
rotor resistance for the pump when ECC performance is being
evaluated. This assumption provides a resistance about
twice as high as would be obtained on the basis of the pre-
dicted pump speed (10, pp. 319-320) (emphasis added).
The revised evaluation modeling criteria of the AC require that plug-
ging of the unbroken reactor coolant pipes be considered complete (i.e.,
no steam flow is permitted) during the time the accumulators are discharg-
ing water into the pipes. The pump condition to be modeled must result
in the greatest cladding temperature, considering both cases of either
a locked impeller or free running rotor. Coolant core exit flow for PWRs
is to be determined on the basis of PWR-FLECHT data relating the fraction-
al flow (carryover fraction) at the core exit plane to the total liquid
flow at the core inlet plane. No specification is given for analyzing
the very important contribution of steam generator tube leakage to ECCS
steam binding, because this subject was ruled to be outside of the scope
of the ECCS Hearings (60, pp. 1121-1123).
The CNI have expressed their concern over low reflooding rates, as
follows:
The extremely degraded cooling effectiveness expected in
modern PWRs is one of the most crucial flaws in the assurances
of PWR safety. CNI does not believe the safety problems thus
posed can be resolved ~ith the present body of experimental
information and with the analytical tools now available for
PWRs operating at their design power rating (1, p. 5.23).
In the opinion of eNI:
It is now established that core flooding rates [once] con-
sidered as extremely degraded are now very close to the expected
conditions for a double-ended PWR inlet line break. There is a
widespread feeling in the community of reactor safety engineers
that there is presently a relatively small and likely non-existent
margin between cooling and non-cooling (1, p. 5.20) (emphasis added).
The AEC denies this allegation, stating:
••• the evidence shows that because of the conservatisms
listed above (maximized stored fuel energy at the beginning of
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reflood and treatment of "accumulator bypass" to mlnlmlze water
remaining in the vessel at the end of blowdown) and because the
reactor reflooding rates predicted by current reflood codes are
for average, not oscillatory, system thermal-hydraulic response,
the calculated reflooding rates are lower than would be expected
to occur in reali ty (.§.., p. 204).
It is significant to note, however, that a substantial decrease has
taken place in AEC estimates of flooding rates from their "intended" rates
of 6 to 11 inches per second (60, p. 1092), even in the brief period
since the lAC was published. The AEC Supplemental Testimony (~) compares
calculations of nominal flooding rates for typical PWR designs from each
vendor. These current estimates range (for average flood rates) from
less than 1 in/sec for a Westinghouse 4-loop system with an ice condenser
type containment (~, p. 14-7) to values as high as 2 in/sec for B & W
vent-valve plants (~, p. 14-9). "Nominal" estimates, for a Westinghouse
4-loop system with a dry containment, predict average flood rates of about
1.3 in/sec.
The current flooding rate estimates, ranging from slightly less than
1 in/sec to a high of 2 in/sec, should be compared with earlier statements
presented in the AEC initial Direct Testimony (~). At that time, vent
valve reactors Were predicted to have "high" flooding rates of "about six
inches/second" while flooding rates of "about 1 inch/second" were consid-
ered "low" (~, p. 2-21). Thus, it appears that even in the short period
(approximately 10 months) between publications of the AEC initial Direct
Testimony and their Supplemental Testimony there was a marked narrowing
of the range of "realistic" estimates of reflood rates towards the "low"
estimate of about 1 in/sec.
As observed in section A9.4, flooding rates of 1 in/sec are critically
low. The PWR-FLECHT test results showed that it was difficult to control
fuel rod thermal excursions at 1 in/sec. At 0.6 in/sec, even when the
temperature at the end of blowdown was relatively low (i.e., 1600°F), tem-
perature turnaround could not be achieved for rods with an initial linear
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power density of 1.24 Kw/ft (comparable to steady-state operational
values of 18 Kw/ft). Thus at estimated values of flooding rates of 1 in/
sec, there is an uncomfortably small margin of coolability remaining.
The margin is made even more uncomfortable when it is recognized
that there is essentially no valid experimental data against which to
compare the calculational results obtained for system flooding rates.
However, there are test programs underway to examine specific limited
elements of the loop resistance/reflood rate prediction problem. Tests
currently being conducted at ANC, Combustion Engineering and Westinghouse,
according to an informed AEC Regulatory Staff member*, are investigating
the counter-current flow of water-steam mixtures. It has been reported*
that the tests will show the excessive conservatism of the assumption of
no steam flow (plugging) of the broken cold leg during ECC injection and
the requirement for total "accumulator bypass" (L e., loss of all ECC
fluid injected during blowdown). If these assumptions can be shown to be
excessively conservative, the magnitude of the reflood rate minimum in
its time history (Le., the 1/2 in/sec portion of the "nominal" reflood
rate predictions) and the duration of the dryout period (the pe~iod be-
tween the calculated time of exhaustion of the core coolant and the time
at which the bottom of the core recovers) would be less critical. Though
these changes would certainly improve post-blowdown heat transfer prior
to reflood, the tests are not relevant to resolving the dominant questions
associated with the magnitude of flooding rates during the reflood period,
which are now uncomfortably close to values bordering on the limits of
thermal excursion controllability.
C. George Lawson, a heat transfer expert from ORNL and the author of
the 1968 ORNL critical review of the ECCS (12), was reported as having
stated his concern over the reflood rate problem in the following manner:
As an experimentalist, a clear demonstration of coolability
by wide margins would be necessary to satisfy his uncertainties
* Mattson, Roger J., personal communication, 8 August 1973.
3-27
regarding ECCS capability. In other words, cooling by narrow
margins would have to be regarded by Lawson as an essentially
uncoolable situation (29, p. 19).
The Commission, in its Opinion to the AC, supported Lawson's con-
clusions. They presented their opinion in their description of the LOCA
physical processes, as follows:
The temperature excursion would eventually be terminated as
the ECCS begins to reflood the core. Both PWR's and BWR's have
ECC systems in which water would reflood the reactor. In BWR's
the reflood would be provided by accumulation of water from the
low pressure injection system and the core spray system. Direct
core spray is discussed below. To accomplish reflood in a reason-
able time, the rate at which the emergency cooling water would
encroach on the core (the reflood rate) must be high enough to
provide a heat transfer rate from the core that would be suffi-
cient to counter the heat input rate from decay heat and from
zircaloy oxidation. The Commission believes that the calculated
reflood rate should have a substantial margin over the rate that
is just sufficient to turn the temperature excursion around in
a short time.
As the cooling water reaches the hot core much of it would
be converted to steam, and it is this steam together with entrained
water droplets that would provide the initial cooling of the hotter
regions of the core. For the reflood water to continue entering
the core it must displace the steam, which would have to escape
from the reactor vessel and find its way into the containment
atmosphere. In the pressurized water reactors the steam would
have to flow through the steam generator and pump to escape
through a cold leg break; the reduction of reflood rate by the
relatively high resistance to flow of this path is called "steam
binding". Steam binding would severely limit the rate of re-
flooding the core, reducing it from an intended 6 to 11 inches
per second to from 1.0 to 2.5 inches per second, depending on the
reactor design. The rule we announce considers all the evidence
in the record on this important subject of steam binding and pro-
vides an acceptable overall assurance of ECCS effectiveness. The
inquiry, however, should not end there. Thus the Commission urges
the pressurized water reactor manufacturers to seek out design
changes that would overcome steam binding. This same point of view
is reflected in the September 10, 1973, letter of the Advisory
Committee on Reactor Safeguards.
3-28
Boiling water reactors would not be subject to steam binding,
because their system design provides a more direct path for the
steam to escape, but the same requirement for rapid reflood would
have to be met if excessive clad damage were to be avoided. Boil-
ing water reactors do have a core spray system that would start
about 30 seconds after occurrence of the break, but its cooling
effect on the central rods of a fuel bundle might be insufficient
in itself to prevent exceeding the temperature limits we have set.
The occurrence of reflooding within three minutes after a postu-
lated break of the recirculation line would terminate the excur-
sion (60, p. 1092) (emphasis added).
At flood rates less than 2-4 in/sec, the PWR-FLECHT results indicate
a dramatic reduction in fuel rod cooling occurs (see appendix 9, sec. A9.4,
for detailed analysis). To allow margins of coolability which would be
sufficient to cover reflood heat transfer uncertainties with greater
confidence, it would appear that reflood rates of 6 in/sec or more would
be necessary. In view of the added uncertainties over the possibility of
reflood rate reduction through steam generator tube rupture, an unevalu-
ated hazard in the ECCS hearings (reviewed briefly in appendix 9, sec.
A9.4), it seems desirable to establish specific criterion related to re-
flood rates (or perhaps more generally a specific, demonstrable reflood
heat transfer coefficients criterion), which is probably the most critical
element of PWR coolability in the event of a LOCA. Thus, the author
would support the Commission's recommendation urging PWR manufacturers
to "seek out design changes that would overcome steam binding" (&Q, p. 1092).
3.2.7 Reflood/core spray heat transfer
The ultimate function of the ECCS is post-blowdown heat removal,
accomplished through the reflood mechanism for PWRs or the combined core
spray reflood mechanisms for BWRs. Thus it is extremely important that
the reflood/core spray heat transfer mechanisms be well understood and
conservatively modeled to insure that successful ECCS performance will
be provided.
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To successfully reverse the LOCA thermal transient, emergency cooling
water must be supplied to the reactor core at a rate (referred to as the
reflood/core spray rate) which is large enough to counter the heat input
from decay heat, zircaloy oxidation, and the remaining initial stored
energy in the fuel. It is intuitively obvious that increasing the re-
flooding rate will improve the heat transfer in the reflooding process.
Previous sections have dealt with problems associated with mechanisms
which tend to reduce or limit reflooding rates. This section will ana-
lyze the state-of-knowledge of the reflood/core spray heat transfer
mechanisms themselves.
Because the physical processes occuring during ECC are quite complex,
the principal means of developing modeling tools for their evaluation has
been through empirical methods. Attempts have been made to isolate and
examine the elements of the phenomena of reflooding and core spray through
a series of experiments, the Full Length Emergency Cooling Reat Transfer
(FLECRT) test programs. The FLECRT programs have formed the basis for
the post-blbwdown heat transfer models prescribed in all of the AEC cri-
teria to date. Though there have been some modifications in interpreta-
tion of the program results over the course of the hearings, the basic
evaluation model methodology is still fundamentally dependent upon the
validity and adequacy of the FLECRT data.
Two separate test programs were conducted, one for boiling water
reactors (BWR-FLECRT) and another for pressurized water reactors (PWR-
FLECRT). The two test programs, conducted by GE and Westinghouse re-
spectively under subcontract to the Idaho Nuclear Corporation, though
different in procedural detail were similar in many general ways. In the
tests electrically heated, full length fuel rods were tested in bundle
configurations simulating reactor fuel rod bundles for BWRs and PWRs which
were contemporary to the test period. The fuel rod cladding material was
fabricated of either stainless steel or zircaloy. The rods were heated
by electrical resistance heaters designed to mock up operational rod axial
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power distribution (a chopped cosine power distribution along the axial
length of the rod).
The time history for the electrical power supplied to the rod bundles
was programmed to simulate bundle decay heat in an operating reactor with
the reactor operating at full power at the time of the LOCA shutdown.
The tests were conducted in a parametric fashion. Analyses of the
calculated values of coolant application rates, initial temperatures,
peak operating power, and time sequences of coolant application wete the
basis for the determination of the ranges for each of these parameters.
The test series for both BWRs and PWRs included several hundred tests
over the full range of parameters, various rod cladding materials, and
several heater designs.
As discussed in detail in appendix 8, both the BWR and PWR-FLECHT
programs had many problems and weaknesses. Critical tests in the programs
were too often poorly designed, marred by malfunctioning test equipment
or poorly analyzed. Consequently, critical data were frequently indeter-
minate in form and suffered from poor evaluation. As a result, the pain-
ful conclusion must be drawn that some of the critical FLECHT results
upon which post-blowdown heat transfer models depend heavily are a source
of unending controversy.
On the positive side, the FLECHT tests did demonstrate that simulated
LOCA thermal transients could be terminated under very severe conditions.
For the BWRs, temperature turnaround was demonstrated for tests with' rod
powers in excess of limiting lAC conditions (probably induced by heater
failures) (Test Zr2K). For the PWRs, limiting values of reflood rates
of the order of 1 in/sec were demonstrated, below which the ECCS may not
function successfully. For BWR core spray tests, and for PWR reflood
rates above limiting values, however, no readily identifiable evidence
of "run-away" metal-water energy release was observed, even though peak
temperatures exceeded the lAC limit of 2300°F.
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Though it would appear that conservative core spray and reflood heat
transfer analysis methods may be derived from FLECHT test results, the
evidence is weak that current models will give completely conservative
results. In fact, the Commission's AC opinion states that:
The accuracy of the FLECHT-determined heat transfer coef-
ficients has been examined several times. (Cf. the review in
the Babcock and Wilcox Concluding Statement, pp. 202-204.)
Westinghouse estimated a possible uncertainty of 12% in the
coefficients (Trans. page 6878). The Aerojet Nuclear Com-
pany concluded "that the FLECHT data currently represent a best
estimate of the heat transfer that will occur in a large un-
distorted core." They also concluded that an allowance of up
to 20% may be needed lito bound the data due to experimental and
inferential errors." (Exhibit 1113, p. 17-14) The Co~nission
approves of the use of the FLECHT data for calculating PWR re-
flood heat transfer, but notes that these will be more nearly
"best estimate" calculations than bounding calculations (60,
p. 1124) (emphasis added).
Thus questionable conservatism associated with calculated reflood heat
transfer based upon PWR-FLECHT results is acknowledged. Similar diffi-
culties are acknowledged with BWR-FLECHT heat transfer coefficients.
The Commission's AC opinion states:
The BlfR-FLECHT convective heat transfer coefficients were
determined from the residue of a thermal balance after all of
the known inputs and outputs were calculated. The factors con-
sidered were the electrical heat input, the rate of change of
the heat content of the rods as calculated from their tempera-
ture history, and the calculated radiation from the rods to
each other and to the channel walls. The residue from these
inputs and outputs was ascribed to convective heat transfer.
The convective heat transfer coefficients so determined could
not be very accurate because their calculation involved taking
the difference between two large numbers. The coefficients
so obtained are small and are about what one would expect from
the mechanisms of natural convection and radiation to steam
(Exhibit 1113, p. 16-14).
There has been a great deal of critisism of the BWR-FLECHT
tests, particularly by the Consolidated National Intervenors
(Exhibit 1041, Chapter 5), and both General Electric and Regula-
tory Staff have defended them (Closing State~ents). However, for
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the purpose of calculating the maximum cladding temperature,
only the derived heat transfer coefficients are of any great
importance. The values obtained have always been known to
have a high statistical error; furthermore the values are low
and reasonable, and there seems little to be gained by renew-
ing the controversy over the manner of conducting and inter-
preting all features of the tests.
The high but inevitable statistical error of the coefficients
for the inner rods (1.5 + 1.0 BTU/hr-ft2-OF) is both~rsome and
leads to an estimated error band of as much as ±200°F in the
calculated peak temperature in some circumstances (Exhibit 1113,
p. 16-36) (60, pp. 1125, 1126) (emphasis added).
A large degree of uncertainty is therefore acknowledged to be asso-
ciated with the use of FLECRT derived heat transfer parameters in esti-
mating LOCA temperature histories. Some additional work on the analysis
of the FLECRT data with respect to the application of the data to the
evaluation models would appear to be appropriate in order to achieve
greater conservatism. Additionally, FLECRT tests to date have been con-
ducted at power levels lower than AC specification. Some additional
testing of current bundle designs for design power level temperature excur-
sions would be desirable as well as more tests utilizing zircaloy rods
(see appendix 8, section A8.l) and improved blockage simulation. With
these additional tests, it should be possible to demonstrate the conser-
vatism of the core spray/reflood heat transfer evaluation models suffi-
ciently to satisfy the requirements of "reasonable men."
Rowever, with the currently acknowledged uncertainties in the FLECRT
data, the desirability of a conservatively high reflooding rate is clearly
apparent. As discussed in the previous section, reflooding rates of
current PWR reactor designs average from less than 1 in/sec up to approxi-
mately 2 in/sec. These flooding rates are critically low. As discussed
in greater detail in appendix 9, section A9.4, at flooding rates less
than 2 to 4 in/sec, the PWR-FLECRT results indicate a dramatic reduction
in fuel rod cooling capacity occurs. Current design flooding rates are
uncomfortably lower than these transition rates. To be conservative,
higher flooding rates, about 6 in/sec, would be desirable.
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BWR flooding rates are relatively high, typically about 4 in/sec.
Moreover, the heat transfer coefficients (HTCs) accredited to these re-
flood rates (25 B/hr-ft2-OF) appear to be conservatively specified.
Nevertheless, ref100ding rates on the order of 6 in/sec would be desir-
able even for the BWRs, as well as PWRs. Again, we note our support for
the Commission's position of urging manufacturers to "seek out design
changes" which would result in higher reflooding rates (60, p. 1092).
3.2.8 Analytical models and numerical methods
The Acceptance Criteria prescribe only the conditions associated
with the calculated reactor system response to a LOCA. Consequently, the
major part of the AC specifications are directed at prescription of
"Required and Acceptable Features of Evaluation Models" for evaluation
of the ECCS performance. We have dealt with the conservatism of indivi-
dual elements of the more significant parts of the AC specifications for
evaluation models previously in this section. In this portion we will
consider the integration of the individual parts into numerical codes
for overall system evaluation.
The scope of this study did not permit an extensive investigation of
the specific details of the various codes available for calculation of
ECCS performance. It is sufficient to observe that the codes themselves
are very elaborate, lengthy, complex and long running. In this regard,
the observation of Alvin Weinberg when he was Director of Ofu~L are well
taken:
With respect to the criteria themselves, I have only
one point to make. As an old-timer who grew up in this
business before the computing machine dominated it so com-
pletely, I have a basic distrust of very elaborate calcula-
tions of complex 9ituations, especially where the calcula-
tions have not been checked by full-scale experiments. As
you know, much of our trust in the ECCS depends on the relia-
bility of complex codes. It seems to me--when the conse-
quences of failure are serious--then the ability of the codes
to arrive at a conservative prediction must be verified in
experiments of complexity and scale approac~ing those of the
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system being calculated. I therefore believe that serious
consideration should be given first to cross-checking differ-
ent codes and then to verifying ECCS computations by experi-
ments on a large scale and, if necessary, on full scale.
This is expensive, but there is precedent for such experi-
mentation--for example in the full scale tests on COMET and
nuclear weapons (29). (Discussed more fully in section A9.l
of appendix 9.) --
power plant (3300 MW ), LOFT is still a vitally
t
Whether 1/60 scaling is wholly adequate for full scale
The author's personal experience with large complex codes of this
type leads him to agree with Weinberg that there is a critical need for
large scale testing against which to validate and mature the ECCS per-
formance codes. The test program which currently comes closest to satis-
fying the need for large scale ECCS testing is the long delayed LOFT
experiment, a test of ECCS operation for a 55 MWt multi-loop PWR nuclear
steam supply.* (System testing of LOFT with nuclear fuel is not expected
to begin until about 1976.) LOFT will be the first significant simulation
of a PWR ECCS to be conducted with a reasonable test configuration and
the reactor is only 1/60 of the scale of ascale. Though at 55 MWt
current 1000 MW nuclear
e
important test.
ECCS simulation is uncertain. The AEC has stated:
For lack of full-scale LOCA experience -- a fortunate
deficiency -- and because of the impracticability and hazard
of full-scale experiments, scaled experiments will have to
be used. This means that the scaling laws have to be in-
vestigated (~, p. 1-27).
From this and other related AEC statements it appears that no signi-
ficant study of scale effects for ECC syystem tests has been made (or at
least none has been published). Consequently, the required scaling for
adequate system simulation cannot be specified with confidence. But it
is a truism that for a system of the complexity of a nuclear reactor
undergoing a LOCA, the closer the test is to full scale the more believ-
able the results will be.
* A listing of ECCS related experimental programs on a world-wide
basis is given in appendix 4.
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Though large or full scale testing is expensive, there is ample
precedent for it. In fact, nearly all recent large complex systems where
survivability has been important, from ballistic missiles to jet airliners,
have been tested extensively in full scale (and frequently to destruction)
to demonstrate their overall design conservatism. On the basis of such
precedents, large scale tests, though admittedly expensive, would certain-
ly appear to be cost effective for the nuclear power industry. It has
been estimated that in the next 30 years more than 500 nuclear power
plants, of approximately 1000 MW
t
capacity each, will be in operation.
To argue over the practicability of ECCS testing for a large scale nuclear
system on the basis of expense under these circumstances seems absurd.
If, on the other hand, the principal drawback to large or full scale
testing is associated with the hazards of the experiment, then the argu-
ment becomes unsettling. It seems unlikely that an adequate location
cannot be found within existing AEC test sites in the U.S. for which the
hazards to the public of large scale ECCS testing could not be reduced
to acceptable levels. If this cannot be done, then it appears that a
double standard is being applied with respect to public exposure tq risks
from operating reactors: existing reactors represent potential sources
of LOCA experience at sites far less remote than test sites where the
AEC is reluctant to conduct full scale tests.
Therefore, it seems that the constraints of the practicability and
hazards of testing, on a sufficiently large scale to overcome major scal-
ing uncertainties, must be overcome. Testing at a larger scale than LOFT
seems practical, desirable, and urgently needed. Consequently, a larger
scale test program should be planned and conducted by the AEC as expedi-
tiously as possible.
The AC specifies the requirement for documentation of the complete
evaluation models for the ECCS for all vendors. This is a very commend-
able and important requirement. The CNI made a very strong criticism of
the BWR LOCA model on the basis that there were no independent models of
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similar scope, available to the AEC, against which to check the General
Electric codes. As Weinberg implies, this is a very legitimate criticism.
It casts no aspersions on GE to suggest that cross-checking of the BWR
model should be performed by comparison with another independent code of
equal stature. Anyone who has had experience with large complicated
numerical models of systems must be aware that it is essentially impossi-
ble to construct one without programming errors. No doubt a great many
cross-checks of individual code sub-routines have been made by GE, where
such checks are possible. Nevertheless subsystem verification, though
important, is no substitute for full scale exercising of the overall model.
It can be stated unequivocally that large codes the size of the BWR-LOCA
model need multiple cross-checking.
The above comments should not be taken as being applicable exclu-
sively to GE. Thorough cross-checking of all of the P\VR codes is also
extremely important. Aerojet Nuclear Corporation (ANC) is currently con-
ducting and coordinating a program of comparative calculations of several
"standard" problems in which each of the PWR vendors is participating.
This program has the potential of providing a very significant $ervice
-- if adequate analysis of the results is made. Consideration should be
given to providing supplemental funding for vendor calculations to assure
that adequate cross-checking is permitted and supported.
In the author's opinion, one more important observation needs to be
made with respect to ECCS evaluation model documentation. The AC require-
ment for documentation is unassailable in its desirability and value.
However, when the vendor documentation is furnished to the AEC, the use
of proprietary documentation for ECCS models by any vendor should not
be allowed. For system elements as critical to public safety as the
ECCS, all supporting documentation should be in the public domain.
Public evaluation of the conservatism of ECCS designs is essential to
the continued growth of nuclear power in the U.S. The public's evalua-
tion must remain incomplete if proprietary documentation of the model is
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accepted by the AEC. Proprietary documentation of ECCS models is
counter-productive to all concerned with the growth of nuclear power
and should be considered unacceptable as evidence of model adequacy.
3.3 Relative Importance of Parameters Affecting Thermal Response
In the preceding discussion of the relative conservatism of the PR
specification of LOCA parameters, no attempt was made to rank the para-
meters in terms of their relative importance to system thermal response.
Estimates of parameter ranking have been made on the basis of parametric
analyses which have been conducted by the vendors and the AEC. As a re-
sult of their convictions that the lAC was "excessively" conservative,
the vendors have conducted "best estimate" analyses in which LOCA thermal
response was evaluated using values of critical parameters which were less
pessimistic than those required by the lAC. The results achieved in the
vendor studies may not be considered truly "best estimate" in a statisti-
cal sense, since, as observed by the AEC, they do not account for the
entire range of uncertainties in input parameters, nor do they "account
for propagation of uncertainties" or "provide confidence bands for the
final calculated results" (i, p. 2.1). However, the results give at
least qualitative indications of the relative importance of the para-
meters investigated and have been extrapolated, for this report, to pro-
vide quantitative estimates of thermal response for more conservative
values of the parameters.
3.3.1 Results of parametric analyses
Results of several parametric analyses have been reviewed (e.g.,
Westinghouse, 31; GE, ~ and 12 [Sec. G]; ANC, 10; AEC, i, Chap. 10)
and some of the more significant results are reproduced and discussed
below.* Table 3.1 lists the results of a GE study. An analysis of 12
parameters showed that the four listed (duration of nucleate boiling,
heat transfer during lower plenum flashing, critical flow rate for liquid
* A detailed analysis of the results is presented in appendix 10.
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Table 3.1
Sensitivity of Peak Clad Temperature During
Core Spray Operation to Specified Variables
Item from Appendix III
of Exhibit 1069
Decrease in Peak Clad
oTemperature ( F) From
Base Case
Discussion
Approx. 150
Approx. 300
Approx. 800
Approx. 120(3) Duration of
Nucleate Boiling
A previous sensitivity study on this item showed
othat the peak clad temperature decreased 40 F for
each second of delay of CHF. It is more important
to note that for the expected duration of nucleate
boiling the rods will rewet.
Rewetting of the rods would decrease the cladding
temperature to nearly saturation temperature by the
time the fuel uncovers. The peak cladding tempera-
ture during core spray operati.on in this case is
merely the heatup during the time of fuel uncovery.*
This item renders insignificant all items that per-
tain to the portion of the accident prior to unco-
very.
The sensitivity of this item has been investigated
using the models of NEDO-l0329. Changing the criti-
cal flow rate essentially changes the time-scale of
blowdown without affecting the decay power signifi-
cantly. Essentially the same rate of energy removal
results with a decreased lower plenum flashing in-
ventory loss.
Analyses have been made using the models of NEDO-
10329 for the case in which all cooling systems
are operable, as well as for cases with single
failure of an active component.
*The peak clad temperature over the entire transient for this case is about 1300oF, and occurs at the start
of lower plenum flashing. Since core heatup after lower plenum flashing begi~s at only about 500oF, the
clad temperature at core reflood will be only about 11000 F. It is this latter figure--the peak clad tempera-
ture during core spray operation--that is compared with the base case in the above table.
(6) Cooling Systems
Operable
(5) Critical Flow Rate
for Liquid
(3) Heat Transfer During
Lower Plenum Flashing
w,
W
1..0
Sensitivity Analysis of Critical G.E. LOCA Assumptions for "Realistic" Evaluations of Parameters (Ref. 27)
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Figure 3.2
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(break flow), and maintaining cooling system operatibi1ity without the
time lag required by the AEC "worst single failure" criterion) were the
most significant for the LOCA thermal response. In addition to the
listed variables the analysis considered parameters such as: axial and
radial power factors, local power distribution, and decay heat generation
rate. I
Analysis of the results indicates that the majority of the refer-
enced parameters of table 3.1 are functionally related to the heat transfer
mechanism of nucleate boiling for their effects. On the basis of extrapo-
lation of the results to more conservative values of the parameters
investigated, an increase in peak temperatures on the order of 100°F
might be expected from application of the more pessimistic parameters
discussed previously in this chapter. That is, if the time to departure
from nucleate boiling (DNB) was decreased by several seconds, as a more
conservative analysis with AC prescribed parameters would indicate might
be possible, an increase in temperature above lAC predictions on the
order of 100°F might be expected, based upon extrapolation of the results
of table 3.1.
Results of an analysis conducted independently by the Aerojet
Nuclear Corporation (ANC) (10) are shown in figures 3.1 and 3.2 for PWRs
and BWRs respectively. Results are given in terms of calculated maximum
temperatures as a function of the cladding temperature at the time ECC
application is initiated (i.e., at the time of reflooding for PWRs or
core spray initiation for BWRs) for various values of flooding rate for
PWRs or delay between spray initiation and time to core ref100ding for
BWRs.
The results for PWRs imply that as long as temperatures at the end
of b1owdown are less than the 2200°F criteria limits, and flooding rates
are in excess of 2 in/sec, maintaining peak temperatures below criteria
limits should not be a serious problem. However, for flooding rates less
than 1 in/sec and temperatures in excess of l600°F at the end of blowdoj~,
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peak temperatures will exceed criteria limits. Moreover, at these
flooding rates, if temperatures exceed l800°F at flooding initiation, the
results may not be controllable. Thus, the importance and inter-relationship
of flooding rate and blowdown parameters are shown.
Similar results are shown for BWRs in figure 3.2. For a reasonable
range of temperatures at the time of initiation of core spray (clad tem-
peratures less than l800°F), delay times before core reflooding on the
order of 2 minutes are possible before temperatures in excess of c~iteria
standards are developed. The importance of minimizing the time between
core spray initiation and reflooding is shown, for a given initial clad
temperature, in the nonlinear increase in peak temperatures with increas-
ing delay time between the two ECC operations.
The influence of other parameters investigated in the ANC study is
shown, for PWRs, in the results of table 3.2. In the words of the ANC
authors, the implications of the table are described as:
As an aid in estimating the effect of several other
parameters, results from other sepsitivity studies are presented
in Table 1. [Table 3.2] This table shows the percent cha~ge
in the cladding temperature rise and embrittlement for two
points on Figure 12 [Figure 3.1]. These points are for 2000
and l600°F initial temperatures for a flooding rate of 6 in/sec
for 4 seconds followed by a flooding rate of 1 in/sec. By
utilizing the information in Table I [Table 3.2] and the curves
of Figure 12, new performance maps could be constructed.
The largest changes occur in the 2000°F column because
the metal-water reaction energy is more significant at this
temperature than for the l600°F temperature at reflood initia-
tion. The parameter which caused the greatest effect was the
initial power. Next, in the order of importance, are: (a)
metal-water reaction energy multiplying factor; (b) the time
at which reflooding begins; and (c) Zr02 thickness.
Another important parameter affecting the relationship be-
tween the temperature at the time of reflooding initiation and
the maximum temperature for a given reflooding rate is contain-
ment pressure. The containment pressure affects the flooding
rate as well as the heat transfer for a specific flooding rate.
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Table 3.2 ANS Sensitivity Study
TABLE I
SENSITIVITY STUDY SHOWING EFFECT OF PARAMETER CHANGES ON RESULTS IN FIGURE 12
oTemperature of 2000 F
at time of reflooding
oTemperature of 1600 F
at time of reflooding
Parameter Value
Baker-Just multiplication factor
Temperature
Rise
(% Change)
Cladding
Embritt1ement
(% Change)
Temperature
Rise
(% Change)
Cladding
Embritt1ement
(% Change)
= 0.5 -21 -21 - 6 - 9
= 1.0 55 75 9 12
Initial power (kw/ft) = 1.0 -56 -50 -45 -61
= 1.4 106 170 53 101
Zr02 thickness (in.) = 0.001 -13 - 9 - 9 - 8w
I = 0.00001 1 2 2 2
-l::-
.p..
7-sec delay in time to initiate
reflooding{a} -16 -16 -10 -15
{a} Delays in flooding initiation result in a reduced temperature rise at any given temperature at ref100ding
initiation because the decay power is decreased.
Reprinted by permission from Brockett, G.F., R.W. Griebe, R. W. Shumway, and J.O. Zane, "Loss of Coolant:
Control of Consequences by Emergency Core Cooling," Proceedings of the International Conference on Nuclear
Solutions to World Energy Problems, Joint ~~S/AIF Cbnference, November 13-17, 1972, Washington, D.C. ,(10
and the American Nuclear Society.)
Table 3.3 AEC Sensitivity Study
Table 10.6
Study No. 2
Peak Cladding Temperature
Linear Power
Density (kw/ft)
11.1 11.1 11.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 17.1 17.1 17.1
22.5 7.0 3.0 22.5 7.0 3.0 22.5 7.0 3.0Rupture TimeSeconds
IFhr* fhb** fkh***
.6 .5 .125 1577 .1 1925.7 2012.0 **** - - - - -
.6 .5 .25 1587.8 1913.4 1975.7 - - - - - -
.6 .5 .5 1605.0 1894.6 1931. 9 - - - - - -
.6 .5 1.0 1628.5 1869.7 1886.1 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 .125 1577 .1 1857.7 1912.5 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 .25 1587.8 1838.1 1878.2 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 .5 1605.0 1807.8 1831.8 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 1.0 1628.5 1766.0 1775.8 - - - - - -
.8 .5 .125 1362.2 1664.3 1699.2 11631.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 .25 1381.1 1664.2 1693.3 1698.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 .5 1409.2 1662.2 1682.8 1725.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 1.0 1443.8 1657.1 1668.L. 1765.2 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .125 1362.2 1625.6 1657.4 1681.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .25 1381.1 1617.7 1664.0 1698.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .5 1409.2 1602.4 1620.5 1725.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 1.0 1443.8 1576.2 1584.3 1762.0 2039.1 2074.8 - - -
1.0 .5 .125 1262.9 1574.6 1593.4 1522.4 2091,if - 1925.0 - -
1.0 .5 .25 1283.0 1572.7 1593.5 1541.1 2051.5 2355.3 1950.2 - -
1.0 .5 .5 1316.3 1563.7 1584.3 1570.3 2004.2 2083.2 1993.7 - -
1.0 .5 1.0 1356.4 1563.8 1556.8 1609.1 1955.9 1986.8 2060.2 - -
1.0 1.0 .125 1262.9 1531.2 1540.8 1522.4 1919.5 2008.8 1925.0 - -
1.0 1.0 .25 1282.9 1522.4 1535.1 1541.1 1889.0 1949.6 1950.2 - -
1.0 1.0 .5 1316.3 1502.4 1514.9 1570.3 1844.8 1879.0 1993.7 - -
1.0 1.0 1.0 1356.4 1489.4 1466.9 1609.1 1788.2 1801.6 2060.2 - -
1.2 .5 .125 1262.9 1559.6 1593.4 1430.3 1874.3 1962.6 1722.2 - -
1.2 .5 .25 1270.6 1565.3 1593.5 1442.7 1858.2 1924.6 1743.6 - -
1.2 .5 .5 1282.6 1564.0 1584.3 1476.7 1836.3 1879.0 1778.2 - -
1.2 .5 1.0 1297.7 1546.1 1556.8 1519.8 1815.6 1836.7 1826.4 - -
1.2 1.0 .125 1262.9 1513.0 1540.8 1430.3 1775.3 1831. 9 1722.2 - -
1.2 1.0 .25 1270.6 1507.9 1535.1 1442.7 1752.9 1796.6 1743.6 - -
1.2 1.0 .5 1282.6 1495.7 1514.9 1476.7 1721.4 1748.6 1778.2 - -
1.2 1.0 1.0 1297.7 1457.5 1466.9 1519.8 1681. 6 1692.9 1826.4 2256.4 2423.9
fhr* - Reflood Heat Transfer Coefficient Multiplier, applies to calculation only
after rupture.
fhb**-B1owdown Heat Transfer Coefficient Multiplier, applies to calculation only
after rupture.
fkh***-He1ium Conductivity Multiplier, applies to calculation only after rupture.
**** - Means Clad Temperature reached melting.
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As an example of this effect, if the core pressure is 25 psia
instead pf 60 psia and the reflooding rate is 1 in/sec, a l500°F
temperature at reflood initiation would result in a maximum
temperature 500°F above the value obtained from Figure 12 [Fig-
ure 3.1] (emphasis added)(lO, pp. 325,326).
Results of an AEC study of LOCA parameters for a PWR study (discussed
in greaLer detail in appendix 10) are presented in table 3.3 (reproduced
from i, table 10.6-revised). The AEC study investigated effects of linear
rod power density, time of swelling and rupture for the rod, reflood heat
transfer coefficients (HTC), blowdown HTC, and gas gap conductivity
(through the helium conductivity multiplier for the gas in the fuel-
cladding gap). Several significant observations can be made from the
results presented.
For example, the AEC parametric study shows that at low power levels
(11.1 Kw/ft), relatively minor perturbations in any of the parameters were
shown to be tolerable -- producing about 50-100°F changes in the peak
temperature. However, large perturbations in parameters, such as major
reductions in gap conductance through early rupture time or changes in
linear rod power levels, produced important changes in peak temperatures
(from 100 to 500°F). Such changes are barely tolerable under the most
ideal conditions, and were basically intolerable under essentially all
conditions investigated which were off-normal (or were otherwise non-
ideal). At rod linear power density levels greater than 11.1 Kw/ft
(considerably below current design peak linear rod power densities of
18 - 19 Kw/ft) meltdown occurred at essentially all off-normal operating
conditions investigated, shown in table 3.3 by elements marked with a
dash. Moreover, the results presented indicate that the thermal response
of the rods is a strongly non-linear function of temperature. As peak
temperatures approach 2000°F, normally minor perturbations in heat trans-
fer related variables induce temperature excursions which are increasingly
difficult to control. This appears to be directly related to energy input
to the system from metal-water reactions at about 2000°F and above.
3-46
Under such circumstances, the nominal (one inch per second) reflood heat
transfer rates are stressed to their limits. In fact, the results indi-
cate that under design basis accident power conditions (18 - 19 Kw/ft),
currently anticipated flood rates will be inadequate to assure that melt-
down will not occur over a relatively large fraction of the core -- assum-
ing the basic accuracy of the AEC's parametric study.
The results give a strong indication that metal-water reactions can
produce serious (and undesirable) synergistic effects on LOCA thermal
excursions if rod temperatures exceed about 2000°F, in the absence of
higher reflood HTCs. This temperature is below the AC limit. It would
appear that the application of the revised criteria for modeling gap
conductance and rod swelling and rupture to reactors of current design
might show that operational power limits reductions may be required to
prevent similar uncontrollable temperature excursions.
Vendors have criticized the results of this AEC parametric analysis,
as shown in figure 3.3, as being unrepresentative of overall core response
to the LOCA. While it is true that swelling and rupture are localized
phenomena on a rod and also that rods with linear power ratings'as high
as 18 - 19 Kw/ft represent a small fraction of the total rods in the core
(average linear power density is about 7 Kw/ft), no statistical model of
the distribution of swelling and rupture in the core is currently accept-
able to AEC. Consequently, the AEC requires that the effects of the tem-
perature excursion be calculated for this singular (but probably not
unique) core element (a swollen, ruptured rod with a high peaking factor)
as though it applied for the entire core, in an explicitly conservative
fashion.
Since the determination of how extensive melting might be throughout
the core is uncertain under these circumstances, the results of table 3.3
are a source of concern. It should be emphasized that in this instance,
the concern is centered around two areas; the relatively low rod linear
power density at which melting becomes a problem, and the relatively low
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temperature (on the order of 2000°F) at which the thermal excursion
appears to approach uncontrollability. In addition, the results indicate
the relative magnitude of temperature changes resulting from changes in
the parameters of gap conductance and blowdown and reflood heat transfer
coefficients (within the limits of temperature excursion controllability).
The significance of these parameters will be analyzed in more detail sub-
sequently.
3.3.2 Influence of parameter variations on the relative thermal
response of the system
As discussed briefly in the previous section, there are some problems
in making quantitative extrapolations from the vendor analyses in the
direction of more conservative application of elements of ECCS evaluation
models. However, on the assumption that such extrapolations can legit-
imately be made, and with the support of the AEC parametric analyses as
discussed above, the following observations on parameter influence on
LOCA thermal response have been drawn.
The parameters reviewed above are listed in table 3.4 with the
relative uncertainties in their magnitudes and an estimate of the incre-
mental temperature increase associated with the uncertainty (assuming no
parameter interdependence and that resulting peak rod temperatures are
within coolability limits for the system). To properly evaluate the
effects to be discussed ("worst case II application of the uncertainties
to the LOCA induced thermal excursion), we should first review current
estimates of temperature histories for power reactors. Typical examples
of temperature-time histories of PWRs and BWRs are shown in figures
AlO.l and AlO.2 of appendix 10 as they have been calculated in accordance
with lAC procedures. They show that peak temperatures during blowdown
of l700°F and l300°F are predicted for PWRs and BWRs respectively. The
maximum peak temperatures for the thermal excursion are predicted to
occur during the core spray/reflood period and are estimated to be ap-
proximately 2300 0 F and l800°F for the PWR and BWR respectively.
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Table 3.4
Relative Influence of Selected LOCA/ECCS Parameters
Parameter
EStrriiatea
Comments Temp. Increment Reference
3. Blowdown Heat
Transfer Coefficients
1. Initial Stored Fuel
Energy/Gap Conductance
2. Break Flow/Transient
Critical Heat Flux
w
I
.j::'-
\0
4.
5.
6.
Decay Heat
Core Blockage
(swelling & rupture)
Reflood/Core Spray
Heat Transfer
PR reduced gap coefficients
h(AC) 100; h(IAC) = 500-2400
BWR; -3 sec to DNB
PWR; Transition Boiling
period uncertainty
Uncertainty in
magnitude (factor of 2)
Uncertainty in
magnitude (5-10%)
BWR - Bundle interior blockage
PWR - Varying estimates
BWR - Analysis Model Conservation
PWR - + 20% Data Uncertainty
100-500oF+
lOOoF
50-400°F
100°F
60-520oF
°26-500 F
200°F
lOOoF
(12, Table 10.6)
(12, pp. 5-5,6)
(12, Table 10.6)
(12, Table 10.6)
(12, pp. 22-15,16)
(12, p. 20-24)
(12, p. 20-18)
(33, pp. 73-75)
(12, p. 17-14)
7.
8.
Metal-Water Reactions
Energy Input
Embrittlement
Reflood Rate
OK - 100% Baker-Just
12% - 17% equiv. Zr02 vs none (lAC)
Bl~ Not rate limited
~ Delay time critical
PWR Transitional Flood Rate:
2-4 in/sec
Typical rates: 1 - l~ in/sec
Go
No Go
Go
No Go
<.~..!., p. 4-34)
(31, p. 3-27)
(12., p. 14-12)
The first parameters listed in table 3.4, the initial stored fuel
energy and the related gas gap conductance, are parameters which appear
to have been conservatively treated under the AC revisions. However, the
changes incorporated in the decreasing gas gap conductance by approximately
an order of magnitude will necessitate revised temperature predictions,
with anticipated increases in estimated peak temperatures of approximately
lOO-500°F depending upon initial power density and the exact size of gap
conductance changes (assuming meltdown can be avoided). When combined
with uncertainties in blowdown heat transfer coefficients, which can in-
duce temperature increases of approximately 50-400°F by themselves, the
resulting combined effect may induce temperature increments of 200-800°F,
which might produce serious controllability problems in the thermal excur-
sion.
The second item in table 3.4, the time to departure from nucleate
boiling and related transition boiling relationships, bridging the tran-
sition from nucleate boiling to film boiling, have strong influences on
heat transfer, especially during blowdown. The uncertainty in critical
coolant flow from the break could lead to underestimation of the b~eak
flow and consequent overestimation of the duration of blowdown. For the
BWRs, a conservative estimate of the influence of underestimated break
flow is a decrease in the time to DNB of approximately three seconds,
with a resulting increase in temperature of approximately 100°F. Though
DNB for a PWR is estimated to take place in about 0.1 sec, similar un-
certainties exist in PWR blowdown related heat transfer phenomena.
Combining worst case effects for the three blowdown related para-
meters could induce peak blowdown temperature increases of approximately
200-600°F. Thus PWR blowdown temperatures might be substantially raised
above 2000°F, with consequent severe controllability problems. BWR tem-
peratures could increase to l500-1900°F.
Comparing the temperature increases which might accrue to the fuel
rod as a result of the later time reflood/core spray heat transfer period,
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it appears that additional temperature increases of 200-300°F added to
peak values might be predicted as a result of combined uncertainties in
decay heat, estimates of the effect of core blockage, and uncertainties
in reflood core spray heat transfer mechanisms. If PWR blowdown tempera-
tures were as high as 2000°F, from figure 3.1, reflood rates of nearly
2 in/sec would be required under normal circumstances to assure that peak
temperatures would not exceed the 2200°F AC limits. With the listed addi-
tional uncertainties in energy sources and heat transfer mechanisms incur-
red during the reflood period, the results of table 3.3 strongly imply
that the temperature turnaround might not be achievable with current ECCS
designs. With substantially higher reflood rates (greater than 4 in/sec)
it might be possible to override uncertainties in FLECHT heat transfer
results and decay heat. As shown in figure A9.5 of appendix 9, a signi-
ficant increase in initial HTC occurs in going from reflood rates of 1 in/
sec to 4 to 6 in/sec. The nominal HTC at 1 in/sec is about 10 B/hr-ft2-OF
and at 6 in/sec is about 40 B/hr-ft2-oF. Table 3.3 shows the benefit of
increasing nominal reflood/HTC by 20 percent. A substantial improvement
in controllability is achieved through this means. Increasing reflood
HTCs by a factor of 4 would appear to introduce sufficient conservatism
into the heat transfer processes to override many uncertainties.
It is the consummate message of many calculations of LOCA thermal
excursions for both BWRs and PWRs that HTCs of less than 10 B/hr-ft2-OF
are not adequate to achieve temperature turnaround. Such HTCs help to
control temperature increases, fighting a holding action, but are gener-
ally not large enough to reverse the LOCA temperature gradients. The
PWR-FLECHT results, figure A9.7 of appendix 9, indicate that temperature
turnaround at high power levels require HTCs of at least 15-20 B/hr-ft2-OF,
and that quenching of the fuel rods (the real termination of the trans-
ient associated with reestablishment of film boiling) generally occurred
when HTCs reached approximately 40-50 B/hr-ft2-oF. When HTCs of this
magnitude are attained, the rate of cooling is great enough that the
transition to nucleate boiling takes place rapidly.
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With possible PWR temperatures at the end of blowdown of the order
of ·2000°F (or greater) it is most important to achieve control as rapidly
as possible to reduce the potential effects of metal-water reactions.
Thus refloodihg rates much higher than current nominal values are needed.
Though the effects of core blockage are uncertain and potentially signi-
ficant as shown in table 3.4, higher reflood rates will certainly aid in
controlling this type of problem also. The open core of PWR permits flow
diversion from local, swollen hot spots (not simulated adequately in PWR-
FLECHT) which may exacerbate the thermal excursion during blowdown and
the early stages of reflood. However, the same openness of the core may
allow fluid to recirculate beneficially to the hot spot as the core fil-
ling process progresses -- especially given high flood rates.
Consequently, it appears that the uncertainties in LOCA parameters
for PWRs make high flooding rates, of at least 4-6 in/sec, seem essen-
tial. Equivalently, heat transfer coefficients of at least 30-40 B/hr-
2ft _oF are needed to assure adequate LOCA temperature control. Presently,
high reflooding rates seem to be the only mechanisms by which such high
HTCs can be obtained.
If BWR temperatures at blowdowns were as high as 2l00°F, delay times
of only about twenty seconds could be allowed between spray initiation
and core reflooding to ensure that temperatures below 2200°F would be
maintained, as indicated in figure 3.2. Typical delay times between core
spray initiations and reflooding for current BWRs are estimated at about
two and one-half minutes (60, p. 1125). A delay of two and one-half
minutes implies that blowdown temperatures must be kept below l400°F, as
indicated in figure 3.2. Thus the uncertainties in BWR heat transfer
mechanisms provide a basis for serious concern over the adequacy of
current ECCS designs. However, reflooding rates for BWRs appear to de-
pend only upon the capacity of the pumps provided for ECC fluid injection.
There are no recognized LOCA induced flow perturbation mechanisms which
might restrict desired increases in BWR reflood rates (60, p. 1092).
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Since reflood delay times could be shortened by increasing the BWR
flooding rates, it would appear desirable to do this to provide a clear
margin of safety.
Incorporating the additional conservatisms suggested here, as par-
tially required by the AC, would appear to necessitate increasing current
BWR flood rates by approximately a factor of two in order to attain ade-
quate safety margins. In view of the apparent uncertainties in critical
parameters as listed, it would seem essential to make such an incr~ase
in flooding rate to assure conservatism.
The core flooding mechanism is obviously the most important heat
transfer process in LOCA thermal excursion control for both PWRs and BWRs.
When reflooding rates are sufficiently high, greater than 4 to 6 in/sec,
heat transfer coefficients are apparently adequate to achieve thermal
control for plants of current designs. As long as PWR blowdown tempera-
tures can be kept below approximately 2000°F (possible with reflood rates
of the order of 4-6 in/sec), it appears that it should be possible to
control LOCA thermal excursions within acceptable limits. Under such
conditions, costly damage to the reactor fuel rods through swelling and
rupture might be expected. However, with the containment vessel presum-
ably intact, the radiation hazard to the public would be minimal and the
case for the "China syndrome" weak.
On the other hand, with current nominal PWR flood rates on the order
of 1 to 1 1/2 in/sec, the ability to control the thermal excursions ap-
pears uncertain (under either lAC or AC restrictions). The results
shown in table 3.3, coupled with the uncertainties listed in table 3.4,
lead to this uncomfortable conclusion, under conservatively estimated
conditions. The estimated two and one-half minute delay time between
BWR core spray initiation and reflooding appears to be of less than ade-
quate conservatism. Doubling the reflood rates, to approximately 6 in/sec,
would help BWR margins of safety substantially. It appears that increased
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flooding rates are needed for both PWRs and BWRs to assure an adequate
margin of safety for LOCA thermal control. Increasing flood rates may
require major redesign of current PWR ECC fluid injection methods. In
view 'of the reduction in risks to the public to be achieved, such changes
would appear to be cost effective. In the absence of flooding rates of
4-6 in/sec, essentially the only alternative for guaranteeing control-
lability is through reduced reactor operating power levels. In the words
of the Commission:
Without redesign and backfitting, the only measures available
to the operator in relation to limiting the design basis accident
within the given design framework are to limit power and the power
density of the reactor (60, p. 1093) (emphasis added).
Severe reductions (on the order of 40 percent) of current nuclear reactor
3.4.1
operating power levels could be necessary to achieve unarguable levels
of conservatism. The cost effectiveness of such long term power plant
restrictions could be traded off against the cost of ECCS redesign for
higher flood rates, but the answer seems likely to favor redesign.
3.4 Alternatives to the AC and Cost/Benefits of Their Implementation
In an environmental impact statement (EIS) (~) on the effects of
the proposed AC requirements, the regulatory staff evaluated the costs
and benefits of several alternatives to adoption of the AC. They find
it easier to evaluate costs than benefits for the proposed action. Con-
sequently, only costs have been estimated quantitatively to any substan-
tial degree. The results of the study are summarized below.
EIS options considered
The EIS investigated six options, as follows:
1. Reaffirm the Interim Policy Statement.
2. Adopt the Proposed Rule recommended by the regulatory staff.
3. Adopt more stringent requirements and a derating of nuclear
power plants beyond that recommended by the regulatory staff's
Proposed Rule.
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4. Adopt the recommendations of industry participants.
5. Adopt the recommendations of the Consolidated National Intervenors
and the Lloyd Harbor Study Group.
6. Do not adopt any criteria; instead, evaluate each nuclear power
plant on a case-by-case basis.
Each of these options, with the exception of a moratorium, would permit
nuclear power reactors to be designed, built, and operated in many dif-
ferent modes.
To quantify the options, the staff asked the ECCS hearings partici-
pants to investigate a further subset of problems. The participants were
asked to estimate the degree of plant derating required to accommodate a
set of alternative conditions, which were ultimately related to tempera-
ture. The requested evaluation was for the following alternatives:
1. Criteria modified to take account of the technical conclusions
set forth in the Staff Supplemental Testimony (i.e., a peak
temperature of 2200°F).
2. Criteria embodying recommendations in the participant's
Direct or Redirect-Rebuttal Testimony, which led in ea~h
case to temperatures greater than 2300°F.
3. Criteria limiting maximum clad temperature to l800°F
calculated with evaluation models of existing Interim
Acceptance Criteria.
4. Criteria with maximum clad temperature limits so as to
prevent clad swelling, with analysis done according to
existing Interim Acceptance Criteria. This was dramatized
by a peak LOCA temperature of l200°F.
Responses to the regulatory staff's request were submitted by the
Utilities group and Combustion Engineering. To supplement the partici-
pant results, the staff asked ANC to conduct a series of six PWR and
three BWR power level sensitivity studies. The studies were parameter-
ized in terms of linear power density and peak LOCA temperatures. Typi-
cal full power linear power densities were selected for PWRs as 17.5 Kw/ft
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(on the basis of a peaking factor of 2.5); and 14.7 Kw/ft (approximately a
peaking factor of 2.1). The values were selected with current regulatory
requirements on reactor controllability. A peaking factor of 2.5 is the
lowest value permitted for PWRs without special surveillance instrumenta-
tion. The peaking value of 2.1 is the lowest value proposed by any manu-
facturer. For BWRs, a peak linear power density of 18.5 Kw/ft was pre-
scribed, corresponding to the design peaking factor for all BWRs of 2.6.
For each of the specified full power levels, ANC was asked to perform
LOCA analyses, and identify peak temperatures for cases where the reactors
were being operated at 100, 75, and 50 percent of full power levels. The
results are presented in table 3.5, as reproduced from the EIS (&l).
On the basis of the results of alternative 1, the AEC concluded that
the new AC specifications would cause a 5 to 10 percent derating of power
plants. This they deduced could be accomplished by operating plants with
normally high peaking factors, at lower values. They felt that operation
of these lower, more demanding, peaking factors could be accomplished
with no greater impact than "increased surveillance of existing reactor
instrumentation" (61, p. 108).
The results indicated in table 3.5 indicate that if more stringent
requirements (i.e., peak LOCA temperatures of l800°F or l200°F -- alter-
natives 3 or 4 respectively) are imposed, substantial reductions in plant
power output would be required.
3.4.2 Estimates of· "costs" of alternatives
The staff assumed that utility response to the required regulations
would be to regain full power operation by replacing fuel with redesigned
elements in new bundles which would have lower peak linear power ratings,
but essentially equivalent volumetric power densities. That is, the
volumetric power density of the reactor (Kw/ft3) would be maintained
by increasing the number of fuel rods (operating at lower linear power
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Table 3.5
SELECTED CALCULATIONS CONCERNING DERATING OF
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FOR ALTERNATIVE CRITERIA
PERCENT DERATINGa
k\LTERNATIVE Utilitiesb CEc 2.5d e fReg: P\\TR, Reg:PWR,2.1 Reg:BWR
1 10 20 20 3 2
2 -- 0 0 0 0
3 25-30 20 35 15 10
4 50-70 55 65 55 40
,
aDerating is for a certain period of time followed by design changes permit-
ting full power operation (see Section 3 of this chapter).
bThe ECCS Utility Group did not differentiate between PWR's and BWR's in
stating their estimates.
cCE estimates correspond to CE-designed PT~.'s.
dpeaking factor of 2.5 corresponds to peak linear power density of 17.5
kw/ft at full power for the design analyzed.
epeaking factor of 2.1 corresponds to peak linear power densitY'of 14.7
kw/ft at full power for the design analyzed.
fpeaking factor of 2.6 corresponds to peak linear power density of 18.5
kw/ft at full power for the design analyzed.
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levels, Kw/ft) in a given cross-sectional area of the core. Evidence
that this is a probable response can already be seen on the part of
reactor manufacturers who have proposed such actions (i.e., Westinghouse
and General Electric).
Redesigning of fuel elements to accomplish this goal would require
some time to achieve implementation. An assumed schedule for implementa-
tion was set by the staff as:
(1) The effective date of imposition of new operating limits'
for those plants affected by the Proposed Rule will be January 1,
1974; (2) the amount of time necessary to order and begin installing
new fuel assemblies permitting full capacity operation will be 18
months (i.e., conversions beginning July 1, 1975); (3) the conver-
sion rate to new fuel designs for those plants operating by July 1,
1975, will be linear over time and will be consummated for all
plants by July 1, 1976; and (4) all new plants coming on-line after
July 1, 1975, will use the new fuel technology at the outset (~' p.
109).
In order to estimate the quantitative effect of derating of the power
plants to various levels, it was necessary to project the electrical
generating capacity for the U.S. and the relative fraction associated
with nuclear power, during the time period of interest. This was done
as indicated in table 3.6 and figure 3.3.
It can be seen from table 3.6 that the impact of nuclear plant de-
rating would not be uniformly felt across the country. The hardest hit
section of the country would be the North Central: Illinois, Wisconsin,
etc., where nuclear power is already a major contributor (nearly 20 per-
cent over the period of interest) to the total electrical generating
capacity for the region. The Northeast, Southeast, and the West Central
are also heavily committed to nuclear power, where it will represent
nearly 15 percent of the total capacity by 1975. The remainder of the
country has a relatively small commitment to nuclear power of the order
of 5 percent or less over most of the 2 1/2 year period of interest
(1974-1976).
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Table 3.6
PRESENT AND PROJECTED NUCLEAR AND TOTAL ELECTRIC GENERATING CAPACITY
FOR 8 U. S. REGIONS, 1972-19752
1972 1973 1974 1975
EEl TOTAL NUCLEAR TOTAL NUCLEAR TOTAL NUCLEAR TOTAL NUCLEAR
REGION
MWe MWe % HWe MWe % MWe MWe % MWe MWe %
NORTHEAST 75,347 4,107 5.3 87,032 8,226 9.4 97,223 11,813 12.1 102,980 15,691 15.2
EAST CENTRAL 65,853 1,041 1.6 71,500 1,041 1.5 77,769 3,043 3.9 83,163 5,021 16.0
SOUTHEAST 77 ,063 2,274 2.9 87,824 6,707 7.6 101,492 12,293 12.1 111,766 17,213 15.4
NORTH CENTRAL 41,700 5,019 2.0 48,254 8,304 17.2 49,776 9,428 18.9 52,731 9,428 17.9
SOUTH CENTRAL 57,343 0 0 63,990 850 1.3 68,842 850 1.2 74,667 850 1.1
WEST CENTRAL 8,995 0 0 10,735 1,565 14.6 11,379 1,565 13.7 12,017 1,565 13.0
NORTHWEST 24,772 800 3.2 26,350 800 3.0 27,540 1,930 7.0 31,044 1,930 6.2
SOUTm-mST 40,518 499 1.2 42,472 1,412 3.3 46,419 1,412 3.0 49,022 2,543 5.2
TOTALS 394,191 13,740 3.5 438,157 28,905 6.6 480,440 42,334 8.8 517,390 54,241 10.5
SOURCES: 52nd Semi-Annual Electric Power Survey, October 1972, Edison Electric Institute, pages 5-8.
Nuclear Power 1973-2000, USAEC, Wash-1139,72), December 1, 1972, pages 33-36.
2For definition of the 8 Regions, see Figure 3.3.
w
I
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a
Figure 3.3 Edison Electric Institute
(see Table 3.6)
Regions
Based upon a variety of assumptions (61, pp. 110-129), the "costs"
of nuclear plant derating were estimated. Results are shown in tables
3.7 and 3.8.
The results shown indicate that the imposition of the Proposed Rule
(equivalent to the AC for this study) has only about a 1 percent effect
on electrical capacity and energy for the nation. However, replacement
of the capacity will cost the U.S. from 200 to 400 million dollars.
While the derating associated with AC imposition would have little ,effect
on the electrical reserve margin for the country, it would cause substan-
tial additional discharge of air pollutants. These would be the result
of additional coal and oil burning to substitute for the unavailable
nuclear power.
However, the impact of the AC is relatively light compared with the
alternatives considered. In the extreme case of a nuclear moratorium,
approximately 9 percent of the U.S. electrical capacity would be lost
along with a loss of as much as 14 percent of the total energy. Replace-
ment costs for the lost capacity and energy would be a factor of 10
greater than costs for imposition of the AC. In the case of a moratorium,
the electrical reserve margin could be reduced to an unpleasantly small
value of nearly 10 percent, while air pollutants would be increased by
a factor of 10 above the case for AC imposition. The costs of other
concepts are proportionally distributed in accordance with relative
changes in derating requirements.
In addition to the costs of temporary replacement of electrical
energy and capacity with fossil fueled power plants, modifications to
the nuclear reactors to permit them to regain their original power levels
would require substantial capital investments. On an individual reactor
basis, each 1000 MW reactor would require from 3.5 to 10 million dollars
e
of additional capitalization to modify and replace reactor fuel elements
with acceptable designs.
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Table 3.7 (from 61)
REPLACEMENT CAPACITY AND ENERGY REQUIRED BY RULE MAKING ALTERNATIVES
I II III IV
Interim Policy Proposed Rule Further Deratings aMoratorium.
Statement
Effect of Derating
1.1 Derating (Percent) 0 5-10 25-30 50-70 100
1.2 Reduction in
Capacity
(thousand MWe)
1974 0 2.11-4.23 10.6-12.7 21.2-29.6 42.3
1975 0 2.37-4.75 11. 9-14.2 23.7-35.0 47.5
1976 0 0.33-0.68 1. 8- 2.1 3.9- 5.7 6.8
,
1.3 :Percent of Total
Capacity Affected
1974 0 0.4 -0.9 2.2- 2.6 4.4- 6.2 8.8
1975 0 0.'1 -0.9 2.3- 2.7 4.5- 6.7 9.2
1976 0 0.05-0.1 0.3- 0.4 0.7- 1.0 1.2
1.4 Energy Affected
(billion KWH)
1974 0 13.3 -26.7 66.8-80 133-187 267
1975 0 15.0 -30.0 74.8-89.2 150-210 299
1976 0 2.1 - 4.3 11.2-13.4 24- 34 43
TOTAL 0 30.4 -61.0 153-183 307-431 609
1.5 Percent of Total
Energy Affected
1974 0 0.6 - 1.3 3.3- 4.0 6.6- 9.3 13.2
1975 a 0.7-1.4 3.4- 4.1 6.9- 9.7 13.8
1976 0 0.1 - 0.2 0.5- 0.6 1.0- 1.5 1.8
,~:B...~c..9#.mi~~a-a_1:::;:l.¢t~h._:_:pJ:;---_PN-1--:·_---aQ.;a-_----liLQ¥ct:,.-Ra:cpo".r.. __-.S;L,~dy:_-q_r-9i4:'-
Table 3.8
Cost Comparison of ECCS Rule Making Alternatives
RULE MAKING ALTERNATIVES
I II III IV
Interim Policy Proposed Rule Further Deratings Moratoriumc
~tatement of 1971
1. Assumed Derating (Percent) 0 5-l0r, 25-30;~ 50-70% 100r,
2. Capacity & Energy Penalty
(millions of dollars/year)
a. 1974 Base $ 84-169 $422- 507 $850-1,180 $1,690
b. 1975 Base 95-190 474- 570 950-1,330 1,900
c. 1976 Base 14- 27 71- 85 150- 230 270
d. Total Base $193-386 $967-1,162 $1,950-2,740 $3,860
3. Reliability of Electrical
System
a. National Reserve
Margin, 1975 (in ;I ) 25.0 24.3-23.7 21. 0-21. 7 15.6-18.3 11.6
4. Chemical Discharges to
Amhient Air (thousands
of tons)
a. Particulates Base 16-32 84- 100 180- 260 320
b. Sulfur Dioxide Base 170-340 900-1,070 1,940-2,730 3,400
c. Nitrogen Oxides Base 90-180 480- 570 1,030-1,450 1,800
5. Modifications to Fuel anddReactor (100 MWe Unit)
a. Capitalized C€st of
Modifications Nil $13.3/kW $13.3/kW $13.3/kW --
b. Capital Investment
(million dollars) Nil I $ 3.5-10 $ 3.5-10 S 1.5-10 --
c. ~ncrease Fuel Costs I(thousand collars/yr) Nil $ 215-520 $215-520 215-520 --d. Effectiveness of Hodi-
:1
fications (Final Power
"utput in 0') '1il 1'10 R5 60 --
e. Replacement Power Costs
(million dollars/yr) Nil 0 $6 $16 --
aTo the extent that corrective ~l"ti(ln ,.1ith np:~'7 f"upl i'p.~igng "1n~ al_rea~v been initiated as a -esult of the
Staff's Supplemental TestimOnY filed in October 1972, and also as a result of the Concluding Statement being filed
in advance of the effective date of the Proposed Role, the delay in achieving conformance with the Proposed Rule
might be shortened and these costs thereby modified. These figures would also be modified if the Implementation
period were longer than presently proposed.
bThis represents the equivalent capitalized cost including both capital investment (5b) and fuel cost increases (5c)
associated with fuel modifications.
cRecomrnendation of CNI and Lloyd Marbor Study Group
dThis data on modifications to fuel and reactor was provided by the ECCS Utility Group and has not been independently
verified by the AEC Regulatory staff (see text).
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3.4.3 Estimated "benefits" from alternatives
Though the regulatory staff was willing to make a sufficient number
of assumptions in the EIS to quantify "costs,1I they were unwilling (or
unable) to make similar decisions regarding relationships affecting the
benefits of various alternatives. Consequently, benefits were described
only in qualitative terms. In the words of the staff:
Lacking accurate numerical values for the probabi1ites asso-
ciated with various amounts of derating, we cannot quantify the
"benefits" and hence compare them to the costs. Instead, we must
use the technical judgment exemplified by the staff Concluding
Statement and the technical portions of the record of the rule
making proceedings (~, p. 142) (emphasis added).
This led to presentation of largely visceral statements about IIcon-
servatisms," as benefits, associated with various alternatives. The
relative benefits of adoption of the AC (essentially equivalent to the
referenced "Proposed Rule") are described as follows:
The significant difference between the Proposed Rule and the
requirements of the Interim Policy Statement are given in Section
I.C. of the staff Concluding Statement. In general, the changes
have been in the direction of increased realism in the calculation,
by taking into account phenomena that were neglected or approxi-
mated in the earlier evaluation models. The criteria changes are
in the direction of increased conservatism. This combination of
increased conservatism results, in the staff's opinion, in an im-
provement in the new criteria and models over the old. That is
why the staff has recommended orderly implementation of the Pro-
posed Rule.
The implication is clear that the improvement in the Proposed
Rule (AC) over the Interim Policy Statement (lAC) gives rise to a
larger margin of conservatism and a higher probability, in the
sense previously discussed, that the criteria and models are ade-
quate. The staff believes this to be true. For the reasons dis-
cussed preViously, no numerical value can presently be placed
accurately on this improvement in probability and margins. It
seems evident to the staff, however, that it is significant in the
present state of our knowledge. If this is true, then the Interim
Policy Statement rules necessarily have a lower probability than
the Proposed Rule that the criteria and models are adequate --
thus a lower margin of conservatism (61, pp. 140-141) (emphasis
added). --
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The benefits of derating nuclear plants beyond AC requirements were
belittled, as bringing negligible benefits, as follows:
Further derating of nuclear power plants beyond that inherent in
the Proposed Rule would result in more conservative plant operation
and thus, in principle, greater margins and higher values of the
probability that the criteria and evaluation models (if such there
are) have been correctly chosen.
But this is illusory; any possible increase in the margins and the
probability over and above the Proposed Rule is believed by the
staff to be negligible. Therefore, the increased cost of such
derating [see section 5 of this chapter] would be compensated
in this case by a negligible benefit (61, p. 142).
On the other hand, the vendor recommendations for no derating were
implied to probably be basically correct (but uniustified on the basis of
present knowledge), as follows:
The recommendations of the Industry Participants are in every
case less conservative than the Proposed Rule and, in addition, all
industry recommendations except GE's are less conservative than the
Interim Policy Statement.
In fact, to make up for gaps in present knowledge, the staff
has chosen in the Proposed Rule an alternative that is very
likely more conservative than would be justified if knowledge
were more complete. Thus, the unanimous recommendation of the
four reactor vendors and the Consolidated Utilities -- that the
Interim Policy Statement is at least conservative enough -- may
be true. However, in the present state of knowledge, the staff
believes that the enhancement of public health and safety
justifies implementation, in an orderly way, of the improvements
and increased conservatism of the Proposed Rule. To go further,
in the staff's opinion, would only be to increase a probability
already adequate and to decrease a risk already negligible (~,
p. 143) (emphasis added).
The benefits of the moratorium were described as:
A moratorium on nuclear power plant licensing would reduce
the risk from nuclear power plants essentially to zero. This
risk••••• is already very low. Therefore, the moratorium, while
it would theoretically minimize this risk and maximize the "benefits"
of the ECCS rule making, it even less necessary and vastly more
costly than extensive derating as discussed ••.•• above.
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[This would be in addition to the 200-400
The need for such a choice could only be justified if presently
available experimental and analytical information were not suf-
ficient to support the conclusion that the Proposed Rule or one
of the more restrictive alternatives ••••• were adequate to protect
the public health and safety and the environment. If such were
the case, a moratorium would have to remain in effect for the
period of time necessary for ongoing research programs to confirm
certain engineering assumptions and numerical values used by the
Regulatory Staff in evaluating ECCS performance. The Regulatory
Staff does not agree that there is insufficient information avail-
able upon which to judge the effectiveness of ECCS performance
and believes that the ECCS hearing record supports it in this
regard. Apart from the lack of technical justification for a
moratorium, such a course would impose severe health, economic,
and environmental penalties (as discussed elsewhere in this
chapter) out of proportion with the supposed risk which a mora-
torium would be designed to avoid (61, p. 144) (emphasis added).
Finally, the concept of having no general criteria was dismissed
as being of no real influence on the real world. In the opinion of the
regulatory staff, the hearings results would influence case-by-case
decisions made even if there were no specifically written criteria.
Judgements would still be based upon the same information and results
would eventually be identical -- although the regulatory plant reviews
would probably be more painful in the absence of a set of definitive
criteria.
In summary, the cost of imposition of the AC was given as a 5-10 per-
cent derating of nuclear power plants. This derating would cost utilities
(and ultimately the public) about 200 to 400 million dollars in replace-
ment capacity and energy costs. The costs of modifications to the nuclear
fuel assemblies were estimated to cost 3.5 to 10 million dollars per
1000 MW of nuclear power.
e
million dollars required for the temporary replacement of lost energy
and capacity.] Costs of other alternatives were as much as a factor of
10 higher, as in the case of a complete moratorium. In addition, there
are other "costs," social and economic, which vary from region to region
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within the U. S., resulting from increased probabilities of power outages
and higher air pollution caused by increased use of coal and oil burning
power plants.
Because no good statistical basis exists for quantitatively evaluating
the margins of safety associated with any of the alternatives, benefits
were presented in a purely qualitative fashion. This is a serious short-
coming of the EIS. Without a quantitative presentation of benefits, it
is difficult to adequately compare costs and benefits for the various
alternatives. This problem will continue to plague the nuclear industry
until a good statistical base is obtained for such analyses.
An initial study of the probability and consequences of nuclear
accidents has been completed by Professor Rasmussen of MIT, for the AEC
(67). It represents a valuable source of quantification of problems of
this sort. However, it must be recognized that the statistical base for
LOCA analyses is essentially nonexistent. Consequently, though of real
interest and benefit to everyone (from AEC to intervenors) the Rasmussen
study depends heavily upon technical judgement and must not be expected
to be the final answer to "benefit" quantification.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS
An interesting summary of the ECCS hearings has been published
by Cottrell, as follows:
Review of the ECCS Rule-Making Hearing and its ramifications
leads the author to the conclusion that much good has resulted
from this unique experience. This "good" falls into several
categories:
1. The recommended modifications to the ECCS criteria
have enhanced the safety of nuclear power reactors to a level
that satisfies most technical experts.
2. The hearing forced a new look at reactor safety
research, i.e., what was being done and by whom.
3. Organizational changes have been induced in both
the AEC and contract organizations which are intended to ex-
pedite the conduct and evaluation of needed research.
4. Several administrative problems were brought to light.
Some of these have been resolved, while others are still under
study (e.g., the availability of information on government-
sponsored work, questions of proprietary safety information,
and procedures for the promulgation of criteria).
However, the price paid for these gains was high. Not only
was the hearing itself a traumatic experience for all concerned
(organizationally as well as individually), it was also very
expensive. Additional costs will be reflected in the deratings
and/or changes in existing plants, as well as costs for new designs
that the vendors are now developing. But these are transient
costs and, in the final analysis, are the costs for developing
safe nuclear power reactors. It is fortunate, considering the
energy demands of our technological society, that these additional
costs will not have a major impact on the costs of nuclear energy,
so that it remains a viable option for the near future (i.e., 25
to 50 years).
Measured by almost any criterion, the ECCS intervenors have
won a major victory. They have been instrumental in causing the
AEC Regulatory Staff to recommend ECCS criteria that are signifi-
cantly more conservative (i.e., safer) than the June 1971 criteria.
In fact, in backing off to these new criteria, the AEC has accom-
modated the reservation of most of those in the nuclear community
who previously expressed concerns about the adequacy of the 1971
criteria. Despite this accommodation, the principal intervenors,
CNI, continue to oppose the Commission, as indicated most recently
by their collaboration with the Friends of the Earth and Ralph
Nader in the suit against the AEC. However, with the majority
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of the scientists and engineers in our technical community
concurring regarding the adequacy of the conservatism of the
Regulatory Staff's concluding statement, it seems unlikely that
the intervenors can effect any further significant change at
this time.
In the final analysis, the hearing was a rough way to go,
but it was a viable route and one which produced many beneficial
results (62, p. 53).
4.1 Results of ECCS Hearings
Adversary hearings are indeed a "rough way to go"! The ECCS adver-
sary hearings seemed to place intervenors, who had essentially no actual
reactor design experience, at diametric odds with the much more experienced
AEC and vendor representatives. Since each side saw the other in the
role of an adversary, neither seemed willing to freely and openly discuss
the technical issues. As a result, the hearings were unable to completely
bridge the gulf of differences between the two parties. As Cottrell noted,
the principal intervenors, the CNI, continue to express their concern over
reactor safety in spite of the accommodation of many of their original
reservations within the AC.
It is interesting to analyze the dimensions of the gulf separating
the two camps in terms of the self-images of the opponents and the argu-
ments which they have presented. The vendors and the AEC expressed the
feeling that the ECCS design, based upon sound engineering practice
(which has been applied for generations in related non-nuclear problems
of heat transfer, pressure vessel and piping design) had assured relia-
bility for operation in the event of a LOCA. As evidence of this, they
pointed to the multiple safety barriers built into the system, the
"defense-in-depth" concept of three levels of defense: (1) quality assur-
ance in design, fabrication, and operation; (2) redundant systems elements,
periodic in-service testing, etc; and (3) the installed engineered safety
systems such as the ECCS. (These last are designed to "mitigate the con-
sequences of postulated serious accidents" no matter how small the proba-
bility of such accidents might be.)
4-2
The vendors acknowledged that they do not understand the LOCA/ECCS
problem completely. But they feel that uncertainty with respect to some
aspects of systems response is common to the engineering design of most
large systems, independent of whether the system deals with nuclear power
plants or aircraft or automobiles. The engineer is pragmatic. Recog-
nizing that he rarely has absolute and complete knowledge and understanding
of all aspects of a problem, he feels it is only necessary to have bounded
the response of the system within reasonable conservative limits by his
design. With a system as complex as the ECCS, he feels that the supply
of physically interesting, challenging, and unresolved problems is
essentially unbounded -- and their investigation could go on forever.
Thus the vendor feels that total understanding of all LOCA/ECCS problems
is not necessary as long as system performance is reasonable and conser-
vatively assured.
In this environment, the intervenors were at a great disadvantage.
They were generally not completely familiar with ECCS engineering design
details and specifically not totally familiar with all the systems studies
which have been performed for the ECCS, many of which may never have been
openly published by the vendors, some of the latter having been considered
as inconsequential or perhaps having negative results. Consequently, to
lend support to their position, the intervenors amassed as great a col-
lection of "expert" opiriion showing dissent over the engineering practice
of the vendors as possible. The intervenors have argued that the exis-
tence of such dissent demonstrates the unreliability of the system. Their
principal goal appears to have been to find a sufficient number of acknow-
ledged problems, where experts had expressed differences of opinion, to
ma.ke the balance of evidence appear uncertain to "reasonable men." The
intervenors have felt it necessary only to establish reasonable doubt
about ECCS reliability. They argue that since clearly the responsibility
for proven conservatism, in the face of uncertainty, lies with the AEC
and the vendors, the ECCS must be considered basically ineffectual until
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proven reliable. Moreover, in the intervenors' opinion, the magnitude
of the consequence of a LOCA in which the ECCS did not perform adequately,
no matter how small the probability of the LOCA, makes it imperative that
all problems and areas of uncertainty in ECCS design should be resolved
before nuclear reactors can be considered "safe" and worthy of extensive
utilization.
In the final analysis, both sides have been guilty of allowing exter-
nal parameters of the problem to influence their judgment. In fact it is
the opposing views of the ECCS externalities which have established the
dimensions of the gulf separating the adversaries and served to maintain
the division in spite of the evidence presented by both sides at the
hearings. On the part of the AEC and the vendors, their view of the low
probability of a LOCA has reduced their concern over the uncertainties in
the physics of the ECCS design. On the other hand, the intervenors' per-
ception of the magnitude of the consequences of ECCS failure in event of
a LOCA clouds their ability to objectively evaluate the issues which they
have raised. To the public, finding the common ground -- or solution --
between the two extreme positions, seems like the classical problem of the
product of zero and infinity, an indeterminate form for which the solution
is uncertain.
4.2 Evaluation of Criteria "Uncertainties"
Whatever final conclusion is reached about the ultimate adequacy of
the AC, it must be acknowledged that it is substantially more specific
and conservative than the lAC. The AC is much more complete in its speci-
fication of the details of the ECCS. A serious attempt was apparently
made to provide specifications which satisfied a consensus of technical
opinion and eliminated several areas of ambiguous or non-existent treat-
ment of elements of the ECCS design.
In the AC preparation, the Commission seems to have given serious
consideration to the issues raised in the hearings. In their discussion
of the specific elements of the AC, the Commission treated in varying
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degrees most of the questions and comments raised by all participants:
intervenors. vendors. and consultants. They appear. in particular. to
have been influenced by the ACRS response to the intervenor interroga-
tories. The AC elements have dealt (in varying detail) with essentially
all the ACRS list of uncertain conservatisms. plus some ECCS design issues
which were not included in the list.
As described by the Commission:
The principal changes from the Interim Policy Statement are
as follows. The old criterion number one. specifying that the
temperature of the zircaloy cladding should not exceed 2300°F.
is replaced by two criteria. lowering the allowed peak zircaloy
temperature to 2200°F and providing a limit on the maximum
allowed local oxidation. The other three criteria of the lAC
are retained. with some modification of the wording. These
three criteria limit the hydrogen generation from metal-water
reactions. require maintenance of a coolable core geometry.
and provide for long-term cooling of the quenched core.
The most important effect of the changes in the required
features of the evaluation models is that swelling and burst-
ing of the cladding must now be taken into consideration when
they are calculated to occur. and that the maximum temperature
and oxidation criteria must be applied to the region of clad
swelling or bursting when the maximum temperature and oxida-
tion are calculated to occur there. Another important change
is the requirement that. in the steady state operation just
before the accident. the thermal conductance of the gap between
the fuel pellets and the cladding should be calculated taking
into consideration any increase in gap dimensions resulting
from such phenomena as fuel densification. and should also
consider the effects of the presence of fission gases. When
these effects are taken into consideration a higher stored
energy may be calculated. Other changes in the evaluation
models are mostly in the direction of replacing previous
broad conservative assumptions with more detailed calculations
where new experimental information is available or where better
calculational methods have been developed (60. p. 1093) (empha-
sis added).
Some of the responses in the AC to the ACRS listed problems seem to
have been adequate to have achieved the desired conservatism sought by
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the ACRS. For example, in their treatment of the initial stored energy
of the fuel, the Commission has considered the influence of clad swelling
and rupture on gas gap conductance in what can be a satisfactorily con-
servative manner, assuming the "case-by-case" follow-up required during
licensing procedures is adequate.
What, then, are the most serious remaining problems with ECCS design
and criteria? A more detailed discussion of the parameters and their
relative importance has been given in chapter 3, especially section 3.3
(supported by several appendices). The single most important ECCS para-
meter for both PWRs and BWRs appears to be the reflood rate. Current
estimates of PWR reflood rates range from less than one inch per second
to two inches per second. At these reflood rates, using adequately con-
servative values of critical thermal parameters (table 3.4), predicted
LOCA thermal excursion controllability is uncertain for PWRs of current
design. Although predicted BWR flooding rates are substantially higher
than PWR rates (nearly 4 in/sec), the long delay time (nearly 3 minutes)
between core dryout and the beginning of reflooding (when the ECC fluid
first refills the pressure vessel to the bottom of the core) is very
hazardous. Again, using adequately conservative values of critical
thermal parameters (table 3.4), delay times prior to reflooding should
be restricted to a period of from one to two minutes (at the longest).
Consequently, one might conclude that for B\~s, as well as for PWRs,
thermal excursion controllability is uncertain at current design oper-
ating conditions and flooding rates.
The problem with current ECCS design can be resolved into three
main categories: (1) uncertainties in LOCA energy sources; (2) blowdown-
related uncertainties; and (3) core reflooding related uncertainties.
A succinct list of individual parameters at issue within these categories
is given in table 3.4, including measures of the relative importance of
each parameter. The reader is referred to this table and its supporting
discussion, for more detailed discussions of thr parameters.
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With respect to energy source uncertainties, the AC has specified
criteria which appear adequately conservative with respect to the initial
stored fuel energy of the rod. It should be observed that the AC specifi-
cations are more conservative than those of the lAC. Consequently, the
revised criteria will result in increases in estimated peak fuel rod tem-
peratures of about 100-500°F above those previously calculated under the
lAC guidelines. On the other hand, an uncertainty of 10-15 percent exists
in the conservatism of the specification of decay heat for the fuel rod.
This uncertainty might contribute an increase in peak temperatures esti-
mates of about 100°F above current lAC predictions. With respect to
specification of energy release from metal-water reactions (zirconium -
steam), the use of the full Baker-Just relationship, as prescribed in
both the lAC and AC. appears to be adequately conservative. Though this
energy source may be critically important to LOCA thermal excursions. it
should not contribute an unanticipated source of temperature increase
above earlier lAC predictions.
In the area of blowdown-related uncertainties. problems exist from
several parameters; specifically: the specification of magnitude and
duration of critical flow from broken pipes; critical heat flux related
parameters; and the magnitude of blowdown heat transfer coefficients. as
well as the effects of core blockage due to swelling and rupture of the
fuel rods which (for PWRs) would most probably take place during blowdown
(if it occurs at all). The combined effect of these parameters. including
the increased conservatisms in treatment of initial stored fuel energy
of the AC. might ~nduce as much as a 200-600°F increase (over the lAC
predictions) in the fuel cladding temperature during blowdown.
Core reflooding-related uncertainties include problems in the areas
of: the adequacy of treatment of reflood/core spray heat transfer experi-
mental data; the effects of core blockage from swollen and ruptured rods
during the reflood period; and the conservatism of AC prescriptions of
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metal-water induced clad embrittlement. Though the embrittlement problem
does not contribute to a specific peak clad temperature differential, it
does raise concern over brittle failure of rods during quenching. Such
failures could result in exacerbation of local blockage with resulting
impairment of hot spot cooling. Aside from the embrittlement phenomena,
the net temperature increase expected from reflood-related uncertainties
(including the effect of decay heat uncertainties) might be as high as
200-500°F above predictions from the lAC. In evaluating the credibility
associated with the author's estimates of the uncertainty in blowdown
and reflood temperature increments, as given above, it is well to bear
in mind that they are the result of the technical judgement of the author
(who accepts responsibility for them). As previously discussed (section
4.4) "technical judgement" admits a wide variety of conclusions with
respect to margins of safety -- which can, after appropriate liberties
are taken, be translated into temperature increments (or other quantita-
tive measures, as desired). It may be well to reemphasize this point
with the words of Cottrell:
The whole purpose of the hearing was to determine the
adequacy of the June 1971 lAC as the basis for licensing
reactors. No one, neither the Commission. the vendors, nor
the intervenors, has a good quantitative basis for determin-
ing whether any given reactor is safe or unsafe. All parties
depend on the judgment of their experts in arriving at this
decision. Since the AEC Regulatory Staff has been working
most closely with the vendors over the years, it is perhaps
reasonable to expect a greater understanding of this elusive
judgment between these groups than between any others. How-
ever, considering the magnitude of the commitment to nuclear
power, the importance of safety, and the need for public
understanding, it is unfortunate that there has been so little
effort expended in attempting to elevate nuclear risk assess-
ment to a more exact science. However, in August 1972 the
AEC embarked upon a major project toward this end. The
Reactor Safety Study, also known as the Rasmussen Study (for
Dr. N. C. Rasmussen of MIT who heads this project), is now
in full swing, and a report is scheduled for 1974. Although
this report is unlikely to be a panacea for the safety-evaluation
business, it will be the first step down a long road (62, pp.
51,52) (emphasis added). -
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Though this is not intended as an apology by the author for exercising
his own judgement, it is indeed unfortunate that no "good quantitative
basis" exists to permit adequate definition of the margin of safety.
With these provisos on technical judgements in mind, we need to put
the potential temperature increases (as suggested above) into the proper
perspective. The following estimates of critical reactor temperatures
have been made by the vendors for their own reactors on the basis of lAC
requirements (see figures A10.l and AlO.2 of appendix 10). Typical esti-
mates of blowdown temperatures for PWRs are approximately l700 o F, while
predicted BWR temperatures reach only about l300°F during blowdown.
Maximum temperatures for both PWRs and BWRs occur during reflood/core
spray periods and are estimated respectively as 2300°F and 1900°F. It
should be noted that estimated peak temperatures for PWRs using the lAC
may already frequently exceed the AC limit of 2200°F, while the BWR had
a cushion of about 300°F under the less conservative requirements of the
lAC. Simply applying the AC requirements (without modification) would
make ECCS performance margins for both PWRs and BWRs uncertain. The ef-
fects of the increases in conservatism described above, which sometimes
exceed AC specifications, will be considered below.
The critical question is: what are the implications of the uncertain-
ties in the conservatism of lAC and AC specification of the critical para-
meters? From the blowdown-related uncertainties with potential temperature
increments of 200-600°F, it can be inferred that maximum blowdown tempera-
tures for PWRs might be predicted to reach (or exceed) 2000°F. At these
temperatures, immediate post-blowdown control is critical.
With current PWR design practice, for which nominal reflood rates
are approximately 1-1/2 in/sec and peak linear rod power density is about
19 Kw/ft, controllability of the thermal excursion is uncertain if peak
blowdown temperatures reach 2000°F. (Compare results of figure 3.1 and
table 3.3.) The question can be legitimately raised as to whether or not
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it is possible to assure controllability under these conditions. The
PWR-FLECHT results (see fig. A9.5) provide an important input to the
answer to the question! The results show that for fuel rod initial con-
ditions of 2000°F and an equivalent linear power density of about 18 Kw/ft,
if flooding rates are 6 in/sec or greater, clad temperature increases are
limited to 100°F (or less). In the tests, temperature turnaround times
were of the order of 10 seconds or less and typical quench times (when
nucleate boiling was regained for the rod) were approximately 75 seconds.
Thus it appears that the key to PWR thermal excursion controllability
in a LOCA is obtainable through sufficiently high flooding rates. In fact,
it appears that if flooding rates equal to or greater than 6 in/sec can
be assured for the reactor, sufficient coolability would be provided to
overcome the uncertainties associated with the specifications of the re-
flood period parameters.
A flooding rate of 6 in/sec produces an initial nominal reflood heat
transfer coefficient (HTC) of approximately 40 B/hr-ft2-OF, for about
4 times the magnitude of the nominal HTC at 1 in/sec (approximately 10 B/
hr-ft2-OF). This factor clearly dwarfs a 20 percent uncertainty in the
specification of the 1 in/sec reflood HTC. Similarly the factor of four
increase in the HTC associated with the 6 in/sec reflood rates overrides
the 10-15 percent uncertainty in definition of decay heat for the fuel
rod, while the rapid quenching assures dissipation of the fuel rod heat
without significant problems. Additionally, the rapid temperature turn-
around time and short time to quenching substantially reduce the probabil-
ity that the more conservative limits recommended for rod oxidation, to
prevent embrittlement, would be exceeded. Moreover, though the effect
of core blockage from swollen and ruptured rods on flow diversion from
local hot spots is highly uncertain (PWR-FLECHT tests of this problem
simulated actual PWR core conditions very poorly), higher flooding rates
must surely improve heat transfer, even under these uncertain conditions.
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In analyzing BWR performance in a LOCA, it appears that they have
two significant advantages over a PWR. First, the nucleate boiling
period during blowdown is substantially extended in a BWR, compared to
the equivalent period in a PWR. The estimated time to departure from
nucleate boiling in a BWR is about from 5 to 10 seconds, compared to an
equivalent estimate of about 0.1 second in a PWR (60, p. 1116). For
every second that the departure from nucleate boiling can be postponed
in a reactor, the initial stored energy can be dissipated at the equiva-
lent rate of from 40 to 150°F/sec. This effect is one of the principal
sources of the large difference in maximum blowdown temperatures for the
two types of reactors (1300°F for BWRs instead of l700°F predicted for
PWRs under lAC rules).
The second beneficial aspect of BWR design is that there are no
recognized mechanisms leading to flow restrictions which would limit re-
flood rates through steam binding. Consequently, BWR reflood rates appar-
ently depend simply upon the capacity of the reflood subsystem pumps.
Thus, there is no apparent inherent reason why BWR flood rates could not
be increased, as needed.
In balance, because of the inherent differences in operational
characteristics and reactor dimensions of BWRs and PWRs, approximately
four times as much water must be added to the BWR, as compared to an
equivalent PWR, to initiate reflooding. The effect of this is apparent
in the BWR delay time of approximately 2-1/2 min between the beginning
of the core heatup period and reflood (60, p. 1125). Thus the inertia
of a BWR to reversal of the LOCA thermal excursion would be greater than
that of PWR under equivalent fluid input conditions. Therefore, since
time delays might be expected to be greater for BWRs than PWR, for equiva-
lent reflooding rates, it is fortunate that the steam binding and CHF
problems are simpler for the BWR.
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Considering the BWR LOCA thermal excursion, the additional uncertain-
ties previously discussed with respect to blowdown-related parameters
might increase maximum temperatures during this period to as high as 1900°F.
·2·With core spray HTC specified as ranging from 1.5 to 3.5 B/hr-ft _oF (AC,
Sec. l.D.6) the core spray is generally inadequate to reverse the tempera-
ture transient (though it provides important temporary control prior to
reflood) (60, p. 1125). The AC specifies reflood HTC values of 25 B/hr-
ft 2_OF (AC-,-sec. l.D.6), which is reported to be associated with reflood-
ing rate of 3.7 in/sec (60, p. 1125). From the PWR-FLECHT reflood data,
a reflooding HTC of 25 B/hr-ft2-OF corresponds to a nominal HRC for flood-
ing rates of about 2-3 in/sec. Since the PWR-FLECHT data (figure A9.7)
indicates that reflooding rates of the order of 4 in/sec would have some-
what higher HTC values (on the order of 30 B/hr-ft2-OF), it appears that
AC prescribed BWR reflooding HTCs are somewhat conservative. On the basis
of LOCA parameters specified by the lAC, reflooding, with the specified
225 B/hr-ft _oF HTC, has been calsulated to achieve temperature turnaround
promptly for all cases bounded by lAC limits. Peak temperatures attained
during the transient are directly related to the time between spray initi-
ation and core reflooding (figure 3.2).
For maximum blowdown temperatures of l300°F (as calculated under
lAC specifications), approximately a three minute delay between core spray
initiation and core reflooding would be allowable before peak temperatures
would reach the 2300°F lAC limit (figure 3.2). As previously noted, for
current BWR design reflood rates, core reflooding is predicted to occur
approximately two and one-half munutes after spray initiation, allowing
a relatively comfortable margin of safety within lAC specifications. A
maximum temperature of about l500°F at the end of blowdown would be
tolerable (figure 3.2). However, using the conservative LOCA parameter
estimates of this review, revised estimates of blowdown temperatures are
obtained of as high as 1900°F. At these temperatures, a delay time margin
of only about 60 seconds exists before temperatu~es reach critical AC
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limiting values of approximately 2200°F. With the additional parameter
conservatisms estimated to be required during the reflood period (under
the assumptions of this review), the delay time must be kept to an abso-
lute minimum to keep temperatures within bounds of controllability.
If the same margin of reflooding rate safety were to be maintained
under the more conservative parameter assumptions discussed previously,
an increase in the current BWR flooding rate of approximately a factor
of two would be required. Reducing the spray initiation-to-core reflood-
ing delay time to approximately one minute would be equivalent to increas-
ing the flooding rate to about 9-10 in/sec, with a corresponding increase
in HTC to approximately 50 B/hr-ft2-oF. Thus, increasing the flooding rate
decreases the delay time and has an extra compensation of increasing the
flooding heat transfer coefficient as well. These complementary changes
would apparently provide acceptable safety margins even within the more
conservative assumptions reviewed here.
4.3 Alternative Courses of Action
As observed earlier in the section, substantial and apparently
irreducible differences of opinion exist with respect to ECCS operational
reliability, even among experts in the field. Though certain observa-
tions have been made in this report in connection with criteria conserva-
tisms, it has been impossible to resolve in absolute terms which parties
have the balance of "truth" upon their side. Consequently, a number of
alternate methods of resolving the issues of uncertainties suggest them-
selves.
Though a spectrum of alternatives are possible, ranging from accept-
ance of current procedures and designs to a total ban on the use of LWRs,
certain steps seem more reasonable than others. The intervenors have
essentially recommended foreclosure of current and future light water
power plant operation and construction -- a course which would result
in substantial local hardship through power shortages in certain portions
4-13
of the U.S., especially in this period of general weakness in the availa-
bility of energy supplies. Derating operational power plants to peak
linear rod power densities substantially below current limits (reductions
of as much as 40 percent) have also been suggested. ·In this regard, the
Commission has suggested:
Without redesign and back-fitting, the only measures available
to the operator in relation to limiting the design basis accident
within the given design framework are to limit the power and the
power density of the reactor. The power density can be manlpula-
ted somewhat independently of the total reactor power by adjust-
ments of fuel enrichment and control rod action to provide more
uniform power generation throughout the core. The Commission
notes that there has been a tendency to reduce the maximum
allowed peaking factor (ratio of the highest power density to
the average throughout the core) to satisfy ECCS criteria.
These lower allowed peaking factors leave less margin above
the normal operating range for maneuvering; thus greater care
in reactor operation is required to ensure that these factors
are not exceeded (60, p. 1093) (emphasis added).
Thus even the concept of power density limitation is not without certain
attendant operating problems. Even if such problems are minimized,
however, this approach would probably also produce local power shortages.
Another course might be to delay licensing of new LWR construction while
results of a substantially increased and accelerated research program
were obtained, analyzed, and incorporated into subsequently revised
criteria. Alternatively, the AEC might attempt to develop design criteria
which were accepted by all parties as clearly conservative which could
be imposed as engineering standards. This might lead to redesign of the
ECCS to assure that its reliability is adequate to satisfy the concerns
of all parties. Of course, the AEC could attempt to continue operation
using their current criteria, with the strong probability that future
construction may be delayed by intervenor-induced court proceedings.
The possibility of locally legislated moratoriums on nuclear power plant
construction is not unlikely. (Activity is underway to introduce such
a referendum for submission to the voters of Ca+ifornia.)
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Combinations of the above steps could also be considered. For example,
restricted or delayed licensing of nuclear construction, combined with
some plant derating, might be considered for individual utility power
networks. A risk-benefit analysis of such steps could be conducted for
the local and regional areas affected by the actions under consideration.
Decisions on whether to accept the risks of continued operation or the
potential costs/benefits of the restrictions could then conceivably be
decided upon a case-by-case basis.
The ECCS Environmental Impact Statement presented an evaluation, of
sorts, of the costs and benefits for several alternative methods of re-
solving the ECCS problem. Though no quantitative relationships for bene-
fits were given, and currently no reliable estimates could be given,
estimates of the costs of several alternatives were presented. For exam-
ple, imposition of the AC was estimated to require derating of curren~ly
operational nuclear power plants by 5-10 percent for a period of up to
2-1/2 years (through 1976). Replacement electrical capacity and energy
was estimated to cost 200 to 400 million dollars, plus the capital in-
vestment for retrofitting the reactor with redesigned fuel elements (3.5-
10 million dollars/IOOO MWe plant) to remove the requirement for plant
derating. Derating would also cause additional social and economic cost
penalties, directly and indirectly, as a result of increased probabilities
of power outages and higher air pollution (caused by increased use of coal
and oil burning plants). Several alternatives were considered, including
a complete moratorium on nuclear power. The costs of implementation for
these more conservative actions (whose benefits could not be, or at least
were not, quantitatively estimated) were essentially linearly proportional
to the required degree of plant derating. Thus the "costs" of a morato-
rium were a factor of 10 greater than the highest costs of imposition of
the AC. A more detailed discussion of the ECCS-EIS alternatives is pre-
sented in section 3.4.
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Whatever steps, or combinations thereof, are decided upon, it would
seem desirable to give serious consideration to taking action that would
essentially eliminate the EGGS problem as a public issue. Such a step
could be as effective as those taken by the AEG in essentially eliminating
the issue of radiation emissions from nuclear power plants under normal
operating conditions. Faced with the alternative of continuing interven-
tion on this subject, and given the evident engineering capability to
design the plants to meet more rigorous standards, the AEG took the posi-
tive step of recommending the imposition of "as low as practicable"
standards upon the industry. Utilization of these standards results in
radiation emissions from power plants under normal operating conditions
being at least a factor of 10 lower than backgound radiation. As a
result of the proposed radiation stanqards, the issue has practically
disappeared as a cause for intervention in power plant licensing.
A similar step for the EGGS reliability issue would be very desirable,
if it is possible. Perhaps the most obvious step to be taken in this
direction would be EGGS redesign. As previously observed, increased re-
flooding rates of at least 6 in/sec would result in substantially improved
LOGA response for both PWRs and BWRs. At reflooding rates of this magni-
tude, reactor damage would be minimized and the potential hazards of sub-
stantial radiation release to the public would appear to be essentially
eliminated.
To achieve flooding rates of 6 in/sec in a PWR, or equivalently heat
transfer coefficients of 40 B/hr-ftZ-OF or greater, would probablY require
redesign of the EGG fluid injection mode. Steam binding and other physi-
cal problems restrict current PWR designs to their current low predicted
flooding rates. Though redesign may be expensive, it does not appear to
be impossible and the resulting safety margins (with associated reduction
in public risk) would appear to make the task cost effective. Even with
the proposed design modifications, it is probable that a severe "design
basis" LOGA would result in considerable damage to PWR reactor fuel rods,
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if all the more conservative values of the critical parameters discussed
above were experienced at once (though the probability of all worst case
events occurring during the same LOCA is remote - see figure AlO.6 of
appendix 10). Even if the peak temperatures of the excursion were limited
to 2200°F, blowdown temperatures of 2000°F would induce fuel rod swelling
and rupture "in abundance" (60, p. 1105). Release of the gaseous and vola-
tile fission products, normally contained within the gas gaps and rod
plenums of the ruptured rods, to the reactor containment vessel would be
expected. However, assuming adequate reflood rates, the LOCA scenario
described does not lead to massive core melting, as envisioned in a "China
syndrome" scenario. With adequate reflooding rates assured, it is not
likely that damage to the containment structure would take place. Conse-
quently, it appears that resulting radiation hazards to the general public
could be kept within currently permissable standards.
With respect to BWRs, as previously discussed, there do not appear
to be the same physical limitations to increasing flood rates to accept-
able standards that trouble the PWRs (60, p. 1092). Simplistically speak-
ing, increasing reflood pumping capacity appears to be a satisfactory
method of resolving the problem. Review of a high reflooding rate LOCA
scenario, even with the additional conservatisms previously discussed,
suggests that the BWRs would probably experience less damage than would
be predicted for the PWRs. In fact, a reasonable probability exists that
no fuel rod ruptures would occur during the LOCA, assuming the availabil-
ity of the increased reflood rates (i, p. 20-19). If this were the case,
reactor damage would be minimal; and the radiation hazard to the public
would not be expected to exceed normal operational limits.
Consequently, performing ECCS redesign to achieve higher reflooding
rates appears to have the same potential for eliminating the ECCS relia-
bility problem as an issue as adopting the "as low as practicable" radia-
tion emission standards did for the issue of normal operating radiation
hazards. Taking action which would eliminate this restriction to develop-
ment of nuclear power seems very desirable.
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If this action is found to be unacceptable by the AEC or the vendors,
it may be possible to quell the argument by imposing still more conserva-
tive design criteria (as compared to the AC), and to conduct accelerated
research that would provide a quantitative basis for assessment of the
margin of safety.
4.3.1 Increased criteria conservatism
As discussed in the body of the text and reviewed in detail in the
relevant appendices, the following changes to the AC might be con-
sidered to increase its conservatism:
(1) Decay heat uncertainty limits increased to ANS Standard 5.1
plus 30-35 percent.
(2) Permissible local clad oxidation limits for embrittlement
lowered. An equivalent (Baker-Just) total oxidation of
12-14 percent of the total cladding thickness should be
considered as a limit to increase confidence in clad
ductility following quench.
(3) The Critical Break Flow Model(s) should be specified.
More definitive specifications of acceptable low quality
fluid break flow models should be provided to assure
conservative treatment of potential metastable fluid
flows in excess of those predicted by the Moody model.
(4) Minimum reflooding rates of 6 in/sec could be specified.
Reactor vendors could be required to demonstrate that
initial nominal reflood heat transfer coefficients of
no less than 40 B/hr-ft2-OF (or alternatively reflooding
rates of no less than 6 in/sec) are attainable with
their ECCS designs in the event of a double-ended pipe
break DBA.
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4.3.2 Accelerated research and development programs*
(1) Programs for large scale system testing (e.g., LOFT)
should be expanded and accelerated, and planning for
near full-scale testing initiated. Current programs
are too limited in scope and operating on too relaxed
a schedule for acceptability under current LWR licensing
demands. Large scale programs should be tightly coupled
with a complete analytical investigation of phenomena
being studied, to assure an adequate basis for transfer
of test results to revised design criteria.
(2) Fission product decay heat investigations should be
conducted, including well correlated experimental and
analytical studies of fuel rods with high integrated
flux-time irradiation histories.
(3) Large scale critical break flow investigations should
be made of pipe flow under conditions simulating typical
LWR-DBA characteristics including adequate linear dimen-
sions and time scaling.
(4) Additional FLECHT tests should be conducted. Tests with
zirca10y clad rods at power levels associated with maxi-
mum peaking factors (in accordance with AC prescriptions)
would be especially valuable.
(5) Determination of a statistically adequate probability
distribution of reactor thermal response as a function
of critical LOCA-ECCS parameters should be undertaken.
(6) Independent development of BWR-LOCA numerical analysis
methods should be accelerated. A thorough cross-checking
of existing BWR codes as systems, and in terms of appropri-
ate subroutines, should be initiated as soon as possible.
* An outline of current, world-wide LOCA-ECCS R&D programs (reproduced
from 10) is given in appendix 4.
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4.3.3 Design concepts for improved LWR stability
During the lAC hearings, both Westinghouse and General Electric
announced plans for revisions in their reactor core designs which would
increase stability in the event of a LOCA. GE proposed a revised fuel
bundle design as part of a larger BWR-6 system design revision. The new
bundle incorporates more rods, each operating at lower linear power ratings,
(64 rods vs 49, each operating at 13.4 Kw/ft vs. 18.5 Kw/ft for BWR-5) in
a fuel bundle of the same basic size as previous designs.
In a similar move, Westinghouse proposed changing to a 17 x 17 rod
array, designed to have the same overall dimensional envelope as their
previous standard 15 x 15 array. The new fuel array "being offered for
operation in 1976 or later," according to Westinghouse, is said to contain
thinner fuel rods with thicker cladding. It is estimated that peak linear
power density may be cut by some 20 percent by the new design.
The desirable result of such design changes are lower normal opera-
ting power (or heat) output per rod with a consequent reduction in indi-
vidual rod decay heat release at reactor shutdown. Thicker cladding for
PWRs, bringing them more in line with current BWR design practice, also
helps to reduce the probability of embrittlement for a given oxidation
exposure cycle. Thus, greater stability is achieved by the design in the
event of a reactor LOCA.
To insure greater stability in all operating reactors, it is recom-
mended that all LWR designs be investigated (including retrofits) for
incorporation of such changes. Recommended, in the spirit of the GE and
Westinghouse changes, are:
(1) Reduced linear fuel rod power ratings,
(2) Thicker rod cladding -- especially for PWRs, and addition-
ally:
(3) Pre-operational oxidation of fuel rod cladding,
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(4) Revised ECC fluid insertion methods to assure increased
reflood rates of 6 in/sec, or more,
(5) Design changes to reduce the effect of steam binding
in PWR primary loops on ECCS performance.
4.3.4 Increased public involvement in nuclear power risk-benefit
evaluations
It has been fairly observed, that "nuclear power technology is now
at a point of crisis" (~). In fact, as Green has stated further:
Given the present national obsession with environmental
values, the rise of (the) public-interest lawyer, public skepti-
cism of authority, and the current judicial attitudes, nuclear
power is locked in a death struggle which it cannot win, except
in a Pyrrhic sense, under the present ground rules (~, p. 77).
Green's skepticism seems well founded, under the circumstances. The crisis
appears to have developed on the basis of the public's perception of a
breakdown in the AEC's "full, free, and frank discussion" of the hazards
associated with nuclear power.
It is not the purpose of this paper to present, or defend, the causes
of this perceived breakdown in the credibility of nuclear power informa-
tion dissemination. However, in the development of nuclear power, as in
several other areas of environmental sensitivity, it appears to be highly
beneficial for all parties concerned to increase public involvement and
enhance participation in decision making processes as much as possible.
The concept of cooperative public/industry "open planning" of important
utility decisions has been discussed at length in several EQL pllblications
(e.g., Lees, et al., People, Power, and Pollution) (40). Demonstrated success
has been shown in achieving goals of public benefit through operation of
concepts involving substantial public participation in decision making
such as "open planning."
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Again in the words of Green:
The starting point must be a policy of "full, free, frank
discussion in public" of the benefits and risks of nuclear power.
The present policy of avoiding explicit discussion of risks so
as to avoid "unduly alarming" the public should be abandoned.
The public should be told, as a matter of course and in language
that can be readily understood, what the risks are, what has
been done to minimize them and what risks nevertheless remain.
The public should also be told in accurate and realistic form
what the benefits are.
I would like to see the nuclear safety community develop
a forensic spirit. It is to everyone's advantage and in the
public interest that opposition to nuclear power be channeled
along constructive and responsible lines. I would hope that
people working in nuclear safety would recognize a public re-
sponsibility to work with intervenors and other opponents of
nuclear power--not to try to educate them as to the error of
their ways, but rather to understand and accept their concerns
as valid, and to help them articulate these concerns effect-
ively, accurately, and responsibly. This, I believe, would
contribute more than anything else to strengthen and promote
the vitality of nuclear power and enhance nuclear safety <11,
pp. 77, 78).
It is of great importance that the opportunity for meaningful public
involvement in nuclear power risk-benefit decisions be increased. To
achieve such involvement would be mutually beneficial for all concerned
in the development of nuclear power. Open planning may not represent an
instant panacea for utility company problems. In fact, it may temporar-
ily appear to enhance problems. However, it is our belief that the
American public, confronted with the decisions to be made and in posses-
sion, with understanding, of all the critical facts, will reach the right
conclusions.
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Appendix 1 GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF LIGHT WATER REACTOR AND EMERGENCY
CORE COOLING SYSTEM OPERATION AND DESIGN
There are two basic types of light water reactors in common
use in the United States today: pressurized water reactors (PWR) and
boiling water reactors (BWR). Figures Al.l and Al.2 show, in schematic
form, the elemental components of BWR and PWR power generating systems.
As indicated in the figures, the principal difference between the two
reactor systems is related to the isolation of the radioactively
contaminated working fluid of the reactor from the turbine-generator
steam supply in the PWR. As shown for PWRs in figure Al.2, steam for
the turbines is produced in a "steam generator" secondary heat exchange
loop isolated from the reactor fluid. High pressure and temperature
water circulates through the reactor core and steam generator primary
loop, while relatively lower temperature and pressure steam, developed
for the turbines, circulates in the isolated secondary loop of the
steam generator.
Typical operating characteristics for P\VRs and BWRs are shown
in table Al.l. As indicated, in order for PWRs to operate with effi-
ciencies approximately equivalent to those of BWRs, it is necessary to
operate with reactor pressures of approximately 2000 psi, nearly
twice the typical 1000 psi BWR operating pressures. At these pressures,
the water in the reactor portion of the PWR loop remains a liquid
throughout the entire cycle. In the PWR, steam is generated only in
the lower pressure (secondary) side of the steam generator loop to
drive the turbine generators.
In a BWR, as indicated by its name, water passing through the
core is boiled within the reactor core itself. Steam produced within
the reactor is piped directly to the turbine without the added complexity
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TABLE A1.1
Typical Operational Parameters for 1000 MW Light Water Reactors
e
PARAMETERS
REACTOR
System Pressure (psi)
aInlet Temperature ( F)
Outlet Temperature
TURBINE
Inlet Pressure (psi6Inlet Temperature ( F)
THERMAL POWER RATING (MW )
t
Electrical Power Output (MW )
e
HEAT TRANSFER AT RATED POWER
Active Surface Area (ft~)
Avg. Heat Flux (B/hr-fZ)Max Heat Flux (B/hr-ft )
Avg. Linear Heat Rate (KW/ft)
Max. Linear Heat Rate (KW/ft)
PWR
2200
550
600
800
500
3400
1100
53,000
210,000
560,000
7
19
BWR
1000
420
550
1000
550
3300
1100
66,000
160,000
420,000
7
18
INITIAL CORE LOADING
Initial Charge (Metric tons of
uranium)
Assemblies/Core
Rods/Assembly
ANNUAL DISCHARGE
Fuel (Metric Tons of Uranium)
Assemblies
Fuel Rods
FUEL RODS
87 149
1q3 764
204 49
1/3 Core 1/4 Core
29 37
64 190
13,000 9,300
Number
Outside Diam (in)
Cladding Thickness (in)
Fuel Pellet Diam (in)
Diametra1 Gap (in)
Active Length (in)
Al-3
39,000
0.43
0.025
0.37
0.01
144
37,000
0.56
0.03
0.49
0.01
144
of the intermediate heat transfer loop of the PWR steam generator.
In the event of a break in the BWR hot leg steam line outside the contain-
ment enclosure for the reactor, radioactively contaminated steam would
be released to the biosphere. In the PWR, on the other hand, radio-
actively contaminated releases from a break in the reactor hot leg
would be retained within the containment enclosure. In order to
minimize radiation hazards to the public from external hot leg breaks,
a critical BWR design feature is the main stream isolation valve which
is provided to limit or prevent the escape of steam and radioactive
trace elements from the reactor in the event of an accident.
More detailed (albeit still schematic) views of the nuclear
steam supply systems for BWRs and PWRs are shown in figures AI.3 and
AI.4. These figures show the elements of the emergency core cooling
systems as well as a more accurate depiction of the working elements
of the reactor and fluid flow portions of the cycle.
Al.I BWR Steam Supply and ECCS Systems
In the BWR (figure AI.3) circulation of the water in the
reactor vessel is maintained by 20 jet pumps located around the circum-
ference of the reactor core, as shown by the two typical pumps in the
cross-sectional view. Water is boiled as it flows through the core
and the wet steam is separated from the entrained water droplets by
steam separators. Liquid from the steam separators and the baffled
steam dryers is returned to the remainder of the water in the reactor,
where, combined with make-up water and condensate feed water returning
from the turbines, it is recirculated through the reactor core.
A break in the recirculation loop to the jet pumps has been
calculated to be the accident placing the most serious demands on the
ECCS for a BWR reactor. Consequently a break in these lines has been
designated the DBA for the BWR. The resulting system depressurization
(blowdown) and subsequent "dryout" prior to delivery of the emergency
coolant is assumed to eliminate all of the water from the reactor
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pressure vessel. Following blowdown, the emergency core coolant is
delivered to the core through the circumferential ducts of the high
and low pressure core spray spargers and the low pressure injection
system, as shown. These three coolant injection sources are the
principal means of supplying emergency coolant for the BWR-ECCS.
As water from the ECCS accumulates in the reactor core,
levels as high as the tops of the jet pumps can be maintained for
long term reactor cooling. Fluid lost from the recirculation loop
break is collected in a fluid reservoir "pressure suppression chamber"
within the containment vessel for the reactor. The pressure suppres-
sion chamber reservoir acts as a sink for condensation of steam from
the break as well as a source for long term recirculation of coolant to
maintain the core temperatures in a safe steady state condition.
A1.2 PWR Steam Supply and ECCS Systems
In the PWR, a break in the "cold leg" main inlet line from
one of the steam generator loops has been calculated to produce the most
severe fluid loss conditions for the reactor and is consequently used
as the DBA. As indicated in figure Al.4, all primary system components
and inlet and outlet pipes are located above the reactor core. This
design increases the potential for emergency coolant to refill the
reactor vessel above the core. Furthermore, penetrations in the vessel
below the core are avoided in the design of PWRs in order to limit the
possibility of breaks occurring in the vessel which could result in
serious coolant losses.
Immediately following the LOCA the principal sources of coolant
for the PWR-ECCS are the gas pressurized accumulators as shown in
figure Al.4. An accumulator tank is provided for each of the steam
generator loops for the reactor (from two to four individual loops
depending upon manufacturer's designs). The accumulator tanks are
typically designed to operate automatically, through check valves, when
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the reactor pressure falls below 600 psi. Without losses, the tanks
are designed to refill the core with borated water (to "poison" further
nuclear reactions) to a level of one-half the length of the fuel rods,
within one-half minute after a large pipe break.
The residual heat removal system of the ECCS for a PWR operates
after the accumulator tanks have begun their delivery when the system
is essentially depressurized. As indicated in figure AI.4, this part
of the system supplies fluid from the refueling water supply and/or the
containment sump through the low pressure injection system (LPIS) and
high pressure injection system (HPIS) pumps. Pressure suppression
chambers are not a characteristic of PWR design as they are for the BWR.
PWR fluid losses during blowdown following DBA are, however, collected
in the containment vessel and recirculated from the sump heat exchanger
system for long term, steady state cooling of the reactor following a
LOCA. Thus steady state cooling methods are quite similar for both
BWRs and PWRs.
The portion of the PWR primary steam system labelled "Pressurizer"
in figure AI.4 is not an integral part of the ECCS. In a PWR, a single
"Pressurizer" is provided for normal operating conditions to act as a
fluid oscillation damping-energy absorbing reservoir, in order to compen-
sate for electrical load following demands on the stearn generators
which may require changes in the steam supply which would be too rapid
for normal reactor load following capability. The fluid in the pres-
surizer is considered a part of the operating system, all of which is
assumed to be lost during blowdown. Consequently no beneficial delivery
from the pressurizer is assumed for the ECCS although, practically
speaking, some benefit might be expected to be gained in an actual LOCA.
AI.3 Radioactivity*
The total amount of radioactivity in an operating nuclear power
plant depends on the reactor's power level and t~me in operation. When a
* Abstracted from (!) pp. 4-6 to 4-R.
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light water nuclear plant (LWR) in the 1000 ~~ size range is first
e
placed into operation, for example, it is loaded with unirradiated,
but naturally-radioactive uranium fuel (enriched to about 3 percent U-235)
having an aggregate activity of about 150 curies in a typical PWR loading
and about 300 curies in a BWR loading. (Table Al-l lists some typical
PWR and BWR fuel loading and discharge data for reference.) With nuclear
operation at power, the quantity of radioactivity increases to the order
of 1.7 x 1010 curies between refueling operations, which occur about once
a year (see table AI.O). Since only a fraction of the core is replaced
during refueling, a large inventory of radioactive material is retained
in the core after initial power operation. The quantity wQuld be greater
or smaller for the same kind of plant with larger or smaller power level,
respectively.
When the reactor is shut down, the generation of radioactivity
ceases and the quantity of radioactivity in the spent fuel decreases,
initially at a very rapid rate due mostly to the decay of short-lived
fission products to longer-lived or non-radioactive nuclides. At tIle
same time, substantial quantities of heat continue to be generated in
the spent fuel due to the interaction of the intense radiation of the
decaying radionuclides with atoms and molecules in the spent fuel and
surrounding media. The amount of heat generated decreases with time
as radioactive decay progresses; this heat is called "decay heat" (see
appendix 5).
Table Al.2 provides some calculated values for the quantities
of radioactivity and heat associated with the entire core of a 1100 MW
e
PWR after a sustained period of operation. The values indicate how
these quantities would decrease with time after reactor shutdown. To a
good approximation, these values would also apply to a comparable BWR
core under the same circumstances. The values in table Al.2 are based
on the assumption that the whole core loading of fuel is allowed to decay.
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Table Al.2
Calculated Radioactivity of 1100 MWe PWR* at Shutdown and
as a Function of Decay Time
Radioactive (megacuries)Decay
Time
(days)
o
1
5
15
30
60
~ 120
I
~ 210
365
1,097
3,653
Iodine and
Bromine Isotopes
1,435
265
101
28.7
6.74
0.494
0.00282
0.00000309
0.00000218
0.00000218
0.00000218
Noble
Gases
1,240
221
105
29.0
4.77
0.784
0.659
0.648
0.630
0.553
0.353
All Fission
Products
13,800
2,890
1,870
1,280
947
656
401
244
146
47.3
17.9
Actinides
3,450
1,330
432
39.7
9.35
6.32
5.90
5.56
5.17
4.45
3.27
Activation
Products
10.6
9.19
8.42
7.50
6.40
4.76
2.76
1.36
0.614
0.324
0.132
Total
17,250
4,230
2,310
1,330
963
666
410
250
152
52.0
21.3
Total
Thermal Power
(kW)
225,000
17,400
9,720
5,600
4,060
2,350
1,740
1,100
659
204
67
*Reactor is assumed to be shut down just before refueling after a sustained (293-day) period at a specific
power of 37.5 MW/metric ton. The time average specific power over the previous 1100 days is 30 MW/metric
ton. The reactor is fueled with 3.3% enriched uranium totaling 82 metric tons of enriched uranium fuel.
Actually, as shown in table AI.I, generally only one-third of the fuel
in a PWR (one-fourth in a BWR) is removed and replaced with fresh fuel
each year, so that most of the fuel remains in the reactor from three
to four years.
The portion of irradiated fuel discharged annually from LWRs
is stored in water pools in the reactor plants. These storage pools pro-
vide cooling for the decay heat and shielding for plant operators against
the intense radiation of the spent fuel. After about 150 days storage,
the radioactive rate of decay in the spent fuel has slowed considerably.
By this time, many of the shorter-lived radionuclides have decayed to
non-radioactive species and the continuing decay is paced by the longer-
lived radionuclides in the fuel. Longer storage of 30 to 60 additional
days does not result in substantial further reduction in total radio-
activity. Consequently, the spent fuel is loaded into heavily-shielded
shipping casks for transfer to a fuel reprocessing plant after about a
150 day cooling period.
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APpendiX 2 GENERALIZED DESCRImON OF LOSS-OF-COOLANT ACCIDENT FOR PWR', AND BWR's
Thll events and processes of an LOGA are developed to illustrate the system behavior and phenomena which mUllt be
accounted for by the calculational methods in order to prescribe the design and performance requirements for ECC systems.
p\VR-LOCA BEnAVIOR
Figure B-1 depicts the generalized LOCA behavior for a postulated large break in one loop of a multiloop PWR primary
coolant circuit. This characterization of the accident is derived from mallY calculations carried out for different pipe break
locations for current PWR designs. The numbers on the figure are indexed to the following description of the course of the
loes-of-coolant proCCIll.
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Figure A2.1 Generalized loss-of-Coolant"Sehavior for Large Pipe Breaks in a PWR.
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Immediately foDowing the pipe break, as the primary coolant is expelled from the rupture, the systcm experiences a rapidU
subcooled depr(,.8surization (I) causing the flow within the reactor core to accelerate for an outlet break (2) or decelerate fOran!J
'inlet break (3). As the system depressurization continues (4) the local fluid saluration pressure is reached and fluid flashing, with!
an attendant fluid density decrease, occurs in the core as steam bubble growth is initiated. Within the core r('~on the decrt:asing
fluid density (moderator loss) causes the core power generation to decline within a few hundred milliseconds to tlu; fission product!
dccay heat power level (approximately 6% of the operating power).
For the inlet break conditions the reduced core flow commensurate with coolant voiding in thc core can cause a larg~~ abrupt;
decrease in heat transfer from the fuel to the coolant and initiate the critical heat flux (CIIF), or departure from nucleate boiling'
(DNB) (5). For thc outlet break condition the core flow increase (2) tends to offset the density dccrea~e and high heat transfer is
preserved for an extended period unti.l the local fluid conditions within the core are degraded sufficiently that CIlF (6) ultimately
is rea('hed. For either break, the abrupt c1eneasc in heat transfer (5) (6) allows the large amount of storcd encrgy within the fuel to;
redistribute with a resullant rapid iticrellSe in fuel dadding lcrupcrillurc8 (7) (B).
For the inlet break condition, at several seconds into the depressurization process the core mass flow rate (9) is significantly'
reduced because of nearly balanced fluid resistance paths to the break. For the outlet break condition, the fluid resistance to the
break from the corc region is markedly lower and results in a continued significant upward core flow (10). These differences in the
core flow histories (9) (10) respectively influence the cladding temperature histories for the inlet and outlet brcak conditions.
As the stored thermal energy within the fuel becomes redistributed the cladding temperature rise may terminate or the.
temperature may decline slightly (II) (12) as the competitive effects of continued fission product decay heating and some limited
amount of heat transfer exist for a few seconds. As the coolant conditions within the core continue to deteriQrate the claddi.@
temperature rises (13) (14) commensurate with adiabatic conditions dictated by the local fission product decay heat rate.
When the cladding temperature cltceeds ... l2000 F for either break condition, structural distortion, such as ballooning of the
cladding, may develop. Ballooning is postulated to result from a combination of thc decreased strength of the cladding (as the
temperature increases) and the increasing differential pressure between the internal fuel rod pressure and the decreasing external
system pressure.
As the coolant is expelled into the containment structure surrounding the reactor, the primary system continues to
deprc-S5urize with an accompanying decrease of liquid level within the reactor vessel (15). When the systcm pressure decreases,
below the gas dome pressure within the ECC accumulators (or core flooding tanks), relatively cold auxiliary coolant is injected
into the appropriate inlet piping (or upper core barrel region) in an attempt to replenish the liquid inventory in the bottom plenum
of the reactor vessel.
For an outlet break condition, soon after accumulator injection begins, the liquid inventory in the bottom plenum is
replenished to the bottom of the core (16), Core flooding is maintained by the low pressure coolant injection systems when the.
accumulator inventory is spent.
For an inlet break, some backflow from the core and continued boiloff of the liquid in the lower plenum cause steam flow
up the downcomer which tends to inhihit the entry of auxiliary coolant to the lower plenum. In addition, the steam flow in thc
inlet pipes of the unbroken loops tends to entrain some of the injected coolant anu this entrained coolant is then carried around
the downcomer annulus to the break. These conditions lead to the postulated "accumulator ECC bypass" situation. As
decomprcSl.'ion continuea and the system steam flow rates decrease. the influence of gravity overcomes the entrainment forces and
the lower plenum begins to fill (17).
As the lower plenum fills and coolant reaches the bottom of the core, steam begins to he generated. The steam, entraining'
!lome liquid, nses in thc corc and cools the cladding. For the inlet break, the steam must escape from tht~ system by passing
through the steam generators and pumps in order to reach the system vent. or pipe break (Figure A-I of Appendix A). The stealn,
in pasaing through the various system components and particularly the steam generator where additional energy is addcd from the
secondary system, is impeded by friction. The frictional pressure drop can reach a value of several pounds per square inch causing a
backpressure on the renooding process which competell against the head of water in the downcomer attempling to drive coolant
into the corc. The downcomer head in most currcnt reactor designs can develop to a maximum head of ..... 7· l!2 psi if the flooding
process is relatively steady·state. If oscillatory effects occur as a result of the coupling between the inertance and the force of
gravity on the liquid in the down.comer and the coupling between the inertance of the liquid in the downeomer ilnd the
compliance of the eomprell8ible stellm volume ahove the flooding front, the average driving head oould he leM than the stcady-6tde
driving head. thus lowering still further the time.averaged flooding rate within the core. The O8cil1atory flooding front could,
bowever. provide improved heat transfer in the early part of the floodinc prOCClll.
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The competing effects of the limited driving head for flooding and the backprcssure from the exiting steam give rise to the
postulated steam binding problem. The limited flooding rate for the inlet break, resulting from steam binding, causes decreased
heat transfer in the core relative to that which would exist for higher flooding rates for an outlet break. Where these competing
effects arc involved for the inlet break, additional suhtlctics, such as the effects of containment backpressure on entrainment and
on heat transfer and such as the compressible-flow accelcration-pressure drops due to energy being transferred from the secondary
side of the steam generator to escaping steam from the primary system, become important.
The temperature that the fuel cladding can attain without loss of structural integrity is determincd, for zirconium-clad fuels,
by the amount of oxygen taken up hy thc eladding during mctal-water reactions which becomc significant at temperaturcs above
1800oF. At 18000 F the reaction rate is low but as the temperature incrcases to 20000 F and above, the reaction rate increases
rapidly. At 23000 F, for example, the oxygen uptake is such that reaction durations exceeding several tens of seconds ca.use
sufficient embrittlement that upon quenching of the fuel cladding by ECC, the structural integrity of the cladding is insufficient to
assure a definable heat transfer geometry within the hotter regions of the core.
The foregoing, intended to depict the general system behavior during an LOCA for a PWR, has emphasized the DBA
conditions which are expected to establish the ultimate requirements for ECC system design. The magnitude of the calculated
effect of break size and location on the DBA is shown in Figure B-2. The calculations for developing the figure inelude those by
the reactor manufacturers and those performed independently by Aerojet Nuclear Company in conjunction with the design and
program planning for the Loss-of-Fluid Test (LOFT). Apparent from the figure is the dominant influence of the large inlet break in
determining the requirements of ECC designs for PWR's. However, the very largest break should not be concluded to be the most
demanding on ECC design for all PWR's.
BWR LOeA BEHAVIOR
Figure B-3 depicts the generalized loss-of-coolant accident behavior for a postulated break in either the liquid recirculation
lines or the steam outlet lines of a contemporary boiling watcr reactor system. The numbers on the figures are indexed to the
following description of the course of the loss-of~oolant process.
Immediately following a steam line or recirculation line break of a BWR the system experiences a very limited subeooled
depressurization because a significant amount of the fluid in the system during operation is at saturation conditions, with the
remainder being slightly subcooled. The loss of one recirculating loop causes the core mass flow to drop rapidly to about one-half
the initial value (I) as the other systems continue to provide coolant supply to the lower plenum, since a large volume of the vessel
contains steam, at the outset, the depressurization process is relatively slow (2), and at several seconds into the transient, the steam
isolation valves in the outlet line close requiring that all system coolant exit from the pipe break region. Since the contemporary
version of the BWR incorporates the internal jet pump design, all pipe breaks, including recirculation and steam line breaks, in
general, produce the effect of an outlet break in a PWR; that is, the depressurizing coolant flows in the normal upward direction
through the core as illustrated in the figure.
At thc approximate time the liquid level within the reactor drops to an elevation at which the jct pumps become uncovered,
the mechanical pumps in the recirculation line are coasting down and shortly cavitate dropping the core mass flow to nearly zero.
These conditions promote coolant starvation within the reactor core and initiate CHF in the hotter regions of the core (3). As the
liquid level in the outer annulus around the core barrel drops to the elevation of the recirculation line outlet, the flow out thc
break becomes steam and the depressurization rate is increased (4). Simultaneously, the saturation pressure of fluid in the lower
plenum of the reactor vessel is reached and a process called lower plenum flashing is initiated (5). During this process the fluid
tends to flash violently and surges into the core region. The potential for significant cooling exists such that the cladding
temperature rise may be terminated (6) and the cladding temperature may be restored to the fluid saturation temperature. As the
coolant inventory in the lower plenum is spent from flashing, the system pressure continues to decline and the cladding
temperature again rises in the holter zones of the core and experiences ONB a second time (7). The cladding temperature rises
rapidly until the energy redistribution within the fuel pin is complete at which time decay heat limits the rate of the temperature
rise (8). Shown in the figure for completeness is the continued temperature rise from the early event of CHF (3) on through to the
temperature limit (9') assuming no cooling due to lower plenum flashing. As the system pressure continues to drop, a high pressure
spray system above the reactor is initiated and top spray flow is developed at about 260 psia. The spray tends to wet the fuel
canister walls providing a radiation sink for heat removal from the fuel pins. The resulting steam from canister welting also
provides some convective heat removal from the cladding surface. This cooling proceaa tends to slow the heatup rate until the
lower reactor veMCl plenum is filled by the accumulated spray and LPCI system coolant inventories and a core reflooding proCCll8
similar to that for the PWR is initiated.
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Figure A2.3 Generalized Loss-of-Coolant Behavior for large Pipe Breaks in a BWR.
For the lower cladding temperature history (8), the cladding temperature turnaround (9) results from the initiation of
flooding at the bottom of the core. For the upper cladding temperature history (8'), the effects of metal·water reaction energy are
seen to cause a significantly increased rate of temperature rise prior to the event of flooding (9').
For the steam line break, the various events are depicted by dashed lines in Figure B·3. The pressure is seen to decrease
considerably more rapidly (10) than for the recirculation line break. Since steam venting is taking place at a higher region of the
reactor vessel the liquid fraction in the system remains high and all recirculation line ..systems continue to operate. Significant core
flow is thus seen to continue (Il); however, the flow eventually decreases as the pressure decay causes the recirculating mechanical
pumps to cavitate. The flashing process continues to provide reasonable core flow and at least sufficient steam cooling to the core.
The attendant cladding temperature indicates that nearly all the stored energy within the fuel is removed until, at the worst case,
the coolant conditions can no longer support the heat transfer required to keep the cladding temperatures near the coolant
saturation temperature (12). At this point the cladding temperature begins to rise as a result of the small amount of remaining
stored energy and decay heat energy. Up to this time most of the fluid lost from the system as a result of a steam line break has
been steam and some two-phase mixture; that fraction of liquid having insufficient enthalpy to flash remains in the lower plenum.
The additional inventory necessary to fill the lower plenum to the bottom of the core and effect early turnover of the cladding
temperature rise (13) is, therefore, considerably less than for the recirculation line break. The general behavior of the fuel cladding,
effect of metal-water reaction, and embrittlement are sufficiently similar to those of a PWR that additional discWl8ion is
unwarranted.
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Unlike the process for til(' PWR, the effect of stearn binding docs not app;:ar to inhibit thl: rate of flooding hecaus~ the stealll
need pass only through relatively small frictional pressure drop paths (Figure A4 of Appendix A) on its way to the break.
Figure B-4 presents the calculated peak cladding temperature as a function of break area for steam line and recirculation line
breaks for two separate single failure conditions in a contemporary BWRB·I. One case considen failure of the HPCS; the othel'
considers failure of a diesel generator. These graphs are considered representative of a single-failure criterion approach to maxim4rn,
cladding temperature and should lIot be considered to be restrictive in defining the capability of a system or combination of
systems. As would hI" expected, a general trend toward higher peak cladding temperatures occurs as break areas increase. For the
smallest breaks, no core hcatup occurs. The exact shapes and magnitudes of the temperature curves for this type of representatiolY
depend to a large extent on such factors 38 the analytical techniques ullCd in the calculations, a811umptions on heat transfer
corrdations. and the particular single failure condition considered.
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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
[Docket No. PRM-3~1)
CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY CORE
COOLING SYSTEMS FOR lIGHT-
WATER POWER REACTORS
Interim Policy Statement
The Atomic Energy Commission has
adopted the interim statement of policy
set forth below providin~ interim accept-
ance crit·eria for emergency core cooling.
SyEtellls for light-water power reactors,
INTERIM ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR EMER-
GENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS FOR
LIGHT-WATER POWER REACTORS
I. GENERAL
The Atomic Energy Commission has
recently been reevaluating the theoret-
ical and experimental bases for predict-
ing the performance of emergency core
cooling systems, Including new informa-
tion obtained from industry and AEC
research programs in this field. As a re-
sult of this reevaluation, the interim
criteria of section IV of this policy state-
ment have been adopted by the Commis-
sion for usc in the licensing of light-water
power reactors.
II, BACKGROUND
Protection against a highly unlikely
.loss-of-coolant accident has long been
an essential part of the defense-in-depth
concept used by the nuclear power in-
dlLstry and the AEC to assure the safety
of nuclear power plants. In th.is concept,
the primary assurance of safety is acci-
dent prevention by correctly designing.
constructing", and operating the reactor.
Extensive and systematic quality assur-
ance practices are required and applied
at every step to achieve this primary as-
surance of safety, Nevertheless, devia-
tions from expected behaVior are postu-
lated to occur, and protective systems are
installee! to take corrective action M re-
quiree! in such events. Notwlthstane!ing
all this, the occurrence of serious acci-
dents Is postulated, in spite of the fact
that they arc highly unlikely. and engi-
neered safety features are installed to
mltlr,ate the consequences of these un-
likely event.s. The loss-of-coolant acci-
dent is such a postulated improbable
accident; the emergency core cooling
system is one of the engineered safety
features installed to mitIgate its
consequences.
Emergency core cooling system desIgn
considerations were reviewed in a 1967
report to the AEC by an ad hoc Advisory
Task Force on Power Reactor Emergency
Core Cooling. The Task Force recom-
mended that additIonal assurance could
and should be obtained that llubstantlal
tUel me1t1n1 can be prevented by emer-
,enC7 core cooling ll18tems. Improve-
mentll in primary system InteGrity. devel-
opment of Improvcd analytical methods
for !Jredlctlng core cooling performance.
and performance of confirmatory experi-
ment.~ were recommended.
Extensive design, analysis. and re-
search programs were Init.lated by the
AEC and the nuclcar industry In thcse
areas, and much new Information has
been developed. Additionally, practiccs
in the design, manufacture, installation,
and inspcctlon of power reactor primary
systems have bcen markedly improved.
Later, in 1969, an AEC Intcrnal Study
Group recommended r,reater emphasis on
quality assurance. and confirmed the use
of postulated unlikely accidents (such as
the loss-of-coolant accle!ent) as de-
sign bases for reactor safety.
The ongoing industry and AEC pro-
grams have produced a large amount of
information not available at the time of
the earlier reviews. This new information
has led to changes in the various emer-
gency core cooling system designs for
power reactors, and also in the analytical
methods lLsed in the evaluation of system
performance. Development by the reactor
vendors, and independently by the AE:C,
of new methods of analysis-computer
codes-more complex and sophisticated
by far than those formerly in usc, gave
new insight Into the processes, and prob- .
lems, in predicting emergency core cool-
ing system performance.
TIle nuclear industry as well as the
AEC has sponsored a great deal of eon- .
firma tory experimentation In this field.
Blowdowl1 experiments performed on
nonnuclear simplified models of pressur-
ized systcms were used to check and cor-
rect the new codes. Some of these
experiment.~ in the small LOFT Semi-
scale Blowdown System at the National
Reactor Testing Station In Idaho showed
deviations from the predictions of the
codes then in use. For example, the emer-
gency core cooling water was ejected
from the system during the blowdown.
Although there arc differences between
the small LOFT Semlscale experiments
and large power reactors, tlJ.1s experi-
mental result has been taken into ac-
count where applicable In the evaluation
models of Appendix A' by Including the
conservative assumption that all of the
water Injected by the accumuliltors dur-
ing blowdown is lost.
The process of code development and
experimentation using models is ex-
pected to continue. The Commission
plans to place the necessary additional
emphasis on such work in Commission
programs and expects the nuclear indUS-
try to accelerate Its efforts.
In view of the large amount of new
InformatIon available, the AEC has
again conducted a review of the present
state ot emergency core cooling system
technology. and has reevaluated the
basis previously used tor accepting sy.-
tem dealsna tor current tJpes ot llght-
water reactors.
III. EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY CORE
COOLING SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
The course of a loss-of-coolant ac~l­
dent, and the performance of the emer-
gency core cooling system, are evaluated
with a sequence of calculations. For cal-
culation, the system is divided into many
control volumes ("nodes"). Each volume
contains the heat sources and sinks ap-
propriate to the component being mod-
eled. During the entire calCUlation.
temperatures In the core are calculated
as function of time. The cooling processes
are primary coolant flow during blow-
down and flow of emergency core cooling
water as it becomes available.
Ideally, one would have available an-
alytical methods capable of detailed re-
alistic prediction of all phenomena
known or suspected to occur during a
loss-of-coolant accident. supported in
every aspect by definitive experiments
directly applicable to the accident. In
the absence of such perfection, adequate
assurance of safety can be obtained from
an appropriately conservative analysis
based on available experimental infor-
matioll. In areas of Incomplcte knowl-
edge. conservative assumptions or
procedures must be applied. When
further experimcntal Information or Im-
provcd calculational techniques become
available. the conservatlsms presently
Imposed will be recvaluatcd and a more
realistic approach will be taken.
Detailed technical reviews have been
performed by the AEC of the computer
codes currently available for predicting
emergency core cooling system perform-
nnce. The AEC has developed sets of
suitably conservntive assumptions and
procedures which together with the com-
puter codes comprise three appropriately
conservative evaluation models to use for
evaluation. The codes used in one of
these evaluation models (described In
Part I of Appendix A) are available from
the AEC. Codes used in the other two
evaluation models (described In Parts 2
and 3 of Appene!ix A) contain proprietary
material. for which summaries are or
soon will be publicly available. Other
evaluation models are under review by
theAEC.
The three acceptable evaluation mod-
els presently included in Appendix A are
differcnt in many.respects, and the sets
of conservative assumptions and proce-
dures also dilIer from one another. These
dilIerences arise from two principal
causes: (I) DiITerences In approach and
calculational methods of the different
analyses. leading to different areas where
Imperfect knowledge or nnnlysis require
conservative treatments. and (2) differ-
ences In hardware among the various
reactor designs, such as spray vs. fiood
cooling and hot leg VS. cold leg vs. direct
vessel Injection.
IV. INTERIM ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS
The criteria for acceptance of emer-
gency core cooling systems have been
developed In the context of the defense-
In-depth concept, with the prImary IUI-
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where their nll\llif'rltlon Is not practicable
or for other r:ood cause.
Ib) The Commission may 01:;0 nuthor-
l7.e vrlrionccs from these criteria for a
limited period of time In allow comple-
tion of testinr: pro:~rams.
(c) The opplication of these criteria
is expected to permit normal elcctrlcnl
power output of nil, or almost all. power
f(·actors. However. if a limita\.ion should
result, rtnd if an urr:l'nt short-term need
for additional power occurs because of
unusual or peak demond, outage of other
efjulpment. or other similar reasons the
Commission may authorize full power
operation of the rl'actor for a limited
period.
(d) AllY variance authorized here-
under shall be based upon a determina-
tion of reasonable a:;surance that the
proposed action will not adversely affect
the health and safety of the public.
ApPENDIX A-ACCEPTAnJ.E EVALUATION MODELS
INCLUDING THF:IR CONSERVATIVE ASSUMP-
TIONS ANO PROCY-OURES
PART l-AEC EVALUATION" MODEL FOR PRES·
SURIZED-WATER REACTORS
Analyses should be performed for the entire
brea k spcotrum, from 0.5 ft.' up to and In-
cludIng the double-ended severance of the
Ill.rgest pipe of the reactor coolant pressure
boundrtry. The combination of systems used
for AnalysIs should be dertved from a failure
mode And e!TecM analysis, using the single
failure criterion.
TIle follOWing Analytical techniques should
be used:
1. TI1ermohydraullc calculation durIng
blowdown-IN-132I, "RELAP 3-A Computer
Prot;ram for Reactor Blowdown AnalysiS."
June 1970.
2. A suitable r"fill and retlood calculation
from the end of blowdown onward.
3. Fuel clement h"'ltup cnlculatlon-IN-
1445 "THETA I-B. A Computer Code forNucl~ar Reactor Core TIlermal Analysis,"
February 1971. Input.- from 1 and 2 will be
used for thIs calculation.
TIle user of these codes should R.osure him-
self th:l.t he hR.' reviewed available "updated
memos" Rnd Is usi nr, the correct versions and
choIce of options wIthIn the code.
The following a.ssumptlons and procedures
are to be used. Any assumptions not speel/led
should be fully Justltled.
1. Core and System Nodlng.
a. RELAP-nt least 3 core nodes, at least 7
nodes In the primary sIde of each steam gen-
erator model. Rnd one conU\lnment node.
b. THETA-at lea.',t 4 radIal fuel nodes and
one radial cladding node; at Icnst 7 axla!
fluid nodes.
2, Pump Mo<!"I·The pump resl:;tance, K,
U5('(! for analy:;l" 51,ould he fully J""tltled.
The e!Tect of pump "peed upon K Rhollid be
considered. The more wnservatlve or two
assumptions (locked or runnIng) should be
u.,cd for the pump during the blowdown
calculntlon.
3. Break CharnctprlsUes-For large breaks
In the rnnge 0.6 to I times the totnl area of
thc double-ended break of the largest cold-
Icg pipe. two brpak modcIs should be uoed.
The first model should 00 the double-endcll
severance (glllllotlne). which assumes that
there 18 break flow from both end8 of the
broken pipe, but no communloe.tlon between
the broken end8. The second model should
usume discharge from a single node (split).
4. A break discharge coemclent (C.. ) of 1
shoUld be used for all break 81zel1.
II. Decay heat-The decay h8lK CUI'Ye de-
acrlbed In the propoeed AN8 8t.ndU'd, with
• Westinghouse Electric Corp. proposals for
subatmospheric and Ice condenser contain-
ments, an~ propo8als from The Babcock and
Wilcox do. and Combustion Engineering,
Inc., are under review by the AEC.
1 A loss-of-coolant accident Is a postUlated
accident that results from the loss of reactor
coolant at a rate In excess of the capability
of tile reactor coolant makeup system trom
breaks In the reactor coolant pressure bound-
ary. up to and Including a break equivalent
In alze to the double-ended rupture of the
largeat pipe of the reactor coolant system.
sumnce or safety being accident preven- models are described in Appendix A."
t1on, achieved by correct design; These evaluation models are acceptable
cons truc tJon, and operation Bnd by ade- to the Commission but their use is not
Quate quality assurance. The 10ss-01-. mandatory. Other evaluation models may
coolant accidents postUlated In the crl- be proposed by applicants for review in
rerlB thus presuppose a highly unlikely' indvidual cases.
event as a starting point. C. Application of criteria to reactor
These criteria are applicable to, all, lice1l$ing-1. Application to operating re-
liJ:ht-water power reactors except as actors. (a) For each reactor holding an
otherwise provided. Improvements are opemtln,;: license on the effective date of
expected In analytical techniques, and these criteria and not covered by p:tra-
eXjlerinwntal proerams are expected to graph (b) below, an analysis of the per-
provide IIlcreased and improved knowl- formance of the emergency core coolinl\'
edge about ECCS performance. On the system presently installed, using methods
basis of such improvements in tech- equivalent to those in Appendix A, shall
nolotry. these criteria will be modified be submit,ted to the AEC as soon as prac-
from time to time. t1cable, but not later than October I,
The Commission believes that these 1971. Each such operating reactor shall
criteria for emergency core cooling sys- be shown by that date to be In compll-
tems provide reasonable assurance that ance with the criteria of sections IV A
such systems will be effective in the un- and B.
likely event of a loss-of-coolant accident. (b) For reactors granted operating 11-
Nevertheless, in connection with water censes on or before January I, 1968, com-
power reactors yet to be designed and p1lance with the criteria of sections IV
ce,nstructed the possibility of accomplish- A and B will not be required until July I,
ing by changes in design further Im- 1974. Each such reactor, to the extent
provements in the capability of emer- that It Is not in compliance with the
gency core cooling systems should be criteria, shall be subject to the following
considered. additional requirements:
A. Criteria Jor all light-water power (l) An analysis of th~ performance of
reactors. These general requirements the emergency core coolmg system pres-
have been the basis of AEC safety re- ently installed. using methods equivalent
view for some time. On the basis of to those in Appendix A, shall be sub-
today's knowledge. the performance of mitted to the AEC as soon aspracLicable,
the emergency core cooling system Is but ln no case later than January I, 1972.
judved to be acceptable if the calcu- (2) A prog-ram of improvements. and a
lated course of the loss-of-coolant ac- schedule for e1fectlng them before July I,
cident' i~ limited as follows: 1974. tog-ether with supporting- :malysls
1. The calculated maximum fuel ele- based on ~n evaluation model equivalent
ment cladding temperature does not ex- to those 111 AppendiX A, shall be sub-
d 2 300· F This limit has been chosen mitt.ed to the AEC as soon as practicable,
cee , .' . ' but In no case later than July I, 1972.
on the basiS of aVa.1lable data on embl'1t- The licensee shall make, llS soon as
tlement and possible subsequent shatter- practicable, such interim improvements
ing of the cladding. The results of fur- in operating techniques as are practical
ther detailed experiments could be the and worthwhile in Improving emergency
basis for future revision of this limit. cor.e .c?oling system performance or
2 The amount of fuel element clad- rehablhty.
. . . I ·th te (3) An augmented Inservice Inspection
dlllg that reacts chemical y WI wa l' prog-rnm shall be inaugurated promptly
or steam does not exceed 1. percent of covering those portions of the system pip-
the total amount of claddmg in the lng, pumps, and valves with a nominal
reactor. diameter of 4 Inches or greater and for
3. The clad temperature transient is whose postuiated failure the performance
terminated at a time when the core of the installed emer.gency co.re cooli.ng
'" t' t'll enable to cooling and system. would not be In comphance With
"eome ry IS s I am .' the cl'lterla. The augmented program
before the cladding Is so embrlttled as shall be based on the American Society
to fail during or after quenching. . of Mechanical Engineers' Boiler and
4. The core temperature Is reduced and Pressure Vessel Code, section XI, except
decay heat is removed for an extended that the frequency of inspection shall be
period of time, as required by the long- tripled.
lived radioactivity remaining In the core. (4) Equlplll.ent shall be inst!ill~d as
.. . . soon as practical if needed to fnclJltatc-
D, Cntena lor speCific reactors. Eaell detection of j)l'lIllIU'}'-Systcm lenkage by
reactor shall be evaluated In accord- at least two di1ferent methods. The tech-
ance with the general criteria of section nlcal specifications regarding allowable
IV.A, and using a suitable evaluation rates of identified and unidentified leak-
model. Examples of acceptable evaluation age shall be reduced to the lowest practi-
cal values.
2. Variances. (a) The Commission may
authorize val'lances from these criteria
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110 20 pl'rcl'nt nl!owanc" (or nnccrlAlnty,
"ll0nlel be u~cd. 1111' (ractlon or dcony heAt
S~ol'rl\teel In t.ll0 hot rOft "honld be ('.(lor,ld-
<!reel to be 100 percl'nt of this vAlue unless a
smllner vnluo Is ju~tlfleel.
6. Time to depart.ure from nuclel\lAl boll-
Inr.--lIfiO nny cnlculnt.ed option In the code.
7. lIe"t transfer !\lter elepnrture from nu-
c1e"t.o b<'lIInr:-·u.50 prOl:;rnmed trnnsltlon
bolllnr. correlntlon option. .
8. Film bolllng 11(,,,t trnns(er-lI~e Groene-
vcl<l eorr"lation (equation 5.7 o( AECL-3281,
O"cember 19(9).
9. Metal-worker renctlon .rnte-use the
Bnker-Just equntlon. with 110 coefficient of 1.
10. Core flow-use 0.8 x RELAP smoothed
flo'" at the jllnctlon which Is entering core.
If now:; nr" opposed, usc 7,ero flow.
II Enthnlpy nnd pres"ure--u5e entering
plenu111 condlt,lons.
12. Aecumulntor Bypass-For cold leg
brenk~. 11011 of the wnter Injected by the nc-
cumulators prior to end-of-blowdown shall
be n$~llmed to be lost. In this context the
enel-o(-blowdown shall be speclned as the
time M which zero break now Is first
computed.
13. Renood-n calculntlon for the renood-
Inr. hent tran~fer should be performed. The
cont.amlnnnt back prer.sure assumed for the
annlysls should not be higher than the Initial
pre-break pressure plus 80 percent of the
Iner!'a,;e In pressure calculnted for the Rccl-
dent. Thl' followIng Items should be con-
strnlntr. on the calculatlon:
a. No steam flow should be permitted In
Intact loop" during the time period that ac-
cum ulntorr. nre Injecting.
b. Core exit quality should be cnlculated
from entering mnss flow rate and nomlnRl
FLECHT heat trnnSfer.
c. Pump reslstn.nce. K. should be cnlcu-
lRted on the bll.5ls o( a locked rotor.
d. The !'fTects o( the nitrogen gns In the
accumulator. which Is dlschnrged following
accumulator water discharge. should be
tl\ken Int.o account In CalculRtlng steam flow
ItS n function of time.
e. The pressure drop In the steam genera-
tor should be calculated with the exist-
Ing fluid conditions and B.Ssoc\:\U!d loss
coefficients.
f. All efTects or. cold Injection water. In
either a hot or cold leg. on steRm flow (and
t::. P) should be Included In the cn.!culatlon.
g. The heat transfer coefficient during re-
flood should be derived from FLECHT data.
PART 2-CF:NF:RAL F.1.F.CTRfC F.VALUATroN MODEL
An:.ly"es should be performed for the en-
tire break spectrum. up to Rnd Including a
douhle-ended severance or the Inrgcst. pipe
of the reactor collant prer.sure boundnry. The
comhlnnl.lons ot syRtl'm. u,ed for Rnaly.ls
nhould he derived (rom a tnllure mode Rnd
!'fIec!", n1Inly.I•. unlng t.he single fnllure cri-
terion nCo Indlcntl'd In Tn.ble 2-1 of the tolllCRI
nl'ort "1.0<"5-of-CoolnrH Accldent nn(J Emer-
gency Core Cooling Models for GenerRl Elcc-
trlc Boiling Water Ren.ctors," NEDO-l0329.
Tho nnnlytlcni techniques described. In
NEOO-I0329 and Its supplement should be
ur."d with the folloWlnr. exc('ptlons:
1. Ourlnr: the period of now constdown
after the minimum crltlcnl hent nux ratio nt
th(' hot spot. IA 1"f.A thnn one nnd until the
top of the Jet pump" uncover, the h('nt trnns-
fer cOl'fficl"nt shOUld be cnlculRted using the
D. C" Groeneveld correlation (AECL-3281,
equation 6.7).
2. During the period or lower plenum nash-
tng until the e!;>re beeomee unCQvered, the
heat transfer coelftclent shOUld be calculated
usIng Groeneveld', correlation aa In t aboVe.
a: The heat transfer coslftclents _Iated
1rltb rated core spray flow shOUld correspond
to tboae derl"ed from ezperlmental data, aa-
122W
lIumlng tho clnddlng nnd channel box emls-
slvlt.y Is e'Iun.! to 0.9.
4. It shOUld bo nMumed thnt channel wet-
tIng d()('s not occur until 60 Aecondn following
tho wottlng tlmo CRlculated using the
YnmRnouchl annlysls.
6. A rnngo of conservatively cnlculRted
penklng factors should be "tudled and the
comhlnatlon selected which resultA In the
most severo thermal trnll6lent for the brenk
spectrum and' comblnatlons of r.yr.tems
analY7.l'd.
6. The decay heat curve der.crlbed In the
proposed ANS Stnndnrd. with a 20 percent
nllowance for uncertainty, should be used.
The frnctlon ot decay heRt generated In the
hot rod should be considered to be 100 per-
cent ot this value unlCM a Rmaller value l~
Justified. The effect of voids on reactlvlty
durIng the blowdown may be tnken Into
account.
PART 3-WESTINGHOUSE EVALUATION· MODEL
Annlyses should be performed for the en-
tire break spectrum. up to Rnd Including
the dou hie-ended severance ot the. largcst
pipe ot the reactor coolant prer.sl1re
boundnry. The combination ot systems used
for analyses should be derived from a (Rllure
mode and efTects Rnl\lysls. ur.lng the slngle-
failure criterion.
The nnnlytlcni techniques to he uscd are
der.crlbed In the t.oplcal report, "Westing-
hour.e PWR Core Behavior FollOWing a Lor.s-
of-Coolant Accident" WCAP-7422-L JRn-
uary 1970 (Proprlel.nry). and a supplemen-
tary proprietary Westinghouse report.
"Emergency Core Cooling Perfomlance." re-
ceIved June 1. 1971, and In an approprlnte
nonproprlet:.ry report to be furnished by
Westinghouse, With the following exceptlonA:
For breaks greater than 0.6 ft.'·-
1. The brenk discharge coefficient. (en).
used with the Moody discharge now model
should be equal to 1 for all break sizes.
2. The decay hent curve described In the
proposed ANS Stl\l1dard, with a 20 percent
allowance for uncertainty. should be u:>ed.
The fraction of decay heat generated In the
hot rod may be conr.ldered to be 95 percent
ot this value.
3. For large breaks In the range 0.6 to I
times the total area of the double-ended
break o( the largest cold-leg pipe. two break
models should be used. The first model
should be the double-ended Severance (GuIl-
lotlne), which ll."sum('s that there Ir. break
flow from both endr. o( the broken pipe. but
no communlcntlon between tho broken ends.
The second model should !\SAUme dlr.charge
from a sIngle node (spilt). .
4. The time after the hrenk for the onset of
dl'pl\rturo from nuclento boiling nt the hot
spot Ahould bo equnl to 0.1 second.
5. For cold lep; hr"l\ler., nil of the wnter In-
jectl'd by the nccumull\torR prior to encl-of-
bJowdown shl\ll be nr..qumcd to be lo~t. 1/1 thIs
context the end-of-blowdown Ahall be specl-
ned as the time Rt which ?.cro brenk ftow Is
ftrr.t computed. The eontnlnm('nt back pres-
sure nssumed for the blowdown analyr.ls
!Ihould not be higher thnn the Inltlnl pre-
brel\k pressure plus 90 percent o( the Increase
In pressure cnlculnted for the necldent under
eonsld('rntlon.
6. The pump re.,lstnnec. K. u~ed for anl\ly-
sis should be fully Justified. 1111' elTect ot
pump speed upon K should be considered.
The more conservative o( two lUlsumptlons
(locked or runnIng) should be used for the
pump during the blowdown calculation.
't. A calculation for the reftoodlng heat
transfer should be performed. The contain-
ment back pre8llure _urnI'd for the analJsls
eould DOt be hlgber tban the Initial pre·
breaJt pWlNure plus 80 percent at the InCl'CUll
12250
tn pressure ealeulateCffor the aoctdent under
consideration.
The following lteme shOUld be 00nstnrJ.Dt.a
on tho OlUculatlon:
a. No steam flow sbould be pennltted In
Int.'\Ct 1001'S during t.hEl time period that ac-
cumulators nre InJooting.
b. Core exit qUn.!Hy should be calculatce1
from entertng ml\SS now rate and nominal
FLECHT hent trnnsfer.
c. Pump reslstanco should be calculated
on the basis ot a locked rotor.
d. The e!Teets or tho nitrogen gnsln the
accumulator, which Is discharged following
accumulntor wn.tcr d1scharge, should be ta.ken
Into necount In cnlculo.tlng sten.m flow· lIS a
function ot time.
e. The pre':su"" <lrvi' In the 6tel\m gen-
err.tor should be calCUlated with the exist-
Ing l1uld conditions and associated loss 00-
elTlclents.
t. All cerects ot cold InjectIon water. In
either a hot or cold leg, on steam flow (and
A P) should be Included In the calculation.
g. Tho heat transfer coefficient durIng re-
flood should be derlvcd from FLECHT data.
Ir. view of the public health and safety
considerations discussed above, the Com-
miSSion hM found that the interim ac-
ceptance critelia cont.a.ined herein should
be promulgated without delay, that no-
tice of proposed Issuance and publlc pro-
cedure thereon arc impracticable, and
that good cause exists for making the
statement of polley elTectivc upon publi-
cation in the FEDERAL REGrSTER. The
Commission invites all interested persons
Who desire to submit written comments
or suggestions for consideration in con-
nection with the statement of policy to
send them to the Secretary of the Com-
mission, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,
Washington, D.C. 20545, Attention:
Chief, Public Proceedings Branch, within
60 days after publication of this notice
in the FEDERA.L REGrSTER. Copies of com-
ments received may be examined at the
Commission's PubIlc Document Itoom,
1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C.
Tho Commission will consider all such
comments and suggestions wit.h the view
to pOSsible an1endmcnts and will Issue a
report. Additionally, the Commission will
consider holding an Informal DubHe rule
making hearing on this interim policy
statement.
(Bee. 161, 68 Stnt. 948. 80 Stat. 383. 81 Sta.t.
64; 42 U.S.C, 2201, 6 U.S.C. 652, 653)
Dated at Washington, D.C., this 25th
day of June 1971.
For the Atomic Energy Commission.
W. B. MCCOOL.
Secretary 0/ the Commission.
(PH Doc.71-9186 Filed 6-26-71;8:62 amI
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MUltlnode Coro neOood Analflltt"-:RepOl:'t
BAW-1OO31, OCtober ~971.
3, "TJli.'TA I-B, A Computer Code tOor
N~clear Reactor COote Th-:rmal Analysl.8."
Idaho Nuclear CorporatIon Report IN-1445,
Pebrullry 11171.
4. "M\lltlnode Analysla of 'B&W'. 2668
MWt Nuclear Plants DurIng A LoeB-ot·COol-
ant Accldent"-Report BAW-l00a., OCtober
1971.
4 "Energy Relel\le Rl\t\llI Foll~wlnlt Shut.
dOwn of UranJum·PulIl ThermAl a.actore,"
BubcOmmltte9 ANB-lI, American Nuclen,
&:>m.ety.Oct~ 19'11. OIJplee l1\!lJ be Qbto.1ne<l
tNffl Dr. M, E, Romle" Chalrmall, .sui:)com-
mitteo ANa-6, MQmlee lmernn.tlonllol, Post
OlDco DOll 309, Cl'IllOgo. ....'11;. OA 111306. Ooplell
Me .vAllable tor publiCI tnajlllOt.lon ~ ~.
Oommlooion'. Publto Document 800m, 1717 H
81.r. NW.. W....btnIVOODo DO.
Blowd.oum.l'crf04
1.1 Core Imct System N04fng.
1:1.1 CRAFT-.M lenst three CQre nodea
600uld be USCQ, and 0.1; least tour atenm g.m-
erowr nodes (prlmnry BIde) 8110uld be Wiell•.
A contllinment nodo llhOuld be uscll.
I.UI THETA 1-D-At l(lust six Ndlal fuel
nodl.'3 and two radial clad nodes, In conJune-
tIIon with Il.t least 10 axlo.l fuel nOdell, &houl<l .
be used.
1.::1 Pump Model.
Tlte pump coarnoterlstlca, ITlCIUdlngth"
elfcce ot pump speed, tor analyses should be
tUlly JlIstlllCll. TIle more COWler'l'Mlve of two
IISSlunptlone (lOCked or runnIng) shouJ<l be
used tor the pump during the blowd<)wn
ealc.ul;\.tlon.
1.3 Break CharacterlJties.
l"or lnrge breaks In the range of 0.6-1.0
times 'the total area of the dotilHe-en<led
break of "lohe liUgese cold-leg pipe. two J>rellk
motlcls should be used. The fimt model should
be 'tohe double-cnded severance (gUillotine)
which assumes that there Is ~eak ilow trom
both ends of the broken pipe, but DQ
munleatloll between the broken end:;.
second model should assume d1schllrge trom
a single node (spilt).
1.4 Disc/,arge Coefficient.
A break ,lizcllMGe coelUcient CD::': 1.0 should
be used tor lll1 bre:,k sIzes.
L5 DecllY lIeat.
The dcet'y hC',lot curve de&<;:ribed in the
proposed ANS &tfllldflrd,' Inerelilled by e. +20
pNccnt allowance tor unccr~Inty, should be
used. The trilctlon of decay beet generated
In the hot rod may be conSidered to be 0.96
t;imoo thl3 value.
1,(1 Time to Departure Irom. Nucleate Boil-
ing (DN8).
The 't,llne to DNB sl1ovl<1 be co.leu!e.l.ed \l6lng
allY one of the programmed optloWi ot th'&
THETA l-·B code.
1.7 }'itm Bolling lieat Trallsler,
'I'he Groeneveld oorrelatlon (cqua.tIO'll 6.7
of AE0Ir-32111, Pwember 1969) &boU1e1 be
uo;cd In the 1'liETA 1-'8 OO<le for the film-
boWlIg he"-t tranSfer regll'OC.
1.11 lIfetal-Water Reactton Rate,
The meW-water re:l.CMon rates eh(}uld be
oMeulo.wtl U31ng the Ba.1<or·JUllt eqUe.tlO'll
wlth a oocfflclcn t ot 1.0.
1.9 Core Flow Rate.
The smoothed coro tlow mte at the bot
Ilpot IOCatlQn, deriVed from the OMPr OOdo
arid multlplled 1:>\' 0.8, shOUIQ be 'lIS<:(1 iI4
input to the THETA 1-D tuel rod heo.tup
eaJcwat1on.
1.10 EntlLalpy and Pre33'Ure.
_ TIle core prc&Sure I,l.lld tJle entertng plenum
enthalpy, dorlved from 1011& cn.AFT OOde,
sboul<l bo t1.S«l lIS Input to. tho 'l'Hl'n'A I~B
calCUlations.
1.11 Gore }"/oodllig Tank BYjXU3.
For oold log brca.kB. all ot the water In-
JectecI by the core ftOO<llng tallks prior to the
•
•
••
•
••
and by Combustion Engineering. Inc.•
have been reviewed by the Comm1sSlon.
wgether with the conservative as5WDP-
tlons and procedures appropnll.te to cach
model. The amendments to tone Interim
Acceptance Critcrla whiCh follow add
these acceptable new evaluation models
M Parts 4 and 5 of Appendilt A. Con-
forming iUnendments have been made
In the body· of the Intel'lm Acceptance
Critcria.
1. The third and fourth paragra.plls of
5ectlon III are amendP.d to read as
fOllows:
III. EVALUATION or ~MERGENCY CORE COOL~
114C SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Detailed technical reviews have been
performed by the AEC of the computer
codes currently available for predicting
emergency core cooling system perform-
ance. The AEC has developed sets of
sUltnbly conservative assumptions and
procedures which together with the com-
puter codes comprise five appropriately
conservative evaluation models to U5e
for evaluation. The eocles u,;cd in one
of these evaluation models (described in
Part 1 of Appendix A) arc availablc from
the AEC. Codes used in the other four
evaluation mOdels (descl'ihed In Parts
2-·5 of Appendix A) contain proprietary
matcrlal, for which summaries arc or
soon will be publicly available. Other
evaiulltion models are under review by
the ABC.
The five acceptable evMup.tion models
prcsently Included In Appendix A nre
different In many respects, and the sets
of conservative assumptions and proce~
dures also dllTer from one another. These
dltTerenccs arise from two principal
causeS: (1) DllIcl'enccs In approach and
·calculatlonal methods of the different
analyses, leading to different areas where
Imperfect knowledge or analysis require
conservative treatments. \l.nd (2) differ-
ences In hardware am~llg the various re-
actor designs, sucll as spray va. flood
cooling and hot leg vs, cold leg VB, direct
vessel inJection.
2. New Parts 4 and 5 are added to AP-
pendilt A to read as follows:
ApPI:NIJIX A-ACCEPTABLE EVALUATION MODF.L8
INCLUDII:(Q TltEI1l OONBEI\VIITlVE ABBVMP-
T1QNS liND PIlOCEl)UIlEB
• 1'1\11I evalul'>tlon model .1'1'11.. to "BoOton
oonw.lnUl, In"'mal 'Jent "alVes.
PUT 4-DIIDCOCK AND WILCOX J:VALu"nON
;MOIJEL"
Analyses should be performed tor the en-
tire break spectrum, trom 0.11 tV, up to and
Including the double-ended r;cverlmce ot the
lar(p,est pipe ot the rel1ctor cooll\nt pressure
boundary. The CombInation of systema tlsed
tor anl1lyses should bo derived frOm a failure
modo and effects analysis, Using the single
t"lluro criterion.
The Analytical technlquCll to be UIIe<l, With
the MlIumptlons and procedures descrIbed In
II 1.1-:U, lue tholle described III the tolJO'1l'-
sng topical ropor\.4;
1. "ORAP'I'-Descrlptlon or Model for
BquUlbrlum LOCA Apalysll Prosr&Ill"-If,e-
port PAW-IOO30. Ootober 11171.
2. "REl"LOOD-Deacrlptlon of Mo4.1 toJ'
CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY CORE
COOLING SYSTEMS FOR LIGHT-
WATER POWER REACTORS
Interim Acceptance
On June 29, Ill'll. the Atomic :Energy
Commission pUbllshed Its Interim Polley
statement, "Interim Acceptance Criterl&
tor EmergenCY Core CooUng Systems for
I,jght-Water Power Reactors:' (36 F.!t.
12247.) Tne Statement lncludcd. M Ap-
pcncl1x A. Parts 1-3, acceptable evalua-
tion models, including conservat,1ve as-
6umptloll8 and procedures. Since that
time. propoBaJa tor evaluation mode15
made by Tho Babcock and WUcox Co.
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PART G--cOMnUSTTON ENGINEF:RINO
EVALUATION MODEL
("!1d-ot-blowdown should be ",';.nuned to be
Iot't. In tht" cont<'xt. tho 4.'nd-ot-b1owdown
should Ix> con"ldrn'd to be tho time at wbIcJl
z,cro brrok flow Is fl1'l't computed..
Reflood Period
~ I 111(' ('Oro r.... flO<'<1 pl'rfonnn.nco should be
(".1.1('\11",<'<1 ""tnr. lho REFLOOD code
(lc'crllh-.:I In DAW-lOO31.
;;:.2 An n<llnbnllc h('n!\lp ot tho core shoUld
11(\ t\.:';";~l\111(,,-1 (mrn tJl~ tlrnc (')f eond-ot...blow-
dOWIl UJltH U,e rnwn:nwy ('<)r~ cooling fl\lld
rt"':lc,h~ t.1l(' boU~lIn of t.he core.
2.3 I'Dr t.I,O rc II 0<'<1 enlcul",tlon, tho con-
tnlll1t1('i,t pro",,,,,re should not exC('C(1 the
Inlt.lnl prrbr('nk prrr."",.., plu" 80 pl'I"Cent or
the tncrr:l."e In pt('<'>5utO calcuJatcd by the
nl('th()(l~ UC..('(j tor ('(>nl.nlnmcnt d<'5lsn tor tho
j\(.·(',dcnt u:1d,-"'r (",on~td('t:\t.lon.
2.4 The r.t(\[lln flow mtc troIn t.ho coro, as
It !\fYl'Cla thO Reflood prc",,;urc-drop cnlcwn-
1.1on", should be c.'\lcUlntc<! on the bMls of
00"0 hel't tmn5f<-r COt"fficlent.'J thnt BJ'O equnJ
ro or f,TCl\tcr thn.n F1ccht hca.t trn.nstCll' 00-
('ffictenta. The Intemnls vent valves showd be
Ute only 110w path trom the upper plenum.
2.6 Tho tuel rod ~mpcr!Lt~ tmns1ents
shoUld be (lI\lcUlntc<! on the bll.sls or heat
tmzu;for coomclentB derived trom f1ccht.
Annl,.""",s should be pcrtonncd tor the en-
tire brmk "f><'Ctrum, trom 0.5 ft.', up to lUld
inolucllnt; tho doublo-<mded sevcrn.noo or the
Il\rr;p,,~ pipe ot tho rt'1tctor OOOlan~ pre5surq
boundary. TI,0 combln"tlon or gyst<'1J18 used
tor nn"I)'"<'<I rJlouJd bo derived truro a tnllure
modo n.nd efrret.s analysis, Wllnt; the· sIngle
fsll ure crll<,rlon.
TIle annlytlcnl ~chnlques tobo used, wIth
the a5s,'mptlons and procedures described in
II 1.1-2.6. Me those described In tho followIng
toplcnl r('ports. SuItable nonproprietary re-
pr.rt" nre to be submItted.
.\. "Dcr.c.rlptlon of Loss-of-Coollmt Calcu-
lntlonnl Procedures," CENPD-26, Propnetn.ry
Combustion Englnc('rlng Report, Auguet,
1971.
2. "Descrlptlon at Lo:;,;-of-Coolo.nt Cnlcula-
tlonnl Procedures," Proprietary Combustion.
Englneerlnr. Report, Supplement 1 to CEN-
PD-26, October, 1971. .
3. "Steam Ventlng Experiments and Their
ApplicatIon to CE Evaluatlon Model,- Pr0-
prietary CombustIon EngIneering Report,
Supplement 2 to CENPD-26, November, 11111.
4. "MoIsture Carry-over During PWR Post-'
LOCA Core Refill," Intonnal proprietary Com-
bustion Engineering submittal, November.
1971.
NOTICES
lost. In thIs eon~xt the ~nd-or-blnwdowit
should b~ eonsld~rcd tQ be tho tim" at whlrh
r;~ro brcak flow Is first compu~d.
1.5 Pump Model.
The pump chnr~rlstlclI, Includlnr, the
~frcct of pump speed, for annlyscs IIhould be
funy J,..I.IOrd. The moro cnnscrv"t.Ivo of two
n..,,-~umpt.lons (lockrd or running) should be
used for the pump durIng tho blowdoWD
calculntlon.
Reflood Period
2.1 The reflood sequcnce of ~Venls should
be cnlculnl-rd uslnl! the annlytlcnl methods
descrlb('d In. CENPD-26 and Its suppl<-ments.
The contnlnment bnck prr",.ure I\.."'~umed for
the nn'''ysls should not be hlr,her thnn tho
Inltlnl prcbr<-nk pr<-r,.ure plull 80 percent of
the Incrrnsc In pr,':<c.uro c"lculnt..,d by tho
mcthods lIsed Cor contnlnmont design Cor the
accident under consIderatIon.
2.2 AIl effects of cold Injection wnter, In
either n hot or cold I('g, on st<'tLm flow (nnd
AP) should be Included In the cnlculatlon.
The steam flow In Intnct loops durIng the
time period thnt the sntety Injection tnnks
are InJeoUng should be calcula~d 1\8 de-
scrIbed In Supplement 2 of CENPD-26. The
stenm flow rato from the core B8 It nfYects
the pressure-drop cnlcultLtlons should be enl·
cUlated on the basis of core hent transfer
coefficients that are equal to or grentor than
FLECHT hent trnnster coefficients.
2.3 Pump roslstanro, K. r.hoUld be calcu-
lated on tho bn."ls of a locked rotor,
2.4 The effects or the nitror:cn gns In the
Ill\foty InjectIon tn.nk whIch Is dISChArged 101-
lowIng Wl\tor discharge, should be Inken Into
ll(XlOunt In calculatIng steron flow &. a funo-
tton of t1rne.
2.5 The pt"C6Sure drop In the s~nm genern-
tor showd be mlcuJatCd with the existing
fluid conditions and 8&<;()C'\atc<! 1008 cocm-
clonts.
2.6 The hC(l,t trn.nsfCll' coefficient tor the fuo!
rod tcmpcrnture calcuJatlon.. during reflood
shouJd be derIved from FLECHT datn..
In view of the necessity, from the stand-
point of public heal'th and safety of pro-
viding Interim criteria for emergency
core cooling systems applicable to a.II
nuclear power reactors, the Commission
has found t.ha.t the amendments con-
tained herein should be promulgated
without delay, that notice of proposed is-
suance and prior publlc procedure are
Impracticable, arid that good cause exists
tor making the amendments effective
upon publication In the FEDERAL REGIS-
TER. The Commission has Issued a noUce
scheduling a public role making hearing
on the Interim Acceptance Criteria for
Emergency Core Cooling Systems for
Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Re-
actors (36 F.R. 22774) . The amendments
herein will be considered at that hearing.
Interested persons desiring to participate
In that hell.rlng should refer to that
notice for the procedures available, In-
terested persons who desire to submit
wrltltcn comments or sUf(gestlcms for con-
sideration In connection With the
amendments should send them to the
Secretary of the Commission, U.S.
Atomic Energy Commission, WashJngton.
D,C, 20545, Attention Chief, Public Pro-
oce<1ings Bmnch, wi'thin 30 daYll after
publication of this notice In the FEDERAL
REGISTER. Copies of comments received
may be examined at the Comm1ss1oo'.
Publ1c Document Room, 171'1 H street
NW.. Washington, DC.
(geG. un. 88 Stat.. H8, 80 Sat. 883, 81 stU..
.6'" fvotDolIe ca pllP H082. M: • v.s.a. 2201, • v.s,a. liN, 1li8)
;' fEDEIM. IIOISTII, VOL. H, NO. 244-SATUIDAY, DECEM.II
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Dl\t.ro at Gelmn.ntown, Md., this 16th
day of December 1971.
For tho Atomic Energy Commission.
P. T. Honns,
Acting Secretar/l 01 the Commissfon.
IFR ·000.71-18645 Flied 12-17-71;10:26 am)
11, 1.71
Revised ECCS Acceptance Criteria
APPENDIX
On N"\'Clllber 30, 1971, the Aloillie Fne[)!v Conll11ission [1llbli,hed in the Federa! Ref!,istcr
(3(, F.f<. 2277-1) a notice schedulin~ a iL'~lslative-IYI'" pubhc ruk 1I1;lkin~ hearil1~ Oil January 27, 1972,
bef(1le a hearing Iward comisting of N;J!lianielll. <;oodrieh, hq . Ch:lirillall, Dr. Ll\vrence I{. Quarles, and
Dr. John II. Blick, concelllillg its ilJ!elJlll sf:llelnent Id J'"lil'y establishin~ an:ept:lIlce niteri:1 for ell1ergency
corc (o(lling systems for light w:l!er-(t)o!ed nuc\(':ll powel IC:lclnrs. published JlIllt' 2Q, 197\
(3(, t-".I? 12.'471. Amendments to the interim criteria \Vrre [1ublislied in flie h'dail! Register on
Deccmber IX. 11171 (36 VR. 240S2) in a notice that stated tlial the amcndments would also be considered
at the rille ll1:\king hearing.
Participation in the lulc making hearing was extcnsive. '1 he prilllar)' participants included the
Commission Regulatory Staff, fom reactor manufacturers. a consolidated group of electric utility
companies, and the Consolidated National Intervcnors (eNI), a group of about 60 organizations and
individuals. In addition, three states, the Lloyd Ilarbor Study Group, and several individuals participated to
a lesser degree. The hearings lasted a total of 125 days and generated a record of more than 22,000 pages of
transcript and thllusands of pages of writ ten direct tcstimony and exhibits. Oral argument (rom the scven
principal participants was heard by the Commission on October 9, 1973.
In implementatilln of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, (P.L. 91-1(0), a Draft
Environmental Statement concerning the proposed rule making was forwardcd to thc Council on
Environmental Quality on December (), 1')71, and circulated for commcnt to partiLipants in the hearing
and intcrcsted Fcderal AgenLies on DeLcmber 7,1972. Notice of public availability of the Statement and an
invitation for comment was also published in the Federal Register at that time. Conllllen'ts OIl the Draft
Statement were received and a Final Environmental Statcmcnt was published on May 9, 1'>73.
The Commission noted in the interim I\llicy Statemcnt:
Protection against a highly unlikely loss-of-coolant accident has long been an essential part of the
defense-in-depth concept used by the nuclear power industry and the AEC to assure the safety of
nuclear power plants. In this concept, the primary assurance of safety is accident prevention by
correctly designing, constructing, and operating the reactor. Extensive and systematic quality assurance
practices are required and applied at every step to achieve this primary assurance of safety.
Nevertheless, deviations from expected behavior are postulated to occur, and protective systems are
installed to take corrective action as required in such events. Notwithstanding all this, the occurrence of
serious accidents is postulated, in spite of the fact that they are highly unlikely, and engineered safety
features are installed to mitigate the consequences of these unlikely events. The loss-ofccoolant accident
is such a postulated improbable accident; the emergency core cooling system is one of the engineered
safety features installed to mitigate its consequences.
The Commission has adopted new rcgulations, set forth below, dealing with the effectiveness of ECCS.
In a 140 pagc opinion issued on December 18, 1973, the Commission discussed the changes from the
interim acceptance criteria ant! thc tcchnical reason for them. Cllpies of Illis opinion are available for
inspecti,m and copying at the Commission's Public Document Room, 171 7 II. St reet, N. W., Washington,
D. C.
The principal changes from the Interim Policy Statement are as follows. The old criterion number one,
specifying that the temperature of the Zircaloy dadding should not exceed 2300°F, is replaced by two
criteria, lowering the allowed peak ZircalllY temperature to 2200°F and providing a limit on the maximum
allowed local oxidation. The other three criteria of the lAC are retained, with some modification of the
wording. These three criteria limit the hydrogen generation frqm metal-water reactions, require
maintenance of a coolable core geometry, and provide for long-term cooling of the quenched core_
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The most important effect of the l:hanges in the required features of the evaluation models is that
swelling and bursting of the dadding must now be taken into wnsideration when they are l:akulated to
OCl:ur, and that the maximum temperature and oxidation aiteria must be applied to the region of clad
swelling or bursting when the maximum temperature and oxidation are l:akulated to occur there. Another
important change is the requirement that, in the steady state operation just before the postulated accident,
the thermal conductance of the gap between the fuel pellets and the cladding should be l:akulated taking
into consideration any increase in gap dimensions resulting from such phenomena as fuel densification, and
should also. l:onsider the effects of the presenl:e of fission gases. When these effects are taken into
consideration a higher stored energy may be l:alwlated. Other l:hanges in the evaluation models are mostly
in the diredion of replacing previous broad wnservative assumptions with more detailed l:alculations where
new experimental information is available or where better cakulational methods have been developed.
The wording of the definition of a loss-of-l:oolant al:ddent has been modified to l:onform to its
long-accepted usage, limiting it to breaks in pipes. The new regulations also require a more l:omplete
documentation of the evaluation models that are used.
The Commission believes that the implementation of the new regulations will ensure an 'adequate
margin of performance of the ECCS should a design basis LOCA ever OCl:Ur. This margin is provided by
conservative features of the evaluation models and by the niteria themselves. Some of the major points that
wntribute to the l:onservative nature of the evaluations and the l:riteria are as follows:
(I )Stured Heat. The assumption of 102'!c, of maximum power, highest allowed peaking factor, and
highest estimated thermal resistanl:e between the U0 2 and the dadding provides a l:akulated stored heat
that is possible but unlikely to Ol:l:ur at the time of a hypothetical a..:cident. While not nel:essarily a margin
over the extreme condition, It represents at least an assumption that an accident happens at a time whiCh IS
not typical. .
(2) Bluw-dow/I. The l:alculation of the heat transfer during blowdown is made in a very conservative
manner. There is evidence that more of the stored heat would be removed than l:akulated, although there is
not yet an al:cepted way of l:akulating the heat transfer more ac..:urately. It is probable that this represents
a wnservatism of several hundred degrees F in stored energy after blowdown, most of whidl can reasonably
be expected to l:arry over to a reduction in the ..:akulated peak temperature of the Zirl:aloy dadding.
(3) Rate of /feat Generatio/l. It is assumed that the heat generation rate from the del:ay of fission
produds is 20% greater than the proposed ANS standard. This represents an upper limit to the degree of
unl:ertainty. The assumption lhat the fission prodUd level is that resulting from operation at 102% of rated
power for an infinite time represents an improbable situation, with a wnservatism that is probably in the
range of 5 to 15'X" The use" of the Baker-Just equation for ..:akulating the heat generation from the steam
oxidation of zirl:aloy should also provide some ..:onservatism, but the factor is uncertain.
(4) The Peak Temperature Criterio/l. The limitation of the peak l:aIculated temperature of the dadding
to 2200°F and the stipulation that this l:riterion be applied to the hottest region of the holiest fuel rod
provide a substantial degree of conservatism. They ensure that the core would suffer very little damage in
the accident.
Pursuant to the Atomil: Energy Ad of 1954, as amended, and Sections 552 and 553 of Title 5 of the
United States Code, the following amendments to Title 10, Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations,
Part 50, are published as a dowment subjed to codifil:ation to be effective on 130 days after publi..:ation in
the Federal Register] . .
I. A new sentence is added to Sedion 50.34(a)(4) of 10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:
§50.34 Contents of applil:ations: technical information
(a) **
(4) *** Analysis and evaluation of ECCS cooling performance following postulated loss-of-coolant
acddents shall be performed in al:wrdance with the requirements of §50.46 for fadlities for which
construdion permits may be issued after Del:ember 28, 1974.
2. A new sentence is added to Section 50.34(b)(4) 10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:
§ 50.34 Contents of applil:ations; technil:al information.
(a) ** *
(b) ***
(4) *** Analysis and evaluation of ECCS woling performanl:e following postulated loss-of-coolant
al:cidents shall be performed in al:cordance with the requirements of §50.46 for facilities for which a
lil:ense to operate may be issued after Del:ember 28, J974.
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3. A new § 50.46 is added to 10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows:
§50.46 Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light Water Nuclear Power
Reactors.
(a)(I) Except as provided in subparagraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph, each boiling and pressurized
light-water nuclear power reactor fueled with uranium oxide pellets within cylindrical zircaloy cladding
shall be provided with ail emergency core cooling system (ECCS) which shall be designed such that its
calculated cooling performance fllilowing postulated loss-of-coolant accidents conforms to the criteria set
forth in paragraph (b). ECCS cooling performance shall be calculated in accordance with an acceptable
evaluation model, and shall be calculated for a number of postulated loss-of-coolant accidents of different
sizes, locations, and other properties sufficient to provide assurance that the entire spectrum of postulated
loss-of-coolant accidents is covered. Appendix K, ECCS Evaluation Models, sets forth certain required and
acceptable features of evaluation models. Conformance with the criteria set forth in paragraph (b), with
ECCS cooling performance calculated in accordance with an acceptable evaluation model, may require that
restrictions be imposed on reactor operation.
(2) With respect to reactors for which operating licenses have previously been issued and for which
operating licenses may issue on or before December 28, 1974:
(i) The time within which actions required or permitted under this subparagraph (2) must occur shall
begin to run on 130 days after publication of the rule in the Federal Register).
(ii) Within six months following the date specified in subparagraph (i) of this subparagraph (2), an
evaluation in accordance with subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a) shall be submitted to the Director of
Regulation. The evaluation shall be accompanied by such proposed changes in technical specifications or
license amendments as may be necessary to bring reactor operation inconformity with subparagraph (I) of
this paragraph.
(iii) Any licensee may request an extension of the six-month period referred to in subparagraph (ii) of
this subparagraph (2) for good cause. Any such request shall be submit ted not less than 45 days prior to
expiration of the six-month period, and shall be accompanied by affidavits showing precisely why the
evaluation is not complete and the minimum time believed necessary to complete it. .The Director of
Regulation shall cause notice of such a request to be published promptly in the Federal Uegistcr; such
notice shall provide for the submission of comments by interested persons within a time period to be
established by the Director of Regulation. If, upon reviewing the foregoing submissions, the Director of
Regulation concludes that good cause has been shown for an extension, he may extend the six-month
period for the shortest additional time which in this judgment will be necessary to enable the licensee to
furnish the submissions required by subparagraph (ii) of this subparagraph (2). Requests for extensions of
the six-month period, submitted under this subparagraph, shall be ruled upon by t he Director of Regulation
prior to expiration of that period.
(iv) Upon submission of the evaluation required by subparagraph (ij) of this subparagraph (2) (or under
subparagraph (iii), if the six-month period is extended) the facility shall continue or commence operation
only within the limits of both the proposed technical specifications or license amendments submitted in
accordance with this subparagraph (2) and all technical specifications or license conditions previously
imposed by the Commission. including the requirements of the Interim Policy Statement (June 29, 1971,
36 F.R. 12248), as amended (December 18, 1971,36 F.R. 24082).
(v) Further restrictions on reactor operation will be imposed by the Director of Regulation if he finds
that the evaluations submitted under subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of this subparagraph (2) arc not consistent
with subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a) and as a result such restrictions are required to protect the
public health and safety.
(vi) Exemptions from the operating requirements of subparagraph (iv) of this subparagraph (2) may be
granted by the COlllmission for good cause. Requests for such exemption shall be submitted not less than
45 days prior to the date upon which the plant would otherwise be required to operate in accordance with
the procedures of said subparagraph (iv). AllY such request shall b~ filed with the Secretary of the
Commission, who shall cause notice of its receipt to be published Prolluptly in the Federaf Register; such
notice shall provide for the submission of comments by interested persons within 14 days following Federal
Register publication. The Director of Regulation shall submit his views as to any requested exemption
within five days following expiration of the comment period.
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(vii) Any request for an exemption submitted under subparagraph (vi) of this subparagraph (2) must
show, with appropriate affidavits and technical submissions, that it would be in the public interest to allow
thc licensee a specified additional period of time within which to altcr the operation of the facility in the
manner required by subparagraph (iv) of this subparagraph en. The request shall also include a discussion
of the alternatives available for establishing compliance with the rule.
(3) Construction permits may be issucd after December 2S, 1973 but before December 211, 1974
subject to any applicable conditions or restrictions imposed pursuant to other regulations in this chapler
and the Interim Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems published on June 29, 1971
(36F.R. 12248) as amended (December 18,1971, 36F.R. 24082): Prorided, 1/()lVe~'e,., thaI no operating
license shall be issued for facilities constructed in accordance with construction permits issued pursuant to
this subparagraph, unless the Commission determines, among other things, that the proposed facility meets
the requirements of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph.
(b)(1 ) Peak CladdillK Temperature. The calculated maximum fuel element cladding temperature shall
not exceed 2200°F.
(2)ll1axill/ll/n Cladding OxidatiO/l. The calculated total oxidation of the cladding shallnowhcre exceed
0.17 times the total cladding thickncss beforc oxidation. As used in this snbparagraph total oxidation
means the total thickness of cladding mctal that would be locally converted to oxide if all the oxygen
absorbed by and reacted with the cladding locally wcre convertcd to stoichiometric zirconium dioxide. If
c1aqding rupture is calculated to occur, the inside surfaces of the cladding shall be included in the
oxidation, beginning at the calculated time of rupture. Cladding thickness before oxidation means the radial
distance from inside to outside the cladding, after any calculated rupt ure or swelling has occurred but
before significant oxidation, Where the calculated conditions of transient pressure and temperature lead to
a prediction of c1addmg swclling, with or without cladding rupture, the unoxidized cladding thickness shall
be defined as the cladding cross-sectional an~a, taken at a horizon!al plane at the elevation of the rupture, if
it occurs, or at the elevation of the highest dadding temperature if no rupture is calculated tll occur,
divided by the average circumference at that e1ev'ltion. For ruptured cladding the circulllferencedoes not
include the rupture opening.
(3) A!axilllllll/ 1Il'ilrogeil Gelleratioll. The calculated total amount of hydrogen generated from the
chemiC'll reaction of the dadding with water llI' steam sh'lllnot exceed 0.01 times the hyputhetical amount
that wuuld be genemted if all of the metal in the c1'ldding cylinders surrounding the fuel, excluding the
cladding surrounding theplenum volume, were to react.
(4) Coo/able Geo/lletry. Calculated changes in core geumetry shall be such that 'the core remains
amenable to cooling,
(5) !,ollg-Temi Coo/illg. After any calculated successful initial operation of the ECrS, the calculated
core temperature shall be maintained at an ,H:ceptably low value and decay heat shall be removed for the
extended period of time required by the long-lived radio'lctivity remaining in the core,
(c) As used in this sectilln:
(I) Loss-of-coolant accidents (LOeA's) arc hypothetical accidents that would result from the loss of
reactor coolant, at a rate in excess of the capability of the reactor coolant makeup system, from breaks in
pipes in the reaLtor cuolant pressure boundary up to and including a break equivalent in size to the
double-ended rupture of the largest pipe in the reactor coolant system.
(2) An evaluation model is the calculation'll framework for evaluating the behavior uf the reactor
system during a post,ulated loss-or-coolant :Jccident (LOCA). It includes one or J1)ure computcr programs
and all other information nccessary for application of the calculational framework to a specific LOrA, such
as m:Jthem:Jtical models used, assumptions included in the programs, procedure for treating the program
input and output information, specification of those portions of analysis not included in computer
progr'l IllS , v'llues of parameters, and all other infof!lw!ioIJ necess'lry to specify the calculational procedure.
(d) The requirements of this section arc in addition to any other requirements applicable to ECCS set
forth in this Part. The criteria set forth in p'lr'lgraph (b), with cooling performance calculated in accordance
with an acceptable evaluation model, arc in implementation of the general requirements with respect to
ErCS cooling performance design set'forth in this Part, including in particular Criterion 35 of Appendix A.
4. A new Appendix K is added to 10 CFR Part 50 to read as follows: Appendix K--ECCS Evaluation
Models.
I. Required and Acceptable Features of Evaluation Models.
II. Required Documentation.
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I. REQUIRED AND ACCEPTABLE FEATURES OF THE EVALUATION MODELS
A. SOURCES OF HEAT DURING THE LOCA
For the heat sources listed in Paragraphs I to 4 below it shall be assumed that the reactor has been
operating continuously at a power level at least 1.02 times the licensed power level (to allow for such
uncertainties as instrumentation error), with the maximum peaking factor allowed by the technical
specifications. A range of powcr distribution shapes and peaking factors representing power distributions
that Illay occur over the corc lifetimc shall be studied and the one selected should be that which results in
the most severe calculated consequences, for the spectrum of postulated breaks and single failures analyzed.
I. The Initial Stored FI/erg)' in the Fuel. The steady-state temperature distribution and stored energy in
the fuel before the hypotheti.:al accident shall be calculated for the burn-up that yields the highest
calculated cladding temperature (or, optionally, the highest calculated stored energy). To accomplish this,
the thermal conductivity of the V0 2 shall bc evaluated as a function of burn-up and tcmperature, taking
into consideration differences in initial density, and the thermal conductance of the gap between the U02
and the cladding slwll be evaluated as a function of the burn-up, taking into consideration fuel densification
and expansion, the composition and pressure of the gases within the fuel rod, the initial cold gap dimension
with its tolerances, and cladding creep.
2. Fission lIeat. Fission heat shall be calculated using reactivity and reactor kinetics. Shutdown
reactivities resulting from temperatures and voids shall be given their minimum plausible values, including
allowance for uncertainties, for the range of pl)wer distribution shapes and peaking factors indicated to t
studied above. Rod trip and insertion may be ;j',sumed if they are calculated to occur.
3. Decay qf Actinides. The heat from the radioactive decay of actinides, including neptunium an
plutonium generated during operation, as well as isotopes of uranium. shall be calculatcd in accordanc
with fuel cycle calculations and known radioactive properties. The actinide decay heat chosen shall be the
appropriate for the time in the fuel cycle that yields the highest calculated fuel temperature during th
LOCA.
4. J?ission Product Decay. The heat generation rates from radioactive dccay of fission products shall b
assumed to be equal to 1.2 times the values for infinite operating time in the ANS Standard (Propose.
American Nuclear Society Standard-"Decay Energy Release Rates Following Shutdown of LJraniun:
Fueled Thermal Reactors", Approved by Subcommittee ANS-5, ANS Standards Committee, Octobe
1971). The fraction of the locally generated gamma energy that is deposited in the fuel (including th,
cladding) may be different from 1.0; the value used shall be justified by a suitable calculation.
5. Metal-Water Reaction Rate. The rate of energy release, hydrogen generation, and cladding oxidatiOl
from the metal/water reaction shall be calculated using the Baker-Just equation (Baker. L., Just, L.C'.
"Studies of Metal Water Reactions at High Temperatures, Ill. Experimental and Theoretical Studies of th,
Zirconium-Water Reaction," ANL-6S48, page 7, May 1962). The reaction shall be assumed not to be stean
limited. For rods whose cladding is calculated to rupture during the LOCA, the inside of the cladding shal
also be assumed to react after the rupture. The calculation of the reaction rate on the inside of the c1addinf
shall also follow the Baker-Just equation, starting at the time when the cladding is calculatcd to rupture
and extending around the cladding inner circumference and axially no kss than 1.5 inches each way from
the location of the rupture, with the reaction assumed not to be steam limited.
6. Reactor Internals lIeat Transfer. Ileat transfcr from piping, vessel walls, and non-fuel internal
hardware shall be taken into account.
7. Pressurized Water Reactor Prin111ry-to-Secondary lIeat Tralls/c'r. lleat transferred between primary
and secondary systems through heat exchangers (steam generators) shall be taken into aCCOUllt. (Not
applicable to Boiling Watcr Reactors.)
B. SWELLING AND RUPTURE OF THE CLADDING AND FUEL ROD
THERMAL PARAMETERS
Each evaluation model shall include a prOVlsron for predicting c\adding swelling and rupture from
consideration of the axial temperature distributinn of the cladding a11d from the difference in pressllfe
between the inside and outside of the cladding, both as functions of time. To be acceptable the swelling and
rupture calculations shall be based on applicable data in such a way that the degree of swelling and
incidence of rupture are not underestimated. The degree of swelling and rupture shall be taken into account
in calculations of gap conductance, cladding oxidation and embritt lement, and hydrogen generation.
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The calculations 0ffuel and cladding temperatures as a function of time shall use values for gap
conductance and other thermal parameters as functions of temperature and other applicable time-
dependent variables. The gap conductance shall be varied in accordance with changes in gap dimensions and
any other applicable varial5les.
C. BLOWDOWN PHENOMENA
1. Break Characteristics and Flow
a. In analyses of hypothetical loss-of-coolant accidents, a spectrum of possible pipe breaks shall be
considered. This spectrum shall include instantaneous double-ended breaks ranging in cross-sectional area
up to and including that M the largest pipe in the primary coolant system. The analysis shall also include
the effects of longitudinal splits in the largest pipes, wi th the split area equal to the cross-sectional area of
the pipe.
b. Discharge Model. For all times after the discharging fluid has been calculated to be two-phase in
composition, the discharge rate shall be calculated by use of the Moody llIodel (F. J. Moody, "l\bximum
Flow Rate of a Single Component, Two-Phase Mixture," Journal of Heat Transfer, Transactions of the
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 87, No. I, February 1965). The calculation shall be conducted
with at least three values of a dis~'harge coefficient applied to the postulated break area, these values
spanning the range from 0.6 to 1.0. If the results indicate that the maximum clad temperature for the
hypothetical accident is to be found at an even lower value of the discharge coefficient, the range of
discharge coefficients shall be extended until the maximum clad temperature calculated by this variation
has been achieved.
c. t:nll of BloWllOWll. (Applies Only to Pressurized Water Reactors.) For postulated cold leg breaks, all
emergency cooling water injected into the inlet lines or the reactor vessel during the bypass period shall in
the calculations be subtracted from the reactor vessel calculated inventory. This may be executed in the
calculation during the bypass period, or as an alternative the amour,t of emergency core cooling water
calculated to be injected during the bypass period may be subtracted later in the calculation from the water
remaining in the inlet lines, downcomer, and reactor vessel lower plenulll after the bypass period. This
bypassing shall end in the calculation at a time designated as the "end of bypass," after which the expulsion
or entrainment mechanisms responsible for the bypassing arc calculated not to be effective. The
end-of-bypass definitionus~d in the calculation shall be justified by a suitable combination of analysis and
experimental data. Acceptable methods for defining "end of bypass" include, but arc not limited to, the
following: (I) Prediction of the blowdown calculation of downward !low in the downcomer for the
remainder of the blowdown period; (2) Prediction of a threshold for droplet entrainment in the upward
velocity, using locailluid conditions and a conservative critical Weber number. -
d. NOllil/g Near tlie Break al/(I tile ECCS II/jectiol/ Poil/ts. The noding in the vicinity of and including
the broken or split sections of pipe and the points of EeeS injection shall be chosen to permit a reliable
analysis of the thermodynamic history in these regions during blowdown.
2. Frictional Pressure Drops. The frictional losses in pipes and other components including the reactor
core shall be catculated using models that include realistic variation of friction factor with Reynolds
number, and realistic two-phase friction multipliers that have been adequately verified by comparison with
experimental data, or models that pruve at least equally conservative with respect to maximum clad
temperat ure calculated during the hypothetical accident. The modified Baroczy correlation (Baroczy, C. J.,
"A Systematic Correlation for Two-Phase Pressure Drop," Choll. EI/gil/g. Frog. Symp. Series, No. 64,
Vol. 62, 1965) or a combination of the Thom correlation (Thom, J. R. S., "Prediction of Pressure Drop
During Forced Circulation Boiling of Water," ll/t. J. of Heat & Mass Tra/lsfa, 7, 709-724, 1964) for
pressures equal to or greater than 250 psia and the Martinelli-Nelson correlation (Martinelli, R. C., Nelson,
D. B., "Prediction of Pressure Drop During Forced Circula tion Boiling of Water ," Tral/sactio/ls of ASME,
695-702, 1948) for pressures lower than 250 psia is acceptable as a basis for calculating realistic two-phase
friction multipliers.
3. Momentum Equation. The following effects shall be taken into account in the conservation of
momentum equation: (I) temporal change of momentum, (2) momentum convection, (3) area change
momentum nux, (4) momentum change due to compressibility, (5) pressure loss resulting from wall
friction, (6) pressure loss resulting from area change, and (7) gravitational acceleration, Any omission of
one or more of these terms under stated circumstances shall be justified by comparative analyses or by
experimental data.
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4. Critical Heat Flux
a. Correlations developed from appropriate steady-state and transient-state experimental data are
al:ceptable for use in predicting the critil:al heat flux (ClIF) during LOCA transients. The computer
programs in whkh these wrreJations are used shall contain suitable c11ecks to assure that the physical
p:Hameters are within the range of parameters spedfied for use of the correlations by their respel:tive
authors.
b. Steady-state CIIF l:orrelations aCl:eptable for use in LOCA transients include but are not limited to
the following: "
(I) W 3. L. S. Tong, "Prediction of Departure from Nucleate Boiling for an Axially Non-uniform Heat
Flux Distribution," Journal ufNuclear EI/ergy, Vol. 21,241-248, 1967.
n) B&W-2. J. S. Gellerstedt, R. A. Lee, W. J. Oberjohn, R. H. Wilson, L. J. Stanek, "Correlation of
Critil:al Heat Flux in a Bundle Cooled by Pressurized Water," Two-Phase Fluw al/d lIeat Tral/sFer in Rud
Bundles, ASI\IE, New York, 1969. .
(3)lIench-LeI'Y. J. M. Healzer, J. E. Hench, E. Janssen, S. Levy, "Design Basis for Critical Heat Flux
Condition in Boiling Water Reactors," APED-518(1, GE Company Private report, July 1966.
(4) Macbeth. R. V. Macbeth, "An Appraisal of Forced Convection Burnout Data," Proceedings of the
Imtitute ofMechanicalblgineers, 1965-1966.
(5) Bamcfl. P. G, Barnett, "A Correlation of Burnout Data for Uniformly Heated Annuli and Its Uses
for Predicting Burnout in Uniformly Heated Rod Bundles," ;\EEW-R 463, 1966.
(6)/Iughes. E. D. Hughes, ";\ Correlation of Rod Bundle Critical IIrat Flux for Water in the Pressure
Range 150 to 725 psia,: IN-1412, Idaho Nuclear Corporation . .Iuly 1970.
c. Correlations of appropriate transient CHP data may be accepted for usc in LOCA transient analyses if
comparisons between the data and the correlations are provided to demonstrate that the correlations
predict values of CIIF which allow for uncertainty in the experimental data throughout the range of
parameters for which the correlations are to be used. Where appropriate, the comparisons shall use
statistical uncertainty analysis of the data to demonstrate the conservatism of the transient correlation.
d. Transient CIIF correlations acceptable for use in LOCA transients include. but are not limited to, the
following:
(I) GE Transient C11F. B. C. Slifer, J. E. Hench, "Loss-of-CooLin t Accident and Emergency Core
Cooling Models for General Electric Boiling Wa tel' Reactors," NEDO-I 0329, General Electric Company,
Equation C-32, April 1971.
e. After CIIF is first predicted at an axial fuel rod location dming blowdown, the calculation shall not
use nucleate boiling heat transfer correlations at that location subsequently during the blowdown even if
the calculated local fluid and surface wnditions would apparently justify the reestablishment of nucleate
boiling. Heat transfer assumptions characteristic of return to nucleate boiling (rewetting) shall be permitted
when justified by the calculated locailluid and surface conditions during the reflood pnrtion of a LorA.
5. Post-CHF Heat Transfer Correlations
a. Correlations of heat transfer from the fuel cladding to the slHrOllllding fluid ill the post-CHF regimes
of transition and film boiling shall be compared to applicable steady-statc and transient-state data using
statistical correlation and uncertainty analyses. Such comparison shall demonstrate that the correlations
predict values of heat transfer coefficient equal to or less than the mean value of the applicable
experimental heat transfer data throughout the range of parameters for whkll the correlations are to be
used. The comparisons shall quantify the relation of the correlatiolls to tile statistical uncertainty of the
applicable data.
b. The Groeneveld flow 111m boiling correlation (Equation S.7 of D. C. (;roeneveld, "An Investigatioll
of Heat Transfer in the Liquid Deficient Regime," AECL-328I, revised Decemher 19(9). the
Dougall-Rohsenow flow film boiling correlation (R. S. Dougall and \V. M. l{ohsenow, "Film Boiling on the
Inside of Vertical Tubes with Upward Flow of the Fluid at Low Qualities," MIT Report Number 9079-26.
Cambridge, Massachusetts, September 19(3), and the Westinghouse c\lrrelation of steady-state transition
boiling ("Proprietary Redirect/Rebuttal Testimony of Westinghouse Electric Corporation," U.S.A.E.C.
Docket RM-50-1, page 25-1, October 26, 1(72) arc acceptable for usc in the post-CIIF boiling regimes. In
addition the transition boiling correlation of McDonough, Milich, and King (.I. B. McDonough, W. Milich,
E. C. King. "Partial Film Boiling with Water at 2000 psig in a Round Vertical Tube," MSA Research Corp ..
Technical Report 62 (NP-6976), (1958) is suitable for use between nucleate and film boiling. Use of all
these correlations shall be restricted as follows:
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(I) The Groeneveld correlation shall not be used in the region near its low·pressure singularity,
(~) the first term (nucleate) of the Westinghouse correlation and the entire Md)onough. Milich. and
King cOlrelation shall not he used during the blowuown after the temperature uifferrnce between the l'lad
and the saturakd fluid Ilrst exceeds 300°F.
(3) transitinn boiling heat transfer shall not be reapplied for the remainder of the LOrA blowdown,
even if the dad superheat returns below 300°F, eXCl:pt for the reflood portion of the LOCA when.iustified
by the calculat(d local fluid and surface conditions.
6. Pump Modeling. The characteristics of rotating primary system pumps (axial flow. turbine. or
centrifugal) shall be derived from a dynamic model that includes momentum transfer between the fluid and
the rotating member. wilh varia hie pump speed as a function of time. The pump model resistance used for
analysis should be justified. The pump model for the two·phase region shall be verified by applicable
two·phase pump penorman..:e data. For IH\'Ks after saturation is calculated at the pump suction, the pump
head may be assumed to vary linearly with quality, going to zero for one percent quality at the pump
su..:tion, su long as the analysis shows that core flow stops before the quality at pump suction reaches one
percen t.
7. Core Flow Distribution During Blowdown. (Applies only to pressurized water reactors.)
a. The now rate through the hot regiun of the core during blowdown shall be calculated as a function of
time. For the purpose of these calculations the hot region chosen shall not be greater than the size of one
fuel assembly. Calculations uf average now and flow in the hot region shall take into account cross now
between regions and any flow blockage calculated to occur during blowdown as a result of cladding swelling
or rupture. The calculated now shall be smoothed to eliminate any calculakd rapid oscillations (period less
than 0.1 seconds).
b. A method shall be specified for determining the enthalpy to be used as input data to the hot channel
heatup analysis from quantities calcuJateu in the bluwdown analysis, consistent with the flow distribution
calcula tions.
D. POST·BLOWDOWN PHENOMENA; HEAT REMOVAL BY THE ECCS
I. Sillglc Fai/ure Criferioll. An analysis of possible failure moues of rccs equipment and of their
effects CHI ECrS performance must be made. In carrying out the accident evaluation the combination of
EeCS subsystems assumeu to be uperative shall be those available after the most damaging single failure of
ECCS equipment has taken place.
2. COllwillI/IC/1f Pressurc. The containment pressure used for evaluating cuoling effectiveness during
reflood anu spray couling shall nol exceed a pressure calculated cOJlservatively for this purpose. The
calculation shall include the effects of operation of all installed pressure-reducing systems and processes.
J. CltlCII!ofioll of Rejlood RafC jfJr Pressurizcd Waf('/" f{eacfors. The refilling of the reactor vessel and
the time and rate of refloouing of the core shall be calculated by an acceptable model that takes into
, consideration the therm;l! and hydraulic characteristics of the core and of the reactor system, The primary
system coolant PUIllPS shall be assumed to have locked impellers if this assumption leads to Ihe maximum
calculated cladding temperature; otherwise the pump rotor shall be assumed to be running free. The ratio of
the total fluid fInw at the core exit plane to the total liquid f1nw at the core inlet plane (carryover fraction)
shall be used to determine the core exit flow and shall be determineu in accordance with applicable
experimental data (for example, "PWR FU:CIIT (Full Length Emergenl~y Cooling Ileat Transfer) Final
Report," Westinghouse Report WCAP-71l65, April 1<)71; "I'WR Full Length Emergency Cooling Ileat
Transfer (FLEUIT) Gruup I Test Report," Westinghouse Report WCAP-7435, January 1<)70; "PWR
FLECIIT (Full Length Emergency Cooling lIeat Transfer) Group II Test Repurt," Westinghuuse Report
WCAP-7544, September 1970; "PWR FLECIIT Final Report Supplement," Westinghouse Report
WCAP-793I , October 1(72).
The effects un reflooding rate of the compressed gas in the accumulator whiL'h is discharged follOWing
accumulator water discharge shall alsn be taken into account.
4. SfCal/l IlIleracfio/l witlt Hl/lcrgell(:1' Core Coolillg Wafer ill Prcssurized Wafer Reactors. The
thermal·hydraulic interaction betwecn steam and all emergency core cooling water shall be taken into
account in calculating the core reflooding rate. During refill and retloou, the calculated steam tlow in
unbroken react,n coolant pipes sllall be taken tll be zero during the time that accumulators ;lre discharging
water inlo lhose pipes unlcss experimental evidence is available regarding tIle realistic tlternwl·hydraulic
interaction between the steam and the liquid. In this case, the experimcntal data may be used to support an
alternate assumption.
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5. Rejill alll' Rej7uud Jleal Tral/sjL'r jill" Pressurized WaleI' Reactors. For reflood rates of one inch per
second or higher, reflood heat transfer coeffIcients shall be based on applicable experimental data fur
unblocked cores lIh.:luding FLECIIT results ("I'WR FLECIIT (Full Length Emergency Cooling lIeat
Trunsfer) Final Report," Westinghouse Report WCAI'.766S, April 1Y71). The usc of a correlation derived
from FLECIIT data shall be demonstrated to be collServative fur the transient to which it is applied;
presently available FLlTIIT heat transfer correlations ("!'WR Full Length Emergellcy Cooling lIeat
Trunsfer (FLECIIT) Group 1 Test Report," Westinghouse Report WCAP·7S44, September 1970; "PWR
FLECIIT Fill'll Rcport Supplement," WcstillghouSl' Repurt WCAP·793 I , Odober 1(72) are not acceptable.
New correlations or modii'ications to tli(: FLECIIT heat transfer correlations are acceptable only after they
are deIllonstra ted to be l'onscrvativc, by comparisun with FLECIIT data, for a range of parameters
consistent with the transient to which they are applied.
Ouring refill and during refluod whcn reflood rates are less than one inch per second, heat transfel
calculations shall be based on the assumptiun that cooling is only by steam, and shall take inlu account any
/low blockage calculated to occur as a result of r1adding swelling or rupture as such IJlucJ.,age IllIgl!t alfect
both local steam flow and heat transfer.
6. COI/Pcclire Heal Tral/s}('r Co(1jicicl/ls fiir !Joitillg WaleI' Reac/or ','/le! Rods Ullder Slm~p ('ootillg.
Following the blowdown period. convective heat transfer shall be calculated using wellkients based Oil
appropriate experimental data. For reactors with jet pumps and having fuel rods in a 7 X 7 fuel assembly
array, the following convective coertlcients are acceptable:
a. During the period following lower plenum flashing but prior to the core spray reaching rated flow. a
convective heat transfer coefficient of zero shall be applied to all fuel rods.
b. During the period after core spray reaches rated flow but prior to reflooding, convective heat transfer
coefficients of 3.0, 3.5,1.5, and 1.5 Btu·IH- 1 .n-2 .oF·! shall be applied to the fuel rods in the outer corners,
outer row, next to outer row, and to those remaining in the interior, respectively. of the assembly.
c. After the two·phase reflooding fluid reaches the level under consideration, a convective heat transfer
coefficient of 25 Btu_ln- 1 ·n-2 .oF- 1 shall be applied to all fuel rous.
7. The Boitillg WaleI' Reaclo}' Channel Box Undc}' S'imy Cooling. Following the blowdtlwn period, heat
transfer from, and wetting of, the channel box shall be based on appropriate experimental data. For
reactors with jet pumps and fuel rods in a 7 X 7 fuel assembly array, the following heat transfer coefficients
and wetting time correlation arr acceptable.
a. During the period after lower plenum flashing. but prior to core spray reaching rated flow. a
convective coeftldent of zero shall be applied to the fuel assembly channel box.
b. During the period after core spray reaches rated flow. but prior ttl wetting or the channel. a
convective heat transfer coefficient of 5 Btu·h(l·ft'-2.oF-1 shall be applied to btlth sides of the l.·hannel box.
c. Wetting of the channel box shall be assumed to occur (,Q seconds aftn the time determined usmg the
correlation based on thl' Yamanouchi analysis ("Loss-of·Coolant Accident and Fmergency ('<-,re Cooling
Models for General Electric Boiling Water Reactors," General Electric Company Report NEDO- )0329.
April 1971).
II. REQUIRED DOCUMENTATION
I. a. A description of each evaluation model shall be furnished. The description shall be sufTicienllv
complete to permi t technical review' of the analy tical appruach including the eq ua lions used, their
approximations in difference form. the assumptions made. and the values of all parameters or the procedure
tor thell' selectIOn, as for example, in accordance wilh a specified physicallaw.or empirical correlation.
b. The description shall be sufficiently detailed and specific to require significant changes in the
evaluation model to be specified in amendments of the description. For this purptlse. a sigllificlJJt change is
a change that would result in a calculated fuel cladding temperature different by lI10re th;1I1 20°F froll1 the
temperature calculated (as a function of time) for a postulated LOCA using the last previously accepted
model.
c. A complete listing of each computer program, in the same form as used in the evaluatitln JJlodel. shall
be furnished to the Atomic Energy COJJlmission.
2. For each computer program, solution convergence shall be demonst rated by sluuies of system
modehng or nodlllg and calculational time steps.
3. Appropriate sensitivity studies shall be performed for each evaluation model. to evaluate the efrect
on the calculated resuI.ts of variations in nading, phenomena assumed in the calculation to predtlminate,
mcludlllg pump operatIon or locking, and values of parameters over their applicable ranges. For items to
whIch results are shown to be sensitive, the choices made shall be justified.
4. To the extent practicable, predictions of the evaluation model, or pnrtions thereof, shall be
compared with applicable experimental information.
5. General Standards for Acceptability---Elements of evaluation mtldels reviewed will include technical
adequacy of the calculational methods, induding compliance with required features of Section I of this
A~pendix K and provision of a level of. safety and. n:argin of conservatism comparable to other acceptable
evaluatIOn models, takJl1g IJ1to account slgl1lflcant dlfterences in the reactors to which they apply.
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Appendix 4 Ongoing and Planned R&D Related to LOCA-ECC in
Water Cooled Reactors
TABLE II
ONGOING AND PLANNED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO LOCA-ECC II WATER COOLED REACTORS
PROGRAM
Fundamental
Studies in Blow-
down and Heat
Transfer
CODE PURPOSE EXPERIMENTAL SYSTDC SCHEDULE !!!!..
ORlfL/BDHT Obtain data on blov-
down heat transfer
prior to ECC inJec-
tion and on heat
transfer related to
operational upsets.
1. PWR blowdown
heat transfer
(USAEC, CRlL)
2. Investigation
of Pressure
Drops and Heat
Transfer Co-
efficients
(USAEC, Uni-
versity of
Cincinnati)
U. Cin/
AEC
7 x 7 electrically heated Continuing
rod array l2-ft-long, pro- to July
filed power distribution, 1975
PWR pin diameter and pitch.
Investigate pressure Two laboratory scale test Continuing
drops and heat trans- systems: (1) sllla11 piping
fer phenomena of im- test section using treon
portance during LOCA. to obtain two-phase pres-
sure drope and flow pat-
terns, and (2) a single
tube with mercury on the
inside to obtain basic
transition boiling and
reflooding heat trans-
fer data.
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Emphasize separate
effects tests on
blowdown heat trans-
fer in which re-
sponse of the rod
array to specific
initial and bound-
ary conditions (for
example, reverse
and re-reverse flov)
vill be determined
vithout influence
of the primary sys-
tem loop.
Fundamental studies
to include condi-
tions under which
nucleate boiling is
reestablished.
TABLE II (Contd.)
OlfGOIlfG AID PLADED RESEARCH AID DEVELOPMDl' RELA'l'ED TO LOCA-JCC II VAUR COOLED RJ:AC'l'OM
PROORAM CODE PURPOSE EXPERIMElfTAL SYST!)I
5. Research Qn ROSA
Safety As-
sessment
(ROSA) (Japlm
Atomic Energf
Resea.rch In-
stitute, Toka!
Laboratory)
Continuing 30 Transient CHF teata
include tranalent
tlow, power. and
pressure testins and·
study of etfects ot
cQIIl})lnations of Intr'"
bundle clearance.
power distribution,
and spacer component.,
Continuing 31 Studies fOr deter-
~ining basic bubble
growth ph.mometla
which cause and con-
trol critical flow.
BWR Yessel system
blowdovn 1Mld heat
transfer data as
part of this pro-
grlllll. A ROSA II
facility is being
fabricated and is
de6cribed under
scaled system et-
fects experiments.
Single-rod and 9(or 15)
rod .array transient CHF
tests; single-rod simu-
lated swelling effects
on steady state CHFi9-
rod array with geometry
cbanges on spacer com-
ponents and simUlated
bOWing and swelling to
investisate ~te8dy­
state CHF.
Long stro.ight pipes up
to 8 in. in diameter,
12 ft in length, heavily
instrumented.
Determine CHF and
temperature re-
g1mea occurring
due to power, flow.
or preaslU"e tran-
sient upset; eval-
uate telllperature
regimes in LOCA;
evaluate conse-
quences of fuel
rOd ge<metry
chaDges.
Acquire basic de-
compression data
for model develop-
ment.
Meuure presllure ROSA I: 56-cm-ID and 106- CoDt1Dulna 32
and leak flow tl'an- em-long pressure vessel.
a i"'nts during blow- rod arny typical of BWR
down, obtain scoping fuel assembly with up to
data on DNB during 13 electrica~y heated
bloWdown, eValuate- roda, rupture disc unit.
pressure oscillations.
CE/OC/
AEC
3. Deficient
Cooling (US-
AEC. General
Electric Coa-
pany, San
Jose, CaUt'.)
4. Blowdown of
Long Straight
Pipes (Risley,
UKAEA)
6. Heat Trans- Am/om
fer During
Blovdown
(AEG-
Telef'unken,
German Fed-
eral Min-
istry)
7. Depressuri- IrJpra
zation Dy-
namics and
Heating
Transient,
Fundamen-
tal Two-
Phase flow
Studies
(EURATOM,
hpn.)
8. Investigation BMI/GlM
of the PhenO'"
mena Involved
in the De-
pressurhatioo
of Jlater-
Cooled Reactors
(Battelle-
Institute
FrankfUrt. Ger-
many)
Acquire data base
for heat trans tel'
coefficients and
thermAl-hydraulic
behavior during
blowdovn.
Obtl;\.in data on beat
transfer during
system decompression.
Dete~ine lO6da on
veeael inter04le
durine deprees1.Iri-
za\lon, investigate
phenomena in the
initial phase of
depressurization (in
particular the dis-
charge rate).
Parametric tests with an Continuing 33
internally cooled tube 3 •
in length. Test section
4-rod bundle tests usins
BWR And PWR power protiles
and 36-1'00 bundle testlil
with BWR and PWR power
profiles.
Test loop consillted 01' an 34
electricl;\.lly-heated round~
tUbe test section (15-mm
on, 13. B-lQIIl ID, and 3-111
length). .an upper plenWll,
a lower plenum. a recir-
culation line. a pres-
surizer. ana a quick
opening valve.
Tests utilize a v••••l ot 35
0.8-. ID and 11.2... leD&th
with 8UDplifled internals
representation. EXit pipe
dll111lcter of 150 1IIlIl.
Parametrlc tests at
toeA conditions for
development of heat
transfer correlations.
ODe Bubchannel .i-
a\llation.
Both BWI! and PWR
Initial fluid eon-
ditions to be in-
velltigated.
A4-2
TABLE II (Contd.)
OIfGOIlfG AlID PLAIOIED RESEARCH AlID DEVELOPMEltT RELATED TO LOCA-ECC II WATER COOLBD REACTORS
-
PROGRAM CODE PURPOSE EXPERIMENTAL SYSTDC SCHEDULE !!!. RDWlKS
-
9· Bottom Flood- ECC/CISE Preliminary experi- Test facility of directly 36 Parllllleters varieding Experi- mental investigation heated tubular and annu- were pressure, flow
ments (CISE, of coolant channel lar test elements 4 m in rate, coolant inlet
Milan, Italy) thermal transient length. enthalpy, heating
following bottom power, and initial
ECC injection. wall temperature.
Data analyzed to
determine influ-
ence of test para-
meters on temperature
turnaround and
quenching times.
10. Dryout Ex- BDHT/CISE Develop a model of Externally heated annulUS, 31 Experimental con-
periments local and instan- 1.35-mm !D, 2.l-cm OD and ditions: steady-
(CISE, taneous values of 400-cm length, with initial state, inlet flow
Milan, Italy) flow and quality pressures to 50 bars. stoppage with pres-
along fuel chan- sure transient or
nel, compare power surge.
transient dryout
conditions with
steady-state con-
ditions.
11. Cooling of CIDB Obtain data on the Pin cluster tests with a Continuing 38 Studies on water
High- direct injection concentric ring of heat- distribution in a
Temperature of coolant onto the ers with a central sparge hot cluster and
Surfaces heated surface for tUbe, single rod and tube cooling effective-
(Central development of experiments with water ness of aerosols
Electricity physical models. directed at top of heated are in progress.
Generating length, and flat plates
Board, United experiments with water
Kingdom) directed at surface of
plate.
EMERGENCY CORE
COOLANT DELIVERY
1. Semiscale - P-SSBD Provide an .under- Plexiglass test vessel Continuing Work related to
Plexiglass standing of ECC with geometry similar to other semiscale
Vessel delivery phenomena, the l-1/2-loop semiscale testing to under-(USAEC, investigate appli- vessel annulus and down- stand ECC delivery
Aerojet cation of air-water comer. and bypass. Ef-
Nuclear countercurrent flow fects of downcomer
Company, correlations to length, and lower
NRTS) downcomer annulus plenum geometry
geometries. studied.
2. Semi scale SS-SSBD Same as for l2-ft long, 8.5 in.-ID Last quar- Steady-state air-
Vessel - Semiscale-Plexiglass pressure vessel, 1/2-or ter of 1912 water and steam-
Steady- Vessel with steam- l-ln. annulus width, water counter-
State Tests water countercurrent outlet phase operator. current flow tests(USAEC, flow and in addition, to study effects
Aerojet effect of heat tranB- of water tempera-
Nuclear Com- fer from fluid bound- ture, wall stored
pany. NRTS) aries at elevated energy, downcomer
temperatures. gap width. and
lower plenum geo-
metry.
3. l-l/2-Loop I-SSBD Investigate ECC de- Semiscale vessel; vessel Mid 1973 Test conditions in-Semiscale - livery with emphasis downcomer; operating loop elude blowdown withIsothermal on the applicability with pump, steam generator, and without ECC in-Tests (USAEC, of steady-state low and pressurizer; blowdown jection; variationAerojet Nuc- pressure results to loop with simulated steam in ECC injectionlear Company, transient blowdown generator and pump; ac- pressure and loca-NRTS) conditions. cumulators. tion. lower plenum
geometry, pump shut-
down times. and steam
generator secondary
A4-3 condit ions.
TABLE II (Contd.j
ONGOING Al'fD PLA1tlfED RESEARCH AND DEVELOAoIElfT RELATED TO LOCA-teC IN WATER COOLED REACTORS
PROGRAM
4. Stealll-Water
Mixing Test
Program
(USAEC and
Combustion
En61neering,
Inc. Windsor,
Connecticut)
Reflood!n! Heat
Transfer
1. Low Rate ECC
Reflood1ng
Heat Trans-
fer (FIAT
Nuclear En-
ergy Section,
Italy)
2. 1-l/2-Loop
MOd.-l (lJSAEC,
AeroJet Nuc-
lear CQIIIP&IIY,
NRTS)
3. iCC Reflood1ng
&tperUients
(Siemens,
Ge1"lll&ll1" )
conE
CE/USAEC
FIAT
M04-1
Siemensl
GFM
PURPOSE
Investigate inter-
action of the ECC
fluid with 8te~
in the primary
systftl.
Obtain rod bundle
heat transfer data
during reflooding.
Includes investi-
gllotion of blowdovn
and ECC injection
variables and their
influence on clad-
4ing temperature.
Investigate the
performance of
low pressure ECCS
and obtain flQid
flow and heat
transfer data dur-
ing retloocllng.
EXPERrML"NTAL SYSTEM
Steam gener6torj cold leg
with loop seal, simulated
pump, and ECC injection
nozzle; and reactor ves-
sel. Test section is a
geometrically sc~led mo-
del of the piping from
the steam generator to
the re~ctor vesoel inlet.
Twenty~one heater rod
a&~embly with upper and
lower plenum. Heater OD
is 9.8 mm, length is
1184 mm, and pitch is
12.9 mm. Uniform power
distribution.
A 5i~ulated PWR system
with generic component
elevation, electrically
heated core, operating
loop, blowdown loop.
accumulator, HP!S &nd
!.PIS. [a] Capability for
5.5- and l2-foot heated
rod lengthll.
1>t'diminary reflooding
tests With a single in-
ternally cooled tube.
Also an electrically
heated 340-rod arr~,
IO.75-mm rod diameter.
3 m in length with
chopped cosine power
distribution. Bundle
has three regions
~ich C&n be inde-
pendently heated vith
maximum power input
of 1.4 MW. A l6-bar
pressure vessel con-
tains the bundle. A
bypass simulates the
annular downcQll1er.
SCHEDULE~. REMARKS
Continuing 39 Jnvestlg~te piping
hydraul!c res istan¢. ,
inJ ect ion nozzlein~'
clination, test
section 9t~e. Equt~
librlum tests at
variOUS pressures
to obtain data on
water remaining, Ilb4"
influence of reactor
vessel geometry on
water remaining.
40 Flooding rates!n
the rMge of 0.2
to 0.6 in./sec,
pover varied trQlll
0.45 to 0.65
kW/ft. A relation- !
ship between bottOi
flooding and maXi~
m\lJll acceptable
power wa!! obtaiMcl;
Emphasi~es system
and loop componeht
effects on ECCde-
livery to core
region during blQV4
down.
Continuing 41 Flooding from the
bottom only and
s1m..u.taneoU8 top
IUld bottOlll floodilll ~ i
4. Loss-of-Fluid
Test (USAEC,
AeroJet Buc-
lear COIIlp&lly,
NRTS)
LOn' Obtain data on
thermal-hydraulic
behavior associated
with core and on
core thermal re-
sponse during EGC
inJection.
55 MW(t) PWR with an
operating loop, a
blovdown loop, ac-
cumulators, LPIS,
HPIS[a], supporting
systems, and initiall)t
a 5.5-tt-lone core of
t)'pical PWR ruel di-
mensions with about
1300 fuel pins. Capa-
bility tor a 12-tt-
long core proVided.
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Contlnuins Reflooding heat
tran$fer data on
nuclear fUeled cor~.
Wide rlUlge of ECC
injection par~et.r.
and inJection l~
cation. can be
.elected.
TABLE II (Contd. )
ONGOING AND PLANNED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RELATED TO LOCA-ECC II WATER COOLED REACTORS
-
PROGRAM CODE PURPOSE EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEH SCHEDULE !!!!. REMARKS
-
5· power Burst PBF Determine maxi- Open tank reactor Continuing Tests with both PWRFacility mum fuel clad- vessel housing 3- an~ BWR fuel clusters;
(USAEC, Aero- ding temperature ft-Iong driver core, up to 24-pin arr8¥.
jet Nuclear permitted at the a central flux trap Top spr8¥ or bottom
company, NRTS) time of coolant de- region containing an in- flooding capability.
livery without loss pile tube in which the Tests include use of
of cladding inte- test fuel is located and irradiated fuel.
grity, the effect of a loop coolant system for
ballooning on maxi- providing required sys-
mum permissible tem- tem conditions in the
perature, and the test section.
effect of degraded
coolant performance
on the maximum per-
missible cladding
temperature.
Scaled System
Effects Ex-
2eriments
1. 1-1!2-Loop Mod-l Provide LOCA-ECC A silJiulated PWR system Extensive systems
Mod-l (USAEC, data; for analy- with an electrically effects and para-
Aerojet Huc- tical model eval- heated core, an operat- meter variations on
lear Company, uation of total ing loop, a blowdown system component in-
NRTS) system codes, on loop, accumulator, HPIS, fluence on blowdown,
effects of phy- and LPIS[ al. Capability blowdown heat trana-
sical scale in for 5.5- and 12-ft-long fer, ECC delivery,
relation to LOFT cores and other system and core reflooding
scale, and for geometry changes. cooling.
guidance of LOFT
test program.
2. BWR Blowdown GE!BDHT! Provide informa- Scaled BWR system con- Continuing 42 Testing conditions to
Heat Trans- AEC tion on the tran- sisting of a pressure include: variation of
fer (USAEC sient heat transfer vessel with two ex- initial system con-
and General following a rupture ternal drive pump re- ditions, break size
Electric of a steam. line or circulation loops. and locations, and
Company, San recirculation line Vessel contains a power dec8¥ transient.
Jose, Calif.) in a BWR. full-size 49-rod elec-
trically heated bundle,
two Jet pumps, and a
steam separator.
3. Research of ROSA II Obtain information ROSA II facility con- Continuing 32 ROSA II facility is
Safety As- on the effects of sists of a 265-mm-ID being fabricated.
sessment system parameters and 5900-mm-long pres- Testing is acheduled(ROSA) , such as piping re- sure vessel containing to begin in October(Japan Ato- sistance, power, 109 electrically heated 1973.
mic Energy pressure, break rods 1500 mm in length,
Research location and size, two loops with pump and
Institute and ECCS variationa, steam generators, one of
TOkai La- for both BWR and these loops has a rup-
boratory) PWR conditions. ture unit, pressurizer,
and ECCS.
~. Full Scale FOOD Obtain cladding tem- The facility consists of Continuing 43 Experimental facility
Safety Ex- perature information a steam drum, circulating is a mockup of the
periments during blowdown and pump, downcomer, lower prototype, heavy-
ot FOOD ECC injection, dis- header, 25 pressure tube water-moderated,
charge reaction assemblies 3 of which boiling-light-vater-
forces, and transi- contain electrically cooled reactor,
ent characteristics heated full-scale fuel FOOEI.
of the pr1llary sys- assemblies, and ECCS. Fuel
tell. assemblies contain 28
heaters 3.7. in length.
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TABLE II (Contd ••}
OJfOOIBG AJfD PWNED RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMEN"l' REI.ATED TO LOCA-ECC IN WATER COOLED REACTORS
---------------------------------------------------------..;
PROGRAM CODI PURPOSE EXPERIMElfI'AL SYST.DI SCHEDULE ~. _--:REm.R=.;;.:;;=K-.S_--.........
5. Full Length
Emergency
Cooling Heat
Ttansfer-
S)'stem Ef-
feetl Tests
(USAEC and
Weatinghou$e
Electric
CorporatiOll,
Pittsburgh.
Pa.)
Ll'Lrge-System Ef-
fects Experiments
vith Nuclear Heat
Source ...
Provide experimental FLECHT flow housing and a ED4 1913
data OQ the Intlu- power profiled 10 x 10
ence ot s,.stem ef- heater rod test assembl,.,
tects OD ECC behavior coolant supply system,
4\11'1111 I'Otloo4:1.ns. downcomer I Fre8s~e con-
trol ~ystem, upper and
lower test section ple-
nums. and single loop
consisting of piping.
valv~s, and orifices.
In later tests the single
loop w111 be replac~
b,. tvo lOOPll each having
a full length steam gen-
erator, pump simulator,
and plpirl$ t\l"ranged to
represent elevations and
flaw cbaracteriatici in
tbe loops.
29 Tests emphasize.tht,
influence of syll\g:
characterist,icsOi!
flooding rate ,hellt
r.lulle trom clad~.'
ding and flov hOU.11l1~.J
carryover, and .prea.. ,]
sure drop. Additi_"
system featuresllllt::·
testIng are bei?!
cODsidered. '
1. Losll-of-Flv.ld
Test (Us.uc.
AeroJet he-
lear CQIp4ID1",
1JItS)
LOFT Provide PWR inte-
gral test data on
all principal as-
pects of an LOCA
vith ECC injection
including transient
thermal, ~ecbanical.
and nuclear response
of tbe system, ca~
'bUtt)" of ECCS.
.-rains or saret)".
contaiDaent ,,.It..
ettects. aDd tlel1aa
pr04v.et behavior.
55 MW( t) PWR vith 8lI Cont!-Dulq
operating loop. a blow-
down loop, accQm~lators,
LPIS. HPIS[a], suppOrting
8)"8te~8, and initiall,.
a 5.5-tt-long core otber-
wise of t)'plcal PWR fuel
diaensionl with &bout
1300 fuel pins. Capabllit)'
tar a 12-tt-lOOS core
proyi4ed•
Test data vill pro-
vide unique experi-
mental informationl
at large scale ,in
more than one dimen..
sion within core an~
reactor vessel,llith:'
generic time constaht.'
of nuclear fuel.·vit~'
interacting effeets'llt;J
cbdding balloon ing j
changing fuel gll.PC(lIIo!
ditions and changil!8i
coolant channelgeo-
metry, and at high
temperature fuel
conditions for detet-
mIning margins of ••'
emergency core eool~
ing pertonlance.
[a] HPIS -- hip pressure injection qat_. LPIS - low pressure inJectlOll s,.stell.
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Appendix 5 REACTOR FISSION PRODUCT DECAY HEAT
Fission product decay heat produces one of the primary energy
inputs for the ECCS. Unlike many of the complicated coupled fluid mechan-
ical thermodynamic-heat transfer problems associated with the overall
effectiveness of the ECCS, the decay heat, as an energy source function
for this system, may be evaluated independently of the remainder of the
problem. Consequently, the analyses leading to a definitive specification
of the magnitude of the decay heat might rationally be expected to have
been adequately disposed of long before the preparation of the lAC.
Regrettably, the magnitude of the decay heat was the subject of substan-
tial controversy during the ECCS Hearings. The principal arguments asso-
ciated with the subject will be reviewed in this appendix.
A5.1 Decay Heat Standards
The lAC specified that the decay heat input utilized for the
analysis should be defined in accordance with the proposed American
Nuclear Society (ANS) Standard ANS 5.1, "Decay Energy Release Rates
Following Shutdown of Uranium-Fueled Thermal Reactor," with an added
20 percent "allowance for uncertainties."* During the early stages of
the hearings, the CNI provoked a substantial controversy over the adequacy
of the ANS Standard 5.1 on the basis of an investigation on the subject
of decay heat by T. R. England. The CNI suggested, based on England's
doctoral dissertation results, that the ANS Standard 5.1 might under-
predict decay heat by 20 percent to 50 percent. Subsequent reviews and
analyses of the decay heat have substantially reduced the controversy
over the problem (as well as the expected magnitude of ANS Standard 5.1
underpredictions).
* See appendix 3: Interim Acceptance Criteria, Appendix A: Part 1,
No,S; Part 2, No, 6; Part 3, No.2, etc.
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The technical community's concern over the adequacy of the
ANS Standard 5.1 + 20 percent prescription of the lAC has not been com-
pletely eliminated. However, supplemental studies imply that there are
no major discrepancies in the ANS Standard 5.1 description of decay heat
(at least of the magnitude initially suggested by England and the CNI).
As a result, the lAC decay heat prescription was adopted in the AC, with-
out change. Subsequent review and analyses of decay heat have substantially
reduced (but not eliminated) the controversy over the problem.
In an operating reactor, in addition to fission product decay
heat generation shown in figure A5.l, thermal energy is also supplied
after shutdown by delayed neutron interactions and heavy isotope (U-239
and Np-239) decay. Figure A5.2 shows a typical total shutdown power
generation curve, demonstrating the rapid decrease in the effectiveness
of delayed neutrons as a power source. As shown in figure A5.2, delayed
neutron interactions act to maintain heat generation at relatively high
levels during the first 10 seconds (approximately) after shutdown. At
the end of this period, the shutdown power has decayed to about 6 percent
of rated power output for the reactor and is subsequently a function of
essentially fission product and heavy isotope decay only. At the end of
100 seconds, the power has decreased to less than 4 percent of rated
power and continues 'to decrease thereafter at a rate approximating the
0.2 power of time.
The ANS Standard 5.1 has been based upon a combination of
numerical and experimental studies. One of the principal problems with
the analysis upon which the standard is based is the shortage of experi-
mental results for both the critical 0-1000 sec time period following
shutdown and for fuel exposed in reactors for extended-high flux irradi-
ation periods (10,000-50,000 hours) (i, p. 22-9). Experimental information
on decay heating is gathered in two ways: through results of gamma or
beta energy decay measurements, or by direct calorimetric measurements.
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No direct calorimetric methods have been successfully employed for shut-
down times less than 1000 sec; calorimetric results exist for experiments
conducted on fuel rod elements exposed to irradiation bursts of short
time periods which agree "satisfactorily" with numerical studies. All
of the important analyses of decay heat depend upon experimental results
of gamma and beta energy measurements during the important 0-1000 sec
time period following shutdown. Unfortunately, there are only about five
to six good independent sets of experimental data for each of the gamma
and beta measurements -- a very small quantity of data for such important
parameters.
ANS Standard 5.1 also depends on experimental results in the
time period 0-1000 sec and results of numerical studies for the modeling
of subsequent time periods. Until recently, numerical analyses were
considered to be of questionable validity in the 0-1000 sec shutdown period
because the influence of short half-life fission product nuclides was
generally neglected in the summation calculations used for the analyses.
AS.2 Comparison of lAC and T. R. England Decay Heat Predictions
An important numerical analysis of reactor shutdown heating
was recently performed by T. R. England (11). The England study was a
numerical summation calculation in which an attempt was made to improve
upon other available short time studies by using more recent data sources
and theory, including evaluation of short-lived isotopes in the analysis,
and the improvement of the neutron capture analysis with a more complete
physical modeling of the coupling of the nuclides of the fission product
chain. These characteristics tended to improve the short time analysis.
Consequently, England's study claimed to be valid for time as short as
60 sec or more after shutdown.
Prior to England's calculation, uncertainty over the physical
characteristics of the short-lived isotopes (i.e., yields, half-lives,
capture cross-sections, and beta and gamma decay energies for isotopes
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with half-lives less than one minute) limited estimates of summation
calculation validity to cooling periods greater than 1000 seconds. The
earlier analysis (Shure, 1961, &2) upon which ANS Standard 5.1 was based
used experimental data to provide the basis for decay times less than
1000 sec. Shure's early study was based (for decay times greater than
1000 sec) upon summation calculations which included 350 fission product
nuclides and employed neutron absorption in addition to radioactive decay
to account for coupling between nuclide decay chains (~, p. 5). Neutron
coupling was not included in the studies upon which Shure's early work was
based. Future studies which are to be conducted under AEC sponsorship may
include as many as 800 nuclides in describing decay energy. Adequate
descriptions of decay times as short as 10 sec may be possible in summa-
tion calculations using the current nuclide data.
The most notable departure of England's results from thE ANS
Standard 5.1 was associated with an indicated increase in the influence
of time-dependent neutron flux-irridiation time characteristics on the
decay heat. England's results, for sufficiently large flux-time intervals,
were considerably larger than predicted by the ANS Standard 5.1 model with
an infinite irradiation period. To graphically demonstrate the differ-
ences, England's original results for the time-history of decay power are
shown (normalized against the ANS standards) in figure A5.3. The results
are plotted in terms of the parameters of multiples of a standardized
flux, ~E' and irradiation times. It should be noted that these results
were based upon calculations which were erroneous. Corrections were made
in the code and the results were revised as indicated by the dashed curve
in figure A5.3.
England's base case, with the standardized flux ~E' corresponds
13 .
to a thermal neutron flux of 2 x 10 for 10,000 hours. This case was
-4 2
calculated with a U-235 density of 5 x 10 at/barn-em (England's units)
which produces an initial power density of 109 w/cm3 , for the unit flux~E.
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Figure AS.3
Comparison of England Fission-Product Decay Calculations to ANS Standard 5.1
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Typical BWR and PWR reactors have average U-235 enrichments of 2.7 and
2.15 percent, respectively, corresponding to U-235 densities of 1.8 and
1.2 x 10-4 at/barn-cm2. With power densities for typical W-PWRs and GE-BWRs
of the order of 105 w/cm3 and 51 w/cm3, respectively, the above U-235 den-
sities would lead to average flux levels for the PWR of 2.7~E and 1.9~E
for the BWR, in England's nomenclature. For these reactors, an average
equilibrium burnup of 30,000 MWd/MT* would correspond to three annual 8000
hour cycles for the PWR and five for the BWR (i, p. 22-10).
In accordance with the lAC, ECCS analyses are based upon evalua-
tion of a fuel rod exposed not to the average flux, but to the influence
of the peaking factor resulting in the "most severe thermal transient"
possible for the accident. To satisfy these requirements, a peaking
factor of 2.6 is appropriate for DBA analysis. Under these circumstances,
a flux-time integral of (7~E' 24Khr) for the PWR and (5~E' 40Khr) for the
BWR would be representative of limiting conditions (a single rod exposed
to maximum flux conditions over its entire life span in the reactor) of
irradiation exposure for the reactor fuel.
England's original dissertation results, shown in figure A5.3,
imply that flux-time integrals of the above magnitudes would lead to
shutdown decay energies substantially in excess of those predicted by the
ANS Standard 5.1. The results (solid lines) indicate the initially pre-
dicted (on the basis of erroneous calculations) effect of increasing
irradiation time and flux on resultant decay power. The results implied
that increasing irradiation time by a given factor, generally speaking,
might produce a greater increase in decay power than the same relative
increase in flux. The nonlinearity of the results shown (as well as their
apparent magnitude) in which increasing fluxes and irradiation times led
to apparently exponentially increasing decay power led the CNI to become
very concerned over this problem. England's conclusions to his disserta-
tion had stated:
* MWd/MT: megawatt days per metric ton of uranium.
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Because previously recommended heating rates, such as Shure's,
have relied on a calculational model which ignores neutron
absorption, several generations of coupled progeny and
coupling systematics in general, this would explain the
differences observed here. Prudence in design would require
an increase of 20-50% in estimated heating rates now in
use (~).
A5.3 Shure/England Reevaluation of Decay Heat
The substantial apparent differences between England's disserta-
tion results and the ANS proposed standards caused substantial concern
within the technical community over the validity of the results and the
sources of the apparent conflicts. In order to investigate the causes of
the apparent decay heat differences, Shure initiated a reevaluation of
his original recommendations together with England's calculational methods.
Though the study was apparently conducted primarily by Shure, he received
the cooperation of England in analyzing, correcting, and rerunning his
code (CINDER) which had been developed and applied in England's doctoral
dissertation.
The CINDER code, which includes "about 350 fission product
nuclides and employs neutron absorption in addition to radioactive decay
for coupling purposes between nuclides," was acknowledged by Shure to be
a "more sophisticated" method than had been employed in his original in-
vestigation (64, p. 5). However, in the course of a careful investigation
of the code, in comparison with other similar calculational routines, it
was discovered that a "very subtle programming bug" had been made in one
of the critical steps of the CINDER code (64, p. 7). After this program-
ming error was corrected by England, further investigations turned up
"several data errors" which were subsequently revised in CINDER's tabula-
ted data for the physical parameters of some of the critical nuclides (64,
p. 7). It should be observed that a similar number of "corrections" were
required in the library of nuclide physical parameters for Shure's own
current code (FSTAB) (64, p. 7).
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With CINDER's programming errors debugged and the corrections
to the nuclide physical perameters incorporated, results of the code were
again compared with the proposed ANS Standard 5.1 decay heat standards.
Comparative data are shown in table AS.l, based upon Shure's reported
results (64). It can be seen that while England's dissertation results
departed from the proposed standard by 10-20 percent in the critical
period of about the first 1000 sec of LOCA shutdown (figure AS.3), with
the revisions and corrections the deviation was less than 6 percent for
the base (or "fiducial") case (14)£, 10K hr).
To evaluate the importance of neutron absorption and coupling
in the nuclide chains, Shure investigated higher flux variations for the
10K hr fiducial case (flux levels of S~E and 10~E). Results are shown
in table AS.3, in comparison with the revised CINDER results of table AS.l
and England's dissertation results. With the corrections and adjustments
to CINDER made, the higher flux results (S~E and 10~E) can be seen to be
much more in line with ANS Standard 5.1 than the original dissertation
results (figure AS.3 and column 4). With corrections, increases can be
observed of 1-3 percent above the fiducial CINDER case, rather than the
factors of nearly 2 which were observed in the original dissertation.
Review of the results indicated that the principal cause of
the apparent reduction in relative energies was associated with the
fission rate history of England's original dissertation. Comparison of
the results indicated that the constant flux assumptions of England's
dissertation led to unrealistically low fission rates (number of fissions/
sec) near the end of the irradiation period (~lOK hr) as a result of
uranium depletion. Low fission rates imply relatively low power output
for the fuel. In practice, the average fission rate for the reactor is
held nearly constant -- for a case of constant reactor power output --
requiring a relatively increasing flux density rather than a constant flux
history. As a result of England's constant flux assumption, the apparent
relative power output near the end of the proble~ from the fuel (in Mev/fis-
sion) was overpredicted, due to extremely low relative fission rates
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Table A5.1
Comparison of ANS 5.1 Standard Decay Energy with England Dissertation
and Revised CINDER Results
("Fiducial" Case-- 1 ~E ' 10,000 Hours Irradiation)
t ANS England CINDER Revised ':~evised CINDEF
(sec) Standard 5.1 Dissertation ANS Standard CINDER ANS Standard
CINDER 5.1 5.1
(Mev/fiss) (Mev/fiss) (Hev/fiss)
0 13.88 11. 68 .841 11.51 .829
101 9.874 9.825 .995 9.317 .943
102 6.632 7.160 1.080 6.639 1.001
103 3.729 4.381 1.175 3.943 1.057
104 1.836 2.205 1.201 1.853 1.009
105 0.8428 1.130 1.341 0.8724 1.035
106 0.4197 0.5453 1.299 0.4369 1.041
107 0.1171 0.1571 1.342 0.1163 .993
108 0.006620 0.007877 1.190 0.007621 1.151
Table A5.2
Effect of Neutron Absorption of U235 Fission Product Decay
Energy for the 10,000 Hour Fiducial Case
(Interim Revised Physical Parameters Used as "Hell as Revised CINDER Program)
t (1) (2) (3) (4)
(sec) Reduced4i 5 4i 10 4i 10~*
Rev. CINDER Rev. CINDER Rev. CINDER Rev. CINDER
0 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.18
101 1.01 1.21
102 1.02 1.27
103 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.43
104 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.84
105 0.98 1.02 1.05 2.61
106 0.98 1.02 1.05 3.60
107 0.98 1.05 1.10 5.42
108 0.92 1. 30 1.60 10.01
* Fission rate history is comparable to case 12 (10 ~ E' 10K hr - England's
dissertation). All other fission rate histories are comparable to the
fiducial case (case 1) of ref. 23.
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(Mev/fission = Mev/sec + fission/sec). The results shown in table A5.2
reflect calculations in which fission rates have been arbitrarily main-
tained at the same relative rates as the fiducial case, for all flux
variations considered.
A5.4 ORNL Review of Empirical Decay Heat Results
Under AEC support, Perry, Maienshein, and Vondy of ORNL investi-
gated the empirical data supporting the proposed ANS Standard 5.1 standard
(65). The results of the study are summarized in figure A5.4 reproduced
from Perry, et al. (65). In the figure, results of various analyses of
fission-product decay heat have been compared, on a normalized basis, with
the ANS Standard.5.l (curve (1». Curve (2) represents the "best estimate"
of the experimentally derived results of Perry et al. for fuel which has
been irradiated in the reactor for an "infinite" time. It can be seen that
in the critical period from 100 to 10,000 sec, the results depart from the
ANS Standards 5.1 by a maximum of about 6 percent (occurring at 1000 sec).
Other results shown in the figure include results of a recent Shure (FSTAB)
calculation (curve (3» of infinitely irradiated fuel (64). The FSTAB
results demonstrate the characteristic inability of summation calculations
to adequately predict short time results (especially for those calculations
which include a relatively small number of nuclides - 201 - in their analy-
sis). As a result, Shure's analyses (e.g., ~) customarily described the
first 1000 seconds after shutdown in terms of experimental results (curve
(5) ) •
Curve (4) presents a graphical comparison of CINDER results
(similar to those shown in table A5.l) for the so-called fiducial case
(lq>E' 10K hr irradiation) of Shure and England's studies. Shure's FSTAB
results for a similar calculation have been shown in curve (5). The most
significant observation to be drawn from the comparison is that all of
the studies presented show a consistent departure, on the order of 5-8 per-
cent, in the period of about 1000 seconds (and later) after LOCA shutdown.
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The 6 percent deviation predicted by England at 1000 seconds after shutdown
appears to be wholly consistent with, and thoroughly supported by, all
the latest results.
Perry, et al. conducted an independent numerical investigation
of the effects of neutron coupling using the ORNL-ORIGEN code in a summa-
tion calculation. England has attributed the dominant role in the in-
creases in decay energy predicted by his dissertation study to neutron
coupling in the fission-product nuclide chains. Using the ORIGEN code,
Perry observed an increase in decay heat attributable to neutron coupling
of no more than 2 percent for cooling times less than 1000 sec, a 4 per-
cent increase at 104 sec, and a 7 percent increase at 105 sec (65, p. 53)
for fuel irradiated at average power levels within the reactor (approxi-
mately 2-3~E in England's nomenclature) for 30,000 MWD/MT. Though this
does not correspond to infinite irradiation time periods, it does repre-
sent approximately 50,000 hours of irradiation at the average power levels
of the calculation. Exposure times of this magnitude for fuel should
furnish an adequate check on the validity of England's assertion of im-
portant long irradiation time effects to be expected due to neutron cou-
pling. Though the results do indicate a potential 2-4 percent increase,
Perry's data do not support the kind of results for long irradiation
periods suggested by England.
As further evidence of the validity of Perry's results, he
conducted an investigation of coupling effects for a case approximately
the .fiducial exposure period of 10,000 hours (at the same flux levels of
2-3~E). Perry's results for this case agree well with the results of
Shure (table AS.2). Increases in decay energy for this case were less
than 2 percent for all shutdown times less than 105 sec in Perry's
"fiducial" study (65, p. 53).
Thus it appears that the combined effects of high fluxes asso-
ciatedwith the hottest rods of the reactor (5-7~E) and long irradiation
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times (up to 50,000 hours) should not increase decay power more than
4-7 percent above the best estimates of decay energy for "fiducial" flux
levels and irradiation times in the critical period of about 1000 sec after
LOCA shutdown. However, this evidently is in addition to an expected
5-8 percent positive deviation from the ANS Standard 5.1 in this same
time period for the fiducial case. Thus the total expected deviation from
the ANS Standard 5.1 at about 1000 sec after shutdown for the hot rod con-
ditions could well be an increase of from 10-15 percent.
A5.4.l Experimental uncertainty in decay heat estimates
These estimates of deviations from the fiducial case must be
coupled with consideration of the experimental uncertainty associated
with the empirical data of Perry, et a1. With respect to their "best
estimate" values of figure A5.4, they have stated:
••• we believe that there remains in the composite
afterheat function, F(t,oo), and error (roughly in the
sense of one standard deviation) of about 10-15 percent
(65, p. 19).
The composite afterheat function, F(t,oo), is simply the resultant decay
heat associated with both beta and gamma ray decay energies of the fission
product nuclides. After a statistical evaluation of the data from which
they derived their best estimate fit to the experimental data, Perry, et
a1. concluded:
The assertion that the standard error in the afterheat function
F(t, 00) is as small as ±7% seems a bit surprising, when the
results of individual experiments are as discrepant as they
are shown to be in Figs. 11 and 14. In Fig. 11, for example,
it may be seen that over much of the time range covered all
the [S decay energy] measurements lie outside of barely
within the error band (±7-8%) deduced for fS(t). The
pattern for gammas is somewhat similar though less clear
cut. It is our feeling, on the basis of many years of
experience with nuclear physics measurements, including
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those of the type being evaluated, that the uncertainty
in F(t,oo) would more conservatively be placed at +15%
(65, p. 44) (emphasis added).
To further define the limits of uncertainty for the data, the upper bounds
of the empirical data were developed. Figure A5.5 shows the upper bounds
for the partial composite after heat function, F+(t,oo), normalized
against Shure's functional expression for the decay energy used in ANS
Standard 5.1. For the limited experimental data examined by Perry et al.,
the results are bounded at the 1000 sec shutdown time by a + 28 percent
increment. Over most of the remaining period of interest, the bounding
value averages approximately 25 percent above the ANS Standard 5.1 values.
It must b~ emphasized that the bounding limits for the data
are based upon a relatively sparse collection of independent experimental
results. The composite afterheat function was formed on the basis of four
independent experiments for S-energy release rates and five experiments
for y-rays. Though more experiments were included for the y-ray energy
spectral measurements, it was the conclusion of Perry et al. that:
The situation with respect to gamma energy-release measure-
ments is somewhat less satisfactory than for betas (65, p. 28).
It seems unlikely that the bounding values would be as low as 25-30 per-
cent above the ANS Standard 5.1 if a more exhaustive set of experimental
data had been included.
AS.4.2 ANS estimates of ANS Standard 5.1 uncertainty
The ANS-5.l Standards Committee also evaluated the uncertainty
in the estimate of decay energy which they were proposing. Without
expressly stating how their uncertainty results were related to a statis-
tical standard deviation, the ANS-5.l subcommittee expressed their esti-
mate of the uncertainty of the results about the recommended curve to be
of the order of +20-40 percent for the first 1000 sec after shutdown.
For the shutdown period between 103 and 107 sec, they stated that an
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uncertainty of +10-20 percent existed. Beyond 107 sec (approximately one
year, a period of relatively lesser concern for LOCA analyses) an uncertain-
ty of +25 percent'to -50 percent was noted. Thus the ANS Standard 5.1 +20
percent prescription of the lAC (and AC) does not represent a clear factor
of safety, but apparently only covers one standard deviation of the recog-
nized uncertainty in the evaluation of the proposed standards validity.
AS.5 Evaluation of Decay Heat Controversy
The Consolidated National Intervenor (CNI) group challenged the
AEC's use of the ANS Standard 5.1 decay heat standard +20 percent as a con-
servative estimate of LOCA decay heat on two bases (~). They challenged
it first on the philos9phical basis that using the upper limit of the ANS
standards uncertainty factor of +20-40 percent does not satisfy the need
for application of a "safety factor" to the decay heat input conditions
for the ECCS heat removal analysis problem. Second, they challenged the
validity and conservatism of the ANS Standard 5.1 itself, claiming that
England's work (~) made its adequacy uncertain.
AS.5.l The semantics of "safety factors"
As far as the philosophical question relating uncertainty
allowances and safety factors is concerned, the AEC has acknowledged that
utilizing ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent for the decay heat specification
of the AC does not allow a "factor of safety" for this input factor. The
Commission has stated:
.•• it appears to us that the 20% on top of the ANS decay
heat formula fairly represents the uncertainty and does
not provide any margin above that uncertainty (60, p. 1103)
(emphasis added).
It may be argued that the decay heat is a parameter of such
importance to the ECCS that a safety factor is a necessary requirement.
However, it is not without precedent for safety factors of nearly unitary
value to be applied in current engineering design practice. For complex
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systems such as large aircraft or major military systems, it is considered
both good and common engineering practice to use safety factors in a very
restricted manner. The arbitrary application of even a relatively small
safety factor to each design parameter in these complex systems could re-
sult in an overwhelming pyramiding of the factors as they were individually
applied. Where careful attention to quality control is utilized and ade-
quate research conducted to resolve uncertainties in the magnitudes of
design parameters, it is accepted engineering practice to use bounding
factors for statistically significant uncertainty limits for the parameters
themselves, as opposed to formally specified safety factors which attempt
to account for ignorance of such limits. This seems to have been the in-
tent of the AEC treatment of the decay heat parameter.
A5.5.2 Decay heat prediction conservatism
The second question concerning the validity of the ANS standard
itself and the adequacy of its uncertainty limits is a more significant
problem. The CNI (2) used England's thesis result to support their posi-
tion that the ANS Standard 5.1 decay heat estimates were too low. From
our previous analyses, it is clear that England's initial dissertation
results (fig. A5.3) have been shown to be invalid. The revised CINDER
results of table A5.l are representative of more accurate output from
England's analysis when coding and input data errors have been corrected.
The revised results indicate a positive deviation of no more than
6 percent from the proposed ANS Standard 5.1, for the fiducial case (~E'
10K hr). When required corrections are made to the fiducial case to ac-
count for the higher neutron fluxes and longer irradiation times specified
for "hot rod" calculations under the AC, deviations must be revised upward
by an additional 4-7 percent. (Under AC specifications, expected neutron
flux levels might correspond to 5-7iPE, while irradiation periods would
range from about 20K hr to 40K hr for total fuel irradiation levels of
the order of 30,000 MWD/MT.) Thus the results of current sophisticated
A5-l9
summation calculations indicate the need for upward corrections to the
ANS Standards 5.1 of the order of 10-15 percent in the critical 1000 sec
cooldown period when operationally consistent high neutron fluxes and long
irradiation periods are considered.
However, it is generally acknowledged that summation calculations
have tended ,to be unreliable, particularly for short shutdown times of the
order of 1000 sec or less (e.g., 65, p. 47; 64, p. 10). The unreliability
is caused by inadequacies in information concerning yields, half-lives,
and decay energies for the short-lived fission product nuclides far from
the line of nuclear stability. Though there is reason to believe that
substantial progress will be made in the near future, as a result of AEC
sponsored research programs at ORNL, Battelle NW, and other locations, the
reliability of summation calculations will continue to be uncertain in the
immediate future.
Consequently, we must look to empirically based results for
support to the quantitative results of the summation calculation. In this
case, we observe (as shown in figure A5.4) that there is good general
agreement between the results of CINDER calculations and empirical results
for cooldown times greater than 100 seconds. The "best estimates" of
Perry et ale give direct quantitative support to an upward deviation from
the ANS Standard 5.1 of 6 percent or better at shutdown times of the order
of 1000 seconds. Moreover, Perry, et ale have estimated a one-standard
deviation uncertainty of the order of +15 percent in the empirical results.
Therefore, it appears that in the critical LOCA shutdown period
of about 1000 sec, that ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent will correspond to
an equivalent deviation uncertainty of about one-standard deviation from
the expected mean decay heat values. It is legitimate to ask whether
confidence limits are adequately and conservatively bounded at one standard
deviation. Since ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent is equivalent to a one
standard deviation uncertainty, the probability that higher decay energies
will be experienced above the AC prescribed limits is above 30 percent.
Increasing the decay energy limits to ANS Standard 5.1 +30 percent would
reduce the probability of experiencing decay heats above the criteria
limits to about 11 percent. On the other hand, if the criteria limits
were raised to ANS Standard 5.1 +35 percent, the probability is less thaIl
5 percent that the criteria limits would be exceeded. A 30 percent proba-
bility of exceeding the AC (ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent) limits seems
excessive. Consequently, it would seem desirable to increase the bounding
criteria values to either ANS Standard 5.1 +30 percent or ANS Standard 5.1
+35 percent.
In their opinion to the AC, the Commissioners have defended
their selection of ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent as follows:
Although no new experimental work was presented during
the hearings, new computer calculations from the doctoral
thesis of T. R. England were brought up and emphasized by
the Consolidated National Intervenors (Exhibit 1152, pp.
2.2-2.6). England's work was essentially a computer
calculation and summation of the contributions of indivi-
dual nuclides, including for the first time the effect of
neutron capture in the fission product chains. As origi-
nallypresented, England's results indicated large deviations
above the ANS prescription, particularly for high neutron
fluxes and fuel burn-ups. (See, for example, Exhibit 1113,
p. 22-5). However a series of errors in both input data
and the calculational program were found both by England
(Exh. 1178, p. 7) and in the course of a review by Shure
(Exhibit 1178), which markedly reduced the deviations
found by England's approach. With the corrections made,
the positive deviations found by the England approach from
the ANS standard are nowhere greater than 10%, an~ are
generally much less (1113, at 22-15). In addition, there
is the possibility that the selection of input data (fission
product yields and decay energies) may not have been the
best (1113, 22-8 and 22-9).
While England's approach is a valuable contribution,
it is only one piece of work out of many cited in the record;
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furthermore it presents no new experimental determinations.
On the basis of the record of these proceedings, however,
one is led to believe that the ANS standard curve may be
about 5% 'low in the time region of principal interest,
namely, zero to five minutes after shutdown. England's
~evised values are well within the previously expressed
limits of uncertainty, and to the extent of the credence
given the new calculations, they tend to narrow those limits
of uncertainty. At present,it appears to us that the 20%
on top of the ANS decay heat formula fairly represents~e
uncertainty and does not provide any margin qbove that
uncertainty. It is still conservative.
There is some margin provided, however, in the prescrip-
tion requiring that the reactor shall have been considered
to' have operated continuously at 1.02 times rated power,
with the maximum allowed peaking factor, for an infinite
length of time. The exact amount of margin is uncertain,
and it will vary with time, but it is probably in the range
of 5 to 15% (Exhibit 1137, pp. 11-3 to 5; and Staff Con-
cluding Statement, p. 114).
Considering all of the above, the Commission believes
that the prescription of ANS + 20% for the fission product
decay heat is reasonable and should be continued (60, pp.
1102, 1103) (emphasis added).
As discussed above, the arguments suggesting a 5-15 percent
margin existing within the ANS Standard 5.1 +20 percent criterion appear
to be tenous. The deviations indicated by England's revised and updated
CINDER code analyses seem to be well supported by the empirical data
within a period of about 1000 sec after shutdown (a somewhat longer period
than that favored by the AEC). The empirical data also suggest that ANS
Standard 5.1 +20 percent represents only one-standard deviation from the
mean decay heat results in this shutdown period. It is the opinion of
the author that the probability of experiencing shutdown decay heats
greater than the criteria specifications should be reduced to no more
than 5-10 percent. On this basis, the criteria limits should be increased
to ANS Standard 5.1 +(30 to 35) percent.
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Appendix 6 INITIAL STORED FUEL ENERGY AND FUEL ROD GAS GAP
CONDUCTANCE
Obviously any uncertainties which might exist over the
magnitude of the initial stored energy in the fuel would raise prob-
lems with predictions of ECCS response in the event of a LOCA. The
problem is more complicated when uncertainties in the release rates
of the stored energy are considered.
A6.l The Physical Parameters o~ Initial S~ored Fuel Energy
A typical idealized picture of the physical relations of
elements influencing heat exchanged between fuel, fuel rod cladding
and reactor coolant/working fluid is shown in figure A6.l. The stored
energy is defined as the energy that would be released by the fuel
if its temperature were reduced to that of the zircaloy cladding.
Thus, the initial stored energy and its subsequent redistribution to
cladding and coolant is a function of the parameters of fuel specific
heat, its thermal conductivity, the thermal conductance of the gas
gap and the heat transfer characteristics of the cladding and coolant.
Following an accidental reactor shutdown, the stored sensible
heat, associated with the heat capacity of the fuel and its high normal
operating temperatures, represents a large heat source which must be
dissipated by the ECCS -- in addition to the dissipation of the energy
associated with the decay heat and other external heat sources such
as exothermal metal-water reactions. A typical, schematic, representa-
tion of the temperature distribution within a fuel rod as a function
of time is shown in figure A6.2. Initially the radial temperature
gradient in the fuel rod is very steep. Centerline temperatures for
the fuel approach the melting point (in excess of 4000°F) as a result
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of the high power output associated with normal operations, while clad
temperatures are approximately 600°F. As soon as shutdown occurs, the
temperature redistributes rapidly within the fuel, as shown in figure
A6.2. The rod temperature history and the amount of heat transferred
to the decompressing coolant depend strongly upon the thermal properties
of the fuel and the physical configurations of fuel, cladding and associ-
ated gas gap (the gap geometry resulting from the previous history of
fuel fabrication, irradiation exposure history, and consequent fuel
densification during normal operation, and possible swelling and rupture
of cladding during the thermal excursion of the accident) as well as the
heat transfer conditions at the cladding surface induced by the flow
of coolant during the accident. Although the importance of the stored
energy was recognized at the time the lAC were issued, no general rule
was formulated or specified for its evaluation (60, p. 1101). Uncertainty
in the conservatism of the method of specification of these parameters,
especially fuel and gas gap thermal properties, apparently caused the
ACRS to include the initial stored energy of the fuel in their list of
items of uncertain conservations given in response to the CNI questions
(chapter 2). The new AC have attempted to rectify this oversight
and make this an area of assured conservatism. In these efforts, the
Commission appears to have been largely successful in achieving the
degree of conservatism needed.
After initiation of a major LOCA, within approximately 30
seconds the temperature distribution across the fuel and cladding is
nearly flat, as indicated in figure A6.2. This is a result of the
relatively low power generation associated with fission product decay
heat and the relatively poor heat transfer characteristics associated
with reactor decompression (blowdown) and the initial period of emer-
gency coolant application after b1owdown when compared with the character-
istics of normal power generation periods.
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Of the above parameters, the dominant ones influencing fuel
rod temperature distribution histories are gas gap thermal conductance
(customarily an empirically based parameter including gas conductivity,
and convective and radiative heat transfer coefficients within the gap)
and fuel thermal conductivity. Both parameters have been historically
obtained from experimental data and are not easily amenable to analytical
quantification. Moreover, experimental observations frequently measure
both quantities together -- so that their combined effect on heat
transfer is easier to evaluate than their individual contributions
(~, p. 10-1). However, the new AC require the calculation of gap con-
ductance in accordance with the new requirements for evaluation models
for each of the reactor manufacturers (60, p. 1104). The vendor's lAC
approved evaluation models did not have the capability of calculating
changes in fuel-clad geometry (i.e., swelling) during the LOCA, nor
of evaluating the effect of thermal radiation across the gap during the
same period. The new AC require that approved models incorporate these
capabilities greatly enhancing the complexity of the calculation, but
also improving its conservatism (at least in theory).
Ideally, for steady-state or accident conditions without fuel
rod geometry changes, designers would prefer high values for both fuel
thermal conductivity and gas gap conductance. Since the heat transferred
from the fuel element is essentially directly proportional to the fuel
conductivity and gap conductance, high values minimize stored heat, or,
similarly, result in lower temperatures and gradients across the: fuel
rod for a given decay power output.
A6.1.l Uranium oxide conductivity
Uranium oxide fuel does not have particularly high intrinsic
thermal conductivity in comparison to other minerals. At normal
operating temperatures, estimates of U02 thermal conductivities range
from approximately 3 to 4 B-ft/hr-ft2-oF. Conductivities of this order
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of magnitude are about the same as would be expected for relatively low
density sedimentary rods such as sandstones. Fine grained igneous rocks
2(such as granite) may have conductivities as high as 20-30 B-ft!hr-ft _oF,
while relatively high conductivity metals (such as silver or gold) may
have conductivities as much as two orders of magnitude greater than that
of uranium oxide. The relatively low U02 conductivity contributes to the
steepness of the steady state -- or zero time temperature profile of
figure A6.2. The low conductivity also tends to retard the release of
the stored initial energy during early periods when coolant heat transfer
properties are relatively good, until later in the LOCA when poor fluid
heat transfer exacerbates clad heating.
A6.l.2 Fuel-cladding gas gap conductance
Gas gap conductance is strongly influenced by the dimensions
of the gap between fuel and cladding and the physical composition of the
gases filling the gap as well as the history of the operating power levels
for the fuel. There is some uncertainty about the gap dimensions under
normal operating and accident conditions. Initial cold gap overall dimen-
sions are governed primarily by fabrication considerations on the part of
the manufacturers and range from 7 to 12 mils (1 mil = .001 in). Most
analyses of fuel heat transfer assume that the gap is uniformly distributed
about the fuel elements, as indicated scJlematically in figure A6.l. Large
gaps, on the order of the initial fabricated dimensions, and uniform gap
distribution have been observed to produce relatively low gap conductances,
on the order of 500-600 B/hr-ft2-OF when filled with the fission product
gases associated with fuel rod end-of-life conditions (41). In practice,
physical contact between fuel and cladding at many (or conceivably all)
points along the rod is probable from the time of fabrication throughout
the life of the fuel rod element. Fuel contact conditions are probably
due to fabrication methods initially and fuel cracking, densification,
and internal readjustment and cladding creepdown during operation (42).
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Contact would raise gap conductance to values on the order of 1000 B/hr-
ft 2_oF. As a result of the mechanisms described above~ gap closure has
been observed by the vendors to occur relatively early in the fuel life-
time and to generally induce higher values of conductance throughout the
normal operational lifetime of the fuel rods (~).
The physical composition of gases filling the fuel-clad gap
also has a pronounced effect on the gap conductance. During fuel rod
fabrication, relatively high conductivity gases such as helium are
frequently used by manufacturers to provide initial fill and pressuri-
zation. The helium increases the start-of-life gas gap conductivity.
After extensive neutron bombardment fission product gases dominate
the gas composition with the rod. These gases have much lower conduc-
tivities, more on the order of argon than helium. Consequently, many
experiments, conducted for short exposure periods, have used argon
to simulate end-of-life conditions. Thus test results must be analyzed
with care to assure that start-of-life gap dimensions are not combined
with end-of-life gas conductivity so that applicability of results is
obscured. After· exposures of 30,000 MWd/MT, fuel cladding/steady state
gap dimensions may be expected to be much smaller than at start-of-life,
if in fact the gap has not been completely closed. The closing of the
gap with extended exposure introduces a mechanism which tends to equal-
ize gas gap conductivity over the lifetime of the fuel element, thus
compensating for changes in the gas composition of the gap which tend
to induce lower conductivities.
Averaged data from GE for gap conductances of BWR f~els are
shown in figure A6.3 (42). Results shown are representative of measured
conductances for fuel elements exposed in reactors for periods ranging
from a few minutes to approximately 60,000 MWd/MT. The data is presented
in terms of the parameter g/D, the ratio of the total gas gap dimension,
g, to the cold fuel element diameter, D. As indicated by the error bars
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in the figure, substantial scatter is observed in the data. But it
should be noted that the greatest statistical variations occur for
fuels with large initial gaps and low exposure times (!£). It is to
be expected that fuel contact variations for such fuel elements would
be more pronounced than for elements with smaller glD ratios or those
exposed for longer periods where gap closing mechanisms would be more
effective or have longer to operate.
The influence of the linear heat generation rate of normal
operating conditions in shown very clearly in figure A6.3. Stored
heat and decay power output are essentially proportional to the linear
heat generation rate for the fuel rods. As the fuel is driven to
higher linear power output (increased KW/ft), the gap conductance in-
creases as the temperatures, heat output and stored energy increase.
In the event of a LOCA, this mechanism for improved heat transfer with
increasing power output from the fuel rods would help to assure that
for the required DBA analysis conditions of high power output higher
conductances would provide a feedback mechanism which would help to
carry away the stored heat more rapidly than would be required under
low power conditions.
The curve labeled GAPCON in figure A6.3 represents the results
of application of the relatively untested numerical code GAPCON, favored
by the AEC (~, p. 10-9) for prediction of the gap conductances. It can
be seen that the results calculated by this method appear to be sub-
stantially lower (approximately a factor of two) than the average
measured values for conductances.
A6.l.3 LOCA phenomena influencing fuel cladding heat transfer
Under blowdown conditions, with rapidly decreasing external
core pressures on the fuel rods and rapidly increasing internal fuel
rod pressures as gap filling gases increase in temperature, ballooning
and rupture of the clad are probable. In fact, the Commission has
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stated that,
• • • when the course of the LOCA is calculated according
to the conservative prescription of an approved evaluation
model, swelling and bursting of the cladding will be esti-
mated to occur, in abundance (60, p. 1105).
Ballooning is expected to be a localized phenomena, with expan-
sion occurring at rod hot spots. Individual fuel rod ballooning has been
observed to occur over an axial length of only about one to two inches of
the typical 12 ft axial length of the rod. Whether such a localized pheno-
mena is significant when compared to heat transfer over the entire length
of the fuel rod has not been seriously addressed in the literature. Though
heat transfer locally would be inhibited substantially by reduction in gas
gap conductances through gap expansion during ballooning (estimates indi-
cate that gas gap conductance on the order of 10-100 B/hr-ft2-OF might be
expected in the vicinity of the ballooned rod section (i, p. 10-21)), it
is conceivable that axial heat transfer not presently included in calcula-
tional methods might contribute in an important manner to removing heat
from the hot spot and preventing catastrophic local heat-up.
The AEC in its final proposals for resolution of the gas gap
conductance problem seems intent on imposing demonstrably conservative
calculation procedures. Under their new criteria, the influence of clad
swelling and rupture and "any other applicable variables" would have to
be accounted for in calculating gas gap conductance and consequently fuel
rod heat transfer during a LOCA (60, p. 1104; appendix 3). Apparently,
the locally reduced gap conductance due to clad ballooning would have to
be used in calculating heat transfer to the hot rod in the reactor core
(without regard to whether axial heat transfer was a significant contri-
butor to local thermal conditions) in estimating whether the peak tempera-
ture criterion for the reactor has been exceeded.
To demonstrate the significance of the fuel rod thermal character-
istics in influencing heat transfer during a LOC~, the AEC has reported the
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results of a parametric investigation of the influence of gas gap conduct-
ance and external reflood and blowdown heat transfer coefficients on fuel
rod thermal response (~, pp. 10-15 to 10-23). The results indicate that
when ballooning occurs early in the transient, before blowdown is complete,
gas gap conductance variation (over approximately an order of magnitude)
can produce temperature increases of frequently as much as 100°F to 200°F.
Gap conductances for these early ballooning cases were relatively low,
ranging from about 10 to 100 B/hr-ft2-oF. If gap expansion occurs later
in the LOCA, following blowdown, the results indicate that relatively high
initial gap conductance coefficients (500-1000 B/hr-ft2-OF) result in
lower stored energy in the fuel rod. Consequently, when ballooning occurs
during reflood, producing lower gap coefficients over the same range of
approximately an order of magnitude results in temperature decreases on
the order of 100°F as conductances decrease. This rather surprising re-
sult demonstrates the importance of the gap conductance in storing thermal
energy in the rod. If ballooning occurs early, low initial conductances
result in the retention of high fuel temperatures and stored energy which,
when released later during reflood, exacerbates the rod temperature history.
If, on the other hand, the gap conductance is large during blowdown, fuel
temperature and consequently stored fuel rod energy is reduced. Subsequent
low gap conductances are then beneficial in reducing heat flow to the clad-
ding at late times.
This example serves to demonstrate the difficulty in predetermi-
nation of what constitutes appropriate prescription of conservative values
for fuel rod thermal property parameters. A simple statement that "low"
or "high" values of gas gap conductance are always conservative from a
safety standpoint cannot be supported. As a consequence, the AEC has
concluded that pertinent fuel rod thermal parameters, presumably including
conductivity and heat capacity as well as gap conductance, must be included
or evaluated in the calculational models as function of time and temperature
(60, p. 1104). Moreover, they have "required" that stored energy and gap
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conductance must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as a part of indivi-
dual plant licensing procedures (60, p. 1101).
A6.2 Evaluation of Stored Fuel Energy and Gas Gap Conductance
Arguments
In the CNI concluding statements, the intervenors have pointed
to the hearing record to provide confirmation for their claim that gaps
exist in the understanding of the mechanisms of initial fuel energy stor-
age and release and that uncertainties over the quantitative and qualita-
tive effects of gas gap conductance and other fuel rod thermal parameters
have contributed to a general lack of understanding of the ECCS problem.
It is claimed that the neglect of the influence of clad ballooning on gap
conductance in the Interim Acceptance Criteria prevented adequate computa-
tion of gap conductance and stored heat in any of the manufacturer's evalu-
ation models. The hearing testimony of Morris Rosen, currently Technical
Advisor to the Director of Reactor Licensing, is cited as evidence that
specification of gap conductance and its influence on stored energy was
neglected by the AEC until after the lAC were promulgated. CNI asserts
that quantification of both the gap conductance and the conservatism of
the calculation methods in which the conductances are applied (as well as
other aspects of the problem) must be demonstrated before the conservatism
of ECCS performance can be demonstrated (2, p. 4, 33-4. 34).
In the face of this criticism, the AEC appeared to progressively
reevaluate the importance of the initial stored thermal energy problem
and the physical parameters affecting it. In the AEC's initial direct
testimony it was claimed that "peak cladding temperature has been shown
to be relatively insensitive to changes in gap conductance during an
accident" (~, p. 4.26). Consequently, gap conductance values recommended
by the manufacturers were accepted apparently without sufficient exami-
nation. In the AEC's revised criteria, to become a modification of the
Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR Part 50), the sections of Appendix K
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have been greatly strengthened which deal with subjects related to fuel
rod initial stored energy and the influence of fuel rod swelling and rup-
ture on gas gap conductance and other thermal parameters.
To indicate the extent of the AEC change in attitude, the verbatim
text of the proposed changes to Appendix K, Sections IAI and IB should
be reviewed (appendix 3).
Though the AC modifications do not meet with the intervenors
desired goals of quantifying specifically the thermal parameters of the
fuel rod and/or the stored energy in the fuel, they have apparently been
written to insure that conservatism in the calculation of the influence
of stored energy and thermal parameters will be achieved. For example,
Section IB requires the calculations of gap conductance take swelling and
rupture into account so that they "are not underestimated." To this extent,
the procedure provides a demonstrable area of conservatism.
Though no quantitative specificaions for thermal parameters are
given in the revised sections, the AEC argues that variations, even with-
in a single vendor's reactors (especially in terms of gas gap conductance),
are too great to permit specification of quantitative values within a
general statement such as the proposed rules especially when new fuel
designs have been recently introduced. Consequently they have argued that
manufacturers' designs will have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
to assure that the general criteria are being complied with and conserva-
tism has been achieved in each case (60, p. 1102). Though this procedure
maybe considered undesirably ill-defined in the eyes of some critics, it
does seem reasonable for criteria which might be expected to endure longer
than a single reactor design without revisions.
Though the AEC may be faulted for having made a poor start in
specifying the methods of treating fuel rod energy storage and release
rates, generally speaking they seem to have made a strong attempt to in-
corporate intervenor (or perhaps ACRS) criticisms into the final AC so
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that assured conservatism in energy storage calculations will be achieved.
Final assurance of the ultimate conservatism of these calculations by
manufacturers will now depend upon the capability of the AEC to maintain
strict vigilance in reactor design review, on a case-by-case basis. The
increased scope and depth of the criteria specifications will require
corresponding increases in specialized investigatory expertise on the part
of regulatory licensing personnel, and strengthened determination by the
AEC to insist on total compliance on the part of the manufacturers.
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Appendix 7 METAL-WATER REACTIONS, ENERGY RELEASE AND FUEL ROD
EMBRITTLEMENT
In the Interim Acceptance Criteria (see appendix 3), the first
two general requirements were related to limitation of metal-water reactions
between the zirconium alloy clad fuel rods and the high temperature steam
produced during the LOCA. These requirements, limiting maximum calculated
clad temperatures to less than 2300°F and overall clad-steam chemical
reactions to less than 1 percent of total reactor cladding, had three im-
plicit purposes: restricting energy release from the exothermic zirconium-
steam reaction; limiting oxidation of the cladding to levels at which fuel
rod embrittlement was not serious; and restricting the production of
gaseous hydrogen from the reaction to safe levels. Hydrogen limitation
was necessary in order to avoid potentially damaging explosive mixtures
with air being developed when reaction products were swept through the
coolant line break into the containment vessel. The simple 2300°F tem-
perature limit of the cladding, without explicit exposure time at tempera-
ture limits, was the subject of much controversy for the AEC. In fact,
the lAC's prescription on oxidation had little support from either industry
or the ARC's laboratory associates.
As a direct result, the revised AC'S most easily detectable changes
are the replacement of the simple 2300°F temperature limit with two cri-
teria. The first criterion reduced the allowed peak zircaloy temperature
to 2200°F while the second provided a limit to the equivalent stoichiometric
oxidation of the cladding to less than 17 percent of the total cladding
thickness before oxidation (60, p. 1095; appendix 3). The criteria con-
tinue to retain the earlier 1 percent limit on overall chemical reaction
with the total metal content of the cladding (excluding the plenum volumes)
as a limit on hydrogen generation. The end result is a more definitive
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Table A7.l Potential Energy that Could Be Released i.n an Accident of
the Indian Point-2 (PWR) or the Brown Ferry (Bv~.) Reactors
aThe zirconium-water and hydrogen-oxygen reaction values for the
Browns Ferry reactor are based on zircaloy both in the cladding and in
the fuel-element shrouds.
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set of criteria. However, as we shall show subsequently, their conserva-
tism is not yet completely assured.
A7.l Physics of the Zirconium-Water Reactions
The energy release, embrittlement hazard, and the hydrogen pro-
duction all result from the following heat-producing (exothermic) reaction
between the zirconium cladding and steam:
where
+ ZroZ + ZHZ + 1:1 Q (Eq. 7.1)
Q = Z9lZ - .0585T (B/lbm)
T = Reaction temperature (OF) at the oxide-unreacted
Zr interface
Equation 7.1 indicates that the products of the zirconium (Zr) and steam
(HZO) reaction are zirconium oxide (ZrOZ)' elemental hydrogen (HZ) and
heat (1:1 Q) •
As will be discussed in more detail later, it is possible for
the local heat release rate to be of the same order of magnitude as the
decay heat generation rate while the fuel rod cladding remains within the
criteria temperature limits. It is instructive, however, to consider
initially the time-oxidation reaction. Table A7.l (43) is a representa-
tive of estimates which have been made to show that the heat release from
the metal-water reaction is relatively small compared with other possible
energy sources in the reactor for both PWRs and BWRs. Note that only if
100 percent of the Zr is reacted is the total heat release by the metal-
water reaction, or a possible hydrogen-oxygen combustion process, compa-
rable to either the primary coolant internal energy or the core decay heat
released during the first half hour of the LOGA. Restricting the overall
oxidation reaction to 1 percent or less of the total core cladding reduces
the total energy release to values of the order of 1 percent of the decay
heat for the same initial half hour period. The misleading part of the
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Oxide
ex phase with absarbecl
oxygen
ex phase transformed
from f3 phase
Fig. 2.1. Zirca1oy-4 After Heating at 3.0°C/sec to 1600°C in Steam.
(From Ref. 17)
Zr
Fig. 2.2. Zirca1oy-4 After Heating at O.3°C/sec to 1300°C in steam.
(From Ref. 16)
Figure A 7.1 Photomicrographs of Zr oxidation forms.
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presentation in table A7.l is that it compares time-integrated total energy
release for all reaction products for the LOCA with the resulting implication
that the metal-water energy release under lAC limits was essentially negli-
gible. More appropriately, comparisons should be made between transient
energy release rates for the oxidation reaction and decay heat at the hot
spots of the reactor core.
The embrittlement of the zircaloy cladding is produced as a
result of crystalline transformation in the metallic structure of the
cladding associated with the zirconium oxidation process. The clad
oxidation takes place by a diffusion process in which several identifi-
able crystalline transformations occur as the zirconium progresses
from pure metal to Zr02 . In a typical clad oxidation process, an out-
side layer of pure, stoichiometrically complete zr0 2 is formed. At
greater clad depths, beneath the zone where the chemical oxidation
reaction has gone to completion, Zr02 crystals are formed. This-a
customarily clearly defined, but incompletely oxidized, layer is refer-
red to as alpha zirconium. Beneath the oxygen stabilized alpha phase
material, a layer of zirconium is customarily found in which the oxygen
concentration is low and the crystalline form essentially unchanged
from the unoxidized state (beta phase). Because the Zr02 and the
a-phase zirconium are characteristically brittle at low temperatures,
the oxygen content of the ductile S-phase zirconium and its relative
thickness compared to the initial thickness of the cladding are appar-
ently the controlling factors in fuel rod embrittlement.
A reproduction of photographs of two typical sections of oxi-
dized cladding is shown in figure A7.l (~). As implied in equation 7.1,
upon complete oxidation to Zr0 2 zirconium experiences a weight gain of
approximately 35 percent. When combined with a density decrease of 14
percent (from 6.49 glcc for Zr to 5.68 Glcc for Zr02), the end result
of the transformation from Zr to zr0 2 is a physical volumetric growth
of approximately 54 percent. This volumetric growth combined with a
natural tendency for a-phase Zr to separate along crystal boudaries,
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as indicated in f~gure A7.1. induces severe embrittlement in the
outermost layers of oxidized cladding.
At elevated temperatures, a relatively small amount of oxygen
(from 5 to 10 percent atomic) can be absorbed in the B-phase zirconium
before the material becomes oxygen saturated without substantial crys-
talline alteration and consequent reduction in ductility. As saturation
is approached, precipitation of a-zirconium in the grain boundaries and
solid-solution hardening of the S-phase zirconium can apparently take
place over a rather critical temperature range (on the order of 2200°F
to 2300°F) the degree of precipitation and/or solid-solution hardening
is apparently exacerbated by high temperatures attained during oxidation
and/or slow cooldown. Both of these processes are extremely important
to S-phase ductility.
Apparently, the degree of oxygen saturation of the S-phase
zirconium is the controlling factor in fuel cladding embrittlement.
However, the exact mechanisms by which it takes place, and the adequacy
of theoretical and empirical models of oxygen uptake in the zirconium
and the relative embrittlement induced thereby, are not felt to be
thoroughly quantified or understood. As indicated in their Concluding
Statement. the AEC staff did not believe that the state-of-the-art would
permit adequate assessment of oxygen uptake in the S-phase (~. p. 86).
In the absence of adequate models. the AEC has attempted to prescribe
a low enough limit on the maximum cladding temperature to assure that
oxygen uptake was maintained below embrittlement limits.
Concern over embrittlement was thus the principal reason
behind the current revision of the maximum temperature criterion to
2200°F. As stated by the Commission in their technical discussion of
the new AC, "Our selection of the 2200°F limit results primarily from
our belief that retention of ductility in the zircaloy is the best
guarantee of its remaining intact during the hypothetical LOCA" (60. p.
1098). The adequacy of this limit will be discussed subsequently.
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A7.2 Reaction Rates
The zirconium oxidation rate is controlled by the solid state
diffusion of the ionic reaction products through the oxide layer.
Generally the chemical reaction rate is of parabolic form (25, p. 2-7),
where
i. e. ,
where
2
w = K (T)t
P
w = weight of metal reacZed (converted to equivalent quanti--
ties of Zr02), mg/cm of surface area
t = exposure time, (sec)
K (T) = parabolic rate constant, a function of temperature (T),p
(mg/cm2)/sec
Based upon experimental results, a number of expressions for the para-
bolic rate constant, K , have been derived. One of the most widely used
p
relationships was derived by Baker and Just (44). Their fit was based
upon experimental data for molten zirconium droplets reacting with water.
Their derived rate constant relationship is given by:
where
K (T)
P
33.6 x 106 exp IKJ r 2]a . mgRT • Tnt~ /sec (Eq, 7.3)
K activation energy. = 45,000 cal/mole
a
R gas constant = 1.987 cal/mole-oK
T metal temperature, oK
The Baker-Just relationship, Eq. 7.3, with its single temperature inde-
pendent expression for the activation energy. Ka , and the rate constant,
~, is consequently best fit to reaction rates near the zirconium
melting point.
Based upon empirical observations of changes in zirconium
oxide crystalline form during temperature excursions, a better fit to
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(Eq. 7.4)(~l/sec4K (T) = 5.52 x 10 exp(-29,000/RT),p
the temperature-reaction rate data with three separate activation
energies was derived by H. H. Klepfer (45). The fit of the Klepfer
equations is given by:
for 'V 20°C < T 2.- 890°C;
53.58 x 10 exp(-33,500/RT)
from 890°C< T2.-1577°C;
111.04 x 10 exp(-79,800/RT)
from 1577°C< T< 1852°C (Zr melting point).
The Klepfer fit to the reaction rate-temperature data is compared with
the Baker-Just equation results in figure A7.2. Note that in the Klepfer
equations the changes in activation energy, Ka, are associated with phase
changes in the crystalline structure of the zirconium oxide at the indica-
ted temperatures.
It should be observed that for most of the temperature range
of interest, T~2300°F, the Baker-Just relationship gives a reaction
rate which is conservatively higher (from a safety design standpoint)
than the Klepfer fit. Only for temperatures less than 1900°F. where the
reaction rate is approximately an order of magnitude below its value at
2300 oF, does the Baker-Just relationship depart from conservatism.
Differentiating equation 7.2 and substituting the Baker-Just
relationship for the reaction rate constant (equation 7.3) and the energy-
mass relationship of equation 7.1. yields equations relating the reaction
rate as a function of the local energy released by the reaction to the
thickness of zirconium oxidized in the reaction. These relationships
are:
do _
<IT -
0.0616
o
exp 1-
41
,000] . IT ' l.n sec (Eq 7.5)
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where:
o equivalent thickness of metal reacted (inches)
t time (sec)
T temperature of the metal (OR)
and
where
q 5.33 x
o
(Eq. 7.6)
q = reaction energy release rate
These equations demonstrate the negative feedback - self limiting effect
of oxide thickness on the rates of energy release and growth rate of
oxidized zirconium. That is, for a given temperature, the growth rate
of oxidized material and the reaction energy release rate decrease with
increasing thickness of the oxidized layer (or equivalently with increas-
ing time). This effect is an important factor in energy release rates
in the metal-water reaction and embrittlement induced in the course
of a LOCA.
A7.3 Energy Releases
Based upon equation 7.6, a comparison of local energy release
rates with fission product decay power output is shown in figure A7.3.
The curves are shown for highly idealized cases of assumed constant
temperature reactions (over all times) as a function of the initial
oxidized thickness at the beginning of the temperature excursions.
It may be observed that a more realistic LOCA temperature history
would have a more gradual increase in temperature to its maximum value,
rather than the assumed constant temperature cases shown here. However,
the curves can be used to evaluate a more realistic excursion when it
is recognized that they indicate relative values of reaction power to
decay power which would be attained when the temperature reaches the
levels shown for the equivalent oxidized thicknesses of zirconium shown.
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For example, if the development of a peak 2300°F temperature is delayed
for approximately ten seconds for cladding with an equivalent oxidized
thickness of .02 mils, the equivalent energy output rate would be identical
to that at the initial times shown in figure A7.3 (.01 sec). Under these
circumstances, the local metal-water reaction power output would exceed
the fission product decay power output of the fuel rod at ten seconds after
LOCA initiation by nearly a factor of ten.
The message of the figure is clear. At a maximum permissible
temperature of 2300°F, the relative energy flux from the zirconium-water
reaction is not negligible in comparison with energy release rates from
the fission product decay power input of the fuel rod. However, from the
beginning of the hearings, the AEC regularly downgraded the significance
of the zirconium-water reaction energy release rate. In their initial
direct testimony they stated,
For calculated LOCA temperature transients limited
to 2300°F, the rate of energy release from Zircaloy-water
reactions is always substantially less than the decay heat
rate. However, if the cladding temperature could reach
2800°F, the Zircaloy-water energy release rate would ex-
ceed the decay heat rate except for the longest transients.
If the cladding temperature could reach 2500°F, the cladding
water energy release rate would equal the decay heat rate
only during unrealistically rapid transients. The cladding
temperatures calculated by the evaluation models take into
account the contribution of the cladding-water reaction
energy (~, p. 2-6).
It can be seen from figure A7.3 that the original AEC conclu-
sions were not easily defendable, To assure that reaction energy release
rates are approximately an order of magnitude below the decay heat rate,
maximum temperatures would have to be limited to about l800°F or less,
or initial oxide thicknesses would have to be of the order of one mil
(3 to 4 percent of the unoxidized clad thickness).
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For long transients, the equivalent oxide thickness term (6)
in the denominator of Eq. 7.6 causes the reaction energy rate to decay
like t-l / 2 . For such extended transients, the rate of decrease in the
energy release rate from the zirconium-water reaction (for a fixed tem-
perature reaction) is substantially more rapid than the decrease in the
fission product decay heat rate, as can be seen in figure A7.3.
Consequently, after periods on the order of an hour, assuming tempera-
tures are controlled within lAC standards, the relative energy release
from metal-water reactions is low enough to be essentially insignificant.
However, the first several minutes of elevated temperatures (in excess
of about 2000°F), will induce energy releases comparable to the decay
heat rate during the transient period. If the time to peak temperature
(2200°F) is retarded, peak metal-water energy release rates may even
exceed decay heat output temporarily, as discussed in the earlier
example.
It should be noted, however, that all calculations of the
energy release based upon the Baker-Just reaction rate relationships
will conservatively predict metal-water reaction energy release rate.
Though early AEC statements appeared to minimize the significance of
metal-water reactions as an energy source, the lAC approved vendor
evaluation models required the use of the conservative Baker-Just
rate relationships. Consequently, energy release rates calculated
under the lAC were adequate. In the new AC, the Commission has expli-
citly recognized the metal-water reaction rate as a significant source
of heat which must be evaluated in a conservative fashion. The new
AC go beyond the lAC specifications, requiring that the reaction cannot
be assumed to be steam limited and must be evaluated for internal clad
reactions, if the cladding is calculated to swell and burst. Under
these circumstances, it appears that calculated energy release rates
from metal-water reactors should be conservatively accounted for under
the AC.
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A7.4 Embritt1ement
The AECls primary concern in establishing maximum temperature
limits (and finally quantitative limits on the extent of the Zr-steam
reaction) has been over the embritt1ement aspects of the effects of
oxidation. This has been the AEC position since the publication of
the lAC. Modifications in AEC embritt1ement assessment have resulted
primarily from problems associated with defining the physical mechanism
for embritt1ement and selecting a method for quantifying the criterion
for limiting the oxidation to levels which would give conservative
assurances of ductile fuel rod behavior throughout the LOCA.
Over the period of time of the ECCS hearings, the criteria
defining acceptable embritt1ement limits have changed as new experi-
mental data became available. In the AECls initial direct testimony,
the defense of the simple 2300°F limit was based on a relatively thinly
defended argument. Embritt1ement was "classified" as occurring if the
Zr02 layer reached 16-18 percent of the total original clad thickness.
This, it was simply stated, corresponded "to a thickness of Zr02 plus
aZr of about 40% of the clad thickness" (~, p. 2-3).
It was also recognized that clad ductility was a function of
not only the peak temperature experienced, but also the reduced tem-
peratures after the thermal excursion had been limited. Studies at
ORNL (46) were cited as evidence that zero ductility temperatures (ZDT)
(the temperature below which cladding has no remaining ductility and
will suffer brittle failure under relatively light loads) would be
below lOOO°F as long as the equivalent clad temperature transient were
held to less than: "6 minutes at 2400°F, 10 minutes at 2300°F, approx-
imately 15 minutes at 2200°F, and about 27 minutes at 2200°F" (~, p. 2-4).
No substantial discussion was given to the adequacy of a ZDT of IOOO°F.
It was implied, however, that since none of the then currently accepted
evaluation models indicated temperatures exceeding 2300°F, or excursions
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above 23000 F for more than 3 minutes, "reasonable assurance" was pro-
vided that "significant cladding failure should not occur as a result
of oxygen uptake" (~, p. 2-5).
The failure of the simple 23000 F maximum clad temperature
limit alone to explicitly limit oxidation was. however. recognized by
the AEC in its initial direct testimony. It was stated:
~fuile the criterion does not specifically include a
time-at-temperature limitation, this limitation is implicit
in that the evaluation models used for calculating the
temperature history are also specified. We have not ob-
served. from the results of calculations performed by the
reactor manufacturers or from the results of our own cal-
culations. prolonged temperature transients that approach
those wherein the clad may enter non-ductile state
(§.. p. 2-5).
The need for an explicit limit on exposure duration as well
as peak temperature was emphasized by the intervenors in their initial
direct testimony. and acknowledged by all of the ~anufacturers and
utility participants as a desirable change in the criteria (i, pp. 18-3
to 18-5).
Several methods were proposed for relating the moving boundary
between the relatively highly oxidized a-phase zirconium and slightly
oxidized S-phase to embrittlement characteristics of the fuel rods.
One of the methods. which is typical of several others, is that of
Meservey and Herzel (iZ). They exposed zircaloy tubing to steam for
various temperature histories and arrived at the results shown in
figure A7.4 (12). After simplification. the theoretically based re-
lationship fitting their data analysis reduced to:
1 6 10-3• x + 0.001 (Eq. 7.7)
~ measured thickness of Zr02 + aZr layer (cm)
[ -41.000 + 1500 ]D diffusion coefficient. = 0.916 exp RT
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t = time (sec)
R
T
o
universal gas constant. 1.987 cal/mole - K
1 (OK)samp e temperature,
The upper bound of the data. a more conservative basis for estimating
the extent of oxidation. is given by:
F, = 2.lQ x 10-3 IUt + 0.0028 (em) (Eq. 7.7a)
Several concepts were advanced by the AEC as methods of
quantifying the extent of embrittlement as a function of the degree
of fuel rod oxidation. In the AECls Supplemental Testimony. a quanti-
tative method for relating ZDT to the thickness of oxidized material
was suggested (~, p. 18-16). The depth of fully and partially oxidized
material !;t (the total thickness of Zr02 and a-phase Zr including both
inside and outside cladding surfaces) and conversely the relative thick-
ness (F ) of "unoxidized" B-phase Zr were related to the ZDT in the AEC
w
model as:
ZDT 2727 - 3636 F (OF)
w
where,
F W -
!;t 1 - .874 i;/wo
w IV 1 + .126 !;t/wo
W "as oxidized" clad thickness
w initial unoxidized clad thickness
0
(Eq.7.8)
Assuming oxidation was limited to 16 percent conversion to equivalent
Zr02 (relating a and B-phase material to Zr02 through atomic oxygen
content by means of zirconium oxidation phase diagrams --e.g., 25
figure 2.4) the AEC has stated that !;t/wo = .56, approximately.-;or
these conditions. Under these assumptions, equation 7.8 indicates that
the ZDT for 16 percent conversion to equivalent Zr02 is about 1000oF.
Sixteen percent equivalent oxidation was still stated to be sufficiently
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small to survive quench loads under these circumstances.
The question of the relevance of quench loadings, as opposed
to other loading mechanisms which might be more closely related to fuel
rod loads during other LOCA periods (as well as experimental problems
associated with definition of physical parameters during quench), led
to investigation of other ways of relating embrittlement to oxidation.
The results of an ORNL investigation of the effects of deformation
temperature for impact and compression load tests on oxidized zircaloy
cladding are shown in figure A7.S (48). The results are shown as a
function of the fractional wall thickness (F ) of transformed S-phase
w
zirconium. The results indicate that as F decreases, or as more of
w
the cladding is oxidized to Zr02 and a-phase zirconium, the ZDT, or
temperature of departure from ductility, increases. When F is of the
w
order of 0.2, the temperatures at which non-ductile failures occurred
(approximately 2000°F) are almost the same as the limiting maximum
allowable temperatures of the lAC (2300°F). At these oxidation levels,
brittle failure could occur shortly after temperature turnaround -- long
before the fuel rods were cooled to steady-state or safe conditions.
Figure A7.S, however, does not relate the results of the tests
to maximum exposure temperatures for the fuel rod test specimen nor the
length of exposure time. Figure A7.6 presents the same test results
in terms of maximum exposure temperatures and exposure times. The
results generally indicate the parabolic temperature relationships
implied by equation 7.2. Though there is a fairly substantial scatter
in the data, the results indicate a general trend of decreasing ductil-
ity with increasing exposure time. The straight-line, constant tempera-
ture-time curves have been "eyeballed" through the data only to show
the general indication of the trend of F with time. The relatively
w
poor correlation between F and exposure time at a given temperature
w
indicated by the scatter in the data is indicative of the problems of
using parameters such as F
w
or ~t/wo to relate oxidation to interface
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thickness of affected regions in the fuel rod. In spite of the scatter
in the data, the results indicate that ductility is not assured for values
of F much less than 0.8. In preparing its Concluding Statement, the AEC
w
reviewed the methods which were recommended by the hearing participants
for evaluating oxidation limits for embrittlement criteria. The results,
presented in table A7.2, indicate the principal features of the recommen-
dations (i, p, 88). After reviewing the proposed methods for evaluating
the location of the moving a-phase zirconium boundary through methDds re-
lating F or t; to temperature and time, the AEC concluded that the multi-
w
plicity of methods for calculating these parameters could not be correlated
with high confidence. They compared the results for the various methods
proposed and concluded, that using an equivalent 17 percent clad reacted
criteria (using the Baker-Just equations for total oxidation of material)
bounded the results of other methods with satisfactory conservatism.
Comparison of the recommendations indicates that the 17 percent limit
permits more oxidation than the equivalent oxygen uptake implied by the
methods recommended by Combustion Engineering, Westinghouse. and the
Utility Group, The C, E. proposed limit (F > .65) corresponds to a limit
w
of about 10 to 14 percent equivalent Zr02 oxidation. As indicated in
table A7.2, Westinghouse recommended an oxidation limit equivalent to a
16 percent clad reaction. In their Concluding Statement. the Utility
Group recommended,
. a limit on the calculated . . . equivalent oxi-
dation of 12 mole percent would prevent clad embrittlement
and failure and should conservatively bound conditions which
could be experienced during a design basis LOCA (22. p. 39).
Moreover, it should be observed that the 17 percent clad reaction limit
corresponds to an F of about 0.5. As shown in figures A7.5 and A7.6,
w
oxidations of this extent generally result in relatively high ZDT values,
and reduce the fuel rod to partially ductile to non-ductile conditions
during cooling periods.
A7.5 Commentary
As indicated in the foregoing sections, the AEC position with
respect to the metal-water reaction has evolved steadily during the
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Table A7.2
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EMBRITTLEMENT CRITERIA AND METHODS
Participant Source Temperature Oxidation Inside Clad Thinning Zirc-WaterLim.it of Limit Reaction Percent Expansion Reaction Equation
Utilities Conclusions 2500 12-17% clad 0-75% of 0-40% Klepfer
reacted outside
B & W Conclusions 2400 19% clad
reacted 0 0 Klepfer
G.E. Conclusions 2300* None* 0 0 Baker-Just
CeE. Conclusions 2500 Fw > 0.65 2/3 of 50% C.E.
outside
:> Westinghouse Conclusions 2700 E,t/wo < 0.47** 0 0 Westinghouse
-...I
I
N
N Staff Rebuttal 2200 E,t/wo < 0.44 100% Baker- Calculate Baker-Just
Just after
rupture***
Staff Conclusions 2200 17% clad 100% Baker- Calculate Baker-JustJust after
reacted
rupture***
* G.E. believes 27000 F and 17 percent reaction are better limits but does not recommend any change from
Interim Acceptance Criteria.
** Westinghouse states that this is equivalent to 16 percent clad reaction.
*** Within 1.5 inches of the center of the rupture.
the hearings. Under pressure from the intervenors, ACRS. and manu-
facturers, the AEC finally acknowledged the necessity of providing a
specific limit to the reaction in addition to peak temperature. Using
the Baker-Just oxidation relationship, the newly prescribed 17 percent
equivalent clad reaction criterion now allows the designer to uniquely
specify the limiting metal-water reaction for his reactor. The AEC's
original position. that the time history of the reaction was implicit
in the calculational models of the reactors, overlooked the principal
problem that the oxidation was not explicitly limited by a peak tempera-
ture criterion alone (~, p. 2-5).
Initially the intervenors argued that the 2300°F peak tempera-
ture limit alone was simply nonconservative. In addition to pointing
up the need to rectify the criteria's failure to specify explicit tem-
perature-time relationships, the CNI proposed that the following addi-
tional criteria changes should be incorporated relative to metal-water
oxidation reactions to increase conservatism.
(1) A minimum ZDT of 200°F or less should be required.
(2) Based upon calculated outside oxidation thicknesses,
equal oxidation should be assumed on interior rod
surfaces to allow for metal-water reactions on sur-
faces which had ballooned and ruptured during blow-
down.
(3) Moreover, to account further for the effect of fuel
rod swelling, the calculated excursion should assume
that cladding walls were thinned to one-half the
original thickness during the expansion.
The CNI concluding arguments were tempered somewhat. Their
call for the above proposed criteria changes was not repeated, perhaps
because they felt that the AEC was moving to incorporate explicit
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changes which were close to their initial criticisms. They did state,
however, that the single peak temperature limit without some form of
explicit time restriction had been "totally discredited." They also
stated that before meaningful criterion could be established, it would
be necessary to conduct more experimental work -- especially in areas
of thinned and ruptured tubing and the verification of calculated LOCA
forces on the fuel rods (2, p. 5-49).
More experimental work in fuel rod oxidation and embrittle-
ment would seem to be desirable. The basis for most of our current
embrittlement limits seems to rest upon less than 100 individual experi-
mental measurements. This is not a particularly large set of data upon
which to base an extremely important criterion, especially considering
the rather large scatter in the data. However, it does seem that the
data should be adequate to permit conservative oxidation limits to be
established. Consequently, though additional tests may be desirable,
the available information appears sufficient for establishing criterion
limits.
From the perspective of energy release (e.g., figure A7.3),
the AECls revised 2200°F peak temperature limit appears to potentially
permit non-negligible zirconium-water reaction energy release rates
when compared to local fission product decay heat release. Depending
upon the time the peak temperature for the rod is reached, the Baker-
Just relationship would predict energy release rates which are nearly
equal to (and possibly greater than) the fission product decay power.
Though the total energy release is small when the temperature excursion
is held within the criteria limits (table A7.1) -- on the order of
I percent of the decay heat release -- the local transient heat release
rate is substantial and could adversely effect the thermal history at
the core hot spot. If this energy source were neglected in the ECCS
thermal analysis, the resulting positive feedback energy input mechanism
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could conceivably spread the hot spot over broader core regions with
potentially disastrous consequences. Reduction of this problem to
metal-water energy release rate levels of essentially inconsequential
magnitudes. e.g •• about an order of magnitude below critical decay
heat power levels. would require a corresponding reduction of peak
temperatures to approximately 1800°F. Alternatively. consideration of
intentional utilization of an initial oxide thickness of about 0.5 to
I mil (or equivalently. an initial equivalent 2 percent to 4 percent
cladding oxidation) would also reduce the peak metal-water reaction
power levels to approximately an order of magnitude below decay heat
levels with the current 2200°F limit. A reduction in permissible metal-
water reaction to power levels of this magnitude would effectively
eliminate this contribution as a significant energy source. There is
no reason to believe. however. that the energy associated with the metal-
water reaction is not adequately predicted in all of the evaluation
models meeting the new AC. The Baker-Just reaction rate equations
prescribed by the criteria appear to be adequately conservative in
specifying energy released and oxidation occurring as a result of the
reaction. Calculations based upon the Baker-Just relationships. and
which satisfy the other AC prescribed metal-water criteria, should ade-
quately include this energy source in their analyses. If the resulting
calculations indicate that the cladding thermal response remains with
the 2200°F AC limit, there should be no basis for concern that the
metal-water reactions have not been conservatively treated from an
energy source standpoint.
From an embrittlement point of view, the proposed 17 percent
equivalent oxidation limit. based upon analyses using the Baker-Just
reaction rate method, appears to be of borderline conservatism (e.g.,
figures A7.5 and A7.6). The 17 percent equivalent oxidation, as pre-
viously noted, corresponds approximately to F = 0.5. Under these
w
circumstances. oxidized rods could be only partially ductile and at
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temperatures of less than about 900°F could be below the ZDT. With the
scatter in oxidation depths indicated by the data of figure A7.6, and
consequent uncertainty in relating embritt1ement to equivalent percent
oxidation or to actual measured oxidation penetration, a 17 percent oxi-
dation limit appears to provide only borderline conservatism. The C. E.
recommendations of F > 0.65, corresponding approximately to an equivalent
w
10 to 14 percent cladding reaction limit, with an estimated ZDT of approxi-
mately 400°F, would appear to be a considerably more conservative (and
comfortable) operating limit. The consolidated Utilities Group has also
recognized the need for a more conservative 12 percent limit, as previously
cited.
With respect to oxidation limits on the inside and outside
surfaces of the fuel rod, the AECls ultimate resolution of this criteria
omission in the lAC appears to be reasonable. According to the new AC,
if in the course of the LOCA cladding rupture is calculated to occur,
the inside tube surfaces shall be included in the oxidation calculation,
beginning at the time of calculated rupture. Moreover, the criteria
require that all evaluation models shall include a model for predicting
clad swelling rupture, which is based on "applicable data in such a way
that the degree of swelling and incidence of rupture are not underestima-
ted" (60, p. 1104). Adequate application of these criteria should meet
the requirement of most reasonable men for conservative treatment of the
metal-water reaction due to clad rupture.
Rather than incorporating a specific quantitative statement of
required fractional clad thinning in sections where swelling and rupture
have occurred, as proposed by CNl, the final AC require that the evalua-
tion model provide for calculation of the ballooned clad thickness at
the elevation of the rupture. The criteria require that the equivalent
unoxidized clad thickness be based upon the initial cladding cross-sec-
tional area,
taken at a horizontal plane at the elevation of the
rupture, if it occurs, or at the elevation of the highest
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cladding temperature if no rupture is calculated to occur.
divided by the average circumference at that elevation.
For ruptured cladding the circumference does not include
the rupture opening (60, p. 1095).
Though classical rupture experiments do not demonstrate such idealized
thinning conditions for swelling and rupture, the assumption of an "aver-
age" distribution of material, in accordance with the revised criterion
specifications. appears reasonably conservative.
Generally speaking. though absolute conservatism of the metal-
water reaction criteria may not be assured within the AECis Concluding
Statement, the revised criteria have gone a long way towards eliminating
most of the principal initial objections of the intervenors (but at the
same time implicitly acknowledging that many of the objections were
fundamentally legitimate). Though clad ductility may not conservatively
be assured by the criteria, the most pertinent data on oxidation reactions
appear to have been considered. The AEC attempts to arrive at a consensus
appear to have been unsuccessful, and vendor recommendations have appar-
ently been misinterpreted. Combustion Engineering's recommendation of a
This stated equivalency.47 (.§.Q, p. 1097).
minimum F of 0.65 was interpreted as being equivalent to a brittle layer
w
thickness ratio of E;, Iw
o
is incorrect. The ratio F = .65 corresponds to E;,/wo = .37, which corres-
w
ponds to a fractional equivalent oxidation of 10 to 14 percent, as previ-
ously discussed. Thus the "uniformity of opinion" which the Commission
has sought to establish is not particularly evident, nor does it strongly
support the 17 percent oxidation limit of the AC.
Assuming assured conservatism is desirable, a reduction in the
limiting equivalent oxidation to 12 percent of the initial clad thickness
would appear to be needed to achieve this goal.
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Appendix 8 FLECHT TEST PROGRAMS
The conservatism of the modeling of heat transfer physical
processes for reactor core reflooding and core spray emergency coolant
mechanisms. as they were defined by the lAC. has been questioned by
both the ACRS and the CNl. Because the physical processes occurring
during coolant application are quite complex, the principal means of
developing modeling tools for their evaluation has been through empiri-
cal methods. Attempts have been made to isolate and examine many of
the elements of the LOCA physical processes through a number of experi-
ments. To evaluate the phenomena of reflooding and core spray. the
Full Length Emergency Cooling Heat Transfer (FLECHT) test programs
were conducted. The FLECHT programs have formed the basis for the post-
blowdown heat transfer models prescribed in all of the AEC criteria
to date. Though there have been some modifications in interpretation
of the program results over the course of the hearings, the basic evalu-
ation model methodology is still fundamentally dependent upon the
validity and adequacy of the FLECHT data. This appendix will review
the several criticisms which have been raised by the intervenors with
respect to these aspects of the FLECHT tests.
A8.l General FLECHT Test Description
Two separate test programs were conducted. one for boiling
water reactors (BWR-FLECHT) and another for pressurized water reactors
(PWR-FLECHT). The two test programs, conducted by GE and Westinghouse
respectively, under subcontract to the Idaho Nuclear Corporation,
though different in procedural detail were similar in many general
ways. For uncertain reasons. GElS BWR-FLECHT program was singled out
for more extensive criticism by CNI than the PWR-FLECHT. Consequently,
in order to evaluate the CNl criticisms, much of the material in this
chapter has been directed toward review of the BWR-FLECHT program.
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Figure A8.l is a schematic diagram (~) of the BWR-FLECHT
test setup. As indicated in the figure, full length fuel rods were
tested in a 7 x 7 rod bundle configuration closely approximating BWR
reactor bundles which were contemporary to the test period. For the
tests, the fuel rod cladding material was fabricated of either stainless
steel or zircaloy. The rods were heated by electrical resistance heaters
designed to mock up operation rod axial power distribution (a chopped
cosine power distribution along the axial length of the rod). Typical
heater construction for Westinghouse PWR-FLECHT rods (50) is shown in
figure A8.2. Though heater materials and construction details differed
somewhat between the BWR and PWR programs, general elements of rod and
heater designs were similar for both programs. The time history for
the electrical power supplied to the rod bundles was programmed to simu-
late bundle decay heat in an operating reactor with reactor operating
power at LOCA shutdown as a parameter.
The tests were conducted in a parametric fashion. Analyses
of calculated values of specific coolant application rates, initial
temperatures, peak operating power, and time sequences of coolant appli-
cation were the basis for determination of the ranges for each of these
parameters. Table 8.1 (~) represents a summary of the BWR-FLECHT test
program indicating the number of tests, rod materials and parameter
ranges utilized in the program. A similar number of tests was conducted
in the PWR-FLECHT program.
A8.2
Three principal criticisms have been made of the BWR-FLECHT
tests. The first complaint was that although all BWR fuel rods are
manufactured of a zirconium (Zr) alloy, zircaloy, only 5 of the 143
FLECHT tests utilized Zr rods. The remaining 138 tests were conducted
with stainless steel (88) rods. Since, as discussed in appendix 7, Zr
reacts exothermically with water at elevated temperatures, contributing
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Figure AB.1 Test Setup
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Table A8.l
BW"R",FLECHT Testing
Tests Tests (kW) Rate 0 ReferenceDate Temperature ( F)
SSlN 5 Steady State 20-235 To Hold Level -- GEAP-I01l7
July 68 Flooding 16 Transient 240-390 0.6-3.7 ips 1328-2150
SS2M 4 Steady State 200-250 2.1-2.6 gpm -- GEAP-I0092
Aug-Sept 68 Spray 15 Transient 120-390 1.1-3.35 gpm 1120-2050
883M 4 Steady State 200 0.6-2.1 gpm -- GEAP-10092
Sept-Dec 68 Spray 38 Transient 120-390 0.4-6.5 gpm 810-1450
ZrlM
May 69 Spray 1 Transient 200 2.45 gpm 1790 GEAP-10092
>00 SS2NI
\JI Aug-Oct 69 3 Steady State 150 1.0-2.45 gpm GEAP-13088--
24 Transient 100-250 2.45-5.0 gpm 865-1850
8 Combined 250-235 2.0-3.5 gpm 1335-1870
Spray & 2.0··6.0 ips
Flooding
Zr2K NEDG-13064
Dec 69 Spray 1 Transient 195 2.45 gpm 1920 GEAP-13112
Zr3M
Mar 90 Spray 1 Transient 240 2.45 gpm 2345 GEAP-13174
Zr4M
May 70 Spray 1 Transient 240 2.45 gpm 2298 GEAP-13174
Zr5M Spray with 1 Transient 300 3.25 gpmJune 70 Flooding 6.0 ips 2325 GEAP-13174
SS4N Spray 10 Transient 250 2.45 gpm 1076-1718 GEAP-13190
Sept-Oct 70 Flooding 11 Transient 250 1.5-6.0 ips 1300-1600
5 Zircaloy-Clad Bundle Spray Transient Tests
11 Stainless Steel-Clad Bundle Steady State Spray Tests
95 Stainless Steel-Clad Bundle Spray Transient Tests
5 Stainless Steel-Clad Bundle Steady State Flooding Tests
27 Stainless Steel-Clad Bundle Flooding Transient Tests
additional energy to that of the decaying fission products, the applica-
tion of water to the core has the potential of increasing the heat input
to the fuel rods rather than cooling them, as desired. The small number
of Zr tests in comparison with the total test program was seriously faulted
by the CNI.
There are two basic explanations which have been proffered for
the relatively large numer of SS rod bundles used in the programs. The
first deals with test repeatability and economics and the second with
simplification of the analysis of the physical processes of the bundle
cooling mechanisms. The repeatability and economics explanation is the
reason most emphasized by the AEC and GE (i, p. 166; 60, p. 1123).
The FLECRT program was conducted as a parametric test series
which strongly affected the economics issue. Because rod heaters are
hand wound, their individual response characteristics are relatively
unique. The SS rods were apparently chosen primarily for their durability.
They could be used repeatedly in testing (for 30 or 40 individual tests)
without substantial changes in response over the series. Thus, differences
in heater characteristics would not influence the test series results.
On the other hand, as a result of metal-water reactions, Zr
rods could be used only once and then had to be subjected to a destruc-
tive post-mortem examination after the test. Since metal-water (M-W)
reaction rates are inversely proportional to the oxidation thickness,
repeated tests on used rods could not be expected to be reproducible
with respect to M-W reactions as the oxidized depth would increase with
each test. Moreover, destructive testing of the rods was felt to be the
only "absolute" method of evaluating the extent of the M-W reaction
which took place in the test. Consequently, to improve test reliability
and to reduce cost of rod fabrication, SS rods were used most extensively
in the test program.
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The second reason for using more 88 than Zr rods involves the
problems of simplifying heat transfer analyses by separating the
M-W reaction from the physical processes of cooling rods which were
not undergoing an A-W reaction. It was assumed that the M-W reaction
was an independent heat input mechanism to the fuel rods, separable
from the basic heat transfer processes of cooling. On this basis, the
88 rods permitted direct determination of the applicable heat transfer
coefficients for the cooling mechanisms without supplementary heat
input complications. The validity of this concept of separability of
the two heat transfer mechanisms rests on the assumption that the
radiative and convective heat transfer processes for heat transmission
between fuel rods and the coolant fluid are essentially independent of
the fuel rod materials, and thus are functions primarily only of tem-
perature and fluid flow conditions. Thus, it was felt to be possible
to evaluate heat transfer coefficients from 88 tests where the results
would not be affected by M-W reactions. The purpose of the Zr tests
was then to evaluate the validity of these assumptions by using 88
derived heat transfer coefficients to evaluate (or provide post-test
predictions) of the thermal response of Zr bundles.
The weakness of these arguments for rod material selection
is that because of the small number of Zr tests and the poor quality of
the Zr results, questions remain concerning the validity of the assump-
tions of the equivalence of non-reactive heat transfer characteristics
for the two materials and the legitimacy of decoupling the metal-water
reaction from the clad heat transfer mechanisms. Thus the AEC in its
Concluding Statement argued that,
••• the stainless steel bundle tests were performed
so as to obtain parametric heat transfer information,
whereas the Zircaloy-clad bundles were used to deter-
mine whether any significant anomaly existed in the
transient heat transfer behavior of Zircaloy (i, p. 166).
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The Commission concluded in their discussion of the AC that,
Stainless steel was used instead of zircaloy as the
cladding material for nearly all of the FLECRT tests be-
cause it is more durable under the test conditions. Al-
though it is not usual to expect significant differences
in convective heat transfer coefficients from different
solid material surfaces, the possibility of such differ-
ences was considered, perhaps resulting from such factors
as differences in thermal conductivity and differences
in wetting properties. The reasonable conclusion was
reached that the effect of the difference between zirca-
loy and stainless steel, if any, would be small. There
is a difference, of course, in the rate of heat gener-
ation from steam oxidation, but this is deposited within
the metal under the surface of the oxide film. The
presence of this heat source should not affect the heat
transfer coefficients, which depend on conditions in
the coolant outside the rod.
The few FLECRT runs made with zircaloy clad rods
provide uncertain and conflicting evidence. Westing-
house pointed out that all of the zircaloy runs except
one (run 9573) yield higher heat transfer coefficients
than were obtained with steel (Westinghouse Concluding
Statement, pp C-74 to C-76; Exhibit 150, pp 3-98 & ff).
Consolidated National Intervenors pointed out that most
of these runs were made at unreasonable high flooding
rates, and that a different result was obtained from
run 9573 where the flooding rate was about one inch per
second. In the first 18 seconds of this run, before
multiple heater rod failures occurred, the zircaloy clad
rods heated up faster than predicted from the stainless
steel based correlations (Exhibit 1041, pp 6.7 & ff).
This anomalous result has been attributed to experimen-
tal error, or possibly to an unusually skewed initial
temperature distribution along the length of the rod
(Exhibit 1113, pp 17-6-17-7).
On balance, the Commission sees no basis for con-
cluding that the heat transfer mechanism is different
for zircaloy and stainless steel, and believes, that
the heat transfer correlations derived from stainless
steel clad heater rods are suitable for use with zircaloy
clad fuels rods. It is apparent, however, that more
experiments with zircaloy cladding are needed to over-
come the impression left from run 9573 (60, pp. 1123,
1124). --
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These conclusions appear to be basically valid. Non-reactive
heat transfer mechanisms have been studied in great detail for heat
exchanger applications in many industries. These studies have shown
that convective heat transfer mechanisms are fundamentally related to
the fluid properties in the heat exchanger -- and only in a second
order manner to the properties of the metallic surfaces of the heat
exchanger itself, assuming equivalent surface roughness, etc. The de-
coupling of the reactive and convective heat transfer mechanisms is a
less clear cut proposition. The evidence for this assumption appears
to be somewhat uncertain, under the circumstances. However, the assump-
tion of decoupling itself appears to have been legitimate at least
initially. In view of the uncertainty and conflicts in the Zr test
results, the ABC position that more Zr tests are needed appears entirely
valid.
The second major criticism of the BWa-FLECHT tests concerns
the excessive use of molybdenum heating elements to power the rods
during reactor LOCA transient simulation. As a resistance heater
material, molybdenum (Mo) has a very large temperature coefficient of
resistivity which induced substantial amounts of power shifting in
the rods as a result of the "chopped cosine" axial power distribution
designed for simulation of in-core heat distribution in the tests and
from rod-to-rod as a result of inter-rod thermal interactions. The
net result was that pre-test predictions of power distribution for the
rods were poorly correlated with measured values for tests utilizing
Mo heaters.
Fortunately for ECCS designers, some of the FLECHT tests
were conducted using other heater materials. Chief among the alternates
was Nichrome V. The temperature coefficient of resistivity for Nichrome
V is nearly constant. However, only a limited number of tests were
conducted using this heater material because of its low failu~e tem-
perature (2500°F). Consequently, according to GE, the heaters could
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not be used in tests requiring extended operating periods at temperatures
greater than 2000°F (51, p. 6). Consequently Mo heaters were favored,
particularly in the SS tests, where the same rod bundle was repeatedly
used for evaluation of different test parameters.
Examination of the GE test documents does not seem to demon-
strate that the substantial Mo induced power shifting observed in the
FLECRT tests was initially expected. Mechanisms for controlling the
positive feedback from the Mo resistivity characteristics do not appear
to have been incorporated into the test apparatus until the last 3 Zr
tests were conducted, nearly two years after the program began (~, p. 4).
Moreover, no clear evidence can be seen that individual rod power deter-
minations were (or perhaps could be) made to allow for systematic analy-
sis of test results. Consequently, the Mo heaters seem to have contri-
buted painfully complicating factors and little useful information to
the FLECRT tests.
As a consequence of the complications associated with inter-
pretation of Mo heater test results, GE has leaned heavily upon results
obtained with Nichrome V heaters in evaluation of heat transfer coeffi-
cients for their transient analysis methods (~, p. 5). Results obtained
with Mo heaters are only rarely referenced and then primarily for the
limited number of Zr test results in which they were used. For example,
the heat transfer coefficients utilized in the GE core spray and reflood
calculation model (54, p. 58), were derived on the basis of the SS2N
test series (53, p. 26), in which Nichrome heating elements were used
for the rod bundles -- as indicated by the N in the descriptive number
scheme (SS2~) for the test series. Thus, tests conducted with heater
materials with low temperature coefficients of resistivity have had a
disproportionately large influence on assessment of heat transfer mech-
anisms when compared to the actual number of tests conducted in the
FLECRT program.
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The third principal criticism of the BWR-FLECHT program con-
cerns the non-reproducibility of the tests. CNI presented (1, p. 5.26)
results from tests conducted with SS2N and SS4N-49 rod bundles which
showed that for selected cases, peak temperatures for the SS4N tests
were approximately 15 percent greater than reported SS2N results for
similar test conditions. In their BWR-FLECHT Final Report, GE used heat
transfer coefficients derived from SS2N results to compare with tempera-
ture-time histories obtained in tests of zircaloy-clad bundles (52, ap-
pendix A). As shown in figure A8.3 using SS4N test results, the CNI
derived heat transfer coefficients which when applied to the limited
number of Zr test results shown in the CNI direct testimony, showed
"better" correspondence with the measured values presented than the
results shown for GE's SS2N derived heat transfer coefficients.
It should be noted, however, that only four time histories
were shown by the CNI in which the correlations were presented. In
every case, data reported by the CNI shows GE predicted peak tempera-
tures which fall short of the measured data. These results are obviously
biased towards support of the CNI contention that the GE heat transfer
coefficients are inadequate. In actuality, using the methods recommended
for design purposes by GE (using 100 percent of the predicted M-W reac-
tion), predicted temperatures were greater than the measured temperatures
for 37 of 44 measurements for tests Zr2K, Zr3M, Zr4M (52, appendix A).
Needless to say, comparison of CNI derived heat transfer results would
not have been as convincing for these 37 other sets of results, if they
had been shown.
A comparison of the test and predicted results is shown in
the graphs, figures A8.4 to A8.6, prepared by GE showing analytical
predictions for all the Zr tests based upon a 50 percent Baker-Just
M-W reaction energy input to the heat transfer calculation compared
to measured peak temperatures and turnaround times (21, pp. 73-75).
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Figure A8.5
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Peak temperatures calculated on the basis of a 50 percent Baker-Just
M-W reaction energy input to the system will tend to be lower than pre-
dictions using a 100 percent Baker-Just input (figure AS.3). However,
comparisons with the FLECHT measured data, for 50 percent Baker-Just inputs,
would tend to accentuate indications of underpredictions, which could make
the calculational results tend to appear unconservative. This aspect
should be considered when the reader analyzes the results shown in figures
AS.4 to A8.6. The curves show the differences in maximum predicted and
measured temperatures as a function of the error in prediction of the time
of the recorded temperature maxima. It should be noted that although
there is a substantial amount of scatter in plotted data, predicted tem-
peratures are generally in excess of measured values using SS2N derived
heat transfer coefficients, even using a 50 percent M-W reactions estimate.
The disturbing aspects of the results shown are the apparent randomness
of the results and the wide limits of the errors in the data. (-4<~t'l.me
<+ 3 minutes; - l50°F<~ <+300°F). The scatter in the results does nottemp
tend to encourage great confidence in the reliability of the calculational
capability for the design methods. It does, on the other hand, support
GE's statement that the "mechanisms of spray cooling are somewhat random"
(26) and provide some basis for the CNI concern over non-reproducibility
of the tests. The implied uncertainty of +15 percent/-7 percent in pre-
dicted temperature maxima seems unpleasantly large. (Note however that
the maximum non-conservative difference shown in the above GE figures is
the -7 percent). However. the range of errors in predicting maximum tem-
peratures lends support to the concept that maximizing the credibility
for the heat transfer methodology would require use of a greater margin
of safety in estimating heat transfer coefficients for design purposes.
The results shown (described as having been derived with the
current GE design model) (~, appendix A) indicate the application of
common design practices but show only uncertain conservatism.
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However, note that if a 100 percent Baker-Just M-W reaction is used in
the calculation, in accordance with stated lAC requirements, predicted
temperature maxima exceed measured values more than 85 percent of the
time. A discouraging aspect of the results shown in figures A8.4 to
A8.6 is that in one test, Zr3M, temperatures were overpredicted for less
than 30 percent of the rods. Even using a 100 percent Baker-Just M-W
reaction energy input, overpredictions were achieved on less than 50 per-
cent of the measurements. Predictions of time histories were also poor.
It is also discomforting to note that central rod prediction,
figure A8.6, had the poorest record for overprediction of all the test
results. Fifty percent of the results were underpredicted for these rods,
which are the hottest in the bundle. Thus the temperatures of the hottest
rods were most regularly underpredicted -- an observation which weakens
confidence in the conservatism of the analysis methods even more.
A8.3 Zr Test Review
The largest portion of the CNI direct testimony (~) was parti-
cularly directed at discrediting the FLECHT Zr2K test (a zircaloy bundle
with internally pressurized rods). The Zr2K test results are very impor-
tant to both the AEC and the CNI, for opposite reasons. The AEC uses the
test results extensively to defend the validity of their recommended BWR
analysis methods. The CNI try to show the inadequacy of the test in order
to weaken the AEC defense.
Fortunately, the Zr2K utilized constant resistance (Kanthal)
heater elements which minimized power shifting (~, p. 12). Unfortu-
nately, 10 of the 49 heaters failed, losing power before the test was
concluded. Fortunately, all the rods with failures were instrumented
with thermocouples and ammeters. Unfortunately, the individual rod
circuits were fused for 40 amps while the ammeters were designed for
maximum currents of 25 amps and were "pegged" for varying lengths of
time on all "failed" rods. Also unfortunately, no ammeter time histories
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are shown for the test (perhaps because estimates of the resistance of
rod current paths during "failure" periods are highly speculative and
hence power estimates based upon current measurement would be equally
uncertain).
Fortunately, the Zr2K rods were internally pressurized to
simulate the results of swelling and rupture produced by fission pro-
duct gases in an operating reactor. Unfortunately, the heater failures
complicated the responses of the rods. Maximum expansion, flow blockage,
and temperatures occurred in the vicinity of the "failed" rods. GE re-
ported 60 percent blockage for the central 9 rod portion of the bundle
only. CNI estimates that blockage of 90-94 percent occurred in the off-
center portion of the bundle containing the "failed" rods. The CNI
implied that the extensive off-center swelling occurred in spite of
heater failures (which were inferred by the CNI to be unpowered sinks
for thermal energy from neighboring rods). Examination of the rod ther-
mal histories indicates it is more likely that the swelling was induced
because of excessive power supplied to the rods during their "failure"
periods, producing local hot spots with consequent synergistic expan-
sion and rupture of adjacent rods.
The CNI claimed that the test showed that near "thermal run-
away" conditions resulted from M-W reactions, in spite of the "failed"
heater rods. They compared test results for SS2N with Zr2K, showing
satisfactory correlation during approximately the first five minutes
of the test with substantial deviations (Zr2K temperatures greater than
SS2N) during the subsequent periods of substantial heater failures.
Attempts by GE to show that M-W reactions were insignificant in the
thermal response of the rods were not overly convincing since they did
not evaluate actual dynamic heat rate inputs but depended instead upon
arbitrarily time averaged heat inputs over arbitrary time intervals (54,
appendix A). Gross estimates were made of the total energy contributed
to the thermal transient through the M-W reaction of 1/4 B/inch of
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cladding length (based upon the maximum observed depth of Zr02 penetra-
tion for the Zr2K experiment of 1.8 mils). This was compared with a
design total delivered decay power to the center of the maximum peaked
rod over the 24 minute spray cooling transient of 29.7 B/inch (14.5
B/inch over the first 10 minutes). Thus, GE inferred the total M-W
reaction to be 5-10 percent of the decay energy depending upon which of
the two time periods was used in the estimation. They acknowledge that
the rate of M-W energy addition is more significant than the comparisons
with total energy shown above, but state that rate information cannot
be obtained from the Zr2K data. Irrespective of the validity of this
observation, it seems that comparisons with rod input energy increments
taken over 10 to 24 minute intervals are too insensitive to be adequate
indications of the significance of the M-W energy contribution. No feel-
ing of confidence is gained that M-W reactions were unimportant as a
result of this GE analysis. However, the case for M-W induced thermal
runaway in the Zr2K test is equally weak.
One of the more difficult aspects of evaluation of Zr2K test
results is associated with the fundamental data for the tests, the re-
corded thermocouple (TC) responses. GE has been very liberal with their
accreditation of observed TC responses as erratic. However, several
proffered examples of erratic response seem to show well defined inter-
rod correlations. Under such circumstances, "unexplained" might be a
better description for the observed TC behavior than "erratic."
Figure A8.7 (based on material from reference 54) presents
an envelope of the thermocouple response histories for the rods which
experienced the peak temperatures during the Zr2K thermal excursion.
It is interesting to observe the correlation between the rods with maxi-
mum temperatures, their periods of maximum temperature, and their re-
lationship to rods in which the currents were "pegged" at levels between
25 amps (the maximum range of the ammeter) and 40 amps (the fused current
limit for each rod), and the periods of excessive current prior to rod
A8-19
Figure A8.7
Envelope of Thermocouple Response Histories for Peak Temperature Rods ofFLECHT Zr2K Test
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"failure." A schematic diagram of the rod bundle layout is shown in
figure AS.S. Using figures AS.7 and AS.S, it is interesting to compare
the order and location of electrical "failures" and the development of
peak temperatures.
A rigorously thorough analysis of the Zr2K thermal response mea-
surements is beyond the scope of this report. It should be noted. however,
that the recorded temperatures of rod 16, which developed the first
electrical anomaly after the official start of the test, were almost
identical to those of rod 24, which was given credit for the maximum
temperature measurement. The intra- and inter-rod temperature measure-
ments for rod 16 and its neighbors show consistent correlations over the
first two minutes of the transient, in spite of the current anomaly
being experienced by the rod (which started essentially at the beginning
of the thermal transient test period and lasted for nearly six minutes).
Between 2 and 3 minutes after transient initiation, however, thermo-
couples (TC) on rod 16 indicate an apparent sharp temperature rise.
Because of the anomalous electrical activity of rod 16 at this time,
experimental analysts have been inclined to discount this TC response
as anomalous also. However, it is interesting to note that the extreme
temperature excursion shown in figure AS.7 for rod 23 (adjacent to rod 16)
occurred at the same time the rod 16 TC excursion occurred and is matched
by nearly identical temperature excursion in rod 9, the other rod dia-
metrically adjacent to rod 16. Moreover. it seems entirely too coinci-
dental that temperature turnaround should be achieved in rod 24 at
essentially the same time that the actual failure (rod current going to
zero) for both rods 16 and 24 occurred. Under those circumstances, it
does not seem surprising that rod 17, still being driven by "normal"
electric current and in direct view of the three hottest rods in the
test (rods 16, 23. and 24) should then become the highest temperature
rod for most of remaining significant portion of the temperature tran-
sient. During this period, rods 17 and 23 both underwent electrical
AS-21
LOCAL PEAKING
FACTOR
00
ROD NUMBER
(;;;\
~
~
\V
(;;;\
\!J
~~
00°·8816lIN
~
\V
rG\
\t9J
(;;;\
~
~~
~~
~~
~\V
~~
~.04
"'V
~\:V
~~
~.\:V
(;;;\
~
~\:J
~
"V
~.
f::::\.06\V
~.~
(;;:;\.82
"'V
~\J
~~~~~\:V~~~\:V
LEGEND:
t<:/\ RODS 12,19,32 FAILED (NO CURRENT) BEFORE TRANSIENT INITIATION
'C>I (ZERO TIME FOR TEST>.
® ROD 24 HAD HIGHEST PEAK TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENT FOR TEST.
i ,j ORDER OF: POST TRANSIENT flFAILUREIl/BECOMING MAX TEMPERATURE
ROD FOR TEST.
N NOT APPLICABLE.
Figure A8. 8 Zr2K Rod Bundle Schematic Showing Rod Fai lure Sequence
(After Figure 6, 54, by pennission.)
A8-22
anomalies in which excessive currents were delivered to them. It was
not until the current to both of these rods actually went to zero, ap-
proximately 12 minutes after the thermal transient began, that rod 17
relinquished its role as the highest temperature rod for the test.
The relationships described above seem to indicate a systematic
correlation between the electrical anomalies of the "failed" rods and
temperature extremes for the bundle. It would appear that a convincing
argument could be made that the driving functions for the highest tem-
perature rods was probably excessive power anomalously delivered to the
rods during these periods rather than any of the normal physical pro-
cesses contributing to rod heat up for a reactor bundle under LOCA con-
ditions. Accordingly, it is regrettable that the test report failed to
provide any significant evaluation of the relationship of electrical
anomalies to measured maximum temperatures, except to imply that the
"failures" resulted in lower temperatures for the test than would have
been experienced had the "failures" not occurred. The report states:
The effect of rod failures later in the transient
(e.g., rods 16, 24, and 30 between transient initiation
and maximum temperature and rods 17, 23, 31, and 37 after
maximum temperature) was not considered in the detail
described above. The effect of these rod failures must
be small, since they were at relatively high tempera-
tures at the time of failure, and less radiation from
the powered rods to the later failing rods can be ex-
pected. In addition, the rods which failed after the
bundle maximum temperature had occurred could not have
affected that maximum temperature. Consequently, the
effect of the later seven rod failures is estimated to
have had a smaller effect on the bundle maximum tem-
perature than did the first three failures; that is,
less than 30°F.
It is therefore estimated that, had no heater
rod electrical failure occurred, the maximum recorded
cladding temperature would have been no more than 60°F
higher than the 2250°F actually recorded ~, p. 67).
A8-23
The possibility that electrical anomalies may have acted as high tem-
perature sources rather than energy sinks does not appear to have been
considered.
Is there a possible relationship between the anomalous TC
readings and M-W reactions? Figure A8.9 is representative of the cor-
relation which GE has made between calculated and measured thermal
response for some of the Zr2K rods where TC anomalies have been re-
corded. CNI has implied that the test was on the verge of "thermal
runaway" and was saved only as a "consequence of the extensive heater
failures that occurred" (~, p. 5.63). GE authors naturally downgrade
this possibility. From the limited data submitted in the test reports,
it is difficult to draw any more satisfying explanations for the erratic
TC behavior than those given by GE investigators. It is significant,
however, that most of the so-called erratic behavior occurs during the
periods of heater failures. Figure A8.10, taken from the Zr2K final
report, shows the correlation between the rod 24 (the absolute highest
temperature rod for the test) electrical anomaly and its TC response (54).
A similar relationship could be shown for rod 31 of figure A9.9. Based
upon examples such as figure A8.10, the proffered GE explanation that
heater short circuits to the rod surfaces could have contributed to
some of the unusual TC responses seems acceptable. It is unfortunate
that no records of individual rod electrical current or voltage measure-
ments were shown in any of the GE test reports to permit independent
evaluation of this source of variance (the individual rod power histo-
ries) with the TC responses.
Some of the "erratic" TC readings even GE cannot explain
through correlation with electrical short circuits of the heater ele-
ments. They note that the majority of these unexplained changes were
in the direction of decreasing temperatures or at such low initial tem-
peratures (1800°F to 1900°F) that association of the TC irregularities
with M-W reactions is discounted. The GE conclusion is that the "erratic
A8-24
2800
2700
2600
0
u.. 2500 00
u,j' 0
0::: 2400
::J 0< 23000:::
LLJ
00 00-~ 2200 /~O 0%t=!
e.::> 2100 ~.........--,~ 0 0
Z / OO,~ 0
Cl 2000 t/ 0 " ~O"/O MWRCl
:s I 0 0 50"/0 MW~"~u 1900
/000 ' .....~
1800 0
1700
1600 '----'-_...L- --'-_...L-_'----'-_...L----I
0123456789
TIME AFTER SPRAY INITIATION, min
Bundle Zr2K Rod 24 Midplane Thennal Response Prediction
9
2000
2100
~ 2300 .----...--r---r-----,---r---r---.....-........,..--,
..
~ 2200
::J
<0:::
LLJ
0-
~
LLJ
l-
e.::>
~
Cl
Cl
:s
u
TIME AFTER SPRAY INITIATION, min
Bundle Zr2K Rod 31 Midplane Thennal Response Prediction
Figure A8. 9 Comparison of Predicted and Measured Thennal Histories for Zr2K Rods with TC Anomalies
(After Figures A-ll and A-12 from 52 by pennission.)
AS-25
Figure A8.10
Analysis of Zr2K Thermal Response
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thermocouple outputs do not represent actual cladding temperatures, but
are the result of equipment malfunctions" associated with the Zr2K test
(54, appendix D, p. 107).
Based upon analysis of the material presented, it appears un-
questionable that the TC response was badly affected by short circuits
and equipment malfunction. The net result is that it is not possible
to certify that M-W reactions were insignificant in the measured thermal
transient, but the case for near "thermal runaway" proposed by the CNI
is also unconvincing. It is probable that most of the dramatic TC slope
changes, as well as several of the other RC aberrations associated with
the test, were short-circuit induced rather than M-W reactions. However,
more results seem to be systematically correlatable between rods that the
GE test analysis is willing to concede. This leads to uncertainty over
the proper interpretation of results. A more thorough analysis and inter-
pretation of the Zr2K-TC data would have been desirable.
The CNI have also observed that the GE analyses regularly
predicted that thermal turnaround (the beginning of the temperature re-
duction for the transient) would occur sooner than was actually experi-
enced in Zr2K. The CNI claim that the retardation of turnaround was caused
by flow diversion from the local hot spots to cooler locations in the
bundle induced by locally increased flow resistance from smaller rods.
GE on the other hand sees the earlier prediction of peak temperatures,
with usually higher predicted peaks, as a conservative design tool.
It seems probable that the difference between test and theory
results from rigid adherence by GE to a time-dependent model of heat
transfer coefficients which were derived from their SS2N tests and
adopted as their "design model" (52, p. 26). The design analysis method,
based on the SS2N time history, apparently did not permit accommodation
of the idiosyncrasies of the Zr2K test experience with its rod heater
failures and TC equipment malfunctions. Consequently, the predicted
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results might not reasonably be expected to correspond well with the
reality of the Zr2K test. Whether or not design basis prediction of
LOCA thermal histories would agree well with an actual transient also
remains to be shown. Results imply that the GE thermal analysis method
may be a weak predictive tool and more effort appears to be needed in
model development. However, it does appear that with sufficient analy-
sis, FLECHT results would be adequate to form a basis for demonstrating
the development of conservative analytical design methods.
A8.4 PWR-FLECHT
The CNI criticism of the PWR-FLECHT program was relatively
mild when compared with the challenge to the BWR-FLECHT test series
results. Their conclusion that the tests established that reflood in
a PWR-ECCS is at best marginally capable of controlling a LOCA is sub-
stantially less severe than the attack on the BWR. The motivation
behind this difference in critical intensity is not immediately appar-
ent, but perhaps it may be the result of a general feeling on the part
of the CNI that the PWR-ECCS had more obvious problems than the BWR
and was consequently more vulnerable to attack at other points. There-
fore, it may not have been felt necessary to challenge PWR-FLECHT re-
sults as severely as the BWR-FLECHT program.
Criticisms were made by the CNI concerning a number of prob-
lems. The experimental design was faulted (especially the use of SS
rods in 84 of the 88 tests vs Zr rods in only 4 of the 88). The range
of test parameters investigated was criticized as being too limited.
The principal objections concerned limiting the test initial tempera-
tures to 2300°F or less and including reflood rates of less than 1 inch/
second which are below design practice. Both objections are basically
invalid. The 2300 0 F upper temperature limit is understandable, although
perhaps a poor choice for a limit, because it does represent the upper
temperature limit of the criteria. The objection to the investigation
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of low reflood rates is hard to understand. The low rates tested
represent extreme cases for LOCAs, since limiting values of low flow
rates for termination of temperature excursions were observed, (i.e.,
temperature turnaround apparently could not be achieved at flow rates
less than 0.8 in/sec for reflood initial temperatures of l600°F or
greater). The results are useful for establishing the conservatism
of design values of reflood rates. If, as CNI claims, current PWR
reactors are designed for reflood rates of around one inch per second,
then the PWR-FLECHT tests show that PWR-ECCS designs may be uncomfort-
ably close to having no margin for error (appendix 9).
The heat transfer coefficients derived from the tests were
also challenged on the grounds that no energy balance was performed
(or perhaps could be), that local saturation temperature for the con-
vection steam was assumed as a boundary condition, and that the "cold"
boundary walls of the test configuration contributed a radiation heat
transfer sink which was neglected and would not be present in the open
lattice construction of a typical PWR. The issue of radiation to the
housing was subsequently reviewed by ANC and found to contribute no
more than a ± 5 percent uncertainty to the data (i, p. 17.3).
Perhaps the most valid of all the CNI objections to PWR-FLECHT
concerned the alleged failure to adequately investigate the consequences
of rod swelling with resulting blockage of core sections. This type of
potential flow blockage was simulated in the tests by introducing per-
forated planar steel orifice plates at the midplane of the bundle so
that the resulting fluid flow in the bundle, though reduced below normal
delivery rates, was s.till constrained to be one dimensional. The orifice
plates apparently caused the fluid to become more finely divided (and
perhaps better distributed) behind the plates, resulting in unsuspected
improvements (increases) in heat transfer rates in the immediate vicinity
of the plates. As a result of this test, W has claimed that swelling
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and rupture may improve heat transfer, a point which seems highly
debatable when the one dimensional limitations of the test are considered.
The most discomforting aspect of this problem is that it appears that
PWR computational methods may have included this "improved" heat transfer
mechanism in their design procedures (~, p. 3-50 and~, p. 198). This
practice, if true, would have been totally at odds with any reasonable
interpretation of conservatism. The Commission in their discussion of
the new AC appear to have recognized this problem. They summarized the
AEC position on the influence of blockage on reflood heat transfer, as
follows:
The FLECRT tests simulated flow blockage in a number
of runs by the insertion of perforated horizontal plates.
With reflood rates of one inch per second or higher, im-
provement was found in the rate of heat transfer as far
as two feet upstream and four feet downstream of the
blockage. The improved heat transfer was shown to be
caused by break-up of the entrained droplets and increased
turbulence (Exhibit 1006a). The blockage in these tests
ranged up to complete blockage over several channels with
75% blockage in other channels. For the fiow blockage
tests at a reflood rate of 0.6 inches per second, heat
transfer was degraded by blockage. Presumably the poor
results at the low reflood rate were the result of a
lack of entrained water droplets, leaving only single
phase steam cooling (Exhibit 1113, p. 17-5).
The FLECRT flow blockage tests were criticized on
the basis that the flat plates were not typical of bulging
of the cladding. However, Davis tried blockage with
sleeves versus plates and ~ound little difference.
As a result of these tests it appears that heat
transfer coefficients based on undistorted rod g~try
would provide a reasonable approach to estimating core
temperature behavior during reflood, for reflood rates
above one in/sec. For lower reflood rates blockage
would have a deleterious effect and one must resort to
calculation with single phase steam cooling, taking
into consideration the effects of blockage on core
flow distribution (60, pp. 1124,1125) (emphasis added).
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Thus the potential practice of taking credit for the uncertain benefits
of flow blockage in PWR reflood heat transfer is specifically precluded
by the new AC.
A8.5 Evaluation of FLECRT Results
In summary, the CNI feel that:
The program [FLECRT] was characterized by narrow
scope, limited range of parameters investigated (many
inappropriate to the tasks at hand), the use of incorrect
materials, crude and incompetent instrumentation and opera-
ting techniques (with consequent major equipment malfunctions),
and, as a culminating weakness, expansive and overgenerous
interpretations [of test results] (1, p. 5.37).
In the AEC's Supplemental and Concluding Testimony, they have
attempted to answer most of the CNI objections (1, chapter 5) on a point
by point basis (i, chapters 16 and 17; ~, pp. 163-177, 194-198). Consider-
ing the test program from the standpoint of bundle design materials and
test conditions, they have attempted to address the program scope and
range of parameters for all parameters investigated. The AEC review of
the engineering basis for selection of the ranges of parameters tested
is reasonably convincing. In only one area, that of peak power delivered
to the test bundle, is the range of the program (especially BWR-FLECRT)
acknowledged to be weak. The AEC acknowledges that none of the BWR-FLECRT
tests were conducted at full reactor bundle power (i, pp. 195, 196).
Though the AEC attempted to show that heat transfer coefficients derived
from the tests are only weak functions of power, the relatively low powered
test results were sufficiently inconclusive that they do not satisfy even
the AEC itself. The AEC claimed that the tests were adequate, since the
heat transfer coefficients are functions of temperature and the peak tem-
peratures for the test exceeded the criteria limits. They acknowledged,
however, that "one or more" zircaloy tests at power levels representative
of current design "would reduce the uncertainties in the evaluation model"
(i, p. 16-41).
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In general, however, they state:
The ultimate usefulness of the BWR-FLECHT test data
is not a plotting of peak clad temperatures as a function
of test parameters, but is the development of a quantita-
tive description of the basic heat transfer mechanisms
operative during spray cooling and flooding (i, p. 16-27).
Though the statement is specifically directed at BWR-FLECHT,
its principal conclusion about the ultimate usefulness of the data being
not for development of quantitative relationships for peak temperatures
against various parameters but for development of general descriptions of
heat transfer mechanisms is equally valid for both PWR- and BWR-FLECHT
programs.
The AEC has acknowledged that, even in its own labs, there is a
divergence of opinion as to whether core heat-up models based on the re-
sults of tests with SS rods can predict the thermal response of zirca10y
rods "within the accuracy of the experimental measurements." The Supple-
mental Testimony notes that "ORNL has commented that the poor quality of
the test data makes these conclusions uncertain" (i, pp. 16-39). Though it
acknowledged that "the quality of the test data is poor," the AEC contends
that the poor data affects only "the accuracy with which the core heat-up
[model] can predict temperatures and has not prevented cooling mechanisms
from being understood and described" (i, .p. 16-21). The major uncertain-
ties in modeling the cooling mechanisms are stated to occur in the "values
of the convective heat transfer coefficients and the time of channel quench"
(4, p. 16-41). It is argued that conservatively low values of convective
heat transfer coefficients have been assured by requiring the radiative
heat transfer for the SS2N tests (from which the model heat transfer
coefficients have been derived) be evaluated at a conservatively large
value for the tests. Assuming basic adequacy of the SS2N experimental
data, this should lead to underestimations (in the direction of conserva-
tism) of the derived convective heat transfer coefficients. This concept
seemed intuitively satisfying. However, to demonstrate how intuition,
and poor preliminary analysis, can adversely affect judgement, the new
A8-32
AC have revised the AEC evaluation of the influence of cladding emis-
sivity and radiative heat transfer. In their discussion of the new AC,
the Commission has noted that:
The values of the calculated convective heat transfer
coefficients depend to some extent upon the value used for
the thermal emissivity of the stainless steel, since the
convective heat transfer is obtained after subtracting the
radiative heat transfer from the total. Theoretically a
high value of the emissivity leads to a low calculated
convective heat transfer coefficient. Values of the emis-
sivity measured after the tests ranged from 0.6 to 0.9
(Exhibit 461, p. 81 and Exhibit 1113, p. 16-14), and to
add conservatism to the calculation, the Interim Policy
Statement required the use of the highest measured emis-
sivity, 0.9, for theca1culation of the convective heat
transfer coefficients. However it turned out that this
resulted in a higher coefficient (less conservative) for
the critical inner rods, with a higher estimated standard
error. (Exhibit 461, Table 2.) After reviewing the deri-
vation of the coefficients as given in Exhibit 461, we
believe that those originally listed as best estimates by
General Electric are the most credible and should be used.
The effect of this change on the peak cladding tempera-
ture will be small, about five degrees according to
Exhibit 461 ~, P. 1125) (emphasis added).
The SS2N test was run at a pressure of one atmosphere.
In practice, the blowdown of the reactor steam supply system into an
intact containment vessel will induce equilibrium pressures greater
than one atmosphere within the reactor core during spray cooling or
reflood. (A pressure of approximately two atmospheres is expected.)
Under these conditions, the SS4N test results (figureA8.ll) indicate
a general improvement would be expected in heat transfer characteristics
with increasing pressure. These factors support the contention that
convective heat transfer coefficients (based on SS2N results) should be
conservatively modeled.
To help ensure conservatism in channel quench times for the
evaluation model, the criterion require that calculated quench times
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for BWR channel box walls be augmented by an additional 60 seconds in
applying the model to calculate res~lts for a LOCA.
As a general conclusion, it appears that the FLECHT tests
have had many problems and weaknesses. Critical zircaloy tests, such as
Zr2K for BWR-FLECHT and 9573 for PWR-FLECHT have been marred by problems
with malfunctioning test equipment, indeterminate and poorly evaluated
data, and inadequacies in the analysis of results. According to the CNI,
the "demonstrated defects'! in the BWR-FLECHT program were so extensive
that virtually no credence could be put in them. It must be acknowledged
that the shortcomings of the test program are sufficiently numerous
that they provide a potential source of almost unending controversy in
evaluating the test results. The ORNL comment, previously cited, that
the quality of the tests was poor and conclusions relative to the adequacy
of core heating models derived from 55 test results are uncertain appears
to be understandable, if somewhat extreme, when compared with the re-
ported results. However, the broader conclusions of CNI that the tests
are totally inadequate to support development of conservative core spray!
reflood heat transfer analysis methods seem too extreme. The tests do
demonstrate that the existing coolant application methods are capable of
inducing temperature turnaround under adverse conditions, substantially
in excess of criteria temperature limits. Even when temperatures exceeded
criteria limits and energy may have been delivered to rod bundles at
rates in excess of DBA design conditions, the core spray and reflood
mechanisms were adequate to achieve temperature turnaround. Furthermore,
little substantial evidence was shown for "runaway" energy input to the
fuel rods from M-W reaction in excess of the capability of the coolant
modes -- as long as criteria temperature limits to the thermal excursions
were reasonably well maintained.
However, as indicated in figures A8.4 to A8.6, the current
BWR numerical analysis method did not provide completely conservative
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analyses of the temperature extremes for the zircaloy tests. Although
predicted peaks were generally greater than measured values, they were
not consistently higher. In fact, on the basis of evaluations using
100 percent Baker-Just M-W reaction rates, approximately 15 percent of
the predicted peak temperatures for tests Zr2K, Zr3M and Zr4M were
lower than their measured values. This number appears too high for an
adequately conservative evaluation model. Moreover, there is substantial
uncertainty with respect to estimation of the time of temperature turn-
around. Though the weaknesses in calculational time histories may have
resulted from too rigid a dependence upon the details of the SS2N heat
transfer coefficient-time histories in application to the zircaloy tests,
the uncertainty in prediction of peak temperatures and turnaround times
for these tests does not create great confidence in the evaluation
model's adequacy.
Consequently, though it would appear that conservative core
spray and reflood heat transfer analysis methods may be derived from
FLECHT test results, the evidence is weak that current models will give
completely conservative results. In fact, the Commission's AC opinion
states that:
The accuracy of the FLECHT-determined heat transfer
coefficients has been examined several times. (Cf, the re-
view in the Babcock and Wilcox Concluding Statement, pp.
202-204.) Westinghouse estimated a possible uncertainty
of 12% in the coefficients. (Trans. page 6878.) The
Aerojet Nuclear Company concluded "that the FLECHT data
currently represent a best estimate of the heat transfer
that will occur in a large undistorted core." They also
concluded that an allowance of up to 20% may be needed
"to bound the data due to experimental and inferential
errors." (Exhibit 1113, p. 17-14.) The Commission ap-
proves of the use of the FLECHT data for calculating PWR
reflood heat transfer, but notes that these will be more
nearly "best estimate" calculations than bounding car:--
culations (60, p. 1124) (emphasis added).
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Thus the questionable conservatism associated with BWR-FLECHT calculated
reflood heat transfer results is acknowledged. Similar difficulties are
acknowledged with BWR-FLECHT heat transfer coefficients. The Commission's
AC opinion states:
The BWR-FLECHT convective heat transfer coefficients
were determined from the residue of a thermal balance
after all of the known inputs and outputs were calculated.
The factors considered were the electrical heat input, the
rate of change of the heat content of the rods as calculated
from the temperature history, and the calculated radiation
from the rods to each other and to the channel walls. The
residue from these inputs and outputs was ascribed to con-
vective heat transfer. The convective heat transfer coef-
ficients so determined could not be very accurate because
their calculation involved taking the difference between
two large numbers. The coefficients so obtained are
small and are about what one would expect from the mecha-
nisms of natural convection and radiation to steam (Exhibit
1113, p. 16-14).
There has been a great deal of criticism of the
BWR-FLECHT tests, particularly by the Consolidated
National Intervenors (Exhibit 1041, Chapter 5), and both
General Electric and Regulatory Staff have defended them
(Closing Statements). However, for the purpose of calcu-
lating the maximum cladding temperature, only the derived
heat transfer coefficients are of any great importance.
The values obtained have always been known to have a high
statistical error; furthermore the values are low and
reasonable, and there seems little to be gained by re-
newing the controversy over the manner of conducting and
interpreting all features of the tests.
The high but inevitable statistical error of the
coefficients for the inner rods (1.5 ± 1.0 BTU/hr-ft2-OF)
is bothersome and leads to an estimated error band of as
much as +200°F in the calculated peak temperature in some
circumstances (Exhibit 1113, p. 16-36). The test bundle
SS2N was used to derive the heat transfer coefficients;
another test bundle SS4N, resulted in cladding tempera-
tures 200°F higher than those of the bundle used as a
standard; one half of this discrepancy could be explained
by test differences, with the other half left to be attri-
buted to statistical variations (Exhibit 1113, p. 16-38).
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The problem of these large statistical errors in the
convective heat transfer coefficients is compensated
to some extent by the fact that the coefficients were
determined at atmospheric pressure, whereas the reactor
would be at some elevated pressure at which the heat
transfer would be improved (Exhibit Ill, p. 16-26)
(60, pp. 1126, 1126) (emphasis added).
A large degree of uncertainty is therefore acknowledged to
be associated with the use of FLECHT derived heat transfer parameters
in estimating LOCA temperature histories. Some additional work on
the analysis of the FLECHT data with respect to the application of
the data to the evaluation models would appear to be appropriate in
order to achieve greater conservatism. Additionally, as recommended
by the AEC, some additional testing of current bundle designs under
design power level temperature excursions would be desirable as well
as more tests utilizing zircaloy rods and improved blockage simulation.
With these additional actions, it should be possible to demonstrate
conservatism of the core spray/reflood heat transfer evaluation models
sufficiently to satisfy the requirement of "reasonable men."
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Appendix 9 OBSERVATIONS ON SELECTIONS FROM THE ACRS LIST OF ITEMS
OF VNPROVEN CONSERVATISM
Detailed evaluation of all of the elements of the ACRS list
of items "considered not proven to be conservative" is beyond the scope
of this presentation. However, selected observations on some of the
more critical elements of the ACRS list, not discussed in previous appen-
dixes, will be given below.
A9.l Analytical Models and Numerical Methods
The AEC Water Reactor Safety Program Agumentation Plan (16),
at the time of its submission (November, 1971), was particularly em-
phatic in its conclusions regarding the adequacy of the reliability of
the evaluation models as licensing tools. It stated:
To date, evolution of codes has not kept pace with
the development of emergency core cooling systems. As
reactor designs and their operating characteristics changed,
the analysis methods were 'patched up' rather than redevel-
oped, with the net result that overall, existing methods are
inefficient, inflexible and do not adequately represent the
physical phenomena intended (16, p. 8).
In conclusion it noted:
•.. the codes are unable to describe important physical
phenomena and therefore are unable to confidently define
safety margins, their treatment of common phenomena is
inconsistent, and they overemphasize the use of empirical
correlations (16, p. 27) (emphasis added).
Though somewhat dated, this criticism appears to be largely valid when
applied to the current description of the state-of-the-art of numerical
methods for ECCS analysis.
The CNI has objected to "the failure of GE to have made avail-
able sufficient description of their LOCA transient analysis methods
to permit a full independent analysis" (L, p. 4-16). Essentially, the
sole description of the GE-ECCS evaluation model is provided by NEDO-
10329 (53). Though it is possible to determine a large number of the
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model's basic features from the document, it is the contention of the
CNI that the report does not adequately describe "the necessary justifi-
cations for the assumptions and simplifications" in the code (2, p. 4-17).
Moreover, the CNI claim that no valid evaluation of the GE code has been
made by the AEC since no independent BWR evaluation codes have been de-
rived by ANC or any other of the independent AEC labs.
The AEC, on the other hand, in their initial Direct Testimony
indicated that at least a partial independent analysis has been con-
ducted of the GE model. Their testimony stated:
To assist us in our evaluation of the core heatup
model we requested the Aerojet Nuclear Company (ANC) to
perform an independent analysis of the fuel cladding
thermal transient following the LOCA. This analysis was
performed using the computer code MOXY. Although the
analytical model incorporated into MOXY is similar to the
model used by GE, the formulation and development of the
ANC code were done independently. As part of the ANC
analysis an attempt was made to duplicate the fuel rod
cladding temperature response calculated with the GE
heatup standard input assumptions for the analysis ...
As can be seen by [the] results the agreement between
the two analytical models is good (~, p. 4-23).
The statement was accompanied by curves showing good agreement between
the ANC and GE code elements for a sample problem on which both had
been exercised.
While it appears that some evaluation of the GE models may
have been initiated, it also seems evident that not as much effort has
been put into the development of independent methods for evaluation of
BWR codes as has been put into PWR code evaluation by ANC. This is
probably due to the intense involvement of ANC in the development of
the LOFT test reactor (a small scale multi-loop PWR) at the AEC Idaho
test facilities.
To resolve this problem (now, and in the future), the AEC has
incorporated a requirement into its revised criteria for documentation
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of all vendor evaluation models (60, pp. 1126, 1127). The proposed
standards specify requirements on acceptable documentation and set
general standards for model acceptability. While the AEC's proposed
rule gave detailed specification of vendor models in terms of approved
codes and parameters (i, pp. 57-73), the AC gives no specific approval
to any elements of the current vendor analysis methods. On the contrary,
it calls for demonstrations of the adequacy of vendor computer programs
through demonstrations of numerical convergence and performance of
sensitivity studies to evaluate the importance of parameters. Compari-
sons of model calculational results with applicable experimental infor-
mation, where available, are also required (60. p. 1127). The clear
implication of the Commission's changes between the PR and the final
AC is that more evaluation of the analytical models is required before
they are to be found acceptable. In their discussion of the AC, the
Commission noted:
The need for noding and sensitivity studies for the
computer programs is clearly reflected by the hearing
record .••••
The need for comparisons of the calculations of
analytical models with experimental data is discussed
and the value is recognized in the written testimony of
nearly all of the participants, including the Regulatory
Staff .•...
In their comments, Babcock and Wilcox suggested
omission of the technical review of the evaluation models.
It is the Commission's opinion that, with the changes
being made by this rule, it is necessary that a technical
review of the evaluation models be made by the Commission;
this review is the responsibility of the Regulatory Staff
(60, p. 1127) (emphasis added).
Perhaps the fundamental concern of all who have dealt with
large scale numerical calculational methods was summarized by Alvin
Weinberg, then Director of ORNL. In a February 9, 1972 letter to
James Schlesinger then AEC Chairman, Weinberg wrote:
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With respect to the criteria themselves~ I have only one
point to make. As an old-timer who grew up in this business
before the computing machine dominated it so completely, I
have a hasic distrust of very elaborate calculations of com-
plex situations~ especially where the calculations have not
been checked by full-scale experiments. As you know~ much
of our trust in the ECCS depends on the reliability of com-
plex codes. It seems to me--when the consequences of
failure are serious--then the ability of the codes to ar-
rive at a conservative prediction must be veriried in ex-
periments of complexity and scale approaching those of the
system being calculated. I therefore believe that serious
consideration should be given first to cross-checking dif-
ferent codes and then to verifying ECCS computations by
experiments on a large scale and~ if necessary~ on full
scale. This is expensive~ but there is precedent for such
experimentation--for example~ in the full scale tests on
COMET and nuclear weapons (12).
While it may be true that a great deal of effort has been
expended to evaluate elements of the numerical codes against corres-
ponding experimental pieces of the LOCA~ the need for code verification
against system test of the magnitude and complexity described by Weinberg
is very real. Subsystem or component tests are a poor substitute~
acceptable only on a temporary basis in place of a large scale ECC
system test.
A9.2 Treatment of Break Flows
The ACRS contention of lack of proven conservatism for the
treatment of break flows of reactor coolant from the DBA double-ended
pipe break for both PWRs and BWRs lent support to the CNI claim of
"incorrect prediction of blowdown rates" for the reactor. That major
variations in the break flow and consequent blowdown rate could poten-
tially seriously affect the thermal history of the reactor is clear.
Higher blowdown rates imply shorter blowdown periods which could lead
to higher containment pressures and conceivably higher rod temperatures
prior to emergency coolant injection.
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The AEC has prescribed the use of the Moody fluid discharge
model (55) both in their Concluding Statement (~, p. 105) and the final
AC (60, p. 1108) as well as in their initial Direct Testimony (~, pp. 2-41
& 4-15) and in the lAC themselves. Moody's analysis method was developed
for flow of a two-phase (liquid-steam) mixture through pipes based upon
an idealized isentropic equilibrium model of the flow. CNI attempted
to show that for relatively short pipes, where the length-to-diameter
ratio was short (less than 10), two-phase equilibrium would not exist
and metastable liquid flow (flow of pure liquid at temperatures and
pressures where vaporization would be expected under equilibrium con-
ditions) would take place (~, chapter 8). Under these conditions, based
upon experimental results of Fauske (56), greatly increased break flow
rates could be obtained e'l. 7 times greater than the rate predicted by
the designers for two-phase flow") (~, p. 8.1).
A rather complete summary of the current investigations of
blowdown break flow is given in GE's Redirect-Rebuttal Testimony (11,
Section I). The GE study, prepared by Moody et al., has a comparison
of calculational models and Fauske's experimental work in terms of
flow rate as a function of pipe length. Figure A9.l has been reproduced
from it. The argument is presented by GE that although flow rates for
very short pipes (less than 2 inches in length and 0.25 in diameter)
are substantially higher than rates for long pipes, choked-equilibrium
flow is established for pipes longer than 2 to 4 inches. The curves in
figure A9.l are very dramatic in showing the significant difference
between the high rates of metastable flow, found in pipes of very short
length, and the equilibrium flow rates. The highest metastable flow
rates are approximately a factor of 3 greater than the equilibrium-
choked flow conditions for relatively long pipes. It is apparently
this potential for flow rates truly dramatically different than those
predicted for equilibrium flow that caused the concern of the ACRS
and CNI.
A9-5
Figure A9.l
Comparison of Results of Blowdown Break
Flow Rate Experiments and Calculational Models
114
500
(FlOWRAl'ES PREDICTED BY
GE BLOWDOWN MODEll
1000
1500
2000 psia
(FlOWRATES PREDICTED BV
HOMOGENEOUS. EQUILIBRIUM
MODELl
500
1500
1000
-
2000 psia
I
I
I
BWR RECIRC. I
NOZZLE LENGTH~
I
I
I
I
I
(UCHIDA)
D • 0.158 in.
Po • 1000
(GE·£lWR CALC'~
CONSERVATIVE)
Po • 1QOO
(GE.BWR REALISTIC)
(FAUSKE)
o • 0.25 in"
lALLEMANN
Po • 1600 psia
D • 6.8 in.)
500
28
114
20.000
15,000
J
~ 10.000
I
..J;-:>\0
I
0\
01 I I I l::=:=r: I •
o 10 20 30 40 50
LENGTH lin.!
(After Figure I-I, 27)
The GE rebuttal argument attempts to show that the length of
the pipe is the only controlling factor in the change from metastable
pure liquid flow to equilibrium-choked flow. This argument, contrary to
Fauske's contention that length-to-diameter ratio is the controlling
parameter,is only weakly established by GE. In fact, some of the re-
sults presented in the GE report (but not discussed therein) indicate a
rather pronounced influence of pipe diameter on the flow transition
point in pipe length. A general trend towards increasing lengths for
transition flow with increasing pipe diameter can be seen, giving some
support to Fauske's and CNI's claims.
GE'S stated position is that "the primary determinant of
whether the flow is essentially equilibrium two-phase, rather than meta-
stable super-saturated pure liquid, is the length of travel from the
pressure vessel." Consequently, the GE report contends, "the design-
basis GE recirculation line break, with 35 inch (890 mm) nozzle length
and 26 inch (660 mm) diameter, falls in the range accurately predicted
by homogeneous equilibrium models" (12). Moreover, it is claimed that
the Moody method (a "conservatively" based homogeneous, equilibrium
model) will predict larger flow rates (conservatively) from the break
than would logically be expected from a "more realistic" homogeneous
equilibrium model (see figure A9.1).
The problems with the GE position are two-fold. First, as
indicated in figure A9.2, the majority of the testing which has been
performed (shown inside the cross-hatched regions) has been done with
relatively small diameter pipes, mostly on the order of 4 inches in
diameter or less. For these tests, when characteristic length-to-
diameter values are constrained within reasonable reactor DBA limits
(9.JD) .::.10), nonequilibrium effects have been important. As indicated
by the figure, only a few tests have been performed for large diameter
pipes. (Essentially only the three limited sets of data shown exist.)
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Figure A9.2
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The second problem is that the Q,/D ratio for the GE-DBA
conditions is disturbingly close to unity. Figure A9.2 indicates that
the vast majority of the data taken for pipes with Q,/D values of approxi-
mately one have shown non-equilibrium results. If the GE physical argu-
ments about the length being the controlling factor are not valid, then
flow rates for such relatively "short" pipes could be much higher than
equilibrium models would suggest even when the "conservatism" of the
Moody model is considered.
The regulatory staff tried to overcome this problem in their
Concluding Statement by calling for more than one model of blowdown
break flow to be used in analyzing critical flow in accordance with the
revised criteria of their Proposed Rule (~, pp. 105-108). Thus the staff
concluded that,
The critical flow model of Moody is appropriate for
use in break spectrum analysis of blowdown transients in
BWRs and PWRs on the basis that it overpredicts blowdown
flow ••. whenever the break exit plane quality is greater
than about two percent .•. However, for the blowdown period
during which subcooled liquid, saturated liquid or low
quality two-phase fluid exists at the break exit plane,
the Moody model underpredicts experimental discharge
data ••• Therefore, the Proposed Rule requires the use of
a model which is more appropriate to these fluid condi-
tions. One such model contained in the evidence of this
proceeding is the modified Zaloudek model of Westinghouse
(Exhibit 1151, (~ Section III). The Moody model may
also be applicable for early times during blowdown be-
fore the exit plane quality reaches two percent if it is
used with a Moody multiplier of greater than unity •..
The staff concludes on the basis of this evidence that
models appropriate to those flow iegimes do exist. How-
ever, additional information describing how those models
are incorporated in the computer programs should be evalu-
ated in accordance with the proposed Section III.A of
Appendix K (~, p. 105) (emphasis added).
In its revised AC, the Commission has downgraded the impor-
tance of the early blowdown stages where the need for a Moody multiplier
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of greater than unity had been recognized. The AC now require that:
For all times after the discharging fluid has been
calculated to be two-phase in composition, the discharge
rate shall be calculated by use of the Moody Model ...
The calculation shall be conducted with at least three
values of a discharge coefficient applied to the postu-
lated break area, these values spanning the range from
0.6 to 1.0 (60, p. 1108).
Though the Commission acknowledged that recommendations for
discharge coefficients greater than one were widespread, their discus-
sion of the AC implies that the Moody model is always conservative and
that the metastable flow period (if any) is adequately covered by
Moody model results. They acknowledge that:
There was widespread agreement that a variable discharge
coefficient provides a better fit to the data than a constant
one .....Ybarrando (Transcript p. 6362) reported the result
of an ANC calculation with a discharge coefficient initia!!y
2.0, and later in blowdown 0.6, where the first peak in the
clad temperature exceeded by about 100°F the value obtained
with a fixed discharge coefficient of 1.0 (60, pp. 1111,
1112) (emphasis added). --
Nevertheless, the Commission concluded:
We agree with the Staff position as to correctness of
use of the model based on critical flow, since the length
of time available during blowdown far exceeds the amount
needed for nucleation and build-up of two-phase discharge.
Furthermore, the evidence is strong that use of the Moody
correlation does not underestimate observed experimental
discharge rates, as would be the case if discharge were
really metastable, but in fact it definitely overestimates
the discharge rates (60, p. 1112).
The question of the adequacy of the experimental data was not addressed
in any significant manner in the AC discussion.
In summary, it appears tha~ the Moody break flow model may
underpredict nonequilibrium flow by nearly a factor of two as indicated
by the CNI. To compensate for this, the regulatory staff in the PR
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suggested using a different (but only vaguely identified) model which
would estimate flow rates greater than those given by the Moody Model
when the quantity of the exit fluid was 2 percent or less. In the final
AC, the Commission downgraded the staff recommendation, implying that
the Moody model (with discharge coefficients < 1) was always conservative.
In view of the limited experimental basis for models which
may be applied to the large diameter pipes associated with the DBA for
large operational reactors, it would appear desirable to perform addi-
tional break flow tests with more representatively sized equipment.
In the absence of experimental data which clearly supports the Moody
model or indicates the requirement for a model of nonequilibrium flow
in large pipes, more conservative and definitive specifications should
be given in the criteria (e.g., quantified Moody multiplier's greater
than one, with their period of application definitively specified) to
attempt to assure that conservatism is attained for break flow specifi-
cations.
A9.3 Transient Critical Heat Flux and Heat Transfer
At the beginning of the LOCA transient, heat is transferred
from the fuel rods to the coolant water in a continuation of the highly
efficient nucleate boiling heat transfer mode of normal reactor oper-
ations. Heat transfer coefficients under nucleate boiling conditions
are immensely higher (approximately a factor of 10,000) than those which
occur during the core spray or initial reflood portions of the cooling
process. During the rapid system decompression accompanying blowdown,
a transition in the boiling process takes place from pinpoint nucleate
boiling to film boiling and two-phase (liquid-vapor) convective cooling
which greatly reduces the system cooling capability. Figure A9.3, re-
produced from reference 33, schematically depicts the various boiling
flow regimes for steady vertical up-flow of coolant.
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In describing the LOCA transient, analysis methods depend
upon the development of the concept of time periods during which a
given boiling transitional condition occurs (e.g., time to critical
heat flux (CHF), or similarly, time to departure from nucleate boiling
(DNB) , or duration of stable film boiling). The important transition
in the blowdown period is the first departure from nucleate boiling.
This transition achieves its importance because the rapid rod dryout
accompanying the transition makes reestablishment of the high heat
transfer, nucleate boiling conditions for the rod very difficult.
Moreover, the conditions for reestablishment are uncertain. As a re-
sult of the uncertainty over conditions leading to reestablishment of
nucleate boiling (rewetting), the revised criterion conservatively re-
quire that clad rewetting phenomena during blowdown be neglected immedi-
ately after CHF is first predicted. The revised AC state:
After CHF is first predicted at an axial fuel rod
location during blowdown, the calculation shall not use
nucleate boiling heat transfer correlations at that loca-
tion subsequently during the blowdown even if the calculated
local fluid and surface conditions would apparently justify
the reestablishment of nucleate boiling. Heat transfer
assumptions characteristic of return to nuclear boiling
(rewetting) shall be permitted when justified by the cal-
culated local fluid and surface conditions during the
reflood portion of a LOCA (60, p. 1109).
Neglect of rewetting during blowdown after DNB, was apparently also
practiced under the lAC and precludes redevelopment of nucleate boiling
conditions before reflooding begins.
Figure A9.4 (a composite of two figures, 14 and 15, from 10)
shows typical assumptions for heat transfer coefficients (HTC) for a
BWR throughout the LOCA thermal transient as well as the calculated
thermal time history for the assumed values of the coefficients. The
indicated heat transfer coefficients are very similar to the values
prescribed by the lAC.
A9-13
100,000
Figure A9.4
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In reviewing the time phasing of the LOCA process from
figure A9.4, the very high initial HTCs associated with nucleate boiling
may be seen as a continuation of essentially normal heat transfer imme-
diately following LOCA initiation. When DNB occurs, the HTC is conserva-
tively assumed to go to zero, even though some transitional period with
intermediate HTC prior to dry-out might be physically expected. The
time for initial DNB is very critical. If the energy stored within the
fuel followed predictions, but no blowdown heat transfer were to occur,
rod temperatures would reach about 2000°F in 4 or 5 seconds as a result
of internal temperature redistribution. After this time period, in the
continued absence of blowdown heat transfer, a relatively slow tempera-
ture increase would occur, with an adiabatic heatup rate of about 20°F/
sec to be expected in the high-power density regions of the reactor core
at about 30 seconds after rupture (10, p. 310). In an alternative way
of looking at the consequences of DNB, if the DNB transition can be
avoided the high heat rates associated with nucleate boiling cause a
reduction in the stored energy of the fuel (and hence of the potential
for heating the cladding) corresponding to an average temperature de-
cline of about 150°F/sec. Each additional second of nucleate boiling
during depressurization can permit a delay of about 10 sec in core cool-
ant (ECC) injection (1i).
Comparing the HTCs and thermal response of the a) and b) por-
tions of figure A9.4 respectively, it can be seen that as long as
nucleate boiling is maintained during the blowdown there is essentially
no change in temperature from that of normal operating conditions.
DNB in a BWR is probably delayed several seconds beyond that which
might normally occur in a PWR, until the rapidly falling coolant level
in the downcomers uncovers the tops of the jet pumps. However, as soon
as the transition through CHF occurs, the rod temperatures rise very
rapidly as the stored energy in fuel causes the rod temperature re-
distribution to occur in the assumed absence (HTC = 0) of any convective
heat transfer contribution.
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When the fluid in the core falls to the level where the break
in the recirculation drive pump line is finally exposed (conditions for
the DBA), the reactor vessel depressurization takes place much more rapidly.
The rapidly falling pressures cause the remaining water in the plenum
chamber beneath the core to experience flash boiling. The strong flashing
action forces the remaining water through the core at a rate initially
equivalent to about 60 percent of normal core flow. The flash boiling
induced flow continues, at a gradually decreasing rate, until the fluid
in the lower plenum is essentially all expended. During this period of
lower plenum flashing, calculations show the CHF is exceeded and theo-
retically the rods would be rewetted and nucleate boiling reestablished
in the core. Uncertainty over the validity of this recurrence causes a
degraded heat transfer coefficient, more representative of lower quality,
film boiling HTCs (100-1000 B/hr-ft2-OF), to be used for estimating thermal
response during the lower plenum flashing period.
Figure A9.4(b) depicts the thermal response for two possible
cases, one without benefit from lower plenum flashing and the other
assuming essentially standard film boiling HTC conditions during the
period, as indicated in figure A9.4(a). The effect of the assumed film
boiling conditions on the thermal response is very profound. As flash-
ing occurs, a sharp temperature turnaround is induced for the brief
flashing period (reducing the rod temperatures by 300-400°F to near
normal operating conditions). As the core flow decreases with approach-
ing lower plenum exhaustion, the heat flux again exceeds CHF levels and
complete. loss of benefit from any form of boiling is assumed again (i.e.,
HTC = 0). This condition remains until core spray action is achieved
(in figure A9.4, in 40 sec). Note that in the case assuming lower plenum
flashing, a large thermal readjustment occurs again when CHF is exceeded
and the HTC goes to zero. However, sufficient heat has been transferred
in the brief period of lower plenum flashing (20 seconds) to reduce the
maximum rod temperatures, as the rod thermal gra~ients begin to stabilize,
to values approximately 400°F below the case whe~e no benefit was attained
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from flashing. Thus figure A9.4 demonstrated the very significant in-
fluence of boiling heat transfer coefficients on the thermal response
of the fuel rods. The concept of CHF values and the times at which
heat flux transitions through CHF occur have important effects upon the
thermal response of the reactor.
The importance of the heat transfer occurring after CHF or
departure from nucleate boiling (DNB) has been recognized by all those
who have investigated the LOCA. In its discussion of the AC, the Com-
mission stated:
The rate at which heat is transferred from the clad
to the water after departure from nucleate boiling (DNB)
is vital to estimation of the course of a hypothetical
loss-of-coo1ant accident for a PWR. DNB is calculated to
occur within about a tenth of a second after a postulated
instantaneous double-ended break of a large pipe, or a
large split. The heat transfer after this time would
primarily determine the temperature history of the clad
during b1owdown and the possibility that clad damage
would occur during this phase. It would also determine
the effectiveness of removal of heat from the oxide fuel
itself and thus the stored energy in the fuel at the time
refill of the plenum by ECCS fluid starts (60, p. 1117)
(emphasis added).
Though a significant body of experimental work has been done
on CHF investigations, the most reliable material is based upon steady-
state fluid conditions. Consequently, the AEC's new AC has authorized
"conservative" application of steady-state data to transient LOCA condi-
tions (.Q.Q., p. 1118).
The use of steady state correlations for defining stable film
boiling after CHF has been questioned. However, in its discussion of
the AC, the Commission has strongly supported the conservatism of use
of steady-state correlations. They stated:
Transient Heat Transfer: Some criticism was expressed
as to the use of steady state correlations during the fast
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transients analyzed for a large LOCA. These views were
stated by Lawson (Transcript, pp. 5766-7), Ybarrondo
(Transcript, pp. 6069, 10282, 10890, 10906-7), and
Brockett (pp. 7480, 7588). The tenor of the criticism
was that evidence was not conclusive that steady state
correlations overpredicted the transient coefficients
or predicted them accurately.
Considerable evidence was provided nonetheless to
the effect that during depressurization the use of steady
state correlations for stable film boiling was a conserva-
tive course •••.• In our view the evidence is near over-
whelming that the use of steady state correlations for
stable film boiling after CHF will provide a conservative
estimate of heat transfer during blowdown (60, p. 1118)
(emphasis added). --
In spite of the COlmnission's assertions of "overwhelming"
evidence of conservatism, not all of those who criticized the use of
these coefficients are entirely convinced. In hearings before the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (22-24 January 1974), Ybarrondo,
manager of the LOFT tests for ANC, stated:
In Section III C, 5 of the Opinion of the Commission,
transient heat transfer is discussed. An experimental pro-
gram directed at providing data relevant to quantifying
the margins resulting from using steady state correla-
tionsduring post-critical-heat-flux heat transfer would
be very valuable. This is especially true in view of
the commission's statement on page 99, "The rate at which
heat is transferred from the clad to the water after de-
parture from nucleate boiling (DNB) is vital to estima-
tion of the course of a hypothetical loss-of-coolant
accident for a PWR," in which I concur (59, p. 5501)
(emphasis added) • --
However, even under steady state conditions, data for full length
(12 ft.) large arrays (7 x 7 or greater) of PWR rod diameters "are
not now available for multirod bundles of this size and geometry ••• " (34).
Although the GE transient CHF correlation (22, p. C-9) was
approved for LOCA analyses, the AEC qualified their acceptance for the
method by requiring demonstrated conservatism through submission by the
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vendor of a "statistical uncertainty analysis" of the data and its
application in the transient correlation. In the words of the AEC staff:
These procedures can be characterized as requ1r1ng
conservatism in the treatment of transient CHF data. The
reason for requiring this conservatism is related to the
sources of uncertainty in the realistic prediction of
transient CHF (~, p. 133).
Freely translated, this statement seems to imply that the
existing transient CHF data sources are of uncertain validity. The CNI
have observed that experiments to
precisely predict heat transfer coefficients for
parallel pin arrays that extend over the range of fuel-
pin geometries and coolant conditions that exist during
blowdowns •••• [have not] been completed by the AEC and
none yet appears to be forthcoming. One major research
program on blowdown heat transfer that the Commission
is presently funding is a joint program with General
Electric Company. However a review of that program by
ANC stated that it does not relate to the problems that
need to be solved and that the program is not, in ANC's
0p1n10n, relevant to the needs of the AEC and the nuclear
industry (HAl -16-71, Jan. 26, 1971) (i, p. 4.15).
The problems with the transient CHF correlations are felt to
exist primarily because current models for their application are highly
empirical. Serious attempts to correlate the experimental data with
theoretical or analytical methods have apparently not been made. Conse-
quently, substantial uncertainties exist with regard to application and
scalability of the experimental results to the conditions of the fluid
in a reactor core during a LOCA. The current ORNL combined experimental
and analytical program on large bundles of full scale fuel rods (described
in ~) may help to resolve the heavy dependence upon pure empiricism.
One of the stated objectives of the program is
to obtain data on the thermal response of the heate~
surfaces in the above multirod bundle during the first
few seconds of a blowdown transient comparable with the
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LOCA transient associated with a double-ended inlet-pipe
break in a PWR. These experiments will establish the time
to reach CHF, the magnitude of CHF, and heat transfer rates
in the immediate post-CHF period; the results will quantify
both the sequence and magnitude of thermal-hydraulic events
during a LOCA-type depressurization and, through comparison,
the conservatism associated with existing calculational
models for estimating CHF and post-CHF heat transfer (34).
Such data, when combined and correlated with other current experimental
and analytical programs and the results of applications of the revised
AEC criteria requirements may help to resolve some of the remaining
uncertainty in CHF related reactor thermal response.
A9.4 Reflood Heat Transfer Parameter Evaluation
The reflood heat transfer mechanisms, for both PWRs and BWRs,
appear to be the dominating factors with respect to the reliability of
the ECCS. If sufficient cooling water can be supplied to the core,
FLECHT tests have demonstrated core coolability for initial reflood
temperatures ranging to near the AC limits of 2200°F. The adequacy of
reflooding rates depends critically upon questions of flow resistance
in the reactor primary loops for PWRs. Local heat transfer during re-
flood is also strbngly influenced by local and general blockage of the
core induced by fuel rod swelling and rupture. In the PWR, steam gener-
ator tube failure (ruled outside the scope of the ECCS hearings) may
also strongly increase primary loop resistances with consequent substan-
tial reductions in reflood rates. This section will review the signifi-
cance of these parameters.
A9.4.1 Empirical estimates of reflood heat transfer (FLECHT)
Figures A9.5 and A9.6, reproduced from the PWR-FLECHT Final
Report (50), summarize FLECHT results in terms of temperature rise,
turnaround time, and quench time as functions of flooding rate and peak
rod decay power respectively. The strong dependency of the results on
flooding rate is shown clearly in figure A9.5, At flooding rates greater
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Figure A9.5
Summary of PWR-FLECHT Results as a Function of Flooding Rate
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Figure A9.6
Summary of PWR-FLECHT Results as a Function of Rod Decay Power
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than 4 in/sec, temperature rise, turnaround time, and quench time were
all minimal. At flooding rates less than 4 in/sec, a clear transition
in all parameters can be observed. At rates on the order of 2 in/sec
or less, temperature rise and times to turnaround and quench increase
strongly with decreasing flood rate. The results imply that for flood
rates of 2 in/sec or less controllability problems are greatly exacer-
bated. The results clearly indicate a great advantage in attaining
flooding rates in excess of 4 in/sec.
At high flooding rates (on the order of 6 in/sec), temperature
rise, turnaround time, and quench time as shown in figure A9.6 are weak
functions of initial rod decay power. However, as flooding rates decrease,
the influence of initial rod power becomes increasingly important. Again
the message of the figure is clear; if rod decay power is uncertain,
flooding rates of the order of 6 in/sec are desirable to minimize the
effects of uncertainties in this parameter. Extrapolation of the results
to low flooding rates (2 in/sec or lower) implies that uncertainties in
rod decay power may be dramatically amplified and a 10-15 percent un-
certainty in initial rod power could result in a peak temperature in-
crease of approximately 100°F, assuming no synergistic effects from
other variables produced even higher temperatures.
The time histories of convective heat transfer coefficients
(HTC) derived from the tests are shown in figure A9.7 for a variety of
parameters, including initial temperature, flooding rate, and initial
rod decay power. Comparison of figures A9.5 and A9.6 with figure A9.7
indicates that temperature turnaround was achieved when rod HTCs of
15-20 B/hr-ft2-OF were obtained. Similarly the rods were quenched at
HTCs of about 40-50 B/hr-ft2-oF. The dramatic increases in heat trans-
fer coefficients, towards nucleate boiling values, are apparent at the
transition to rod quenching for each of the tests. When this transition
occurred, the temperature transient for the rods was essentially termi-
nated, almost at once.
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Figure A9.7
Summary of PWR-FLECHT Heat Transfer Coefficient Results
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Analysis of the results shown in figure A9.? indicates that
after the fluid in the reactor plenum reaches the bottom of the fuel
rods, a typical HTC-time history shows a rapid increase to a relatively
stable (but gradually increasing) value which is maintained until the
transition to quenching occurs. This relatively stable plateau HTC,
hereafter referred to as the nominal initial reflood HTC, can be seen
to increase strongly with increasing flood rate. At a flood rate of
1 in/sec, the nominal HTC is about 10 B/hr-ft2-OF, while at 4 in/sec
it increased to approximately 30 B/hr-ft2-OF, and at 6 in/sec reaches
a nominal value of 40 B/hr-ft2-OF in its initial rapid rise. At a
nominal value of 40 B/hr-ft2-OF, temperature turnaround occurs almost
at once, and rod quenching takes place in approximately one minute.
Conversely, as implied by figure A9.?, at a flooding rate of 0.6 in/sec
temperature turnaround could not be achieved at the nominal HTC of
3-4 B/hr-ft2-OF indicated, even though the initial rod temperature was
a relatively low l600°F. These low flooding rate results demonstrate
the difficulty of thermal excursion control at rates less than 1 in/sec.
It should be observed that HTCs are not identical at all
points on a given rod. As indicated in figure A9.?, results have been
shown for the rod midplane (6 ft) values. At lower rod elevations, HTCs
are greater than those shown, while at higher levels they tend to de-
crease. However, thermal hot spots and peak rod powers generally occur
at the midplane location and the results shown are representative of
typical values for the rods.
The principal observation to be made from the FLECHT results
is that an important transition occurs in reflood thermal transient
control at flood rates in excess of approximately 4 in/sec. At flood
rates above this value, temperature rise, turnaround time, and quench
time are minimized. Conversely, at flood rates on the order of 1 in/sec,
thermal transient controllability problems are substantially magnified.
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A9.4.2 Reflooding rate predictions
The AEC estimate of nominal reflood rates for a typical four
loop PWR is shown in figure A9.8, reproduced from the AEC Supplemental
Testimony (!t., p. 14-12). The results shown indicate an initial flood
rate of about 3 in/sec falling in approximately 5 sec to a low of about
1/2 in/sec resulting from line plugging. The mechanism of line plugging
is associated with ECC fluid filling inlet pipes which is assumed to
block the passage of steam in the unbroken steam generator loops during
ECCS accumulator injection into the unbroken cold leg pipes. The mini-
mum reflood rate lasts until about 16 sec after the bottom of the core
is first recovered by the entering ECC fluid (defined to be the begin-
ning of core reflooding). After that 16 sec period of core reflooding,
the ECCS accumulator injection is essentially completed. This minimal
flood rate is followed by an increase to a pseudo steady state, slowly
decaying flooding rate which is commonly called the nominal flooding
rate for the reactor. For the case shown in figure A9.8, the nominal
flood rate varies from about 1.4 in/sec at 20 sec to approximately 1.1
in/sec at 220 sec.
The results shown in figure A9.8 were obtained by the AEC
using a calculational method (the Flood 1 computer code) developed by
ANC, with which "the Regulatory Staff intends to evaluate plants" in
the future (!t., p. 14-10). The analysis was based upon " .•. a set of
realistically calculated resistance(s), for system components; using
assumptions set forth in the Interim Policy Statement (lAC)" (!t., p. 14-6).
Estimates of flooding rates for several other types of PWR nuclear
steam systems were also made, based upon similar assumptions. Predicted
values range from less than 1 in/sec (0.9 in/sec) for a Westinghouse
four loop system with an ice condenser type containment (!t., p. 14-7) to
values as high as 2 in/sec for B & Wvent-valve plants (i, p. 14-9).
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Figure A9.8
ABC Estimates of Nominal Reflood Rates for Typical Four Loop PWR
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Thus the range of "realistically" predicted reflooding rates,
however conservative the lAC specifications may be felt to be, is narrow,
running from less 'than 1 in/sec to only 2 in/sec with nominal rates
typically about 1.3 in/sec for PWRs. Clearly these reflood rates are
on the low side of desirable flooding rates, where uncertainties in
flooding rates magnify potential problems with thermal excursions, as
discussed in the previous section.
BWR reflood rates are apparently substantially higher than
PWR rates, typically as high as 3.7 inches per second (60, p. 1125).
Reflood HTCs of 25 B/hr-ft2-OF have been specified by the Commission
(60, p. 1126). When compared with equivalent HTCs for PWRs, the BWR-
HTCs correspond to flood rates of about 2-3 in/sec (e.g., figure A9.7),
and are probably somewhat conservative for the indicated flood rates.
Though BWR reflood rates appear somewhat higher than typical PWR rates,
they are still slightly below the apparent critical transition points
of desirable reflood heat transfer conditions.
The relatively low PWR reflood rates are generally attributed
to problems with steam binding. In the discussion of the AC, the Com-
mission suggests:
The reflooding rate for pressurized water reactors
would be controlled to a large extent by steam binding,
the phenomenon by which the resistance to flow through
the reactor system (steam generators, pumps, etc.) of
the effluent from the reactor core limits the rate of
reflood and, indirectly, the rate of heat removal from
the fuel rods. The pumps in their locked rotor condition
would typically provide more than half of this resistance
to flow so that the stipulation of their being locked is
a serious limitation. If the pump rotors were not locked,
their resistance to flow would be reduced by 60% (Exhibit
1113, p. 14-10). In their Concluding Statement, Combus-
tion Engineering states that if the pumps were free run-
ning during reflood the calculated maximum temperature
of the zircaloy cladding would be reduced by 75°F (CE
Concluding Statement, p. 3-61).
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The stipulation of locked. pumps during reflood is
unchanged from the Interim Policy Statement, and no new
experimental information was provided during the hearing
justifying a change in this part of the rule (60, p. 1122)
(emphasis added).
The steam binding problem is exacerbated by the EGGS accumu-
lator injection design. Only the accumulated head associated with the
differential height of the fluid in the downcomer relative to the height
in the core is available to drive the EGG fluid. It is opposed by the
flow resistance developed in the unbroken legs of the ruptured nuclear
steam supply systems. Reduced flood rates due to normal LOGA flow
resistance for the system are additionally perturbed by such problems
as fluid oscillations in the downcomer, density decreased in EGG fluid
within the downcomer, and line plugging during accumulator injection.
As a consequence, obtaining higher flooding rates with current PWR EGGS
designs is probably not possible. System redesign might be needed to
achieve flooding rates as high as the 4-6 in/sec which would appear to
be desirable.
For BWRs there do not appear to be any inherent reactor
design problems which would preclude obtaining higher flooding rates,
if they were desir~d. Direct injection of the BWR-EGG reflooding fluid
through the pressure vessel head above the core apparently minimizes
flow resistance constraints to increasing reflood rates. Simplistically
speaking, increased reflood rates would appear attainable through simply
increasing the pump capacity for the BWR core flooding injection system.
Estimates of reflood rates are clouded by two major problems:
inadequacies of current flood rate computational methods and lack of
experimental evidence to support the predicted results. In the words
of the AEG:
All three PWR vendor codes, as well as the FLOOD 1
code (the current AEG recommended model), are incomplete
in their modeling to differing degrees, and all codes lack
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experimental verification•••• In view of the present
status of reflood codes and experimental programs, the
need to develop or improve reflood computer codes is
indicated and the staff considers this development can
be accomplished relatively soon (4, p. 14-17).
The Commission, in their discussion of the AC, also acknow-
ledged the need for reflood model improvement. They stated:
The Regulatory Staff in their Concluding Statement
proposed the development of more sophisticated refill-
reflood computer programs, including those capable of
predicting the expected oscillatory flow of wake into
the reactor core ••.•• (The AEC anticipates that the "ex-
pected" oscillatory flow during reflood will improve re-
flood HTC.) ...• The Commission believes with the Staff
that improved and more realistic models are desirable,
but realizes that the full benefit of sophisticated
models that predict oscillatory flow cannot be obtained
until there are more suitable experiments with which they
can be compared (60, p. 1122, 1123) (emphasis added).
Though the AEC staff and the Commission apparently feel such improve-
ments would permit reduction in current levels of conservatism in the
codes, with possible consequent increases in predicted reflood rates,
the lack of experimental evidence to support such assumptions will make
future implementation of reductions in conservatism difficult to support
until the needed evidence is available.
A9.4.3 Flow blockage and core flow distribution
Swelling and rupture of fuel rods during the LOCA can perturb
flow distribution of the ECC fluid away from local hot spots with conse-
quent decreases in cooling and hence increases in local rod temperatures.
The potential for core blockage has been a source of serious concern to
the CNI. In their concluding statement they said,
Clad ductility for some pressure-temperature regimes
is clearly sufficient to allow complete or nearly complete
coolant channel closure •.•• The results [of CNI calculations]
establish that in the present state of knowledge flow block-
age effects may well hopelessly comprom~se ECCS effectiveness
(2, p. 5.3).
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The AEC has acknowledged that their consultants have indicated that
extensive core blockage could be expected. During the hearings,
Rittenhouse testified "that (local) blockages of 90% embedded in (general
core blockages of) 80%, J90% in 70%, 90% in 50% and 80% in 50% could
be inferred by examination of the ORNL multi-rod burst tests" (i, p. 20-8).
Estimates of expected core blockage were given by the Commis-
sion in their discussion of the AC. They recognized that:
In the postulated LOCA the reactor system pressure
would drop rapidly and would soon fall below the pressure of
the helium and fission gases within the fuel rod. The result-
ing differential pressure would exert an expansive force on
the cladding. At the same time, as the cooling effective-
ness dropped, the temperature of the cladding would increase
rapidly, decreasing the yield strength of the cladding. At
some time during the LOCA the yield strength of the zircaloy
might become less than the tensile stresses exerted by the
differential pressure, and the cladding would then swell
and perhaps burst.
For example, Babcock and Wilcox, using the evaluation
model of the Interim Policy Statement, estimated that, for
pressurized fuel, rupture of the cladding would be predicted
over 70% of the core 1.3 seconds after the maximum size
cold leg break. (Exhibit 1059, p. 6-4.) This corresponds
to the time when the differential pressure would be about
200 psi and the cladding temperature about l800°F. Westing-
house in a similar calculation, conservatively estimated
that 25% of the fuel rods would burst sometime during blow-
down, and that, by the end of the reflood period, 70% of
the rods would burst. (Exhibit 1078, pp. D-48 and n-49.)
Combustion Engineering calculated the degree of flow block-
age resulting from rod swelling for each fuel assembly in
the core for both unpressurized and pressurized fuel. In
bath cases, as judged from the blockage, they were calculated
to be perforated or swollen rods in nearly every fuel assem-
bly. The major difference between the pressurized and un-
pressurized fuel was that the unpressurized fuel was estimated
to undergo less swelling and perforation during blowdown,
as of course might be expected. (Exhibit 1144, sec. 5,
using material from Exhibit 1066, sec. 2.)
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For the Boiling Water Reactor the situation seems to
be somewhat different. The blowdown would provide a longer
period of assured effective cooling of the fuel elements,
and the 'initial calculated rise in temperature of the cladding
in not so great. Furthermore, the pressure within the fuel
rods is said to be low, so that ballooning of the cladding
would not be expected to occur during the blowdown (Exhibit
1001), p. 2-24). General Electric offered one calculation
for a 1967 product line BWR for which the peak cladding tem-
perature was 2l05°F (Exhibit 1148, sec. P). Using some
of the assumptions made by CNI (Exhibit 1041, sec. 7.2),
but using a constant internal fuel rod pressure, they calcu-
lated that 13% of the rods in the hottest bundle would per-
forate. CNI, using the probably erroneous assumption that
there was no communication between the hot spot and the
fission gas plenum at the top of the fuel rod, estimated
that 22% of all the fuel rods in the whole reactor would
rupture. They said that this compares with 21% estimated
by General Electric for the Pilgrim reactor (Exhibit 1041,
p. 7.9). In Exhibit 1032, Page 11.8.2-1, reference is made
to a calculation for a Boiling Water Reactor in which 60%
of the fuel pins were expected to rupture by the time the
ECCS core sprays came on, with 75% of the pins expected to
rupture ultimately•••.•
From the above it is obvious that, when the course of
the LOCA is calculated according to the conservative pres-
criptionsof an approved evaluation model, swelling and
bursting of the cladding will be estimat~d to occur in abun-
dance (60, pp. 1104, 1105) (emphasis added).
The location of swelling on the rods and relative inter-rod
relationship of swollen segments is as important to blockage as the
overall extent of swollen and ruptured rods. This aspect of the core
blockage question has been a subject of substantial controversy. It
apparently will be a continuing center of uncertainty and debate, as
we will discuss below. In their AC discussion the Commission noted:
The data from the rod burst tests show a great deal
of scatter, particularly in the degree of swelling experi-
enced. (See, for example, fig 2.5 of Exhibit 1066.) The
greatest controversy, however, has been with respect to
interpretations and predictions of the resulting blockage
to coolant flow.•••• It is expected that variations in
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cladding thickness, fuel pellet properties, gap thickness
and eccentricity, and the texture of the zircaloy because
of its anisotropic character would go into the determination
of just where along the length of a fuel rod the perforation
would occur (Transcript 11, 515-18) •
. The swollen and perforated region is expected to be
about 1-1/2 to 3 inches long, and to occur at random as
determined by the above variables over a length of relatively
uniform temperature of from 7 inches to 27 inches. (Trans.
12, 701; Exhibit 1066, fig. 2.7; Exhibit 1144, p. 5.2).
Thus it is not expected that a large number of adjacent rods
would have their maximum swelling in the same plane. The
maximum blockage observed to date in any multirod experiment
containing 16 channels or more has been approximately 70%
on any horizontal plane (Trans. pp. 9166-7).
All in all, the record still supports the Regulatory
Staff position in Exhibit 1001, pp. 2-12, namely, that the
core-wide flow area reduction in the plane of greatest
blockage would not exceed 60% and that local flow channel
reductions, over perhaps a 4 x 4 array of fuel rods, would
not exceed 90%. As shown by calculation of blowdown and
ECCS heat transfer considered elsewhere, these reductions
of flow area, while necessary to be considered, would not
be disastrous. In other words, the Commission concludes
that estimated fuel rod swelling and rupture would not
render the geometry of the core to be uncoo1able (60, pp.
1105, 1106) (emphasis added).
That the question of the extent of blockage may not have been
resolved with adequate conservatism is demonstrated by the testimony of
William B. Cottrell, Director of the Nuclear Safety Information Center,
Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Two statements in the Commission's discussion of the
criteria••.•• , if not clarified, could result in a lack
of conservatisms in applying the criteria •..
The question of core flow blockage as results from fuel
pin swelling is addressed only indirectly in new criterion
No. 4 but is adequately covered later in the criteria in
the discussion of evaluation models (Section IB). There
it is stated that clad swelling and rupture must be considered,
and "shall be based upon applicable data in such a way
that. •• (the effects) are not underestimated."
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The Commission
based on applicable
rupture are not
It should be realized that only little applicable
data exists in this area and that which is available is
open to question. In this regard there are two statements
in Section IIIB of the Opinion of the Commission which are
of concern: specifically, (1) it is assumed that clad
swelling and perforations occur at random over a length of
from 7to 27 inches. I should point out the shorter the
length, the more compact the blockage and, therefore, the
greater difficulty in cooling the reactor and secondly,
undue significance is given to the maximum observed block-
age of 70 percent to support the Regulatory Staff position
that local flow reductions would not exceed 90 percent.
The available information could equally well, if not
better, justify a random failure distribution over less
than seven inches in length and local flow blockages in
excess of 90 percent. These are both important matters,
which should be resolved by additional experiments.
Furthermore, until such time as definitive informa-
tion on rod swelling behavior is available, I would recom-
mend that highly conservative blockage values be used in
the calculation models (~, pp. 323-325).
Cottrell's position on the need for utilization of more
conservative blockage values was further amplified by the testimony of
his associate at ORNL, Phillip Rittenhouse. Rittenhouse cautioned with
regard to the AC requirement for predicting clad swelling and rupture:
I have one caution in this regard.
also states these calculations should be
data in such a way that the swelling and
underestimated.
I have some concern that we presently have inadequate
data to do this. I would caution that in the use of that
applicable data that these evaluation models be defined as
that presently available and giving the most conservative
result.
The Commission also discusses blockages resulting from
swelling and rupture, prescribes how the effects of the
blockage should be considered during b1owdown and on heat
transfer during re-fi11 and re-f1ood period.
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I agree with the AEC's stated position that core-
wide flow area reduction will not exceed 60 percent.
However, I do not believe that the 90 percent limit
on local flow channel reduction, four by four array
of rods defined by the Commission has been satisfacto-
rily demonstrated.
I suggest that this is a subject that needs addi-
tional study to determine the magnitude of flow block-
age and for the present we assume no less than 95 per-
cent local flow blockage (59, pp. 340, 342) (emphasis
added).
The effects of such extensive channel blockage and the result-
ant flow redistribution have been variously estimated for PWRs. With
evaluation models approved under the lAC, vendors were allowed to esti-
mate hot channel flow as 80 percent of the "smoothed" calculated aver-
age flow for the core. Under the PR, it was proposed that flow diversion
for a "hot region" no larger than the "size of one fuel assembly" be
calculated, allowing for blockage induced crossflow resulting from clad
swelling or rupture. Somewhat similarly to the lAC prescription, the PR
recommended that the hot region flow, during blowdown, be "multiplied"
by a flow reduction factor of 0.8 "to allow for the effects of clad
swelling or rupture" (&., p. 51).
The 80 percent of average core flow factor applied in the lAC
to estimate hot channel flow was acknowledged by the AEC to be "an
arbitrary, interim factor intended to compensate for uncertainties in
core flow distribution" (i, p. 7-7). More sophisticated calculations of
hot channel flow were said to indicate flow reductions ranging from a
factor of 0.9 times average flow for single phase steam flow to complete
stagnation for two phase (steam-liquid) flow under certain conditions
(i, p. 7-6). Parametric studies of the effect of flow diversion on the
hot channel temperature excursion have indicated a temperature increase
of approximately 470°F as flow decreased from 100 percent to 40 percent
average (i, p. 7-11). Though the sensitivity of the thermal excursion
due to blockage was minimized by the regulatory staff (the change was
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only "about 8°F per one percent change in core flow" (!!:), the large
uncertainty in predicted factors for flow diversion (including total
flow stagnation) must make this parameter non-negligible in estimating
the effects of core blockage on blowdown heat transfer.
An extensive discussion of blowdown effect induced by core
blockage was included in the discussion of the AC. The Commission
stated:
The analytical models used in reviewing the course
of a hypothetical loss of coolant accident under the
Interim Policy Statement have all been one-dimensional,
with no direct treatment of flow redistribution in the
core. The detailed flow in the reactor core following
initiation of the hypothetical loss-of-coolant would be
complex, and would be different depending on the kind of
reactor and fuel and the specific time during the LOCA.
The nature and degree of flow redistribution were discussed
at length during the hearing.
Flow redistribution between channels is a phenomenon
primarily affecting Pressurized Water Reactors, because they
have no channel walls to restrict cross-flow. The principal
forces affecting cross-flow are friction, acceleration,
drag in channels, drag through spacer grids and fittings,
and buoyancy (Morgan, Transcript pp. 12678-9). The presence
of a two-phase fluid affects buoyancy and frictional drag
(through the two-phase multipliers). In upflow the buoy-
ancy effects tend to produce higher hot channel flow than
average channel flow (though frictional effects act in the
opposite direction). In downflow the buoyance and the
friction act together to reduce hot channel flow relative
to average channel flow (Morgan, Transcript 12679).
The Interim Acceptance Criteria models have accounted
for these effects by a requirement that the average channel
flow during blowdown of a PWR be multiplied by a factor of
0.8 to obtain the flow in the hot channel calculation.
Westinghouse Testimony stated that calculations made using
the THINC code are the basis for this choice of factor.
The calculation assumed parallel channels, and zero cross-
flow resistance between channels, so that the pressure was
constant in every horizontal plane. These calculations
did not unambiguously lead to flow reductions bounded by
the factor 0.8.
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Although the vendors' discussions of the effect of flow
redistribution generally tended to support choice of the
factor 0.8, there was little sympathy elsewhere for it.
Its conservatism was questioned by Rosen (Testimony), Lawson
(Transcript 5755), and Ybarrondo (Transcript 6076, 6270,
10255), and its continued use has not been proposed by the
Staff.
It appears that consideration of flow redistribution
prior to the hearing comprised only circumstances in which
the clad is not deformed. Questioning during the hearing
also dealt with effects of clad swelling, fuel deformation,
and partial blockage on flow redistribution. It was less
apparent that the factor 0.8 would be adequate if partial
channel blockage occurred than if channels were undeformed.
The Staff's Supplementary Testimony recognized this
point, and proposed that models be developed and used that
explicitly calculate the effect of flow redistribution during
both the upflow and downflow phases of blowdown. The view
included use of models that calculate the flow redistribution
resulting from flow blockage if that should be calculated
to take place.
We believe this is the correct course to follow. We
believe the wording in the Staff's proposed rule adequately
expressed the position supported by the record, with one
exception. There is no basis in the record for continued
use of the flow reduction factor of 0.8 after flow redistri-
bution effects have been calculated for the hot channel.
We have not included this requirement in the Rule (60, p.
1120) .
With respect to reflooding, core blockage is not expected to
produce a significant reduction in reflood rates. A uniform core block-
age of 75 percent was calculated to produce a pressure drop increment
of "no greater than 0.3 psi-" The resulting change in the reflood rate
was calculated to be "less than 3 percent" (~, p. 20-5).
However, the relatively small overall effect on reflood rates
does not necessarily indicate that local effects due to flow diversion
from hot spots may not be significant. W. R. Gambrill of ORNL was
reported to have made calculations which "indicated that clad tempera-
ture increases between 500°F and 2000°F" could occur as a consequence
of blockage (!, p. 20-8).
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Although FLECRT experimental results must be recognized as
poorly simulating the open lattice core of the PWR, it should be noted
thay they have been frequently cited as indicating that core blockage
may actually improve local RTC with consequent reductions on local tem-
peratures. Tests of 10 x 10 rod arrays with up to 100 percent central
blockage in a field of 75 percent blockage (using flat plates to achieve
midplane orifice channel blockage) showed reductions in midplane tem-
peratures of about 200-250°F as a result of blockage. (The unblocked
temperature increase during reflood was 465°F; restricted flow tempera-
ture increases, 193-245°F.)
Westinghouse has observed the evident limitations on FLECRT
simulation of flow diversion. They have stated:
It should be noted that no attempt was made to simulate
core wide radial flow effects in the PWR FLECRT tests.
Typical reactor loss-of-coolant accident calculations indi-
cate that the coolant flow at the midplane of the "hot" assem-
blywith 50% flow blockage would be approximately 75% of
the core average. Therefore it is important to recognize
the need to take the radial flow distribution into account
in using FLECRT data for reactor loss-of-coolant accident
analyses (50, p. 4-5).
As a consequence of the lack of apparent correlation between
experiments and analyses, the effect of potential PWR core blockage on
reflood heat transfer is uncertain. As the AEC has observed:
Vendor estimates of the effects of flow blockage on
peak cladding temperature range from 76° (CE) to 90°F
(Westinghouse) to 159°F (B&W). Suggestions for an allow-
ance to be applied to account for blockage range from 100°F
(Gambrill, ORNL) to "more appropriate power/flow ratios"
(BNWL1to general agreement with the Regulatory Staff
discussion of this section (ANC) to a 500°F penalty (Colmar)
(i, p. 20-18).
The regulatory staff acknowledges that their overall review "suggests
that there could be a temperature increase due to blockage as a result
of degraded heat transfer (extended period of low steam flow) at early
* Battelle Northwest Laboratories
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times ••• " Moreover, with low flow, calculations "indicate a flow re-
duction could occur for specific blockage configurations" (!, p. 20-18).
Flow blockage effects in a BWR are somewhat less of a problem
than in a PWR. BWR fuel rod internal gas pressure differences during a
LOCA are expected to be less than 55 psi when compared with pressures
in the reactor core. Test data indicate that rupture of a rod at these
pressure differences requires temperatures above 2200°F (!, p. 20-19).
Although, as previously discussed, a large amount of individual rod
swelling may take place, swelling of the outer rods next to the cooler
channel walls is unlikely and no rod swelling is expected during blow-
down. Though ballooning of interior rods in the 7 x 7 or 8 x 8 indivi-
dual rod bundles may take place, they are expected to rupture towards
the relatively hot center of the bundle. At least 90 percent overall
assembly blockage is required before bottom flooding is impaired, the
AEC has reported (!, p. 20-21). Since the area between the outer rods
and bounding metal channel for each bundle is nearly 30 percent of total
fuel bundle cross-sectional flow area, ballooning of the inner rods is
not expected to affect core flooding capability. Moreover, each indivi-
dual 7 x 7 or 8 x 8 BWR fuel bundle is a self-contained unit with its
own separate zircaloy channel bounding the bundle. Consequently, radial
cross-flow out of the bundle (away from the hot spot) is restricted.
The AEC has estimated that BWR flow blockage will induce peak temperature
increases of less than 60°F. However, extreme estimates, with complete
restriction of radiation view factors to other than adjacent rods and a
zero convective HTC for interior rods, have indicated peak clad tempera-
tures might increase 520°F before termination of the temperature tran-
sient (!, p. 20-22). In spite of this extreme example, flow blockage does
not appear to be as serious a problem for the BWR as it does for PWR.
A9.4.4 Steam generator tube failure effects
One of the primary concerns of the CNI with respect to treat-
ment of loop resistances in fluid flow through the PWR reactor heat
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transfer loops is related to the problem of PWR steam generator tube
failures. In the event of failure of a tube in the steam generator during
the LOCA, the high'pressure-high temperature fluid in the secondary steam
system providing steam to the power plants' turbine-generator could poten-
tially feed back large quantities of steam into the primary loop of the
reactor steam system. The concern of CNI is that the steam added to the
primary system from the large secondary loop supply could effectively
choke the flow of the escaping gases in the system during reflood, re-
ducing reflood rates below their already precariously, hazardously low
values.
The GNI concern is perhaps best summarized by these statements:
Steam generator tube failures in a PWR give every
appearance of being the Achilles heel of PWR ECCS. Dr.
Morris Rosen and Mr. Robert Colmar in their June 1, 1971
memo [to the EGGS Task Force] wrote:
"Although arguments are being made that we can conser-
vatively predict performance during the reflooding period,
recent experience indicates that problems in this area are
first coming to light, e.g., plugging of lines and locations
of safety injection systems. Notwithstanding all the assur-
ances that one can obtain upper bounds on two-phase and
superheated steam pressure drops, very little is known
about these types of flow at high velocity through turning
pipes, steam generators and pumps.
Of paramount concern in this area, however, is the
possible effect of steam generator tube failures on the
EGCS. We have been told that as few as [Censored] steam
generator tube failures could prevent reflooding. It seems
clear that the area of steam generator integrity during
blowdown requires an immediate and thorough evaluation."
The Regulatory Staff apparently treated the Rosen-
Colmar concern in a quite superficial manner. Thus, Dr.
Hanauer testified that there were some general discussions
on the subject within the Regulatory Staff, but that no
one was assigned to study the question (TR. 2335)(7, p.
3.22). -
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In their concluding arguments the CNI summarized their concern as:
(6) Steam Binding: Steam binding is the name given
to the counter-active force from steam generation in PWR
reflood that acts to defeat or reduce the emergency coolant
reflood rate during injection and vaporization of emergency
coolant. It is the phenomenon recognized late in the
reactor program which is the source of the great reduction
in reflooding rates. Steam binding can be greatly aggra-
vated by steam injected as a result of steam generator
tube failures.
(7) Steam Generator Tube Rupture: It has been esta-
blished that the rupture or failure of only a very few,
a handful, of the steam generator tubes in a PWR under
LOCA conditions can inject sufficient steam to stall totally
the reflood capability and so to insure clad melting. It
appears likely, if not certain, in view of the known aggra-
vated corrosion of and wall thinning in steam generator
tubes in several operating reactors, that the forces
developed by a cold-leg pipe break would rupture sufficient
tubes to cause this stalling. The matter is discussed
elsewhere in our findings. The subject, although of
obvious importance, was not considered in this proceeding
(1, pp. 5.48, 5.49).
Some added quantitative feel for the magnitude of the problem
is given by Brockett, et al. They described the steam generator tube
leakage problem as follows:.
During core reflooding the fluid from the secondary side
of the steam generator has the potential to transfer energy,
and in the event of a tube leakage also mass, to the primary
system. Transfer of either mass or energy can add signifi-
cantly to the pressure drop from the upper plenum to the
downcomer annulus. Unless the secondary side has depressur-
ized before reflooding is initiated, significant errors in
reflooding rates would occur if energy transfer processes
are not properly taken into account. Current predictions,
which are based on the secondary side of the steam generator
being at normal operating temperatures at reflooding initia-
tion, are considered to account for all energy transfer pro-
cesses. If only a few tubes leak, mass transfer processes
can also significantly add to the error in the calculated
reflooding rates. To provide a 17% reduction in reflooding
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rates (at 1.5 in/sec) a tube break area
would be required. Present predictions
assumptions that none of the tubes fail
added) ..
2
of about 0.003 ft
are based on the
(10, p. 320) (emphasis
In rebuttal, the AEC has simply sidestepped the issue, stating
in their Concluding Statement:
5. Steam generator tube failures.*
6. Pressure vessel failures.**
7. Fuel densification.***
In its Order of February 23, 1972 the Commission
observed with respect to scope rulings that 'the technology
and the issues may not present clear-cut answers to questions
of inclusion [of matters in the hearing record].' Some
cases are clearer than others, however. Thus, where the
integrity of steam generator tubes and reactor pressure
vessels are covered by other Commission regulations,****
such matters are properly excluded from the scope of the
present proceeding which is concerned with emergency core
cooling systems' ability to control the consequences of
a large pipe rupture, not a break in a pressure vessel or
cracks in steam generator tubes, which problems are dealt
with elsewhere.
Similarly, the question of fuel densification--a pheno-
menon which came to light wholly outside the ECCS hearing
but while it was still going on--is treated on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis. The staff chapter on this subject in
its Supplemental Testimony--included for information
purposes--made just this point and was stricken on that
basis as beyond the scope of the proceeding. In all events,
since the question is not within the scope of this rule
making, it is properly a subject for consideration and has
been so considered in individual cases that have arisen.
*
**
***
****
CNI Statement, pages 2.7, 3.1
CNI Statement. pages 2.8, 3.1
CNI Statement, pages 2.8, 3.26-3.41
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, General Design
Criteria (i, p. 16).
In an earlier portion of the AEC Concluding Statement
they amplified on the concept of giving out-of-scope subjects further
subsequent consideration. They stated specifically:
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An issue or subject ruled beyond the scope of this
rulemaking proceeding is not proper within the scope of
any rule that ultimately eventuates. Thus, rulings that
have the effect of narrowing or expanding the scope of the
rule making merely result in a narrowing or expansion of
the potential coverage of any ultimate rule. And the
breadth of the rule -- be it narrow or broad -- cannot be
the source of "prejudice" to anyone, since matters ruled
within the scope of the proceeding are proper for consider-
ation here, while matters ruled beyond the scope of the
present rule making are subject to consideration either
in individual licensing proceedings or in the context of
a petition for further rule making (~, p. 13).
While the subject of the contribution of steam generator
tube failures to steam binding and fluid flow restriction within the
primary reactor coolant loop may have been deemed beyond the scope of
the present hearings, it appears unlikely that it will be the last time
the ABC will be required to deal with this problem. Though the infor-
mation developed in the hearings with respect to the problem is inadequate
to permit a rea~onable evaluation of the subject, as a result of the
AEC ruling, the problem appears to be of sufficient magnitude that a
ruling will ultimately have to be made on it.
A9.5 Summary
In analyzing the subjects reviewed in this appendix, including
analytical models and numerical methods; treatment of break flows;
transient critical heat flux and heat transfer; reflood rates and heat
transfer; and effects associated with flow blockage, it seems that the
ACRS concern that the preceding representative items "are considered
not proven to be conservative" (19) is still justified. The regulatory
staff made serious attempts to demonstrate that adequate conservatism
had been shown for each of the items of ACRS concern (ABC Concluding
Statement, ~). Nevertheless, it appears that as far as the above items
are concerned, there are still unresolved questions of conservatism.
This judgement should not be considered to imply that nothing is known
about the subject items. On the contrary, in most cases a great deal
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of information has been gathered. Generally speaking, however, addi-
tional testing accompanied by appropriate analysis is still required to
develop confidence that models of all items and their treatment under
the revised acceptance criteria are adequately conservative.
The problems associated with reflood heat transfer are espe-
cially critical. If current estimates of low flooding rates (of the order
of 1 to 2 in/sec) remain valid, blockage induced flow reduction to the
hot channel could be a very serious problem. Under these conditions,
the uncertainties associated with heat transfer coefficients, flooding
rates and flow distribution make core coolability during a LOCA uncertain.
More conservative estimates of critical parameters in these areas would
certainly raise predicted peak local temperatures, perhaps in excess of
500°F.
In the revised AC, the Commission attempted to introduce more
conservative restrictions on methods of dealing with low flooding rates
and their associated problems. As examples of requirements intended to
increase conservatism, the AC requires: the prediction of swelling and
rupture for cladding whenever they occur during the course of the LOCA;
and the assumption that PWR cooling takes place by steam only, if re-
flood rates are less than one inch per second (taking into account any
blockage effects on steam flow induced by clad swelling and rupture).
Though the assumption of steam cooling for the flow rates indicated was
intended to increase conservatism, there is some question about whether
it is a viable requirement. James o. Zane, Manager of Experimental
Projects for the Aerojet Nuclear Company of Idaho Falls testified at the
hearings before the JCAE (22-24 January 1974) concerning the questionable
conservatism of this assumption:
Mr. Zane•. I am trying to make my point that the new rule
is likely to have some problem. I think in this particular
area, flooding rates below one inch per second have been a
concern because of the limitations of FLECRT data. Someone
has specified that we will make a calc~lation in the future
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assuming only steam cooling. My point here is that if you
were to do that you would find yourself in a very inconsistent
situation. The codes I think may exist today for doing this,
but in a previous section of the rules dealing with reflood-
ing rate it has been specifically stated they will not be
used, you will simply use experimental data.
It seems to me to be a contradiction or conflict here
in sections of it. I use this as an example to point out
that I think as our regulatory and the applicants live
with some of these decisions that they are going to have
minor problems working out some of the technical aspects
of this.
Chairman Price. Are you suggesting that the Commission
change its position?
Mr. Zane. In this particular case I would suggest
that the Commission would take a little different approach.
I think in other areas a similar thing. If I were to take
a position on this particular matter, instead of the rule
as it is written I might simply say that for reflooding
rates less than one inch per second that additional safety
systems -- I wouldn't accept a reflooding rate below one
inch per second if I were in this situation.
Chairman Price. Which position is more conservative,
your position or the Commission's opinion?
Mr. Zane. Mine would be. Here they are going to give
them some credit but they are suggesting that they calculate
it in a way that seems to me is not within the state of the
art at the moment to do a very reasonable calculation (21).
It seems apparent that the strong implication of all of the
above is that a criteria specification should be made for higher flood
rates (as high as 6 in/sec or greater), or equivalently higher reflood
heat transfer coefficients (in excess of 40 B/hr-ft2-OF). These values
seem large enough to achieve desired levels of conservatism. If imple-
mented, reflood would achieve not only rapid temperature turnaround,
but rapid rod quenching as well. Currently it appears that only a
narrow margin of coolability, if any, exists. In light of uncertainties
in ECCS performance parameters, cooling by only narrow margins appears
unacceptable. In fact, the Commission itself has stated (in the Opinion
to the AC) that:
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The Commission believes that the calculated reflood
rate should have a substantial margin over the rate which
is just sufficient to turn the temperature around in a
short time •••• Steam binding would severely limit the rate
of reflooding the core, reducing it from an intended 6 to
11 inches per second to from 1.0 to 2.5 inches per second,
depending on reactor design•••• The Commission urges the
pressurized water reactor manufacturers to seek out design
changes that would overcome steam binding (60, p. 1092)
(emphasis added).
As discussed above, such low reflood rates do not appear to
represent the "substantial margin" required to assure adequate cooling.
The higher flooding rates proposed as a criterion (approximately 6 in/sec)
would appear to be adequate to overcome the current narrow margins and
provide acceptable levels of conservatism in reflood heat transfer.
The author strongly supports the Commission in urging reactor manufac-
turers to "seek out design changes that would overcome steam binding"
which could provide the higher recommended reflooding rates.
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Appendix 10 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PARAMETERS AFFECTING THERMAL RESPONSE
Many statements have been made by the AEC and vendors concern-
ing conservatism, or even excessive conservatism, of the lAC and the PRo
These statements are based upon a number of "realistic" LOCA analyses
with associated estimates of model parameter importance which have been
made by vendors and the AEC. This section will summarize and attempt to
put into perspective some of these analyses and their implications with
respect to the relative importance of the parameters investigated.
AlO.l Vendor Conceptions of Model Conservatism
A number of examples of vendor "realistic" or "best estimate"
calculations of LOCA thermal response could be cited. Two typical graphi-
cal examples of comparisons between analyses conducted in accordance
with lAC requirements and those made with assumptions felt to be "more
realistic" by the vendors are shown in figures AlO.l and AlO.2. Figure
AlO.l (reproduced from 31) shows the comparison of a Westinghouse "best
estimate" calculation with the lAC-imposed design method calculation.
Note that the peak temperature calculated under the lAC, designated
"design" in the figure, approaches the 2300°F limit, and is attained
during reflood. In the "best estimate" calculation, the peak temperature
is only about l200°F, approximately one-half the 2300°F lAC limit, and
occurs during blowdown.
Figure AlO.2 (reproduced from 1l) presents a similar compari-
son of a General Electric prediction with the analysis based upon lAC
requirements. Note that the peak temperature of the GE calculation
(~18000F), even under lAC assumptions, falls substantially short of the
lAC 2300°F limit. With the "realistic" prediction, the maximum tempera-
ture occurs during blowdown and does not exceed 800°F.
Before considering the assumptions used in such "realistic"
calculations, it is well to consider the comments of the AEC with respect
AlO-l
Figure A10.1
Westinghouse Comparison of "Best Estimate" and lAC
Design Requirement LOCA Calculations
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to them. In the AEC Supplemental Testimony, they commented:
The vendors in their direct testimony reported the
results of "expected" or "realistic" analyses of the design-
basis LOCA for their respective reactor designs. They claimed
that these calculations provide an estimate of the conserva-
tism of the analysis methods prescribed in the Interim Policy
Statement. These are not the first calculations which esti-
mate that conservatism; sensitivity studies have previously
been performed (see Regulatory staff direct testimony) which
establish the influence of certain LOCA parameters.
A shortcoming of the vendors' "realistic" calculation
is that they are not "best estimate" in a statistical sense.
In the strict statistical sense, all input parameters and
their associated uncertainties would be taken into consider-
ation in performing best estimate calculations. Such analy-
ses would account for propagation of uncertainties and would
provide confidence bands for the final calculated results.
The Regulatory staff is developing methods at ANC to per-
form such calculations. Several vendors have also indicated
analytical development efforts in this area (TR. 15,432 and
14,432) (~, p. 2.1).
In faGt, the actual statistical basis is very weak for the "realistic"
or "best estimate" calculations. The experimental basis for statistically
accurate estimates of many of the LOCA phenomena is weak or non-existent
(especially for overall integrated system operational results). Conse-
quently, most "realistic" calculations (even those having an apparent
statistical formulation) depend heavily upon "engineering judgement" for
parameter probability specification in lieu of an adequate empirical
base for a statistical analysis.
It should also be observed that the presentations in figures
AlO.l and AlO.2 have a pronounced bias towards an "optimistic" picture
of ECCS control of a LOCA. That is, in estimating critical thermal
parameters for the "best estimate" calculation, the "optimistic" side
of "confidence bands" for the ranges of uncertainty for the parameters
has been chosen. The discussions of parameter uncertainties in chapter 3
attempted to express the alternative view, Le., the "worst case" or
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pessimistic side of the confidence bands for parameter uncertainty.
The vendors have based their "best estimate" calculations on the observa-
tion that the lAC parameter requirements are biased heavily (in their
opinions) towards the "pessimistic", or conservative, view of parameter
uncertainty. However, the AEC's comment that vendor calculations do not
"account for uncertainties" or "provide confidence bands for the final
calculated results" (~, p. 2.1) is indicative of a more objective view
of these so-called best estimate calculations. If the calculations fol~
lowed the AEC recommendations, and limiting values for confidence bands of
parameter uncertainty were utilized for both optimistic and pessimistic
views of the parameters, then the optimistic side of the results would
probably look much like the vendor presentations while the pessimistic
view might more nearly reflect the LOCA thermal history for conditions
portrayed by the analysis of chapter 3.
An example of the basis for decisions concerning parameters
for which "unrealistic" assumptions are considered to be required in
the lAC is given by GE in table A10.l (reproduced from ll). This table
lists the parameters for which GE feels that the lAC imposes assumptions
which are "excessively conservative". Figures A10.3 and AlO.4 present
a graphic comparison of the heat transfer coefficients (HTC) associated
with the LOCA calculations based upon lAC requirements and "realistic
predictions" respectively. The HTCs assumed in figure A10.4 were used
to calculate the thermal response of figure A10.2. Table A10.2 (12, sec.
G) shows the results of separately (and individually) varying selected
parameters from table A10.l to values felt to be more "realistic" by GE.
Note that in the results presented in table AlO.2 the durations of criti-
cal periods for parameters and assumed HTCs associated with them are
probably similar to those shown in figure A10.4. Comparing the assump-
tions of figure A10.3 and AlO.4 shows that the assumed rod rewetting
(figure A10.4) during low plenum flashing results in much higher HTCs
(by a factor of approximately 100) than the lAC allows for the same
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Table A10.l
General Electric Listing of lAC Required "Conservative" Assumptions
CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS REQUIRED FOR BWR LOCA LICENSING EVALUATION
Parameter
BLOWDOWN PHASE
1 Break critical flowrate
2 Feedwater flow
3 Duration of nucleate
boiling heat transfer
4 Heat transfer during
lower plenum flashing
CORE HEATUP PHASE
5 Fuel assembly axial
and radial power factor
6 Local power distribution
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING PHASE
8 System initiation signal
9 Normal auxiliary power
10 Containment backpressure
11 Cooling system operable
12 Time when fuel bundle
channels are wetted
Required Assumption
Use Moody Model
Ignore feedwater
Assumed nucleate boiling
continues only until jet
pumps uncover
Use Groeneveld film boiling
equation (2,4)
Use maximum design values
Use worst case operating
peaking
Use latest occurring signal
Assume not available
Ignore backpressure
Use systems available after
worst single failure
Use Yamanouchi analysis
plus 60 seconds
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Effects of Assumption
on Accident Analysis
Maximizes flowrate
and break severity
Does not account for
feedwater replacing
water lost through
break
Minimizes removal of
stored energy during
blowdown
Minimizes removal of
stored energy during
blowdown
Maximizes stored energy
and heatup rate
Does not account for
power flattening due
to gamma redistribution
Delays ECC initiation
Delays ECC for diesel
generator starting
Reduces effective ECC
pump head
Reduces total ECC
flowrate, delays
core reflooding
Delays radiation to
channel cooling
Sensitivity of Peak Clad Temperature During
Core Spray Operation to Specified Variables
Item from Appendix III
of Exhibit 1069
Decrease in Peak Clad
oTemperature ( F) From
Base Case
Discussion
A previous sensitivity study on this item showed
othat the peak clad temperature decreased 40 F for
each second of delay of CHF. It is more important
to note that for the expected duration of nucleate
boiling the rods will rewet.
Rewetting of the rods would decrease the cladding
temperature to nearly saturation temperature by the
time the fuel uncovers. The peak cladding tempera-
ture during core spray operation in this case is
merely the heatup during the time of fuel uncovery.*
This item renders insignificant all items that per-
tain to the portion of the accident prior to unco-
very.
Approx. 150
Approx. 300
Approx. 800
Approx. 120(3) Duration of
Nucleate Boiling
The sensitivity of this item has been investigated
using the models of NEDO-l0329. Changing the criti-
cal flow rate essentially changes the time-scale of
blowdown without affecting the decay power signifi-
cantly. Essentially the same rate of energy removal
results with a decreased lower plenum flashing in-
ventory loss.
Analyses have been made using the models of NEDO-
10329 for the case in which all cooling systems
are operable, as well as for cases with single
failure of an, active component.
* . 0The peak clad temperature over the entire transient for this case is about 1300 F, and occurs at the start
o
of lower plenum flashing. Since core heatup after lower plenum flashing begins at only about 500 F, the
o
clad temperature at core reflood will be only about 1100 F. It is this latter figure--the peak clad tempera-
ture during core spray operation--that is compared with the base case in the above table.
(5) Critical Flow Rate
for Liquid
(6) Cooling Systems
Operable
(3) Heat Transfer During
Lower Plenum Flashing
i::
o
I
\.0
f Table i\10. 2
Sensitivity Analysis of Critical G.E. LOCA Assumptions for "Realistic" Evaluations of Parameters (Ref. 27)
phenomena, and the high HTCs of both the initial blowdown prior to DNB
and lower plenum flashing periods are retained for much longer than the
lAC allows. The net result is that, as indicated in figure AlO.2, the
heat transfer during lower plenum flashing more than compensates for
the decay heat released during that period (from approximately 20 to
45 sec) together with the remaining stored energy of the fuel so that
the temperature during this period actually is predicted to fall below
normal operating temperatures. Even though the HTCs during core spray,
prior to reflood, are very low, the decay heat remaining during the
core spray period is calculated to be insufficient to raise the rod tem-
peratures as high as the blowdown peak reflood occurs. Moreover, the
"realistic" calculation assumes reflood occurs substantially before it
is allowed under the lAC requirements. In addition, the resulting re-
flood HTC, with assumed rewetting of the rods in the "realistic" case,
is much higher (by approximately a factor of 40) than permitted under
the lAC.
Under these conditions, as described in table AlO.2, the
critical parameters are shown to be:
(1) The duration of nucleate boiling (associated with CHF
predictions) producing a 120°F decrease in peak clad
temperature, based upon an apparent increase in time
to CHF of approximately 3 seconds.
(2) Heat transfer during lower plenum flashing (the most
(overall) influential factor affecting thermal response)
producing a reduction in the late time temperature of
approximately 800°F. In the GE realistic picture, heat
transfer during lower plenum flashing also depends
heavily on the CHF correlations. The large HTC asso-
ciated with rod rewetting are assumed based upon calcula-
tion of reduced rod heat flux well below CHF during the
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flashing period so that rod rewetting is assumed to
be assured and nucleate boiling reestablished.
(3) The critical flow rate for liquids under the lAC was
based upon the Moody model which has been previously
discussed as possibly underpredicting break flow during
at least a portion of the blowdown period. Analyses of
experiments conducted for fairly large scale pipes are
cited as evidence that predicted flow rates will be
approximately 0.8 of the Moody predicted values. On
this basis, the blowdown period is extended with a
consequent effective increase in the duration of the
period of nucleate boiling, similar to (1) above but
apparently longer so that peak temperatures during core
spray operation are reduced by approximately 300°F.
(4) Failure to keep the cooling systems operable is the
"worst single failure" assumption of the lAC and requires
the assumption of the loss of auxiliary power at the
same time the LOCA occurs. GE feels that the "high qual-
ity and high reliability" requirements imposed on ECCS
design realistically prevent this type of outage from
occurring. If, in opposition to lAC requirements,
auxiliary power is maintained, the ECC pumps will oper-
ate on schedule and core reflooding can be accelerated.
Core reflooding generally results in almost instantaneous
temperature turnaround. Earlier functioning was found
to reduce peak temperatures by 150°F. It is interesting
to observe that of all the dominant parameters, only
this one is significant in the period following core
dryout. All other critical parameters are associated
with blowdown.
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Figure AlO.5 <12, sec. G) shows the GE assignment of the
probabilistic interrelationships between branch elements of several of
the critical LOCA paths. Probabilities of event occurrence have been
assigned to each branch of the LOCA event tree by the GE authors. On
the basis of the assigned branch probabilities, the joint probability
of each branch could be calculated. Within this framework, the LOCA
thermal response corresponding to the combination of events for any
branch can be calculated and the probability associated with the corres-
ponding peak temperature "derived" from the joint probability of the
branch.
Calculations of the peak temperatures associated with the
several branches were made and a curve, figure AlO.6, of the probability
of achieving any given maximum temperature was obtained from the proba-
bilistic relationships of figure AlO.5. In the description of the
authors:
It would be presumptuous to suggest that all the
realistic assumptions are without significant levels of
uncertainty. In fact, the uncertainties in the various
assumptions as well as in the cladding temperature pre-
diction have been assessed [as shown in figure AlO.5]
••• Figure 16 [AlO.6] shows the final result in the form
of a complementary cumulative distribution function of peak
cladding temperature. Note that the realistic prediction
of 800°F is actually a best estimate or most probable re-
sult and there is an equal probability that temperatures
will be higher or lower than this value. The probabilities
in Figure 16 [AlO.6] do not include the probability of
occurrence of a LOCA. Thus, for example, the figure
indicates that given one hundred BWR LOCAs only 1 of these
would result in a cladding temperature exceeding l200°F.
The real importance of this result is in the illustration
that even with significant levels of uncertainty on indivi-
dual parameters, the probability that many of the parameters
will combine in a worst case manner is very low. In any
event, it is clear that temperatures predicted with the
lAC evaluation assumptions applied to the BWR represent
a highly unlikely outer bound (~).
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Figure A10.6
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Though the analysis behind figures AIO.5 and AlO.6 is certainly
a valuable and enlightening exercise, a word of caution should be given
in connection with the conclusions presented above. Figure AlO.5 has
the appearance of giving quantitative probabilistic estimates of the
events on each of the branches. Although it has evidently been worked
out with substantial thought and care, the authors have made the follow-
ing comment about the values associated with the events.
The probabilities [figure AlO.5] assigned to the various
paths of the tree were derived considering the interactions
of the variables. Thus, for example, the probability that
rewetting will occur increases as the break flow rate de-
creases and as the duration of nucleate boiling increases.
In those cases where specific data could not be applied to
establish the probabilities, subjective probabilities were
established based on expert technical judgement (£2, p. G-4)
(emphasis added).
In this probabilistic discussion, it is well to bear in mind
that the probability is high that most of the specific values assigned
to events of figure AlO.5 were "based on expert technical judgement."
If this is true, then it must be recognized that the curve of figure
AIO.6, though interesting and qualitatively informative, may be quanti-
tatively fictional. These qualifiers have not been intended to negate
the value of the material in figures AIO.5 and AlO.6. On the contrary,
the results indicated by the figures should be recognized as a valuable
contribution towards a preliminary estimate of the probabilistic distri-
bution of LOCA events in terms of the maximum temperatures which might
occur from them.
10.1.1 ANC parametric investigation
An independent series of parametric calculations conducted by
ANC has been designed to provide estimates of the importance of various
LOCA events and parameters (10, pp. 322-331).
AlO-15
Numerical calculations were made of fuel rod heat up based
upon selected parameters for initial and decay power generation rates,
physical properties of the fuel and zircaloy, an assumed gap conductance
of 500 B/hr-ft2-OF, metal-water reaction rates, initial clad and fluid
temperatures and surface heat transfer coefficients. For PWRs, the
surface heat transfer coefficients were based upon PWR-FLECHT results
as a function of reflooding rate .. The results of the calculation show-
ing representative peak clad temperatures for a PWR as a function of
flooding rate and temperature at the initiation of flooding are shown
in figure AlO.7. Also calculated in the analysis, and shown in the
figure, is the so-called "embrittlement" factor -- a calculated relative
oxidation depth of Zr02 + aZr. The embrittlement factor was obtained by
applying a factor of 2.2 to the calculated (Baker-Just) equivalent Zr02
depth for the problem. The 2.2 conversion factor was derived on the
basis of an empirically based evaluation of the relative depth ratio of
the combined oxide and a-layers compared to the Baker-Just calculated
oxide depth. On this basis, a 40 percent embrittlement factor is equiva-
lent to a Baker-Just calculated relative oxidation depth of Zr02 of 18
percent of the original clad thickness.
Figure AlO.7 shows, for example, that if the ECCS delivers
coolant to the core at 1 in/sec, and if the core midplane temperature at
the time of reflooding is l500°F, then the maximum rod temperature will
be 2200°F and the cladding will be 19 percent "embrittled". Similarly,
the results imply that at the same flooding rate (1 in/sec) the predicted
rod thermal response cannot be controlled if blowdown temperatures at
the time of flooding exceed approximately l800°F.
The lines of constant embrittlement of figure AIO.7 have an
interesting characteristic -- they are essentially horizontal. Thus,
for the transients investigated, embrittlement was almost wholly a
function of the maximum temperature. Since the time at temperature is
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Figure AIO.7
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UO and the American Nuclear Society)
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an important factor in embrittlement, the results imply that the time
histories of thermal excursions are essentially identical for all corres-
ponding combinations of flooding rate and temperature at flooding initia-
tion which result in a given peak temperature.
The relative importance of variations in some of the other
parameters of the problem is shown in table AIO.3. As described by
the authors:
As an aid in estimating the effect of several other
parameters, results from other sensitivity studies are
presented in Table I [Table AIO.3]. This table shows the
percent change in the cladding temperature rise and em-
brittlement for two points in Figure 12. These points
are for 2000 and l600°F initial temperatures for a flood-
ing rate of 6 in/sec for 4 seconds followed by a flooding
rate of 1 in/sec. By utilizing the information in Table I
and the curves of Figure 12 [Figure AlO.7], new performance
maps could be constructed.
The largest changes occur in the 2000°F column because
the metal-water reaction energy is more significant at this
temperature than for the l600°F temperature at reflood
initiation. The parameter which caused the greatest effect
was the initial power. Next, in the order of importance,
are: (a) metal-water reaction energy multiplying factor;
(b) the time at which reflooding begins; and (c) zr02_thickness.
Another important parameter affecting the relationship
between the temperature at the time of reflooding initia-
tion and the maximum temperature for a given reflooding
rate is containment pressure. The containment pressure
affects the flooding rate as well as the heat transfer
for a specific flooding rate. As an example of this effect,
if the core pressure is 25 psia instead of 60 psia and the
reflooding rate is 1 in/sec, a l500°F temperature at re-
flood initiation would result in a maximum temperature
500°F above the value obtained from Figure 12 [figure AlO.7]
(emphasis added) (10, pp. 325, 326).
The differences observed in the relative importance of various
factors between the ANC results and the GE investigation are worth reviewing.
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Table A10.3 ANS Sensitivity Study
TABLE I
SENSITIVITY STUDY SHOWING EFFECT OF PARAMETER Cl~GES ON RESULTS IN FIGURE 12
oTemperature of 2000 F
at time of reflooding
oTemperature of 1600 F
at time of ref100ding
Parameter Value
Baker-Just multiplication factor
Temperature
Rise
(% Change)
Cladding
Embritt1ement
(% Change)
Temperature
Rise
(% Change)
Cladding
Embritt1ement
(% Change)
= 0.5 -21 -21 - 6 - 9
= 1.0 55 75 9 12
Initial power (kw!ft) = 1.0 -56 -50 -45 -61
= 1.4 106 170 53 101
Zr02 thickness (in.) = 0.001 -13 - 9 - 9 - 8
:>
= 0.00001 1 2 2 2I-'
0
I 7-sec delay in time to initiateI-'
\0
reflooding{a} -16 -16 -10 -15
{a} Delays in flooding initiation result in a reduced temperature rise at any given temperature at reflooding
initiation because the decay power is decreased.
Reprinted by permission from Brockett, G.F., R.W. Griebe, R. W. Shumway, and J.O. Zane, "Loss of Coolant:
Control of Consequences by Emergency Core Cooling," Proceedings of the International Conference on Nuclear
Solutions to World Energy Problems. Joint ANS/AIF Conference. November 13-17. 1972. Washington, D.C •• (10
and the American Nuclear Society.)
Note that the ANC study was restricted to investigation of factors
affecting thermal response following blowdown (during the reflood phase)
while the GE study considered the entire LOCA event. Essentially all
of the GE factors of importance were related to blowdown factors and
consequently could not appear in the ANC study, since blowdown related
elements of the LOCA were not investigated. In analyzing the ANC re-
sults, it should also be noted that of the cited important parameters,
both the metal-water reaction energy multiplying factor and Zr02 thick-
ness are parameters influencing the metal-water energy input to the rod.
This feature serves to support the earlier observation (appendix 7) of
the importance of the metal-water reaction energy input to the thermal
response of the system, as opposed to the AECls view of the relative
unimportance of this source of energy input to the system. However, it
should also be noted that the AC (as well as the lAC) require the use
of a Baker-Just multiplier of 1.0 -- a conservative estimate as
indicated.
Results of a similar investigation by ANC of the BWR are shown
in figure AlO.8. The results give support to the critical role which
GE has claimed for the single failure criterion. If auxiliary power is
not lost and the delay time between spray initiation and core reflooding
minimized, then the temperature rise is also reduced. As long as peak
temperature remains below 2200°F, lines of constant delay between spray
initiation and reflood are almost parallel. This implies that flooding
temperature turnaround is almost instantaneous. This can be confirmed
by comparison of constant delay curves with the zero second delay curve,
which shows no temperature increase regardless of the initial cladding
temperature at the time of ECC injection. The effects of the metal-
water reaction are not particularly significant (less than 10 percent)
for the transients with peak temperatures below 2200°F limits.
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Figure AlO.8
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10.1. 2 AEC parametric investigation
A third parametric investigation of particular importance was
conducted by the AEC and presented in their Supplemental Testimony (~).
Table AlO.4 (Table 10.6 (revised) of i) shows the results of this study
in which the effects of variations in reflood heat transfer coefficients,
blowdown heat transfer coefficients and gas gap conductances (Helium
Conductivity Multiplier) were investigated. There is a great deal of
interesting information to be deduced from this table on a variety of
subjects.
Perhaps the most obvious result of the study was that rod
temperatures reaching approximately 2l00°F could not be controlled and
were observed to reach melting under the influence of the metal-water
reaction occurring when the fuel rods became swollen and ruptured,
allowing oxidation on both inside and outside surfaces. The results
indicate a pronounced metal-water reaction induced temperature instabil-
ity at values lower than the criteria limits of either the lAC or PRo
This result is shown by the large number of hash marks on the table which
indicates that for cases marked in this fashion the "clad temperature
reached melting."
The study investigated variations about a reference base case
calculation which hypothesized a situation where fuel rods did not swell
or rupture regardless of their limits of exposure. Variations about the
base case were considered for three parametric rup~ure times: two occur-
ring during blowdown (at 3 and 7 sec respectively) and a third variation
which occurred after blowdown was completed, at 22.5 sec, at the begin-
ningof the heatup period when the core was assumed to be uncovered and
drying out. No convective film heat transfer was considered to take
place during this period until reflood began, at approximately 34 sec.
It is interesting to observe that, except for a few variations
involving post-blowdown swelling and rupture, me14ing occurred for
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Table AIO.4 AEC Sensitivity Study
Table 10.6
Study No. 2
Peak Cladding Temperature
Linear Power
Density Ow/ft)
Rupture Time
Seconds
11.1 11.1 11.1 14.1 14.1 14.1 17.1 17.1 17.1
22.5 7.0 3.0 22.5 7.0 3.0 22.5 7.0 3.0
Irhr* fhb** fkh***
.6 .5 .125 1577.1 1925.7 2012.0 **** - - - - -
.6 .5 .25 1587.8 1913.4 1975.7
- - -
- - -
.6 .5 .5 1605.0 1894.6 1931. 9 - - - - - -
.6 .5 1.0 1628.5 1869.7 1886.1
- - - - - -
.6 1.0 .125 1577 .1 1857.7 1912.5 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 .25 1587.8 1838.1 1878.2 - - - - - -
.6 1.0 .5 1605.0 1807.8 1831.8
- - - - - -
.6 1.0 1.0 1628.5 1766.0 1775.8 - - - - - -
.8 .5 .125 1362.2 1664.3 1699.2 11681.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 .25 1381.1 1664.2 1693.3 11698.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 .5 1409.2 1662.2 1682.8 11725.1 - - - - -
.8 .5 1.0 1443.8 1657.1 1668.4 1765.2 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .125 1362.2 1625.6 1657.4 11681.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .25 1381.1 1617.7 1664.0 1698.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 .5 1409.2 1602.4 1620.5 1725.1 - - - - -
.8 1.0 1.0 1443.8 1576.2 1584.3 1762.0 ~039.1 2074.8 - - -
1.0 .5 .125 1262.9 1574.6 1593.4 1522.4 2091. 4 - 1925.0 - -
1.0 .5 .25 1283.0 1572.7 1593.5 1541.1 2051.5 2355.3 1950.2 - -
11.0 .5 .5 1316.3 1563.7 1584.3 1570.3 2004.2 2083.2 1993.7 - -
1.0 .5 1.0 1356.4 1563.8 1556.8 1609.1 1955.9 1986.8 2060.2 - -
1.0 1.0 .125 1262.9 1531.2 1540.8 1522.4 1919.5 2008.8 1925.0
- -
1.0 1.0 .25 1282.9 1522.4 1535.1 1541.1 1889.0 1949.6 1950.2 - -
1.0 1.0 .5 1316.3 1502.4 1514.9 1570.3 1844.8 1879.0 1993.7 - -
1.0 1.0 1.0 1356.4 1489.4 1466.9 1609.1 1788.2 1801.6 2060.2 - -
1.2 .5 .125 1262.9 1559.6 1593.4 1430.3 1874.3 1962.6 1722.2 - -
1.2 .5 .25 1270.6 1565.3 1593.5 1442.7 1858.2 1924.6 1743.6 - -
1.2 .5 .5 1282.6 1564.0 1584.3 1476.7 1836.3 1879.0 1778.2 - -
1.2 .5 1.0 1297.7 1546.1 1556.8 1519.8 1815.6 1836.7 1826.4
- -
1.2 1.0 .125 1262.9 1513.0 1540.8 1430.3 1775.3 1831.9 1722.2 - -
1.2 1.0 .25 1270.6 1507.9 1535.1 1442.7 1752.9 1796.6 1743.6 - -
1.2 1.0 .5 1282.6 1495.7 1514.9 1476.7 1721.4 1748.6 1778.2 - -
1.2 1.0 1.0 1297.7 1457.5 1466.9 1519.8 1681.6 1692.9 1826.4 2256.4 2423.9
fhr*-Ref100d Heat Transfer Coefficient Multiplier, applies to calculation only
after rupture.
fhb**-B10wdown Heat Transfer Coefficient Multiplier, applies to calculation only
after rupture.
fkh***-Helium Conductivity Multiplier, applies to calculation only after rupture.
**** - Means Clad Temperature reached mel ting.
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essentially all cases investigated where the initial power density was
greater than 17.1 Kw/ft. For those cases where the effective reflood
rates were less than one inch per second (i.e., reflood heat transfer
coefficients less than those of the base case), when the initial linear
power density was as low as 14.1 Kw/ft, melting also occurred for essen-
tially all cases investigated. This is particularly significant since
peak design linear power densities, for DBA estimation purposes, custom-
arily are about 18-19 Kw/ft. These results imply that rather severe
restrictions might have to be placed ~pon reactor operating powers to
prevent excessive temperature excursions in the event of a LOCA -- assum-
ing the validity of the AC required models for gap conductance in the
presence of clad ballooning and rupture and the current low reflood rate
predictions.
Considering the effects of gap conductance on blowdown and re-
flood heat transfer, the verification of some of the results discussed
under the gap conductance discussion can be observed. When swelling
and rupture occurred during blowdown, t8mperatures increased (the magni-
tude depending primarily upon the initial power density) as the gap con-
ductances decreased. For such cases, gap conductances "ranged from 20-
80 B/hr-ft2-OF" (i, p. 10-21). On the other hand, when swelling and
rupture took place during reflood following blowdown (initial blowdown
gap conductances were assumed to be high, on the order of 1000 B/hr-ft2-OF),
peak temperatures were calculated to decrease on the order of 100°F with
decreasing gap conductance (with a parametric variation over the same
equivalent conductance range as the blowdown cases) in a manner exactly
opposite to the cases where swelling and rupture occurred during blowdown.
This observation demonstrates the problem of defining what
constitutes a conservative assumption with respect to the gap conductance
parameter. For the cases where rupture occurred during b1owdown, the
low gap conductance restricted energy flow from the fuel elements resulting
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in higher fuel temperatures. These higher temperatures were ultimately
transferred to the cladding during reflood, a period of very poor con-
vective heat transfer, with resulting increasing peak temperatures asSo-
ciated with decreasing gap conductances. In the post-b10wdown swelling
and rupture cases, apparently the higher gap conductances during b10w-
down permitted sufficient energy transfer during this early period so
that fuel temperatures during the b10wdown period were substantially
lower than for those cases where swelling and rupture occurred early
during b10wdown. Thus, for these cases, when clad ballooning occurred
during reflood, it resulted in a beneficial restriction of subsequent
heat flow producing decreasing peak cladding temperatures as gap conduct-
ance decreased.
The influence of gap conductance is further demonstrated by an
examination of the effects of rupture time changes. The principal heat
transfer effect on the change in rupture time is associated with the gap
conductance. As previously noted, the ballooned gap had a heat transfer
coefficient of 20-80 B/hr-ft2-OF, while the non-ballooned cases had gap
coefficients on the order of 500-1000 B/hr-ft2-oF. The results clearly
indicated that such a reduction in gap HTCs had a profound effect on
b10wdown heat transfer. For the low power cases (11.1 Kw/ft), tempera-
ture increases of from approximately 100°F to 400°F are associated with
early ballooning (3 or 7 sec) when compared with temperatures of those
cases where rupture was delayed until after b10wdown was complete (the
22.5 sec cases). At low power, the effect of reflood rate upon rupture
time induced incremental peak temperature changes was not significant.
As long as peak temperatures were kept within reasonable limits, less
than 2000°F, results were reasonably consistent -- even though peak tem-
peratures increased over 500°F, while the reflood rate was reduced by a
factor of two.
However, for the relatively higher powered cases (14.1 and
17.1 Kw/ft), non1inearities appeared in the incremental peak temperatures
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induced by reducing rupture times. For these cases, melting occurred
for all cases where the flooding rate HTC was less than nominal (1 inch
per sec). At the high power levels (17.1 Kw/ft), even at the highest
simulated reflood rates, no reduction in rupture time was feasible with-
out melting. For these cases, if meltdown was to be avoided at all, the
high initial gap conductances were necessary to avoid disaster. But even
with high gap conductances, meltdown occurred for all cases where reflood
rates were less than nominal.
Considering the effect of reflood rates on peak temperatures,
table AlO.4 also indicates that at low power (11.1 Kw/ft) the effects
were reasonably uniform irrespective of the conditions of the rods (i.e.,
whether they had undergone early ballooning or not). For example, a 20
percent reduction in reflood HTC (from nominal to 0.8 nominal) produced
incremental changes in peak temperature of about 100°F (a fractional
increment on the order of 6%) regardless of ballooning conditions, de-
creased gap conductance, or reduced blowdown heat transfer.
The borderline nature of the nominal reflood HTC (associated
with 1 in/sec reflooding rates) to control the temperature excursion,
is exemplified in the results of an additional 20 percent decrease in
reflood HTC (from 0.8 to 0.6 nominal). Under these circumstances, peak
temperatures increased incrementally about 200 to 300°F (a change of
approximately 15 percent). For these cases, the peak temperatures were
barely held beneath the critical 2000°F levels at the lowest power levels
investigated (11.1 Kw/ft).
Comparing the two sets of cases (i.e., the transitions from
1.0 to 0.8 nominal with that from 0.8 to 0.6 nominal), nonlinearities
in peak temperature increments are evident. The nonlinearities in incre-
mental peak temperatures indicate problems associated with control of
peak temperature as the temperature increases toward 2000°F. As peak
temperatures approach the critical 2000°F level, incremental changes
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in temperature in excess of 300°F can be observed in comparison to the
100°F increments at the lower temperature levels. Such nonlinearities
are characteristics of the influences of each of the pertinent variables
as peak temperatures approach the 2000°F level.
As previously observed, the effectiveness of reflooding heat
transfer is sharply reduced as linear rod power is increased. At the
intermediate power levels (14.1 Kw/ft) reflooding effectiveness is severely
compromised by small perturbations in blowdown heat transfer and gap con-
ductance. For the early rupture cases (at 3 or 7 sec), temperatures in-
crease from about l700°F to nearly 2000°F as blowdown heat transfer and
gap conductance are reduced, at even the highest reflood heat transfer
conditions investigated (i.e., 1.2 nominal).
Generally speaking, at low power levels, blowdown heat transfer
was the least sensitive parameter investigated. Reducing blowdown HTC by
50 percent produced 50 to 100°F increases in peak temperatures (a 2 to 6
percent temperature increase). At these low power levels, the effect of
changes in blowdown HTC were relatively insensitive to variations in other
parameters, including temperature. However, when linear rod power levels
were raised to 14.1 Kw/ft, or higher, blowdown HTC became as important
a parameter as any of the others investigated. Temperature increases of
from 100 to 400°F (6-10 percent) were observed for 50 percent reductions
in blowdown HTC at the 14.1 Kw/ft power level.
In summary, the AEC parametric study shows that at low power
levels, relatively minor perturbations in any of the parameters were
shown to be tolerable, producing about 50 to 100°F changes in peak tem-
peratures.
However, large perturbations in parameters, such as (1) major
gap conductance decreases produced through early rupture time, or (2)
changes in linear rod power levels, produced important changes in peak
temperatures (from 100 to 500°F). Such changes were barely tolerable
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under the most ideal conditions, and were fundamentally intolerable
under essentially all conditions investigated which were off
normal (or were otherwise non-ideal). At rod power density levels
greater than 11.1 Kwjft (ccnsiderablybe16w current design peak linear
rod power densities of 18-19 Kw/ft), meltdown occurred at essentially all
off-normal operating conditions investigated. Moreover, the results
presented indicate that the thermal response of the rods is a strongly
non-linear function of temperature. As peak temperatures approach 2000°F,
normally minor perturbations in heat transfer related variables induce
temperature excursions which are increasingly difficult to control.
This appears to be directly related to energy input to the system from
metal-water reactions at about 2000°F and above. Under such circumstances,
the nominal reflood heat transfer rates (one inch per second) are stressed
to their limits. In fact, it appears that under design basis accident
power conditions currently anticipated (18-19 Kw/ft), rates will be in-
adequate to assure that meltdown will not occur over a relatively large
fraction of the core, assuming the basic accuracy of the AECls parametric
study.
Vendors have objected to using the AEC analysis methods judged
to be unrepresentative of the thermal excursion over the entire core.
They point out that swelling and rupture are very localized phenomena
an inch or two on a 12 ft rod -- as are the maximum DBA peaking factors
associated with the 18-19 Kw/ft linear rod power densities. Consequently
they feel that applying the results of such a singie "hot rod" calcula-
tion to the entire core is very conservative.
This is probably true. However, the AEC does not currently
recognize the adequacy of any of the statistical models which are used
to estimate the distribution of peak linear power density or swelling
and rupture over the core. Consequently they feel that there is no way
of accurately predicting how extensive the melting might be. Thus,
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though the results may be very conservative and dam~ge resulting to the
core from this mechanism relatively small, in actual practice the AEC
has prescribed that this conservative method be applied in the AC.
10.1. 3 Ranking critical parameters
The most significant observation to be deduced from the pre-
viously cited investigations is that ranking critical parameters is not
easy. The ranking of the parameters depends, to a large extent, on the
limits of the range of parameter variations which were selected as
"realistic" in the various studies conducted. To the extent that they
may have been selected unrealistically, especially if they were chosen
to support the position that the lAC was excessively conservative, we
are currently at the mercy of those who have conducted the investigations.
Recognizing these limitations, the results seem to imply that
blowdown heat transfer parameters are very important. Critical heat
flux (CHF) parameters are especially important. This parameter affects
the initial duration of nucleate boiling and the potential reestablish-
ment of high heat transfer boiling conditions throughout blowdown (evi-
dently an especially important period) and reflood periods. In a related
manner, the critical break flow rate has been shown to be significant
in its influence on the time to DNB and the time history of fluid availa-
bility for cooling during blowdown.
Obviously, the initial power and the decay heat release are
important driving functions of the system. As shown in table AlO.3
from the ANC study, a 20 percent increase in power resulted in a corres-
ponding increase in temperature of 53 percent or more, even when re-
flooding started at the relatively cool blowdown temperature of l600°F.
This observation serves to highlight the critical nature of the question
of the validity of the ANS Standard 5.1 + 20 percent decay heat criterion
as well as the potential results of limiting (or reducing) peak opera-
tional power for the facilities.
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The ANC study also highlights the importance of the metal-water
reaction energy release rate. Though the energy release from metal-water
reactions may not have been given proper recognition as a significant
LOCA energy source in the AEC publications defending the ECCS criteria,
it has been treated conservatively in both the lAC and the revised AC.
The use of the full Baker-Just relationships for the energy release rate
in calculations should conservatively predict this energy source.
This LOCA parameter evaluation has, of necessity, been rather
qualitative. Development of a valid statistical basis for probabilistic
evaluation of thermal excursions of the type conducted by GE would be a
valuable contribution to the resolution of ECCS uncertainties. It would
also be enlightening to have the results of peak temperature differences
associated with observations for thermal excursions corresponding to
pessimistic branches of a LOCA fault tree as well as the optimistic branches
selected by GE (e.g., figure AlO.3).
Though vendors, in general, have all indicated that they felt
the lAC requirements led to excessive conservatisms in design, the AEC
parametric results shown in table AlO.4 do not appear to support this
contention. The results shown indicate that reflood rates of one inch
per second are of borderline adequacy in controlling thermal excursions
where swelling and rupture of rods takes place early in the blowdown.
They also indicate that for large portions of the core, where linear
power densitites are greater than 11.1 Kw/ft, small adverse perturbations
to current estimates of projected ECCS operating conditions may result
in meltdown. All variables including reflood and blowdown heat transfer,
gap conductivity, rupture time and operational power densitites were
shown to be important contributors to thermal excursions. However,
major changes in gap conductance through early rupture time and pertur-
bations in linear power density as well as reflood heat transfer were
shown to dominate the heat transfer mechanisms.
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